People of the Philippines vs. Orlando A. Guerrero, Jr.

The qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse need not be alleged in the exact words of the law; it is sufficient that it is deducible from the recital in the information. Likewise, self-defense cannot be appreciated, whether in its complete or incomplete form, once unlawful aggression has ceased, that element being a condition sine qua non of the justifying circumstance.

The Guerrero and Ocampo families were linked by employment and by an illicit relationship that poisoned relations between them. Rosa Guerrero and her daughters Ana, Rina, and Nora worked at various times as household help for the parents-in-law of Nancy Ocampo, wife of the victim Ernesto Ocampo, until Nancy discovered an affair between her husband and Nora and had the Guerreros dismissed. The killing that gave rise to the prosecution occurred against this backdrop of betrayed family ties and the ensuing effort to separate Nora from Ernesto.

Rosa Guerrero and her daughters Ana, Rina, and Nora Guerrero worked at one time or another as household help for the parents-in-law of Nancy Ocampo, whose husband was the victim Ernesto Ocampo. Sometime in October 1996, Nancy caught her husband and Nora embracing each other near the kitchen of their house; she screamed and slapped Nora, and the Guerreros were asked to leave the employ of the Ocampos to end the relationship. Nancy believed the affair continued, and on December 20, 1996, she went to see Dino Guerrero to ask him to stop Nora from seeing her husband or to send her far away. According to Nancy, Dino told her, "If ever I will see your husband, I will kill him," while appellant Pablo was on the porch of the duplex the Guerreros shared with the Ocampos. Nancy relayed the threat to Ernesto, who dismissed it, saying the Guerreros could not do that to him because of the goodness of his parents to their family. On January 6, 1997, the day before the incident, Nancy saw appellant, who told her, "Ninang, if ever I will meet your husband, I will cut-off his head including his penis." Nancy observed that he appeared to have made the statement lightly, laughing, and her husband did not believe the threat.

According to the defense, appellant learned of the affair from his mother on December 22, 1996, and decided to bring Nora to Manila because he did not want his sister to become a married man's mistress. The following day he left with Nora for their aunt's house in Mandaluyong, where Ernesto caught up with them and said he wanted to take Nora. Appellant pleaded with him not to, explaining that Nora was to be brought to Laguna to help a sister-in-law who had just given birth, and he succeeded in bringing Nora to their brother's house in Laguna.

On January 7, 1997, appellant arrived home from night-shift duty at Bolong Farm, washed, and slept. He woke at around 9:00 A.M., had breakfast with his wife, and sat at their porch, where he saw people cutting an "umbrella tree." He helped by handing his bolo to the person on top of the tree and pulling the rope tied to the felled branches, then returned to his house and went back to sleep. He was roused by someone calling his name outside the kitchen door. When he rose and proceeded to the door, it was suddenly kicked open and he saw his godfather, Ernesto Ocampo, who immediately put his left foot inside the house and demanded to know the whereabouts of Nora. Appellant replied that he did not know where she was. Ernesto warned that if appellant could not present Nora, "blood will be spilled" around their house, then rushed toward appellant and lunged at him ("dinuklos nak") while drawing a knife from his waist. Appellant immediately reached for a wooden club kept beside the door, struck Ernesto on the head, which sent him reeling and caused him to step backward, and struck again, causing Ernesto to fall on the porch. After Ernesto fell, appellant got Ernesto's knife and used it to slash his neck, completely severing the head from the body, and then cut off Ernesto's penis. He placed the head beside the body and went out. Along the way he met his father Dino, told him "I caused the death of Takel Ocampo," and was advised to surrender to mitigate his liability. Appellant proceeded to the house of his uncle Joe Acierto and asked him to accompany him to the police station, where he surrendered that same day. Appellant denied meeting Monico Guinitaran and Cirilo Garcia and denied admitting to them that he and his father had killed someone, and he likewise denied Nancy Ocampo's account of his alleged threat.

