People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Mil

The death penalty cannot be imposed where the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation is not clearly proven and the aggravating circumstances attending the crime are offset by mitigating circumstances; the penalty must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Pedro Mil was an enlisted man of the Philippine Constabulary, a corporal stationed at Camp Lukban in Catbalogan, Samar. Augusto Arteche worked as a piano player at the Arco Iris, a nightspot in the same municipality, and Sgt. Pedro Arteche was a staff sergeant of the same Constabulary. Both Arteches were relatives of then Vice-Mayor Filomeno Arteche, Jr. of Catbalogan, who sought to mediate the criminal cases that had arisen between Mil and Augusto Arteche.

Pedro Mil was an enlisted man of the Philippine Constabulary, a corporal stationed at Camp Lukban in Catbalogan, Samar. Augusto Arteche was a piano player at the Arco Iris, a nightspot in Catbalogan, while Sgt. Pedro Arteche was a staff sergeant of the same Constabulary.

On December 22, 1966, Mil boxed Augusto Arteche at the Arco Iris, causing the latter physical injuries. Mil was accordingly charged with less serious physical injuries before the Municipal Court of Catbalogan, and because he was a PC enlisted man he was placed under technical arrest in the custody of his commanding officer. Augusto Arteche, in turn, was charged with Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority. Almost every night thereafter, Augusto Arteche and his family were harassed by Mil and his companions. Fearing for his life, Augusto sought security assistance from the President of the Philippines and from the Municipal Mayor of Catbalogan, and a policeman was detailed to guard their house, but the policeman stayed for only three nights. Efforts were also made to settle the cases amicably, and to that end Atty. Filomeno Arteche, Jr., then Vice-Mayor of Catbalogan, wrote his cousin Augusto Arteche to effect a settlement of their cases as a personal favor; the letter was entrusted to Sgt. Pedro Arteche for delivery to Augusto.

At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 12, 1967, Augusto Arteche, Salvador Alba, and some friends were drinking at Amba's Refreshment Parlor when Pedro Mil and Sgt. and Mrs. Anicio Laparra entered the store and occupied a table near the counter. Upon seeing them, Augusto informed Pablo de los Reyes and Fidel Tan of the presence of his enemies, pointing to the table occupied by Mil and his companions; he was told to remain seated and was cautioned to be very extra careful. After a time, Sgt. Laparra saw Augusto and invited him to their table; Augusto acceded and was offered a bottle of beer, after which they talked. Salvador Alba tried to follow Augusto but, already very drunk, merely sat beside a nearby table and slept with his head cradled in his arms. Suddenly, Mil shouted at Augusto, "Let's have a fight;" "Kung ganoon kailangan kang mamatay," immediately drawing a .45 caliber pistol tucked under his belt. Augusto stood up, pleading "Huwag huwag," at the same time raising his hands. Nevertheless, Mil shot him, causing him to fall face downward. Mil then took a step towards the prostrate body and fired two more shots at his back, exclaiming, "This is the killer of Leyte." He then kicked the fallen body, turned on the sleeping Salvador Alba and shot him, saying, "Ikaw pa." Mil left the store, accosted a passerby and asked for the house of one Atty. Plaridel Bohol, and, when the person did not know, went towards the Noble Drug Store where he hailed a motorized tricycle and left the place. Augusto Arteche was brought to the Samar Provincial Hospital at Catbalogan but expired a few minutes upon arrival; an autopsy attributed his death to multiple gunshot wounds.

At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of that very same day, while Sgt. Pedro Arteche and his wife were seated by the window of their house at Barrio Maulong, Catbalogan, about half a kilometer from the PC Camp, Mil arrived aboard a motorized tricycle and asked Pedro Arteche about the letter the latter was supposed to deliver to Augusto, saying, "Sergeant, you did not hand the letter to Augusto because Augusto said that he did not receive it." Pedro Arteche replied, "Why, where is Augusto now?" Mil told him that Augusto was at Amba's place and insisted, "But, you did not give?" Pedro Arteche answered, "No, I did not." Thereupon, Mil shot Pedro Arteche. When Trinidad Arteche asked why Mil had shot her husband, Mil pointed the gun at her and squeezed the trigger, but the gun did not fire. Mil then ran to the waiting tricycle and returned to the PC Camp, where he surrendered to his commanding officer, Capt. Villena. Pedro Arteche was brought to the Samar Provincial Hospital and operated on for the gunshot wound, but he died two days later from a gunshot wound to the left hypochondriac region.

For the death of Augusto Arteche, Mil was charged with Murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of (a) taking advantage of his public position, (b) use of a motor vehicle, (c) deliberately augmenting the wrong done by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, and (d) employment of means or circumstances adding ignominy to the natural effects of the act. For the killing of Sgt. Pedro Arteche, he was likewise accused of Murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of (a) taking advantage of his public position, (b) use of a motor vehicle, (c) commission of the crime in the dwelling of the offended party, and (d) insult or disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank. He was further prosecuted for Frustrated Murder for the shooting of Salvador Alba and for Illegal Possession of Firearm. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Samar found the accused guilty of Frustrated Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm, as well as of two cases of Murder, and sentenced him to death in each of the murder cases. In imposing the death sentence for the killing of Augusto Arteche, the trial court found the crime qualified by evident premeditation and attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, taking advantage of public position, and scoffing at or outraging the person or corpse of the deceased, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For the killing of Pedro Arteche, the trial court found the offense aggravated by dwelling, taking advantage of public position, insult or disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, and commission with the aid of a motor vehicle.

• Treachery (Killing of Augusto Arteche): Counsel de oficio contended that treachery was absent because Augusto Arteche had been forewarned of the accused's presence in the refreshment parlor and had been given enough chances to prepare for his defense or to avoid a confrontation with the accused, who had allegedly harassed him and his family as a result of the filing of the criminal case for physical injuries; counsel further noted that the accused shouted "Mag-away kita" before shooting the deceased.
• Cruelty and Outraging the Corpse: Counsel contended that the aggravating circumstance of scoffing at the person or corpse of the deceased was not present, pointing to the contradictory statements of prosecution witnesses Pablo de los Reyes and Fidel Tan as to the kicking of the body of the deceased after he had been shot.
• Taking Advantage of Public Position: Counsel acknowledged that the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position was present, but maintained that it was offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Use of a Motor Vehicle: Counsel argued that the killing of Pedro Arteche was not attended by the aggravating circumstance of commission of the offense with the aid of a motor vehicle.
• Insult or Disregard of Rank: Counsel argued that the killing of Pedro Arteche was not attended by the aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Counsel maintained that the accused should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in the shooting of Pedro Arteche, in view of the trial court's finding that the accused, already "blinded with rage" after shooting Augusto Arteche and Salvador Alba, decided to kill Pedro Arteche because of the latter's failure to deliver the letter of Atty. Filomeno Arteche, Jr. to Augusto Arteche.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether the killing of Augusto Arteche was qualified by evident premeditation.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing of Augusto Arteche to murder.
• Cruelty and Outraging the Corpse: Whether the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and of outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of Augusto Arteche attended the killing.
• Use of a Motor Vehicle: Whether the use of a motor vehicle aggravated the killing of Pedro Arteche.
• Insult or Disregard of Rank: Whether the killing of Pedro Arteche was aggravated by insult or disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether passion and obfuscation mitigated the killing of Pedro Arteche.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed in each of the two murder cases.

• Evident Premeditation: No. The killing of Augusto Arteche was not qualified by evident premeditation, the prosecution having failed to show when the accused resolved to commit the crime or that he meditated on and persisted in that resolution.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing to murder, the accused having fired at the victim while the latter, with hands upraised, was pleading that his life be spared.
• Cruelty and Outraging the Corpse: No. The kicking of the body was intended to verify whether the victim was still alive, not to increase his suffering deliberately and inhumanly; and outraging or scoffing at the corpse was not alleged in the information.
• Use of a Motor Vehicle: No. The motorized tricycle was not purposely used to facilitate the commission of the crime, the accused's primary purpose in riding it having been to return to camp.
• Insult or Disregard of Rank: No. There was no evidence that the accused deliberately or particularly intended to insult or disregard the respect due the offended party.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Yes. The failure of Pedro Arteche to deliver the letter was a prior, unjust and improper act sufficient to produce great excitement and passion in the accused, warranting the mitigating circumstance.
• Penalty: No. The death penalty was improperly imposed; the correct penalty in each case is reclusion perpetua.

