People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Cedenio y Rasonable, et al.

There is no complex crime of arson with homicide; where the killing is the objective and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of separate crimes of murder and arson. Conviction for the separate offenses may be sustained by circumstantial evidence that forms an unbroken chain pointing to the accused as perpetrators.

Pedro Cedenio, Felipe Antipolo, and Jurito Amarga were residents of the same locality as the Dorio family, whose household was said in the village to be a family of sorcerers. The prosecution’s case arose under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, which repealed Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code and penalizes arson, including arson where death results, with reclusion perpetua to death. The information designated the offense as “Arson with Multiple Murder,” a designation that framed the legal question of whether such a complex crime exists under the decree.

On 26 November 1986, at about ten-thirty in the evening, Bonifacio Palomas was roused from sleep by bangs, slams, and women’s desperate cries for help coming from the direction of a neighbor’s house about thirty meters away. Hilario Dorio’s house was on fire. Peeping through his window, Palomas saw around seven persons, among them Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga, and Felipe Antipolo, emerge from the burning house. The blaze was bright enough for him to recognize them; they were wielding unsheathed bolos. Afraid, he remained home. The following morning, he told Romeo, Hilario Dorio’s son, what he had witnessed, and then went with Romeo to the rubble, where he saw the charred bodies of Hilario, Flora, Maria, Dioscora, and Nicanora Tabanao, said to be a family of sorcerers in the village.

Policarpio Apostadero was resting at around ten-thirty that same evening when he heard dogs barking. Thinking a carabao might have gone astray, he went out and headed for the cornfield. On his way, he noticed some thirty meters away that Hilario Dorio’s house was on fire. From where he stood, he saw people running out of the burning house. As the fire illuminated the surroundings, he recognized three of them as his neighbors Cedenio, Amarga, and Antipolo. When they drew nearer, he saw them holding bolos stained with blood, so he retreated home. The next morning, he went to the burned house, joined the people already milling around, and saw the seared bodies of the five members of the Dorio household.

Albino Calunod, Sr., Barangay Captain of Gandingan, Pangantucan, Bukidnon, narrated that on 27 November 1986, at around seven o’clock in the morning, Cristituto Gajo informed him that the Dorio residence had been gutted by fire the night before and that five members of the Dorio family occupying the house had been burned to death. He proceeded to the scene and found the house razed to the ground. The five bodies retrieved were those of Hilario Dorio, with wounds on the head and chest; Flora Dorio, with a wound on the leg and her head almost severed; Maria Dorio, with wounds in the neck and left nipple; Nicanora Tabanao, with a wound in the stomach; and infant Dioscora Dorio, with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.

Perfecto Antifuesto implicated Cedenio. Antifuesto said that on 26 November 1986, at around seven o’clock in the evening, he was awakened by Cedenio, who borrowed his bolo. At around three o’clock the following morning, Pito Panla-an woke him to return the bolo earlier borrowed by Cedenio. It was placed in its scabbard and left leaning against the wall below the window. When Panla-an left, Antifuesto got his bolo and found bloodstains on its handle. Upon unsheathing it, he discovered fresh blood on its blade. Thirty minutes later, Cedenio arrived and appeased him, saying, “. . . do not worry, if this incident reaches the court I will answer (for) everything.”

The death certificates of Hilario Dorio, Flora Dorio, Maria Dorio, and Nicanora Tabanao stated the cause of death as “incised wounds,” which could be caused by a bolo, while the infant’s death was due to “burns.” The trial court, having observed the witnesses, was morally convinced that the three accused were all guilty.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellants argued that no direct and positive evidence showed they killed the victims and burned the house; the fact that witnesses saw them coming out of the burning house cannot sustain conviction because that circumstance is capable of several interpretations.
• Innocuous Presence: They maintained that if witnesses saw them at the scene, it was when they were trying to save the burning house and its occupants; they were in the area due to a moral obligation to save life and property.
• Credibility of Witnesses: They contended that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were contrary to human experience; Antifuesto’s claim that his bolo was borrowed and returned with bloodstains was highly improbable because it is unnatural for criminals to openly bare the instruments used in committing a crime.
• Denial and Alibi: They asserted that their denial and alibi should prevail over the prosecution’s insufficient evidence; Cedenio claimed he cut banana trunks and hurled them into the fire, while Antipolo gathered soil and threw it into the blaze.

