People of the Philippines vs. Pedro del Castillo, Sr. and Pedro del Castillo Jr.

A killing is qualified by treachery even if the victim was not the person the accused intended to kill, and conspiracy may be established from the concerted and coordinated acts of the accused in the execution of the crime. The use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the crime is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 20, of the Revised Penal Code, while nighttime is necessarily absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Pedro del Castillo, Sr. and the deceased, Sedesias del Castillo, were first cousins, and Pedro del Castillo, Jr. was the deceased's nephew. Earlier on the evening of the incident, Pedro del Castillo, Sr. and Fernando Castromayor had engaged in a heated argument and a fistfight at the house of Nene Emak, from which Castromayor emerged with a torn shirt that Sedesias del Castillo replaced with his own T-shirt. The two accused were charged with murder before the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the judgment of conviction.

About six o'clock in the evening of November 25, 1962, Sedesias del Castillo, Fernando Castromayor, Virgilio Palencia, and Rizalino Patanao came from a drinking session in the house of one Badong in the municipality of Sara, Iloilo. Overtaken by a slight rain, del Castillo, Castromayor, and Palencia, with the exception of Patanao, sought shelter in the house of Nene Emak, where they saw Pedro del Castillo, Sr., who had also taken refuge from the rain. While waiting for the rain to stop, a heated argument ensued between Castromayor and Pedro del Castillo, Sr., which resulted in a fistfight between the two, with Castromayor getting the upper hand but coming out with a torn shirt. Sedesias del Castillo offered Castromayor his T-shirt, which the latter accepted, and the group then proceeded home.

Upon reaching the crossing at Concepcion, Sara, Iloilo, Sedesias del Castillo told his companions to stay on the side of the road as there was a jeep coming from the rear at a fast speed. When the jeep, driven by Pedro del Castillo, Jr., came abreast with the group walking in single file, it suddenly swerved and hit Sedesias del Castillo, who was thrown about a meter away from where he was standing. Pedro del Castillo, Sr. then jumped down from the jeep and, with a blunt instrument, struck Sedesias at the back of the head, followed by two more stab blows in the neck. Realizing that the person he had assaulted was not Fernando Castromayor but his first cousin Sedesias del Castillo, Pedro del Castillo, Sr. looked around and, upon seeing Castromayor nearby, ran after the latter but failed to overtake him. Pedro del Castillo, Jr., upon realizing that the man he had run over was his Uncle Sedesias, carried the latter in his jeep and brought him to Dr. Vicente Javellana, Rural Health Physician, who examined the victim and found him to have suffered (a) a stab wound about 3/4 inch long and one inch deep below the left jaw, middle portion; (b) two stab wounds 1/2 inch long and one inch deep at the anterior margin of the sternocleidomastoid muscle behind the posterior angle of the right jaw; (c) contusion and swelling about a duck's egg in size at the right occipital region, near the hairline; (d) abrasion on the right forehead and right clavicle extending to the right side up to the level of the 10th rib; (e) abrasion one inch in diameter on the left zygoma; and (f) abrasion on the left knee. The cause of death was shock due to the above injuries.

The defense consisted of denial and alibi. Accused-appellant Pedro del Castillo, Sr. admitted that he and Fernando Castromayor met in the house of Emak, where they had a heated discussion about inheritance; that Castromayor was irritated at his intervention in the discussion and, as a consequence, boxed him in the head; that they grappled with each other and he was able to hit back at Castromayor, who fell on the floor; that Castromayor accused Sedesias of trying to take sides with him, and Sedesias explained that he was only trying to stop the fight; and that Castromayor warned Sedesias that the time would come when he would pay for it. They were thereafter separated by the others present and all went down to go home. According to Pedro del Castillo, Sr., he arrived home at about seven o'clock in the evening and told his son, Pedro, Jr., to dress up as they would go to the dance at the Sara Elementary School with Mayor Ricardo Zerrudo. With Pedro, Jr. driving the jeep, both father and son proceeded to the house of the mayor, who, with his wife, boarded the jeep, and they all went to the Sara Elementary School where the dance was being held. About nine o'clock in the evening, Pedro, Sr. noticed a commotion in the street; he immediately notified Mayor Zerrudo, and together they went to the place of the commotion and learned that something was going on inside the house of Jose del Castillo. They went inside and saw the body of Sedesias del Castillo lying on top of the table. Mayor Zerrudo inquired from Pat. Avellar what had happened, and the peace officer replied that Virgilio Palencia had told him that Castromayor and Sedesias del Castillo had a quarrel which resulted in the death of the latter.

The appellants further argued that the theory of the prosecution was highly incredible, in that it was improbable for Pedro del Castillo, Sr. not to have recognized his cousin Sedesias and to have stabbed him twice on the neck after turning him over on his face. Both accused were charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 9624, pleaded not guilty, and, after trial, were found guilty as charged by the trial court, which credited the prosecution's account of the incident and rejected the defense of denial and alibi.

• Denial and Alibi: Appellants interposed the defenses of denial and alibi, Pedro del Castillo, Sr. testifying that he was at home at about seven o'clock in the evening and thereafter attended the dance at the Sara Elementary School with Mayor Ricardo Zerrudo and his wife, and that he learned of the commotion only at about nine o'clock in the evening when he and the mayor went to the place of the commotion and saw the victim's body inside the house of Jose del Castillo.
• Improbability of the Prosecution's Theory: Appellants argued that the theory of the prosecution was highly incredible, in that it was improbable for Pedro del Castillo, Sr. not to have recognized his cousin Sedesias and to have stabbed him twice on the neck after turning him over on his face.

• Identification: Whether the identity of Pedro del Castillo, Sr. as the assailant was established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Defense of Denial and Alibi: Whether the defenses of denial and alibi interposed by the appellants warranted reversal of the conviction.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between Pedro del Castillo, Sr. and Pedro del Castillo, Jr. was established.
• Treachery and Mistake of Identity: Whether the killing was qualified by treachery notwithstanding that the victim was not the person the appellants intended to kill.
• Nighttime: Whether nighttime was properly appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
• Use of a Motor Vehicle: Whether the use of a jeep was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 20, of the Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of death should be imposed upon the appellants.

• Identification: Yes. The identity of Pedro del Castillo, Sr. was clearly testified to by Virgilio Palencia, who was walking with Castromayor and the victim at the time of the incident.
• Defense of Denial and Alibi: No. The appeal was devoid of merit, the conviction resting on the positive identification made by the eyewitness.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was shown by the circumstance that immediately after Pedro del Castillo, Jr. bumped the deceased with the jeep he was driving, the appellant-father jumped from the jeep and struck his victim.
• Treachery and Mistake of Identity: Yes. The killing was qualified by treachery, which is taken into account whether or not the victim was the person the appellants intended to kill.
• Nighttime: No. The trial court erred in considering nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance, it being necessarily included or absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Use of a Motor Vehicle: Yes. Under Article 14, paragraph 20, of the Revised Penal Code, the use of a jeep was an aggravating circumstance because it facilitated the commission of the crime.
• Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. Although the proper penalty should be death, the Court imposed reclusion perpetua for lack of the necessary votes.

• Identification: The identity of Pedro del Castillo, Sr. as the assailant was clearly testified to by Virgilio Palencia, who at the time was walking with Castromayor and the victim Sedesias del Castillo. Palencia testified that he saw a jeep approaching from the rear with bright headlights; that Sedesias told the group to go to the side of the road, saying it was the jeep of "Nong Preking"; that he jumped to the canal when he saw the jeep approaching; that Sedesias was bumped by the jeep; that, simultaneously with his flashing of his flashlight, he saw a person jump from the jeep, hit Sedesias, turn the body, and stab him; that the man who jumped from the jeep was Pedro del Castillo, Sr.; and that the jeep was driven by Pedro del Castillo, Jr. The witness pointed to both accused in open court. On this eyewitness account, the conviction was sustained.
• Defense of Denial and Alibi: The appeal was held devoid of merit. The appellants' contention that it was improbable for Pedro del Castillo, Sr. not to have recognized his cousin was answered by the circumstance that Castromayor had been wearing the T-shirt offered by Sedesias del Castillo, so that while the group was on its way home, the deceased was mistaken by Pedro del Castillo, Sr. to be Fernando Castromayor, and the vengeance of the appellant was brought to bear upon his own cousin Sedesias. The defense of denial and alibi did not overcome the prosecution's positive identification.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy between the appellants, father and son, was established by the circumstance that immediately after Pedro del Castillo, Jr. had bumped the deceased with the jeep he was driving, the appellant-father jumped from the jeep and struck his victim. The immediate and coordinated sequence of the son's use of the vehicle and the father's assault manifested a common design in the execution of the crime.
• Treachery and Mistake of Identity: The appellants employed means which tended directly to especially ensure the commission of the crime without risk to themselves, and the killing of the victim was therefore qualified by treachery. Treachery, whenever present in the commission of the crime, should be taken into account whether or not the victim was or was not the same person whom the appellants intended to kill. The fact that Pedro del Castillo, Sr. mistook Sedesias del Castillo for Fernando Castromayor did not remove the qualifying circumstance.
• Nighttime: The trial court erred in considering nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance. Nighttime is necessarily included or absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery and cannot be appreciated separately.
• Use of a Motor Vehicle: Under paragraph 20, Article 14, of the Revised Penal Code, the use of a motor vehicle is an aggravating circumstance if the crime was committed by means thereof. There was no question that in this case the aggravating circumstance should be appreciated, since the defendants used a jeep and it facilitated the commission of the crime. On that basis, the proper penalty should be death.
• Penalty: Because the proper penalty should be death but the required number of votes was not obtained, the Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• Conspiracy inferred from concerted action — Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement; it may be established from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, particularly the concerted and coordinated acts of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine by finding conspiracy from the circumstance that immediately after Pedro del Castillo, Jr. bumped the deceased with the jeep he was driving, Pedro del Castillo, Sr. jumped from the jeep and struck the victim, the immediacy of the two acts showing a common design.
• Treachery and error in personae — Treachery, as a qualifying circumstance, is taken into account whether or not the victim was the person the accused intended to kill. The Court applied this rule by holding that the killing of Sedesias del Castillo remained qualified by treachery even though Pedro del Castillo, Sr. had mistaken him for Fernando Castromayor, the person with whom he had earlier fought.
• Absorption of nighttime in treachery — Nighttime, as a generic aggravating circumstance, is necessarily included or absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery and may not be appreciated independently. The Court applied this rule in holding that the trial court erred in considering nighttime as a separate generic aggravating circumstance.
• Use of a motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance — Under Article 14, paragraph 20, of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is aggravated when committed by means of a motor vehicle. The Court applied this provision because the defendants used a jeep and it facilitated the commission of the crime, and on that basis held that the proper penalty should be death.
• Denial and alibi as defenses — The defenses of denial and alibi interposed by the appellants did not prevail against the prosecution's evidence. The Court disposed of the appeal as devoid of merit and sustained the conviction on the strength of the positive identification made by Virgilio Palencia.
• Imposition of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death for lack of the necessary votes — Where the circumstances attending the crime warrant the imposition of the death penalty but the required number of votes is not obtained, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed. The Court applied this rule in fixing the penalty at reclusion perpetua notwithstanding its holding that the proper penalty should be death.

• "There was conspiracy between appellants father and son to commit the crime as shown by the circumstance that immediately, after Pedro Jr. had bumped the deceased with the jeep he was driving, appellant-father jumped from the jeep and with a blunt instrument stabbed his victim twice on the neck." — This passage states the ratio for the finding of conspiracy, grounding it on the immediate and coordinated acts of the two appellants rather than on direct proof of a prior agreement.
• "And, considering that appellants employed means which tended directly to especially ensure its commission without risk to themselves, the killing of the victim was qualified by treachery which whenever present in the commission of the crime should be taken into account whether or not the victim was or was not the same person whom they have intended to kill." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the rule that treachery qualifies the killing notwithstanding an error in the identity of the victim.
• "However, the trial court erred in considering nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance. It is necessarily included or absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery." — This passage corrects the trial court's appreciation of aggravating circumstances and states the absorption rule applied to nighttime.
• "Under paragraph 20, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, motor vehicle would be an aggravating circumstance if the crime was committed by means thereof. There is no question that in this case this aggravating circumstance should be appreciated since the defendants used a jeep and it facilitated the commission of the crime. Therefore, the proper penalty should be death. But for lack of necessary votes, We have to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua." — This passage applies the statutory aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle and explains why the penalty actually imposed was reclusion perpetua despite the Court's holding that death was the proper penalty.

• Article 14, paragraph 20, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the commission of a crime by means of a motor vehicle is an aggravating circumstance. The Court applied the provision because the defendants used a jeep in running over the victim and the vehicle facilitated the commission of the crime, and on that basis held that the proper penalty should be death.
• Qualifying circumstance of treachery, Revised Penal Code — The decision treats treachery as a qualifying circumstance that raised the killing to murder and that absorbed nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance; the text does not cite a specific article number for treachery.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.