The prosecution's witnesses gave a different account of the killing. Danilo Garcia, an eighteen-year-old student who had been cutting a tree near the Guerrero house, testified that after Pablo left their group, they heard a woman scream; he stopped for about five minutes, then proceeded toward the direction of the scream, which turned out to be the Guerrero house, where he saw appellant severing the head of Ernesto Ocampo with a "rambo" knife while Ernesto lay motionless on the cement floor. Saturnino Cuello, Jr., a furniture worker, testified that he saw Ernesto talking with Dino Guerrero, Sr., and that appellant, holding a club, struck Ernesto at the right side of the back of the head, causing him to fall face up; appellant struck again while Dino got a bolo and hacked Ernesto in the neck below the jaw and then cut off his penis; after Dino left, appellant severed the victim's head. Nolan Atijera testified that while he and companions were cutting a tree, they heard a woman's voice saying "He is dead"; his companions ran, but he waited and then proceeded to the place, passing between the Guerrero and Acierto houses, where he saw appellant on the Guerreros' porch swinging a bloodstained club and warning him, "Do not come near, I will kill you also." Monico Guinitaran testified that on January 7, 1997, as he walked with Cirilo Garcia, they met appellant running toward them; when Monico jokingly said, "Bayaw, let us have a shot," Pablo responded, "Itago mo kami, bayaw. Nakapatay kami" ("You hide us, brother-in-law. We have killed somebody"), his hands and the front of his shirt stained with blood. Cirilo Garcia corroborated this and added that appellant uttered in Ilocano, "Illemeng dak" (You help us), adding "because my father and I killed a person." Alexander Atijera, Barangay Captain of Taboc, testified that at past 11:00 A.M. of January 7, 1997, he met Ernesto Ocampo at the side of the house of Ana Costales, who told Ernesto to go speak with her father Dino, and that Lorena Acierto later came to him saying, "Uncle, you come to our house because they are going to kill George Ocampo"; he went there immediately but Ernesto was already dead.

The defense witnesses Ana Costales, Lorena "Rina" Acierto, and Ireneo Acierto largely corroborated appellant's version. Ana testified that at around 11:00 A.M. she saw Ernesto Ocampo with two companions who asked permission to use a small hut west of their house to go drinking, and later saw Ernesto approaching the Guerreros' house asking for Pablo; when she told him appellant was sleeping, Ernesto entered the common porch, called out "Pablo, Pablo!" again, and kicked the door open, appearing angry. She called her sister Rina to fetch the barangay captain and then went to the seashore to call her father, but could not find him, and returned home in time to see appellant cutting off Ernesto's head; she screamed, and she and Ireneo tried to pacify appellant, who told them not to intervene. Rina testified that Ana sent her to fetch the barangay captain, that she saw Ernesto at the porch shouting, that Barangay Captain Alexander Atijera refused to come because he feared going to the Guerreros' place, and that Ernesto's own mother, when asked to help bring her son home, said, "Why is it that Ernesto still went there… let him die. Why is it that he still went there when he is at fault." Ireneo testified that he heard screaming, went near the Guerreros' porch, and saw Ernesto's head about to be severed by appellant; when the head was cut off, appellant placed it on the right side of the victim's trunk and then cut off Ernesto's penis, the victim lying on the floor and not moving throughout. Ireneo told appellant, "That is enough, bayaw. Stop it," and appellant angrily told him not to interfere. Ireneo did not see Dino at the time of the incident.

Dr. Eumelia T. Sanglay, municipal health officer of San Juan, La Union, performed the autopsy and confirmed her January 13, 1997 Certification finding the victim decapitated at about the level of the fifth cervical vertebra, with the penis amputated, lacerated and incised wounds on the head, arm, shoulder, and face, and multiple linear abrasions on the chest, as well as complete lacerations of the trachea, esophagus, thyroid gland, neck muscles, carotid artery, jugular veins, and various nerves. The cause of death was hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple hacking wounds. She testified that the victim had been beheaded and his penis cut off totally, that two wounds were found on his head, and that of the injuries, decapitation was the fatal one; she could not ascertain the order in which the wounds were inflicted nor whether they were inflicted while the victim was standing or lying down. SPO2 Bienvenido Jacalne testified that when the police arrived at the scene they saw the victim lying dead, his head separated from the body and his penis completely severed and placed on his abdomen; that Dino Guerrero came out of the nearby house with his hands extended forward and was frisked and handcuffed by SPO1 Emilio Taracatac; that before being handcuffed Dino said it was his son who had killed the victim; that there was no sign of disorder at the porch, with chairs and tables in place; and that appellant was not at the scene during the investigation but was already at the police station upon their return, where he admitted killing the victim by clubbing him first with the wooden stick and then cutting his head and penis with a knife. SPO1 Taracatac testified that Dino voluntarily extended his hands to be handcuffed, that when asked what he knew of the killing Dino replied he would give his statement when he had a lawyer present, and that Dino was wearing only shorts with his hair appearing wet, as if he had just taken a bath.

On November 14, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant Orlando Guerrero, Jr. guilty of murder and imposing reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Ernesto Ocampo P50,000.00 as moral damages and P62,000.00 as actual damages, and acquitting Orlando Guerrero, Sr. of the crime charged. The trial court found that the evidence on treachery and evident premeditation fell short of the requirements of law, observing that the attack against the victim was frontal and preceded by an altercation between appellant and the deceased, and that the alleged utterances regarding intent to kill were insufficient to prove a determination to kill to which appellant had clung.

• Unlawful Aggression: Appellant claimed self-defense as a justifying circumstance, contending that the victim's act of coming to his house and threatening that blood would spill there unless appellant produced his sister, while simultaneously holding a knife, was tantamount to unlawful aggression.
• Violent Entry as Aggression: Appellant averred that Ernesto's violent entry into the house while armed with a deadly weapon and forcing his way in showed that Ernesto was ready and looking for trouble, and that this manner of entry constituted an act of aggression he had the right to repel; the threatening attitude of an aggressor was offensive and a positively strong indication of the victim's wrongful intent to cause injury.
• Defective Information: Appellant strongly took exception to the finding of outraging or scoffing at the corpse, stating that this circumstance was not properly alleged with specificity in the information, thereby violating his right to be informed, and that "beheading and/or cutting-off the penis" were merely mentioned in the information as the cause of death but not as a qualifying circumstance.

• Cessation of Aggression: The Office of the Solicitor General contended that while Ernesto Ocampo was clearly the unlawful aggressor at the point where he barged into the Guerreros' house, advanced towards appellant, and drew a knife from his waist, and while appellant was justified in repelling that aggression by striking Ernesto at least twice with a wooden club, the aggression had already ceased when Ernesto fell to the floor; when appellant wrenched the knife from Ernesto, whatever aggression had initially been manifested had completely ceased, and appellant was no longer in peril because he had already disarmed and completely neutralized the initial aggression.
• Revenge, Not Self-Defense: The OSG argued that appellant's succeeding acts of decapitating and emasculating Ernesto could not be considered acts of self-defense but rather of revenge.
• Sufficiency of the Information: The OSG averred that the allegations in the complaint that the accused "beheaded and cut off the penis of the victim" served the function of stating specifically the act which constitutes outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse.

• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in ruling against appellant's claim that he acted in self-defense.
• Cruelty: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of cruelty in the perpetration of the crime.
• Outraging or Scoffing at the Corpse: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse despite the failure of the prosecution to allege the same with specificity in the information.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the trial court erred in imposing on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua with actual and moral damages.

• Self-Defense: No. The unlawful aggression had already been repelled when appellant struck the victim twice with the club and disarmed him, and unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.
• Cruelty: No. Cruelty requires deliberately and sadistically augmenting the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanely increasing the victim's suffering; the victim died from decapitation, and no cruelty may be appreciated where the act constituting the alleged cruelty was perpetrated when the victim was already dead.
• Outraging or Scoffing at the Corpse: Yes. Although the information did not allege the circumstance in the exact words of the law, outraging the dead and scoffing at the victim's corpse are deducible from the recital in the information that the accused "beheaded and cut off the penis" of the victim.
• Penalty and Damages: No error as to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, but the actual damages must be reduced to P39,105.00, the amount properly evidenced by receipts, while the awards of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages are sustained.

• Self-Defense: The Court agreed with the OSG that appellant failed to prove his claim of self-defense persuasively, the proven sequence of events militating against his attempt to exculpate himself. Appellant admitted he was able to strike twice at the victim with the wooden club, which caused Ernesto to stagger and step back; by that time, any aggression on the victim's part had already been repelled successfully. Moreover, appellant was already able to take possession of the fatal "rambo" knife without any sign of struggle from the victim, who lay prostrate on the ground. At that juncture, appellant had dramatically turned the situation in his favor, and further heinous attacks upon the hapless victim's person could not be considered acts of self-defense. Citing People vs. Enfectana, the Court reiterated that given the burden of evidence imposed by law on the party invoking self-defense, the admission of killing made it incumbent upon appellant to convincingly prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadly force, and that having established there was no more unlawful aggression at the moment of killing, there could likewise be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, as unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non to the appreciation of this justifying circumstance. The location, number, and seriousness of the wounds inflicted on the victim likewise belied the claim of self-defense: the victim suffered multiple mortal injuries, his head severed and his penis cut off, while appellant suffered nary a scratch. The factual circumstances showed that appellant had ample opportunity to take a more prudent course of action but gave vent to his anger, a deep-seated thirst for revenge, and a brutal lust for blood; even if the killing was precipitated by a sense of outrage, of family honor lost or of ritual kinship betrayed, criminal responsibility for the victim's death could not be washed clean except by clear and convincing proof of the alleged justifying circumstance.

• Cruelty: The Court first disposed of treachery and evident premeditation, agreeing with the trial court that the evidence adduced by the prosecution fell short of the requirements of law. On treachery, the Court noted that the attack against the victim was frontal and preceded by an altercation between appellant and the deceased, and that no alevosia attends an attack that is frontal; the victim himself barged into the family house of appellant and, as a witness for appellant said, was looking for trouble. That appellant successfully caused Ernesto's fall appeared unintended and was part of his action to repel Ernesto's attack; the vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately sought nor contrived by appellant to facilitate the hacking, but was a result of a series of acts spontaneous on appellant's part, without manifest calculation. Where the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery, even if the position of the victim was vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by the accused but was purely accidental. On evident premeditation, the Court set out its requisites: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. While the victim's widow testified that a day before the killing appellant had lightly told her he would kill Ernesto by cutting off his head and penis, she said the statement was not taken seriously by her and the victim. The trial court found the alleged utterances insufficient to prove that, at the time they were allegedly made, there was indeed a determination to kill and that appellant had clung to that determination, planning and meditating on how to carry out the threat. Assuming appellant did utter those words, other antecedent facts did not show that the crime was a product of serious and determined reflection: prior to the incident, appellant had not expected Ernesto to visit the Guerreros' house that day, and earlier that morning he had carried on in his usual fashion, helping his neighbors cut a tree and even leaving his bolo for them to use; had he planned to carry out any threat to kill, securing a weapon and keeping it in his possession would have been his first concern. A threat to kill, unsupported by other evidence disclosing the true criminal state of mind of the accused, will only be construed as a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation. While appellant might have nursed a grudge or resentment against the victim, that circumstance is not conclusive proof of evident premeditation; moreover, it was the victim himself who sought out appellant by going into the latter's house and forcing his way in, and there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan, but of rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger. As to cruelty, the Court held that as established by the testimony of witnesses, appellant first severed the victim's head before his penis was cut off; given this sequence, cruelty had to be ruled out, for it connotes an act of deliberately and sadistically augmenting the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanely increasing the victim's suffering. As testified to by Dr. Sanglay and reflected in her medical certificate, Ernesto in fact died as a result of his head being severed, and no cruelty is to be appreciated where the act constituting the alleged cruelty in the killing was perpetrated when the victim was already dead.

• Outraging or Scoffing at the Corpse: On the remaining question of whether cutting off the victim's penis constituted the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse, the Court agreed with the OSG's assertion and interpretation. While the information did not allege this qualifying circumstance in the exact words of the law, outraging the dead and scoffing at the victim's corpse are nevertheless deducible from the recital in the information. The sequence of events as "attack, assault, club, beheaded and cut the penis of the victim, Ernesto Ocampo" alleged in the information points to the outrage committed on the dead. The Court concluded that appellant's conviction for the crime of murder had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• Penalty and Damages: The sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed on appellant was appropriate. However, a modification of the damages awarded by the trial court was in order: actual damages should be pegged only at P39,105, the amount properly evidenced by receipts; but the award of civil indemnity in the sum of P50,000 is in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, and the award of P50,000 as moral damages is substantiated by the testimony of the victim's widow, hence both awards were sustained.

• Self-defense — unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non — Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is an indispensable element of self-defense; absent it, neither complete nor incomplete self-defense may be appreciated. The justifying circumstance requires that the aggression be existing and continuing at the time the defender employs the means of defense. In this case, the Court found that appellant had already successfully repelled the victim's aggression by striking him twice with a wooden club and disarming him of the "rambo" knife without any sign of struggle, so that the subsequent decapitation and emasculation were acts of revenge rather than self-defense.

• Burden of proof in self-defense — Once the accused admits killing the victim and invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to him to convincingly prove the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadly force. The location, number, and seriousness of the wounds inflicted on the victim, contrasted with the absence of injury on the accused, may belie the claim of self-defense. Here, the victim suffered multiple mortal injuries while appellant suffered nary a scratch.

• Cruelty as a qualifying circumstance — Cruelty connotes an act of deliberately and sadistically augmenting the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanely increasing the victim's suffering. It cannot be appreciated where the act constituting the alleged cruelty was perpetrated when the victim was already dead. Because appellant first severed the victim's head — the fatal injury — before cutting off the penis, cruelty was ruled out.

• Outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse — This qualifying circumstance is committed by outraging the dead or scoffing at the victim's corpse. It may be appreciated even if the information does not allege it in the exact words of the law, provided it is deducible from the recital in the information. The information's allegation that the accused "beheaded and cut off the penis" of the victim sufficiently charged the outrage committed on the dead.

• Treachery — frontal attack — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. No treachery attends an attack that is frontal and preceded by an altercation. Where the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery even if the position of the victim was vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by the accused but was purely accidental.

• Evident premeditation — requisites — For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. A threat to kill, unsupported by other evidence disclosing the true criminal state of mind of the accused, is only a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor, not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation; and there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan, but of rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger.

• "Having established that there was no more unlawful aggression to speak of at the moment of killing, there can likewise be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, as the element of the unlawful aggression by the victim committed against the person defending himself, is a condition sine qua non to the appreciation of this justifying circumstance in appellant's favor." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the self-defense issue, fixing unlawful aggression as the indispensable element that, once absent at the moment of killing, forecloses both complete and incomplete self-defense.

• "No cruelty is to be appreciated where the act constituting the alleged cruelty in the killing was perpetrated when the victim was already dead." — This is the Court's canonical formulation distinguishing cruelty from outraging or scoffing at the corpse; because the victim died from decapitation before the penis was cut off, cruelty was excluded as a qualifying circumstance.

• "While the information did not allege this qualifying circumstance in the exact words of the law, outraging the dead and scoffing at the victim's corpse are nevertheless deducible from the recital in the information." — This passage supplies the controlling rule on the sufficiency of the information to charge the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse, and is the basis for affirming the murder conviction.

• "A threat to kill, unsupported by other evidence which would disclose the true criminal state of mind of the accused, will only be construed as a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor and not a resolution of the character involved in evident premeditation." — This defines the evidentiary threshold for evident premeditation, explaining why the threats appellant allegedly made to Nancy Ocampo did not qualify the killing.

• People vs. Enfectana, G.R. No. 132028, April 19, 2002 — Cited as controlling authority on the burden of evidence imposed by law on the party invoking self-defense and on the necessity of proving unlawful aggression; the Court quoted its ruling that an appellant who admits killing must convincingly prove unlawful aggression necessitating the use of deadly force.
• People vs. Sarmiento, 8 SCRA 263 (1963) — Cited on evident premeditation; the Court quoted its holding that threatening remarks made on different occasions, without proof that the appellant made plans or sought the deceased to accomplish the killing, do not establish evident premeditation.
• People vs. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429 (1991) — Cited in support of the rule that outraging the dead and scoffing at the victim's corpse are deducible from the recital in the information even if not alleged in the exact words of the law.
• People vs. Lopez, 342 SCRA 431 (2000) — Cited for the definition of cruelty as an act of deliberately and sadistically augmenting the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanely increasing the victim's suffering.
• People vs. Villarmosa, et al., G.R. No. 131841, October 23, 2001 — Cited for the definition of treachery: the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
• People vs. Cadag, 2 SCRA 388 (1961) — Cited for the rule that where the decision to kill was sudden, there is no treachery even if the position of the victim was vulnerable, because it was not deliberately sought by the accused but was purely accidental.
• People vs. Fuentesuela, 73 Phil. 553 (1942) — Cited for the rule that a threat to kill, unsupported by other evidence disclosing the true criminal state of mind of the accused, is only a casual remark naturally emanating from a feeling of rancor.
• People vs. Lacao, 60 SCRA 89 (1974) — Cited for the rule that a grudge or resentment nursed against the victim is not conclusive proof of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Padrones, 189 SCRA 496 (1990) — Cited for the rule that there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan, but of rising tempers.
• People vs. Anin, 64 SCRA 729 (1975) — Cited for the rule that there is no evident premeditation when the attack was made in the heat of anger.
• People vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 131817, August 8, 2001 — Cited for the rule that the location, number, and seriousness of the wounds inflicted on the victim belie a claim of self-defense.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death when committed with any of the enumerated circumstances, including treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. The Court applied the provision in determining that the killing was qualified to murder solely by the circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the victim's corpse, treachery, evident premeditation, and cruelty having been ruled out.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.