• Complex Crime of Arson with Multiple Murder: Whether the crime of “Arson with Multiple Murder” under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613 exists.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the accused-appellants may be convicted of murder and arson on circumstantial evidence when no witness saw the actual killing or burning.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the accused was established.
• Denial and Alibi: Whether the accused-appellants’ denial and alibi should prevail over the prosecution’s evidence.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killings.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation qualified the killings to murder.
• Dwelling: Whether dwelling aggravated each count of murder although not alleged in the Information.
• Waiver of Multiplicity: Whether the trial court could validly render judgment for as many crimes as alleged despite the Information’s erroneous designation and multiplicity.
• Civil Liability: Whether civil liability for the deaths was impliedly instituted with the criminal action and whether damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss.
• Penalties: Whether the imposable penalties are four terms of reclusion perpetua for murder and another reclusion perpetua for arson.

• Complex Crime of Arson with Multiple Murder: No. There is no complex crime of arson with homicide; where the killing is the objective and arson is used to cover it up, the offender may be convicted of separate crimes of murder or homicide and arson.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. Conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which inferences are derived are proven, and the combination produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt; the proven circumstances formed an unbroken chain.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy may be inferred from acts pointing to a joint purpose or design; the accused’s coordinated acts of hacking and stabbing the victims and then burning the house to conceal the killing established it.
• Denial and Alibi: No. Denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused and the circumstantial evidence forming an unbroken chain; the accused were seen leaving the burning house with bloodstained bolos and were not there to save lives but to escape.
• Treachery: No. Treachery cannot be presumed; absent proof of the manner of attack and that the victims were unable to defend themselves, it cannot qualify the killing.
• Evident Premeditation: Yes. The accused definitely resolved to commit the offense, reflected on the means and consequences, and an appreciable time elapsed between the borrowing of the bolo and the killing.
• Dwelling: Yes. Dwelling aggravated each murder; it was sufficiently proven during trial even if not alleged in the Information.
• Waiver of Multiplicity: Yes. Failure to move to quash on the ground of multiplicity waived the defect, allowing judgment for as many crimes as alleged and proven.
• Civil Liability: Yes. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, and the heirs are entitled to P50,000 for each death even without proof of pecuniary loss.
• Penalties: Four terms of reclusion perpetua for murder and another reclusion perpetua for arson. Death was the imposable penalty for each murder due to evident premeditation and dwelling, but the sentence was reduced to four terms of reclusion perpetua; arson where death resulted carries another reclusion perpetua.