• Evident Premeditation: Premeditation must be clearly proven as the criminal act itself, and where nothing in the case can serve as a ground to determine when the accused resolved to commit the crime, nor consequently to determine whether that criminal resolution was meditated on, reflected upon, and persisted in, the circumstance is not present. The evidence must show not only when the intent to commit the crime was engendered in the mind of the accused, but also the motive which gave rise to it and the means he elected beforehand to carry out his criminal intention — all those facts and antecedents which together show that the crime was knowingly premeditated and that the accused acted not only with a preexisting design, ordinarily found in all crimes, but with cold and deep meditation and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of his criminal purpose. Here, the prosecution's proof of deliberate planning consisted merely of the testimony of Elena Arteche, the wife of Augusto Arteche, that the accused had threatened her husband before the killing; such threats are not sufficient in themselves to constitute premeditation, not having been followed by subsequent acts revealing on the part of the accused a firm and tenacious persistence to carry them out, reflected upon coldly and deeply. Moreover, the record does not show that the accused purposely looked for his victim at Amba's Refreshment Parlor; their meeting there was casual, and when the accused went to the parlor it was not for the purpose of killing Augusto Arteche. On the contrary, the accused was hopeful that the case against him would be settled in view of the letter of Atty. Filomeno Arteche to Augusto asking the latter to settle the case; prosecution witnesses Pablito de los Reyes and Fidel Tan declared that Sgt. Laparra, upon seeing Augusto, invited the latter to join them at their table, and that Mil even offered Augusto a bottle of beer, which the latter accepted, after which they conversed. Had there been premeditation to kill Augusto Arteche, Mil would have shot him the moment he saw him.

• Treachery: Treachery was present in the commission of the offense because the accused fired at the victim who, with hands upraised, was pleading that his life be spared. Treachery therefore qualified the crime to murder, consistent with People vs. Ricoherynoso and People vs. Tan.

• Cruelty and Outraging the Corpse: Witness Pablo de los Reyes testified that after Mil shot Augusto Arteche and Salvador Alba, Mil kicked the fallen body with his foot on the left lumbar portion; witness Fidel Tan testified that Mil returned to the fallen body and stepped his right foot on the middle of the back. From these testimonies, the reason the accused kicked the deceased or placed his right foot on the body was to verify whether the latter was still alive, and not for the purpose of deliberately and inhumanly increasing the victim's sufferings. The aggravating circumstance of cruelty cannot therefore be appreciated against the accused. For the same reason, and aside from the fact that it was not alleged in the information, the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the victim's person or corpse cannot be considered present. The rule is settled in People vs. Aguinaldo, U.S. vs. Vitug, U.S. vs. Cervo, U.S. vs. Ulat, People vs. Luna, People vs. Llamera, and People vs. Manzano.

• Use of a Motor Vehicle: Under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code, a motor vehicle would be an aggravating circumstance if the crime were committed by means thereof. It will not be considered as an aggravating circumstance where there is no showing that the motor vehicle was purposely used to facilitate the commission of the crime, or where it is not shown that without it the offense charged could not have been committed, as held in People vs. Canial and People vs. Tingson. In the case at bar, the primary purpose of the appellant in riding on a motorized tricycle was to return to their camp after shooting Augusto Arteche, and it was merely incidental that on his way to the camp he happened to see Pedro Arteche sitting by the window of his house.

• Insult or Disregard of Rank: The aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed with insult or disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank may be appreciated only where there is a difference in the social condition between the offender and the offended party, because persons of dignity, or those generally considered of high station in life, deserve to be respected. Here, the accused and the deceased Pedro Arteche were both non-commissioned officers in the Constabulary, and while Pedro Arteche was a staff sergeant and Pedro Mil a corporal, there was no evidence that the accused deliberately or particularly intended to insult or disregard the respect due the offended party.

• Passion and Obfuscation: In order that courts may take into consideration the existence of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation in the commission of a felony, it is necessary to show the causes or special motives which have produced in the mind of the offender those stimulants so powerful that they naturally resulted in passion and obfuscation overcoming reason; the guilty party must act under the impulse of such special motives originating from lawful sentiments. The failure of Pedro Arteche to deliver the letter of Filomeno Arteche to Augusto Arteche was a prior, unjust and improper act sufficient to produce great excitement and passion in the accused as to confuse his reason and impel him to kill Pedro Arteche. It was a legitimate and natural cause of indignation and anger since the accused had pinned his hopes of settling the case against him amicably on that letter. Accordingly, the accused should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

• Penalty: Recapitulating, in Criminal Case No. 7548, the crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery and attended by the sole aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position, offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; the correct penalty should therefore be reclusion perpetua. In Criminal Case No. 7551, the crime committed is likewise murder, qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of (a) dwelling and (b) taking advantage of public position, and the mitigating circumstances of (a) voluntary surrender and (b) passion and obfuscation; the correct penalty is likewise reclusion perpetua.

• Evident premeditation — Premeditation must be clearly proven as the criminal act itself. The evidence must show not only when the intent to commit the crime was engendered in the mind of the accused, but also the motive which gave rise to it and the means he elected beforehand to carry out his criminal intention — all the facts and antecedents which together show that the crime was knowingly premeditated and that the accused acted not only with a preexisting design, ordinarily found in all crimes, but with cold and deep meditation and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of his criminal purpose. Threats made prior to the commission of the crime are not sufficient in themselves to constitute premeditation where they are not followed by subsequent acts revealing a firm and tenacious persistence to carry them out. In this case, the only proof of planning was the testimony of the victim's wife regarding prior threats, and the meeting at the refreshment parlor was casual; evident premeditation was therefore not appreciated.

• Treachery — Treachery qualifies a killing to murder where the attack is sudden and unexpected and the victim is in a defenseless position. The accused fired at Augusto Arteche while the latter, with hands upraised, was pleading that his life be spared; treachery therefore qualified the killing.

• Cruelty — Cruelty, as an aggravating circumstance, requires that the accused deliberately and inhumanly augmented the suffering of the victim. Where the acts done on the victim's body — here, kicking the fallen body and stepping on its back — were intended merely to verify whether the victim was still alive, and not to increase his sufferings, cruelty cannot be appreciated.

• Outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse — This circumstance cannot be considered where it was not alleged in the information, and, in any event, was not shown to have been committed for the purpose of outraging or scoffing at the victim.

• Use of a motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance — Under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code, a motor vehicle is an aggravating circumstance only if the crime was committed by means thereof. It will not be considered aggravating where there is no showing that the motor vehicle was purposely used to facilitate the commission of the crime, or where it is not shown that without it the offense charged could not have been committed. Here, the accused's primary purpose in riding a motorized tricycle was to return to camp after shooting Augusto Arteche, and his seeing Pedro Arteche along the way was merely incidental.

• Insult or disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of rank — This aggravating circumstance may be appreciated only where there is a difference in the social condition between the offender and the offended party, because persons of dignity, or those generally considered of high station in life, deserve to be respected. Even though the deceased was a staff sergeant and the accused a corporal, both were non-commissioned officers in the Constabulary, and there was no evidence that the accused deliberately or particularly intended to insult or disregard the respect due the offended party.

• Passion and obfuscation — For this mitigating circumstance to be considered, it is necessary to show the causes or special motives which produced in the mind of the offender those stimulants so powerful that they naturally resulted in passion and obfuscation overcoming reason; the guilty party must act under the impulse of such special motives originating from lawful sentiments. The failure of Pedro Arteche to deliver the letter on which the accused had pinned his hopes of an amicable settlement was a prior, unjust and improper act sufficient to produce great excitement and passion in the accused as to confuse his reason and impel him to kill Pedro Arteche.

• Voluntary surrender — The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was appreciated in the accused's favor, having surrendered to his commanding officer, Capt. Villena, immediately upon returning to the PC Camp after the shooting of Pedro Arteche.

• "Premeditation must be clearly proven as the criminal act itself and if there is nothing in the case that call serve as a ground to determine when the accused resolved to commit the crime, nor, consequently, to determine if the said criminal resolution was meditated on, reflected upon and persisted in, which constitutes premeditation, this circumstance is not present." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for rejecting evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in the killing of Augusto Arteche, and is the formulation of the evidentiary standard for premeditation applied throughout the decision.

