People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Libria

Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, and a public boxing inflicted by the victim on the accused may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance analogous to those in Article 13, paragraph 10, of the Penal Code, even if the wrong did not immediately precede the killing and did not qualify as sufficient provocation or passion and obfuscation.

Pedro Libria was an ex-soldier of the Philippine Scouts. Esteban Campo was originally included with Libria in the information for the murder of Jaime Idloy but was discharged before trial to be utilized as a witness for the Government. Because the prosecution's case depended in part on Campo's testimony, his credibility as a former co-accused was a central contextual issue.

During the fiesta of the barrio of Buri, municipality of Alang-alang, Leyte, a game of monte was being played. Jaime Idloy believed that Esteban Campo was keeping the tong collections and asked him for some money. Campo refused, saying he was not the tong collector and keeper, and Idloy boxed him. The same evening during a dance, Idloy also boxed appellant Pedro Libria. These incidents showed Idloy was not exactly a peaceful citizen but rather a bully, resorting to force at the least or without provocation.

About two weeks thereafter, in the evening of June 12, 1950, Libria, carrying a carbine, went to Campo's house in the barrio of Buri. Campo and his wife Teofila Resano received him. Libria invited Campo to accompany him to look for Idloy to settle their differences — in other words, to avenge the wrong and injury Idloy had committed against the two of them during the barrio fiesta and dance. Campo accompanied him on his mission of revenge, according to him, because of fear, though the Court found it not unreasonable to believe that he was not exactly averse to getting even with Idloy and so consented to go with Libria.

In the barrio of Lingayon, Libria found Idloy in the house of Paulino Verzosa, lying and stretched on a bench. The two remained in the yard below, Campo hiding behind a coconut tree and Libria seeking cover in a banana grove, watching. Soon Idloy got up from the bench and went down the house. Libria was ready for him, and as the victim was on the stairs and about to step on the ground, Libria fired his carbine. The bullet pierced Idloy's two arms as well as his chest. Idloy collapsed to the ground, and Libria fired a second shot, again hitting him in the lower part of the trunk and fracturing the sacral bone. Idloy died almost instantly. The shooting was an exhibition of sharp and accurate shooting, not strange because Libria was an ex-soldier of the Philippine Scouts. The actual shooting was witnessed and testified to by Campo, and the invitation to go out and take revenge upon Idloy was established by the testimony not only of Campo but also of his wife. The motive for the killing — revenge — was sufficiently proved.

Libria denied any participation in the murder and tried to establish an alibi, saying that in the evening of June 12, 1950, he was busy making copra in the house of one Pedrero, and at 11:00 p.m. he was at a drinking party in the house of his witness Eleuterio Brando. The trial court did not give credence to this story, and the Supreme Court likewise declined to do so. Although Campo's testimony as to the shooting was not entirely above suspicion, coming as it did from a polluted source because he was originally included in the information and at least gave moral support to the killing, and although the testimony of his wife about the invitation may not have been entirely impartial, the appellant's presence at the scene of the killing and his being identified with the shooting were definitely established, thereby precluding acceptance of the defense of alibi. The trial court found Libria guilty of murder, the killing being qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery, and sentenced him only to reclusion perpetua. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Denial and Alibi: Appellant denied any participation in the murder and sought to establish an alibi, claiming that on the evening of June 12, 1950, he was busy making copra in the house of one Pedrero and at 11:00 p.m. was at a drinking party in the house of Eleuterio Brando.