• Complex Crime of Arson with Multiple Murder: The Court found no such offense. It cited Groizard and Aquino: if fire is used with intent to kill a particular person and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only; if the main objective is burning the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by arson; if the objective is to kill and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson. In this case, the evidence showed the victims were hacked and stabbed to death, and the house was burned to hide the killing. Thus, separate crimes of murder and arson, not a complex crime. The Information, though erroneously charging “Arson with Multiple Murder,” clearly charged six distinct criminal acts: stabbing five victims and burning the house. Since no motion to quash on multiplicity was filed, the defect was waived; the trial court could validly render judgment for as many crimes as alleged. Both arson and multiple murder must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court held appellants responsible only for the murder of the four victims who sustained fatal hack and stab wounds; they could not be convicted of homicide for the infant, who died of arson resulting in death under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The Court accorded credence to prosecution witnesses Palomas, Apostadero, and Antifuesto; they were disinterested, there was no evidence of subornation, and no evil motive was shown. Although they did not see the actual killing or burning, guilt may be established by circumstantial evidence under Section 4, Rule 133: (1) more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court listed six circumstances: Cedenio borrowed Antifuesto’s bolo at 7:00 p.m.; Cedenio, Antipolo, and Amarga were positively identified brandishing bloodstained bolos while rushing out of the burning house around 10:30 p.m.; the bolo was returned at 3:00 a.m.; the bolo had bloodstains; Cedenio appeased Antifuesto at 3:30 a.m. saying he would answer if the incident reached court; and the victims’ bodies bore stab and hack wounds. These formed an unbroken chain pointing to the accused. The Court rejected the argument that Antifuesto’s testimony was contrary to human nature; the accused never thought he would testify, and Cedenio even mollified him.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose or design. From the evidence, after the victims were hacked and stabbed to death, appellants set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. This was the only logical conclusion for the burning: if their objective was merely to kill, there would be no reason to burn the victims’ abode; if their objective was merely arson, they would not have attacked the victims with bolos. The Court thus found they conspired to inflict fatal blows and thereafter burn the house to conceal the deed.
• Denial and Alibi: The Court rejected the claim that the accused were at the scene to save lives and property. It found that when they were seen in the vicinity of the burning house, they were not there to save the lives and valuables of the victims but to save their own—to escape from the locus criminis and avoid answering for the consequences of their act. Their denial and alibi could not overcome the positive identification and the circumstantial evidence.
• Treachery: The Court could not consider treachery. For treachery, there must be proof that at the time of the attack the victims were not in a position to defend themselves and that the offenders consciously and deliberately adopted a particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. No proof of such fact existed; there was no testimony on how the attack was actually carried out. Where no particulars are known as to the manner of aggression or how the act began and developed, treachery cannot be established from suppositions. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. Hence, absent another qualifying circumstance, the killing would be homicide only.
• Evident Premeditation: The Court qualified the killing to murder on account of evident premeditation. The requisites are: the overt acts of the accused show they definitely resolved to commit the offense; they coolly and dispassionately reflected on the means of carrying their resolution into execution and on the consequences of their criminal design; and an appreciable length of time elapsed to expect an aroused conscience to relent and desist. The prosecution established these. The fact that appellants burned the victims’ house after inflicting fatal wounds suggests they clung to their determination. Cedenio’s borrowing of the bolo and later placating Antifuesto when the bolo was returned bloodstained indicated they pondered on the means and consequences. Since the bolo was borrowed at around 7:00 p.m. and the crime was committed around 10:00 p.m., there was sufficient interval to reflect.
• Dwelling: The Court held each count of murder aggravated by dwelling. Although not alleged in the Information, it was sufficiently proven during trial.
• Waiver of Multiplicity: The Information charged six distinct criminal acts. Since appellants failed to move to quash on the ground of multiplicity or object at any other time, the defect was waived, and the trial court could validly render judgment for as many crimes as alleged. In order to sustain a conviction for as many offenses, all the allegations must be proven with moral certainty. Both arson and multiple murder were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Civil Liability: The heirs of the deceased did not waive nor reserve their right to institute a civil action, nor did they institute a civil action prior to the criminal action. Under Section 1, Rule 111 of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, appellants are jointly and severally liable to the heirs in the amount of P50,000 for every death even without proof of pecuniary loss.
• Penalties: The penalty for murder if committed with evident premeditation is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, while for arson where death results, it is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the murder was attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling with no mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty was death for each of the four counts of murder. However, considering that the death penalty was prescribed at the time appellants committed the crime, their sentence was reduced to four terms of reclusion perpetua. For the arson where death resulted, appellants were sentenced to a separate term of reclusion perpetua. The penalties are to be served successively in accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

• No complex crime of arson with homicide — There is no complex crime of arson with homicide. If fire is used with intent to kill a particular person and that objective is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder only. If the main objective is the burning of the building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by arson. If the objective is to kill—and the offender has already done so—and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the hacking and stabbing of the victims followed by the burning of the house to conceal the killing constituted separate crimes of murder and arson, not a complex crime.
• Circumstantial evidence — Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must form an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator. The Court applied this doctrine by enumerating six circumstances, including the borrowing of the bolo, the accused being seen leaving the burning house with bloodstained bolos, the return of the bloodied bolo, and the victims’ wounds, which together formed an unbroken chain.
• Conspiracy inferred from acts — Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose or design. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the accused’s coordinated acts of hacking and stabbing the victims and then burning the house to conceal the killing established a common design.
• Treachery — For treachery to be appreciated, there must be proof that at the time of the attack, the victims were not in a position to defend themselves and that the offenders consciously and deliberately adopted a particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the accomplishment of their purpose with impunity. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. The Court applied this doctrine by refusing to appreciate treachery because there was no proof of the manner of attack.
• Evident premeditation — For evident premeditation to be considered, it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts of the accused that they definitely resolved to commit the offense; that they coolly and dispassionately reflected on the means of carrying their resolution into execution and on the consequences of their criminal design; and that an appreciable length of time elapsed as to expect an aroused conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the accomplishment of the intended crime. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the borrowing of the bolo at 7:00 p.m. and the killing at 10:00 p.m. gave sufficient time for reflection, and the burning of the house after the killings showed they clung to their determination.
• Dwelling as aggravating circumstance — Dwelling aggravates the crime when it is sufficiently proven during trial, even if not alleged in the Information. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that each count of murder was aggravated by dwelling.
• Waiver of multiplicity of charges — Failure to move to quash the information on the ground of multiplicity of charges waives the defect, and the trial court may validly render judgment against the accused for as many crimes as were alleged. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the accused’s failure to move to quash allowed the trial court to convict them for the separate crimes alleged and proven.
• Implied institution of civil action — If the heirs of the deceased did not waive nor reserve their right to institute a civil action, nor institute a civil action prior to the criminal action, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The Court applied this doctrine by awarding P50,000 for every death even without proof of pecuniary loss.