• "From their testimonies it appears that the reason why accused kicked the deceased or placed his right foot on the body of the deceased was to verify whether or not the latter was still alive, and not for the purpose of deliberately and inhumanly increasing the victims sufferings." — This passage supplies the factual basis for rejecting cruelty as an aggravating circumstance, illustrating the requirement that the augmentation of the victim's suffering be deliberate and inhuman.

• "It will not be considered as an aggravating circumstance where there is no showing that the motor vehicle was purposely used to facilitate the commission of the crime or where it is not shown that without it the offense charged could not have been committed." — This passage states the controlling rule on the use of a motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance, which the Court applied to hold that the tricycle ride was merely incidental to the accused's return to camp.

• "In order that courts may take into consideration the existence of the mitigating circumstance of 'passion and obfuscation' in the commission of a felony, it is necessary to show the causes or special motives which have produced in the mind of the offender those stimulants so powerful that they naturally resulted in passion and obfuscation overcoming reason." — This passage defines the requisites of passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, which the Court found satisfied in the killing of Pedro Arteche.

• People vs. Ricoherynoso, 56 SCRA 431 (1974) and People vs. Tan, 73 SCRA 288 (1976) — Cited as authority for the finding of treachery where the victim was shot while pleading for his life; the Court relied on these in holding that treachery qualified the killing of Augusto Arteche to murder.
• People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1; U.S. vs. Cervo, 9 Phil. 158; U.S. vs. Ulat, 7 Phil. 559; People vs. Luna, 58 SCRA 198; People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48; People vs. Manzano, 58 SCRA 250 — Cited collectively for the rule that cruelty is not appreciated where the acts on the victim's body were not intended to deliberately and inhumanly increase his suffering; the Court applied this line of cases in rejecting cruelty and outraging the corpse as aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 634, 652 — Cited for the rule governing the use of a motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243 — Cited for the rule that a motor vehicle is not an aggravating circumstance where it was not purposely used to facilitate the commission of the crime or where it is not shown that without it the offense could not have been committed.
• People vs. Borja, G.R. No. 22947 — Cited in Justice Barredo's separate opinion as the basis for his position favoring the imposition of life imprisonment rather than death, given that the appellant had been convicted by the trial court in 1967, more than ten years earlier.

• Article 14, paragraph 20, Revised Penal Code — Cited for the rule that a motor vehicle is an aggravating circumstance if the crime was committed by means thereof. The Court applied the provision to hold that the motorized tricycle taken by the accused was not shown to have been purposely used to facilitate the killing of Pedro Arteche, so the circumstance could not aggravate the offense.
• Article 248(6), Revised Penal Code — Cited in Justice Aquino's separate opinion for the aggravating circumstance of deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. Justice Aquino invoked it to argue that the kicking of the prostrate victim constituted an outrage on his corpse, warranting the death penalty for the killing of Augusto Arteche.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred in the majority opinion. Barredo, J., filed a separate concurring opinion voting for life imprisonment, citing his position in People vs. Borja, G.R. No. 22947, on the ground that the appellant had been convicted by the trial court in 1967, more than ten years earlier. Antonio and De Castro, JJ., took no part; Justice Antonio took no part because he was the Solicitor General at the time.

• Justice Aquino — Concurred in the affirmance of the judgment of conviction but dissented as to the imposition of reclusion perpetua only. He would have sentenced the accused to death for the killing of Augusto Arteche because, in kicking the prostrate victim, the accused committed an outrage or wrong on his corpse, a circumstance included in the allegation in the information that he deliberately augmented the wrong done by causing another wrong not necessary for the consummation of the killing. He cited Article 248(6) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Justice Teehankee — Voted for affirmance of the death penalty imposed on the accused for each of the two cold-blooded murders. He found evident premeditation amply shown by the systematic acts of harassment and threats perpetrated by the accused on the victim and his family, which culminated in the killing of Augusto Arteche, and he would not appreciate passion and obfuscation in the killing of Pedro Arteche because the latter's failure to deliver the vice-mayor's letter was not such an unjust and improper act as to confuse the accused's reason and impel him to kill Sgt. Arteche and to shoot at the latter's innocent wife.