People of the Philippines vs. Pablo de la Cruz

A court may reduce a penalty within the range prescribed by the statute, in the exercise of the discretion granted by that same statute, to avoid resolving a constitutional challenge that the penalty is excessive or cruel and unusual. Entrapment is not a defense where the accused was openly selling to the public and no special circumstances show that he was led or induced to commit the offense.

Pablo de la Cruz operated a store in Sampaloc, Manila. Republic Act No. 509 authorized the President to fix maximum selling prices for articles, goods, or commodities, and Executive Order No. 331, issued pursuant to that authority, fixed twenty centavos as the maximum price for a six-ounce tin of Carnation milk.

Pablo de la Cruz operated a store in Sampaloc, Manila. On the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to that store and purchased from de la Cruz a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. The purchase was made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with de la Cruz.

Executive Order No. 331, issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509, fixed twenty centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity. Because the sale exceeded that ceiling, the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution.

After trial in the Court of First Instance of Manila, de la Cruz was sentenced to imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs; he was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years. The record showed that the People's case had been established beyond reasonable doubt, and the claim that the charge was fabricated was not accepted. The defense of entrapment was likewise rejected because de la Cruz was selling to the public, i.e., to anybody who would come to his store to buy his commodities, and no special circumstances were shown that he was led or induced to commit the offense.

• Fabricated Charge: Petitioner argued that the trial judge erred in not holding that the charge was fabricated.
• Disproportionate and Unconstitutional Penalty: Petitioner argued that the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offense and therefore unconstitutional.
• Invalidity of Republic Act No. 509: Petitioner argued that the trial judge erred in not invalidating Republic Act No. 509 insofar as it prescribed excessive penalties.
• Entrapment: Petitioner raised an argument based on the principles of entrapment.

• Fabricated Charge: Whether the charge was fabricated and without foundation in fact.
• Entrapment: Whether the defense of entrapment should be upheld.
• Excessive or Unconstitutional Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed was wholly disproportionate to the offense and therefore unconstitutional.
• Validity of Republic Act No. 509: Whether Republic Act No. 509 should be invalidated insofar as it prescribed excessive penalties.
• Reduction of Penalty: Whether the Court may reduce the penalty within the statutory limits to avoid the constitutional issue and execute substantial justice.

• Fabricated Charge: No. The People's case was established beyond reasonable doubt, and the record did not support the claim that the charge had no foundation in fact.
• Entrapment: No. De la Cruz was selling to the public, i.e., to anybody who would come to his store to buy his commodities, and no special circumstances showed that he was led or induced to commit the offense.
• Excessive or Unconstitutional Penalty: Not resolved. The Court assumed, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Constitution, but it did not declare the penalty unconstitutional.
• Validity of Republic Act No. 509: Not resolved. The Court did not invalidate Republic Act No. 509; it instead reduced the penalty within the statutory limits.
• Reduction of Penalty: Yes. The Court reduced the imprisonment to six months and the fine to P2,000, exercising the discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment, and affirmed the appealed decision in all other respects.

• Fabricated Charge: The record did not support the claim that the charge had no foundation in fact. The People's case was established beyond reasonable doubt, so the contention of fabrication failed.
• Entrapment: The entrapment argument could not be upheld because de la Cruz was selling to the public, i.e., to anybody who would come to his store to buy his commodities. No special circumstances were shown that he was led or induced to commit the offense; the defense therefore failed.
• Excessive or Unconstitutional Penalty: The constitutional prohibition provides that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in duration or amount, and applies to punishments never existing in America or regarded by public sentiment as cruel or obsolete, such as whipping post, pillory, burning at stake, breaking on wheel, and disemboweling. Fine and imprisonment are not within the prohibition. However, respectable authorities hold that the inhibition may apply to punishments that, although not cruel and unusual in nature, are so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. To justify a declaration of conflict with the Constitution, the prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances; seldom has a sentence been declared cruel and unusual solely on account of its duration. Two opposing theories were noted. Under the first, the prohibition applies to legislation only, not to courts' decisions imposing penalties within statutory limits; the statute violates the Constitution only if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, with the minimum entirely out of proportion to the offense. Under the second, the fundamental prohibition also restricts the judge's power; the penalty imposed is compared with the gravity of the particular crime, and if notable disparity results, the constitutional brake applies even if the statute would not be extreme under other circumstances. Under the first theory, imprisonment for two months or a fine of P2,000 was not excessive for a merchant who sold above the ceiling, because he might derive profits amounting to thousands of pesos; the penalty imposed was within statutory limits. Under the second theory, the question was whether five years and P5,000 was cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit. Many did not regard such punishment as unusual and cruel, considering the national policy against profiteering in foodstuffs affecting people's health, the need to stop speculation in essentials, and the safeguarding of public welfare in times of food scarcity or similar stress. The damage to the State was not measured exclusively by the accused's gains, because one violation would mean others and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls. Some were deeply moved by the plight of the modest store-owner with a family to support who would serve five years in Muntinglupa for attempting to earn a few extra centavos. An area of compromise was found that skirted the constitutional issue while executing substantial justice: the penalty could be decreased, exercising the discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. It was assumed, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Constitution, but the constitutional questions were not definitively passed upon.
• Validity of Republic Act No. 509: The law was not invalidated. The constitutional questions had not been definitely passed upon, although U.S. vs. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279, stated that the prohibition of the Philippine Bill on punishments referred not only to the mode but to the extent thereof. For the purposes of the decision, it was assumed without holding that too long a prison term might clash with the Constitution. The constitutional issue was avoided by reducing the penalty within the statutory range.
• Reduction of Penalty: The imprisonment was reduced to six months and the fine to P2,000. This was done under the discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment, as an area of compromise that skirted the constitutional issue yet executed substantial justice. The appealed decision was affirmed in all other respects.

• Cruel and Unusual Punishment — The constitutional prohibition is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in duration or amount, and applies to punishments never existing in America or regarded by public sentiment as cruel or obsolete, such as whipping post, pillory, burning at stake, breaking on wheel, and disemboweling. Fine and imprisonment are not within the prohibition. However, authorities hold that the inhibition may apply to punishments that, although not cruel and unusual in nature, are so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction; to justify a declaration of unconstitutionality, the prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men. The Court assumed without holding that too long a prison term might clash with the Constitution.
• Two Theories on Constitutional Restriction of Penalties — First, the prohibition applies to legislation only, not to courts' decisions imposing penalties within statutory limits; the statute violates the Constitution only if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, with the minimum entirely out of proportion to the offense. Second, the prohibition also restricts the judge's power; the penalty imposed is compared with the gravity of the particular crime, and if notable disparity results, the constitutional brake applies even if the statute would not be extreme under other circumstances. The Court discussed both theories but did not adopt either definitively.
• Statutory Discretion to Reduce Penalty / Constitutional Avoidance — Where a statute prescribes a range of penalties, a court may decrease the penalty within that range to avoid resolving a constitutional challenge and to execute substantial justice. The Court applied this by reducing imprisonment from five years to six months and the fine from P5,000 to P2,000.
• Entrapment — Entrapment is not available as a defense where the accused was selling to the public, i.e., to anybody who would come to his store to buy his commodities, and no special circumstances show that he was led or induced to commit the offense. The Court rejected de la Cruz's entrapment argument on this basis.
• Price Control and Public Welfare — In assessing whether a penalty is cruel or unusual, the damage to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, because one violation would mean others and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls. The Court considered the national policy against profiteering in foodstuffs affecting people's health and the need to stop speculation in essentials.

• "The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete" — Defines the general scope of the constitutional prohibition and frames the Court's analysis of whether the penalty was cruel or unusual.
• "However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction." — States the competing view that a punishment may be constitutionally excessive despite not being cruel or unusual in form.
• "In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls." — Explains why the Court did not regard the heavier penalty as cruel or unusual solely because the profit was only ten centavos.
• "Fortunately there is an area of compromise, skirting the constitutional issue, yet executing substantial justice: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment." — States the ratio for reducing the penalty within statutory limits instead of deciding the constitutional question.

• U.S. vs. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279 — Cited for the proposition that the prohibition of the Philippine Bill on punishments refers not only to the mode but to the extent thereof. The Court noted it while discussing whether the constitutional restriction applies to the duration or amount of punishment.
• Weems vs. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 — Cited in a footnote as distinguishable from the present case. The decision does not elaborate on the distinction in the provided text.
• State vs. Ross, 55 Or. 450, 104 Pac. 596 — Cited as authority for the theory that the fundamental prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment likewise restricts the judge's power and authority, not only the legislature.
• State vs. Whitaker, 48 La. Am. 527, 19 So. 457 — Cited alongside State vs. Ross for the same theory that the constitutional prohibition may limit the penalty a judge may impose.

• Republic Act No. 509, Section 12 — Prescribes imprisonment of not less than two months nor more than twelve years, or a fine of not less than P2,000 nor more than P10,000, or both, for selling any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the President. It also bars guilty persons from wholesale and retail business for five years for a first offense and permanently for second or succeeding offenses. The Court reduced the penalty within these statutory limits.
• Executive Order No. 331 — Issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509, it fixed twenty centavos as the maximum price for a six-ounce tin of Carnation milk. The sale at thirty centavos violated this ceiling.
• Constitutional prohibition on excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment — The decision quotes the Constitution: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." The Court discussed whether this prohibition invalidated the penalty imposed or the statute prescribing it, but it avoided a definitive ruling by reducing the penalty within statutory limits.
• Article 5, Revised Penal Code — Mentioned in the Court's discussion of the practice that when a court finds a penalty "clearly excessive," it enforces the law but makes a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency. The Court asked whether the Constitutional Convention intended to stop that practice or whether the article is unconstitutional, but it did not resolve the question.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.