• “It is settled that there is no complex crime of arson with homicide.” — This states the ratio decidendi on the non-existence of the complex crime charged and anchors the Court’s modification of the trial court’s conviction.
• “But if the objective is to kill—and in fact the offender has already done so—and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson.” — This is the controlling formulation for distinguishing arson, murder, and separate crimes when death and burning are both present.
• “While the prosecution witnesses did not see the actual killing of the victims and the burning of the house, we have repeatedly ruled that guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.” — This defines the requisites of circumstantial evidence and explains why conviction could be sustained despite the absence of eyewitnesses to the actual killing and burning.
• “For evident premeditation to be considered, it must affirmatively appear from the overt acts of the accused that they definitely resolved to commit the offense; that they coolly and dispassionately reflected on the means of carrying their resolution into execution and on the consequences of their criminal design; and, that an appreciable length of time elapsed as to expect an aroused conscience to otherwise relent and desist from the accomplishment of the intended crime.” — This sets out the canonical requisites of evident premeditation, which the Court found established by the interval between the borrowing of the bolo and the killing.

• People vs. Paterno, 85 Phil. 722 (1950) — Cited for the rule that where the defendants killed the victims and thereafter set the house afire, with an infant perishing in the fire, the accused were guilty of murder for the killing and arson for burning the house.
• People vs. Basay, G.R. No. 86941, 3 March 1993, 219 SCRA 404 — Cited for the rule that where the house was burned to conceal the stabbing and hacking, separate crimes of murder and arson were committed.
• People vs. Adriano, G.R. No. 104578, 6 September 1993; People vs. Galendez, G.R. Nos. 56465-66, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 360 — Cited for the rule that conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator.
• People vs. Briones, G.R. No. 97610, 19 February 1993, 219 SCRA 134 — Cited for the requisites of circumstantial evidence under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
• People vs. Villagracia, G.R. Nos. 82727-28, 7 April 1993, 221 SCRA 136 — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose or design.
• People vs. Devoras, L-48009, 3 February 1992, 205 SCRA 676 — Cited for the rule that where no particulars are known as to the manner of aggression, treachery cannot be established from mere suppositions.
• People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 56925, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 148 — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself.
• People vs. Pastoral, G.R. No. 51686, 10 September 1993 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Ducay, G.R. No. 86939, 2 August 1993 — Cited for the rule that failure to move to quash on the ground of multiplicity waives the defect, citing Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

• Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1613 — Penalizes arson and, where death results, imposes reclusion perpetua to death. The Court held that the infant’s death from the burning was arson resulting in death under this provision, while the four victims who sustained fatal hack and stab wounds were murdered.
• Articles 320 to 326-B, Revised Penal Code — Expressly repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1613. The Court referred to this repeal in explaining the statutory basis for arson and the absence of a complex crime of arson with homicide.
• Article 218, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for murder if committed with evident premeditation, which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The Court applied this provision in determining the penalty for the four counts of murder.
• Article 70, Revised Penal Code — Governs the service of successive penalties. The Court applied this provision in ordering that the four terms of reclusion perpetua for murder and the separate reclusion perpetua for arson be served successively.
• Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Concerns the motion to quash on the ground of multiplicity of charges. The Court applied this provision in holding that the accused’s failure to move to quash waived the defect.
• Section 1, Rule 111, New Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived or reserved. The Court applied this provision in awarding civil liability to the heirs.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets out the requisites for circumstantial evidence. The Court applied this provision in sustaining the conviction based on the unbroken chain of circumstances.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ.