People of the Philippines vs. Osmundo Fuertes

Conspiracy may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest; proof of a previous agreement is not essential, and once conspiracy is established, all conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation, the act of one being the act of all.

Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo" had served as overseer of Hacienda Ong in Mati, Davao Oriental, since 1972. The victims, Napoleon Aldeguer (14) and Mateo Aldeguer (16), were minors who entered the hacienda to gather firewood and young coconuts. The killings occurred on November 1, 1986, a period during which the imposition of the death penalty stood suspended, the same having been reimposed only later by Republic Act No. 7659. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as it then read prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, penalized murder with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death when attended by any of the enumerated qualifying circumstances.

Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo" was the overseer of Hacienda Ong in Lumagaob, Barrio Sainz, Mati, Davao Oriental, a position he had held since 1972. On the morning of November 1, 1986, Francisco Salva @ "Butsoy" was riding a horse and pasturing cows and carabaos within the hacienda when he saw two boys gathering young coconuts. Salva approached them and asked why they were gathering the coconuts; the boys replied that they were thirsty. Salva reported the matter to Fuertes, who promptly ordered Salva and several others, including Edgar Gibone, to board a jeep that he himself drove to the place where the boys had been seen. Upon arrival, the two boys were already on a hill; Fuertes and his group gave chase but failed to catch them. The pursuers returned to Fuertes's house bringing with them two bundles of firewood allegedly gathered and left behind by the boys, and thereafter Fuertes sent somebody to fetch Rolando Tano and Agustin Luyong @ "Jack."

Later that afternoon, Tano and Luyong arrived at Fuertes's house, and Fuertes summoned Salva and Gibone and instructed them to accompany Tano and Luyong to the place where the boys had earlier been seen, to apprehend them should they return. Upon arriving at the place, Salva and Gibone hid in a canyan tree; after a while the two boys appeared, and after a brief chase they were caught. The boys were hand-tied and brought to the house of Joaquin Reyes, where Luyong ordered Salva and Gibone to hide. Luyong and Tano then asked Felisa Reyes, Joaquin Reyes's wife, for water and instructed her to fetch Fuertes. Felisa complied and informed Fuertes that two persons were waiting for him in her house; when she described them, Fuertes told her that they were Jack and Boy Negro and instructed her to go home, saying that he and his companions would just follow. After a while, Fuertes arrived with two other persons. Upon seeing the two boys, he scolded them and called them thieves. After scolding them, Fuertes and Luyong had a conversation during which they allegedly agreed that the two boys be killed. Fuertes then left with his companions.

Luyong thereafter ordered Salva and Gibone to proceed to the "dead creek," which they did. Later, Luyong, Tano, and the two boys arrived at the dead creek, followed by Fuertes. At the creek, Luyong removed the shirts of the two boys upon being ordered to do so by Fuertes; Luyong and Tano tore the shirts and used them to cover the boys' mouths. Luyong stabbed the smaller boy, later identified as Napoleon Aldeguer, in the abdomen with a bolo, and as Napoleon fell to the ground Luyong kept stabbing him. Luyong then handed the bolo to Tano, who began stabbing the other boy, later identified as Mateo Aldeguer. Tano handed the bolo to Gibone, who was threatened by Luyong that he would be stabbed if he did not stab Mateo; Gibone complied. Gibone was then instructed by Luyong to hand the bolo to Salva, but Salva refused, prompting Luyong to threaten him with death; Salva accepted the bolo and hacked the left thigh of Napoleon as instructed by Luyong. Luyong then took the bolo from Salva and hacked Napoleon's neck. After the stabbing, Luyong and Tano left and followed the dead creek, while Fuertes, Gibone, and Salva proceeded to the house of one Nardo, where Fuertes allegedly warned Gibone and Salva not to reveal what had happened. Later that day, Tano and Luyong arrived at Fuertes's house and were met by him in his office, where he gave each a small envelope. In the afternoon of November 2, 1986, the bodies of Napoleon and Mateo Aldeguer were found in Hacienda Ong.

The post-mortem examination reports issued by Dr. Gil G. Mantilla, Assistant Provincial Health Officer, showed that Mateo Aldeguer sustained a hacked wound on the right side of the neck and multiple stabbed wounds, while Napoleon C. Aldeguer, Jr. sustained an incised wound at the level of the Adam's apple cutting the trachea and carotid arteries, multiple stabbed wounds, and an incised wound on the middle third of the left thigh. Both deaths were attributed to severe hemorrhage secondary to stabbed and incised wounds.

Accused-appellant Osmundo Fuertes denied any participation in the killings. He testified that on November 1, 1986, he was at home; that he took a bath in the morning, then checked the daily time record and prepared the payroll; that at around 5:00 p.m., Salva informed him that persons were looking for him, and upon going downstairs he saw Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan, who asked if he had seen her brothers, to which he replied that he had not; that he and his family and companions had supper at 6:00 p.m., during which Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived also looking for the Aldeguer boys; and that at around 9:00 p.m., P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan, and companions arrived, and he allowed them to search the bodega and surrounding areas. He further testified that on November 2, 1986, at 6:00 a.m., he and his family and companions went to the San Nicolas Tolentino church, then to the Madang public market, returning to the hacienda at around 9:30 a.m.; that policemen later inquired about the Aldeguer boys; that after lunch he presided over a purok meeting as its president; and that at around 4:00 p.m., policemen arrived and informed him that the two Aldeguer boys had been found dead. At around 5:00 p.m., one Jun Talaboc, an ex-policeman, advised him to transfer to the Mati poblacion, warning him that it was dangerous to stay, citing several violent incidents. Feared for his safety and that of his family, Fuertes ordered his wife to pack up and proceeded to the place of Police Chief Cipriano Sefuentes, who advised him to check in at a hotel because his life was in danger; he instead proceeded to the house of one Captain Serrano at Capitol Hill, Mati, where he and his family stayed until his arrest. Greta Fuertes, his wife, corroborated his account point by point. Fuertes denied any participation in the crime, claiming that he was being framed by P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay and P/Maj. Cipriano Sefuentes, who wanted to extort P50,000.00 from him, and asserted that Francisco Salva was a "coached" witness whose credibility was suspect.

The trial court found that the prosecution's evidence established the participation of the accused-appellant in the killings, crediting the testimony of Salva as corroborated by the sworn statements of Agustin Luyong and Edgar Gibone and by the testimony of Felisa Reyes, and found that conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation, and the circumstance of price, reward, or promise attended the commission of the crimes.

• Credibility of State Witness: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to, and relying heavily on, the testimony of prosecution witness Francisco Salva, whom he characterized as a "coached" witness whose credibility was suspect, such that his guilt could not be predicated thereon.
• Absence of Conspiracy: Accused-appellant maintained that the trial court gravely erred in finding that a conspiracy existed among the accused.
• Frame-Up and Extortion: Accused-appellant claimed that he was being framed by P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay and P/Maj. Cipriano Sefuentes, who allegedly wanted to extort P50,000.00 from him.
• Self-Confessed Killer's Testimony: Accused-appellant pointed to certain excerpts from the testimony of self-confessed killer Agustin Luyong which allegedly cleared him of any participation in the crime charged, and concluded that "the passion and outrage which attended the commission of the crime should not blur the evidence" pointing to his innocence.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to, and relying heavily on, the testimony of prosecution witness Francisco Salva.
• Existence of Conspiracy: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding that a conspiracy existed among the accused.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: No. The conviction was not predicated solely on Salva's testimony; it was amply supported by the mass of evidence on record, particularly the sworn statements of Agustin Luyong and Edgar Gibone and the testimony of Felisa Reyes.
• Existence of Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was established, the accused having performed concerted acts in pursuit of a joint purpose — lying in wait for, capturing, hog-tying, and gagging the victims before taking turns in stabbing and hacking them to death at the instigation of the accused-appellant.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Although the challenged decision rested mainly on the testimony of Francisco Salva, who had been initially accused together with appellant but was subsequently discharged and utilized as a state witness, a circumspect scrutiny of the record disclosed that appellant's conviction was not predicated solely on Salva's testimony; it was amply supported by the mass of the evidence on record. Particularly damaging to appellant's pretensions at innocence was the sworn statement of Agustin Luyong, who entered a plea of guilty and was convicted on the basis thereof, in which Luyong narrated that Fuertes had requested him and Boy Negro to go to Ong Hacienda to help apprehend the two boys; that after the boys were caught and brought to the house of Joaquin Reyes, Fuertes arrived, investigated the two boys, and later signaled Luyong to go inside the sala, where Fuertes hired him to kill the two boys for a price of P5,000.00, giving him P200.00 as down payment with the assurance that the balance of P4,800.00 would be paid after the job was accomplished; that Fuertes himself hogtied one of the boys while Luyong and Boy Negro hogtied the other; and that Fuertes left with his companion before the boys were brought to the dried creek and killed. Equally damaging was the sworn statement of Edgar Gibone, which recounted that Fuertes got his air rifle and called Gibone, Salva, and others to go with him to apprehend the two boys; that when the boys escaped, Fuertes was mad and angry; that in the afternoon Fuertes hired Jack and Brando to kill the two boys if they returned inside the hacienda; that Gibone was present when Fuertes and Jack conversed, with Fuertes ordering Jack to kill the two boys and to kill the thieves who might be seen inside the hacienda; that Fuertes handed an airmail envelope containing money to Jack and told him to proceed to the place where the two boys had left the bundles of dried coconut palms; and that Fuertes handed envelopes to Jack and Brando, respectively. The statements of Luyong and Gibone were executed separately in the presence of lawyers personally chosen by them and after they were informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and bore certifications showing that they were given freely and intelligently. Writing finis to any further pretensions of innocence were the excerpts from the testimony of Felisa Reyes, who testified that when Fuertes arrived at her house, he went upstairs and, upon seeing the two boys, said, "now you were already caught and you are picking things in the hacienda, you are thieves"; that after scolding the two boys, Jack called Fuertes to the kitchen, where they had a secret conversation lasting about five minutes; and that after the conversation, Jack called Fuertes, who said, "I am entrusting them to you, take care of them."

• Existence of Conspiracy: From the testimonies of Luyong and Gibone on how the crimes were committed, there was no doubt that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; the agreement may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. It is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement to commit the crime; it is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose. Conspiracy was undoubtedly present since all the accused performed concerted acts in pursuit of a joint purpose: they lay in wait for the two victims, captured, hog-tied, and gagged them, and finally took turns in stabbing and hacking them to death with bolos — at the instigation of the accused-appellant, who promised and, in fact, paid Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Brando/Boy Negro sums of money enclosed in small envelopes. The records showed that accused-appellant even took active part in trussing up the victims before they were brought to the place where they were killed. Conspiracy having been established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation, since in the contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. Treachery likewise attended the killing: there is treachery when the offender commits the crime employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the means, method, and form of execution employed gave the victims no opportunity to defend themselves or to retaliate; they were likewise deliberately adopted by the malefactors to ensure that their persons would not be endangered, considering that the victims' hands were tied behind their backs with nylon ropes and their mouths were gagged with their shirts before the accused commenced taking turns in hacking them with bolos. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, although alleged, was absorbed in treachery and could no longer be appreciated separately; when treachery qualifies the crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former and cannot be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance. Evident premeditation was likewise appreciated: it can be presumed where, as in this case, conspiracy is directly established; its essence is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment; and its requisites are the time the accused determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination, and a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. The facts showed that accused-appellant had more than ample time to coolly reflect upon the consequences of his act when the victims escaped the first pursuit; instead, he had Jack and Boy Negro summoned and ordered them to catch the victims and kill them if they returned; he was afforded even more time to contemplate the repercussions of his deed when Jack and Boy Negro set out to do his bidding; and instead of desisting, he clung to his resolve when Jack and Boy Negro returned with the two victims and ordered them killed. The crimes were likewise committed in consideration of a price, promise, or reward (precio promesa o recompensa), considering that Agustin Luyong @ Jack was hired by accused-appellant for a price of P5,000.00 to kill the two victims and in fact received P200.00 contained in an airmail envelope as down payment with the assurance that the balance would be paid after the job; however, while this circumstance is qualifying in murder, it would merely be generic aggravating if it concurs with other qualifying circumstances like treachery, as in this case. The aggravating circumstance of ignominy, although alleged, could not be appreciated: ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime, and the clause "which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act" contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame; in this case, there was no showing that the offenses were perpetrated in a manner which tended to make their effects more humiliating to the victims. Neither the act of slicing the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer's lifeless body nor the stabbing of Mateo Aldeguer's corpse in the stomach could be considered indications of ignominia, because what is required is that the crime be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering. Considering the presence of several aggravating circumstances with no mitigating circumstance, the penalty in its maximum period, which is death, would be imposable under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code; however, since the crimes were committed during the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty and prior to its reimposition under Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua, which is single and indivisible and shall be imposed regardless of any attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The civil indemnity awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim was affirmed, but conformably with controlling jurisprudence it was increased to P50,000.00. The trial court, in sentencing the accused-appellant, erroneously equated reclusion perpetua with life imprisonment; the Court reiterated that the penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not the same: "life imprisonment" is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code; "life imprisonment," unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty; and "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

• Conspiracy — Definition and Proof — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. It is not essential that there be proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime; it is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose. In this case, the Court found conspiracy from the concerted acts of the accused — lying in wait for, capturing, hog-tying, and gagging the victims before taking turns in stabbing and hacking them to death.
• Liability of Conspirators as Co-Principals — All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation, since in the contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The Court applied this rule to hold Fuertes liable as a co-principal notwithstanding that he did not personally inflict the fatal wounds, having instigated and hired the actual killers and having taken active part in trussing up the victims.
• Treachery — Definition and Requisites — There is treachery when the offender commits the crime employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown that (1) the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The Court found both requisites satisfied because the victims' hands were tied behind their backs with nylon ropes and their mouths were gagged with their shirts before the accused commenced taking turns in hacking them with bolos.
• Abuse of Superior Strength Absorbed in Treachery — When treachery qualifies the crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former and cannot be appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance. The Court applied this rule to disregard the alleged abuse of superior strength despite its being alleged in the Informations.
• Evident Premeditation — Presumption from Conspiracy and Requisites — Evident premeditation can be presumed where conspiracy is directly established. Its essence is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Its requisites are: (1) the time the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. The Court found these requisites satisfied because Fuertes had ample time to reflect when the victims escaped the first pursuit, yet he summoned the hired killers and ordered the killings.
• Price, Promise, or Reward — Qualifying in Murder, Generic Aggravating When Concurring with Other Qualifying Circumstances — The circumstance of price, promise, or reward (precio promesa o recompensa) is qualifying in murder, but it is merely generic aggravating if it concurs with other qualifying circumstances like treachery. The Court found that Fuertes hired Agustin Luyong for P5,000.00, giving P200.00 as down payment, but treated the circumstance as generic aggravating because treachery also qualified the killing to murder.
• Ignominy — Definition and Non-Appreciation — Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. The clause "which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act" contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame. What is required is that the crime be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering. The Court held that neither the slicing of the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer's lifeless body nor the stabbing of Mateo Aldeguer's corpse in the stomach constituted ignominia, since the acts were performed after the victims were already dead.
• Reclusion Perpetua Distinguished from Life Imprisonment — The penalties of life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not the same. First, "life imprisonment" is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment," unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Third, "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. The Court reiterated this distinction in correcting the trial court's erroneous equation of the two penalties.
• Indivisibility of Reclusion Perpetua — Reclusion perpetua is a single and indivisible penalty, and it shall be imposed regardless of any attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The Court applied this rule in affirming the penalty of reclusion perpetua notwithstanding the presence of several aggravating circumstances.
• Civil Indemnity for Death — Civil indemnity is awarded without need of further proof other than the death of the victim. Conformably with controlling jurisprudence, the Court increased the civil indemnity from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each victim.

• "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed; or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest." — This passage states the Court's canonical formulation of the doctrine of conspiracy and the evidentiary basis from which it may be inferred, and is the ratio decidendi for rejecting the accused-appellant's second assigned error.
• "Conspiracy having been established, '[a]ll the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in the contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.'" — This passage states the rule on the liability of conspirators, which the Court applied to hold Fuertes liable as a co-principal notwithstanding that he did not personally inflict the fatal wounds.
• "For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown that: 1.] the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and 2.] the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted." — This passage enumerates the two requisites of treachery, the qualifying circumstance that raised the killings to murder, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the appreciation of treachery.
• "First, 'life imprisonment' is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, 'life imprisonment', unlike reclusion perpetua, does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Third, 'life imprisonment' does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years." — This passage is the Court's canonical three-part distinction between life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua, reiterated in correcting the trial court's erroneous equation of the two penalties.

• People vs. Santillana, G.R. No. 127815, 9 June 1999 — Cited for the proposition that murder is "one of the instances when man descends to a level lower than that of a beast, for it is non-instinctive killing, a deliberate destruction of a member of the same species for reasons other than survival," which the Court used to characterize the gravity of the offense.
• People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 [1998] — Cited (with People vs. Andres and People vs. Sumalpong) as authority for the rule that the agreement in conspiracy may be deduced from the manner in which the offense was committed.
• People vs. Perez y Halog, et al., G.R. No. 130501, 2 September 1999 — Cited (with People vs. Magallano, People vs. Albao, People vs. Obelllo, and People vs. Sumalpong) as authority for the rule that conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest.
• People vs. Apelado y Palmores, et al., G.R. No. 114937, 11 October 1999 — Cited (with People vs. Berganio, 110 Phil. 322 [1960]) as authority for the rule that it is not essential that there be proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime; it is sufficient that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly indicate unity of action and purpose.
• People vs. Altabano y Ellorin, et al., G.R. No. 121344, 29 October 1999 — Cited (with People vs. Salvatierra and People vs. Apawan) as authority for the rule that all conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation, since in the contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Gaspar, et al., G.R. No. 131479, 19 November 1999 — Cited (with People vs. De la Cruz, People vs. Garcia, People vs. Tampon, People vs. Bionat, People vs. Tumaob, and People vs. Francisco) as authority for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Villablanca, et al., G.R. No. 89662, 1 October 1999 — Cited (with People vs. Azugue and People vs. Valles) as authority for the requisites of treachery, and (with People vs. Violin) for the rule that abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery.
• People vs. Padlan, 290 SCRA 388 [1998] — Cited (with People vs. Bibat and People vs. Bautista) as authority for the rule that evident premeditation can be presumed where conspiracy is directly established, and for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Balasa, G.R. Nos. 106357, 108601-02, 3 September 1998, 295 SCRA 49 — Cited (with People vs. Ballabare and People vs. Retuta) as authority for the distinction between life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua, which the Court quoted at length in correcting the trial court's erroneous equation of the two penalties.
• People vs. Binas, G.R. No. 121630, 8 December 1999 — Cited (with People vs. Pulusan and People vs. Juachon) as authority for the rule that since the crimes were committed during the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty and prior to its reimposition under Republic Act No. 7659, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. Mangahas, G.R. No. 118777, 28 July 1999 — Cited (with People vs. Espanola) as authority for the rule that reclusion perpetua is a single and indivisible penalty that shall be imposed regardless of any attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
• People vs. Gallo, G.R. No. 128361, 16 November 1999 — Cited (with People vs. Verde and People vs. Lobino) as authority for the increase of the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 conformably with controlling jurisprudence.
• People vs. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429 [1991] — Cited for the rule that the fact that the accused sliced and took the flesh from the thighs, legs, and shoulders of the victim with a knife after killing the victim did not add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
• People vs. Balondo, 30 SCRA 155 [1969] — Cited (with People vs. Ferrera) as authority for the rule that acts performed after the victim's death do not constitute ignominia.
• People vs. Saqing, 30 SCRA 845 [1969] — Cited (with People vs. Gapasin) as authority for the appreciation of treachery where the victims were bound before they were killed.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (pre-amendment by R.A. No. 7659) — Defines murder and penalizes it with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death when committed with any of the attendant circumstances, including treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, in consideration of a price, reward, or promise, and with evident premeditation. The Court quoted the provision in full and applied it to hold that the killings were qualified to murder by treachery and evident premeditation, with price/reward treated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
• Article 64, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Provides the rules for the imposition of penalties when aggravating or mitigating circumstances attend the commission of the crime. The Court applied this provision to hold that, considering the presence of several aggravating circumstances with no mitigating circumstance, the penalty in its maximum period, which is death, would be imposable.
• Article 70, Revised Penal Code — Governs the service of penalties when the culprit has to serve two or more penalties. The Court noted that the rules provided in Article 70 shall be observed in the service of the sentences, as stated in the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Reimposed the death penalty. The Court applied the law's temporal effect to hold that since the crimes were committed on November 1, 1986, during the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty and prior to its reimposition under R.A. No. 7659, the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.