• Penalty: The Solicitor General believed that the penalty for murder should have been imposed in its maximum degree, namely death.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the guilt of Pedro Libria for the killing of Jaime Idloy was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Alibi: Whether appellant's defense of alibi should be credited.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the killing was properly qualified as murder by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the killing was attended by a mitigating circumstance that would preclude the imposition of the maximum penalty of death.
• Penalty: Whether the proper penalty is death or reclusion perpetua.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The evidence established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the trial court's finding was affirmed after careful examination.
• Alibi: No. Alibi was rejected because appellant's presence at the scene and his identification with the shooting were definitely established.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. The trial court found the killing qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery, and no error was found in the decision appealed from.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes. The public boxing of appellant by Idloy during a dance produced rancour and insult, a mitigating circumstance analogous to those in Article 13, paragraph 10, of the Penal Code.
• Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. The presence of the mitigating circumstance warranted affirmance of reclusion perpetua, not death.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The evidence was carefully examined and found sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The actual shooting was witnessed and testified to by Campo; the invitation to go out and take revenge upon Idloy was established by the testimony of Campo and his wife; and the motive of revenge was sufficiently proved. Although Campo's testimony came from a polluted source because he was originally included in the information and at least gave moral support to the killing, and although his wife's testimony about the invitation may not have been entirely impartial, appellant's presence at the scene and his being identified with the shooting were definitely established.
• Alibi: Appellant denied participation and claimed he was making copra in Pedrero's house and later at a drinking party in Brando's house at 11:00 p.m. The trial court did not give credence to this story, and the Supreme Court likewise declined to do so. The positive identification of appellant at the scene precluded acceptance of the defense of alibi.
• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: The trial court found appellant guilty of murder, the killing being qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery. The Supreme Court found no error in the decision appealed from and affirmed it. The text also initially describes the conviction as one for murder with the aggravating circumstance of treachery; the affirmance did not disturb the trial court's characterization of the killing as murder.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The killing was not entirely without mitigation. Strictly speaking, because it was done several days after the wrong (boxing) committed on appellant by the deceased, it may not be considered as sufficient provocation that "immediately preceded" the act under Article 13, paragraph 4, or that appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have produced passion and obfuscation under paragraph 6 of the same article. However, Idloy's boxing of appellant during a dance and in the presence of so many people, and appellant being an ex-soldier and ex-member of a military organization and unit, well-known and respected, undoubtedly produced rancour in his breast and deeply insulted him; to vindicate himself and appease his self-respect, he committed the crime. The mitigation may well be found under paragraph 10, which provides for any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.
• Penalty: Because the killing was not entirely without mitigation, the maximum penalty of death sought by the Solicitor General was not imposed. The trial court's sentence of reclusion perpetua, with indemnity of P4,000 to the heirs of Jaime Idloy and costs, was affirmed.

• Alibi — Alibi is a defense that places the accused elsewhere at the time of the crime; it cannot prevail over positive identification by witnesses. The defense was rejected because appellant's presence at the scene and identification with the shooting were definitely established.
• Polluted Source / Co-Accused as Witness — Testimony from a co-accused discharged to become a state witness is viewed with suspicion, but it may still sustain conviction when the accused's presence and participation are independently established. The Court noted that Campo's testimony was not entirely above suspicion but still found the shooting and appellant's presence established.
• Mitigating Circumstance Analogous to Provocation or Passion and Obfuscation — Under Article 13, paragraph 10, of the Penal Code, any circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those in the preceding paragraphs may mitigate. A public boxing inflicted by the victim on the accused, an ex-soldier, during a dance, producing rancour and insult, may be appreciated as such even if the wrong did not immediately precede the killing and did not qualify under paragraphs 4 or 6.
• Murder Qualified by Evident Premeditation and Aggravated by Treachery — The trial court found the killing qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by treachery, and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder. The decision did not elaborate on these circumstances beyond affirming the trial court's finding.
• Reclusion Perpetua vs. Death — The presence of a mitigating circumstance may preclude the imposition of the maximum penalty of death even where the Solicitor General argues for it. The Court affirmed reclusion perpetua.

• "For the killing of Jaime Idloy, appellant Libria and Esteban Campo were originally accused of murder. Before trial, however, Campo was discharged from the information to be utilized as a witness for the Government." — Establishes the procedural posture and the fact that the prosecution relied on a former co-accused as a witness.
• "Although the testimony of Campo as to the shooting is not entirely above suspicion, coming as it does from a polluted source because he was originally included in the information and he at least gave moral support to the killing, and the testimony of his wife about the invitation made by Libria may not be entirely impartial, still we find that appellant's presence at the scene of the killing and his being identified with the shooting, to have been definitely established, thereby precluding acceptance of the defense of alibi." — States the ratio for rejecting alibi despite the witnesses' compromised credibility.
• "Strictly speaking, inasmuch it was done several days after the wrong (boxing) committed on the appellant by the deceased, it may not be considered as sufficient provocation that 'immediately preceded' the act, under Art. 13, paragraph 4; or that appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have produced passion and obfuscation under the same article, paragraph 6, of the Penal Code." — Explains why the mitigating circumstances under paragraphs 4 and 6 were not applicable.
• "However, it is not difficult to see that Idloy's boxing appellant during a dance and in the presence of so many people, and he, an ex-soldier and ex-member of a military organization and unit, well-known and respected, undoubtedly produced rancour in the breast of Libria who must have deeply insulted; and to vindicate himself and appease his self-respect, he committed the crime." — Provides the basis for treating the public boxing as a mitigating circumstance analogous to those in Article 13, paragraph 10.

• Article 13, paragraph 4, Penal Code — Sufficient provocation immediately preceding the act. The Court said the boxing several days earlier may not be considered sufficient provocation under this paragraph.
• Article 13, paragraph 6, Penal Code — Passion and obfuscation. The Court said the killing may not be considered as having been committed upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation under this paragraph.
• Article 13, paragraph 10, Penal Code — Any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. The Court applied this paragraph to the public boxing of appellant, producing rancour and insult, as a mitigating circumstance.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L. concurred.