People of the Philippines vs. Oliver Arevalo Jr. y Abanilla, and Herminigildo Organista y Andres

The qualifying or aggravating circumstance of rape committed by two or more persons must be specifically alleged in the Information; absent such allegation, the accused may be convicted only of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, not death. Insanity as an exempting circumstance requires proof of complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the crime; prior confinement in a mental institution does not suffice.

Oliver Arevalo Jr. and Herminigildo Organista were friends and neighbors in Makati. Regina Acuña and Ruth Acosta were the complainants. The charges were filed under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, which punishes rape and prescribes reclusion perpetua to death when it is committed with a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, require the complaint or information to specify qualifying and aggravating circumstances.

Regina Acuña was a jobless 22-year-old married woman residing in Payatas, Quezon City, while Ruth Acosta was a native of Bukidnon who had left her family for Manila when she was about eighteen years old and had reached only the third grade. On January 23, 2001, between three and four o’clock in the afternoon, Acuña was walking along Manggahan Street in Fairview, Quezon City, looking for a job when Arevalo, a stranger, approached her and offered to get her work as a saleslady. While they were talking, a car stopped; Arevalo placed a white handkerchief on Acuña’s face and boarded her on the vehicle, and she later woke up on a bed inside a room at nighttime. That same day, around six o’clock in the evening, Acosta met Arevalo at Luneta Park; he told her he could help her find a job and invited her to go with him, and they boarded a jeepney to what turned out to be his house in Pembo, Makati. Upon entering the house, Arevalo pushed Acosta to the bed, stripped off her clothes, and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina; that same evening, Organista, Arevalo’s friend and neighbor, also raped Acosta in the same room.

From January 23 to February 14, 2001, Acuña was kept in Arevalo’s house and repeatedly raped. According to the prosecution, Arevalo raped her on January 23; on January 24, an unidentified man paid Arevalo before raping her; on January 25, about six men raped her in succession, with one pointing a knife at her neck; on January 26, Arevalo forced her to sniff a powdered substance and made her take tablets, then raped her while running a knife point from her breasts to her vagina; and on January 31, after raping her, he inserted a lighted cigarette into her private part. She fell ill with fever on February 6, discovered she had a venereal disease on February 8, and was raped almost every day until February 14. On February 14, Arevalo stripped her naked; Organista approached her, and when she pushed him away, Arevalo said, “kaya mo yan pre,” after which Organista inserted his penis into her vagina while she lay on the floor and Arevalo looked on; after Organista finished, Arevalo took over and raped her.

Acosta’s ordeal followed a similar pattern. Arevalo raped her on January 24; on January 25, Arevalo raped her and other men raped her after paying a fee, and she recognized Organista among them because she held his beard while blindfolded; on January 26, appellants Organista and Arevalo took turns raping her; on January 28, appellants forced her to take drugs and Arevalo blindfolded her before several men raped her after paying him; on January 30, Arevalo raped her while Organista watched, and then Organista took over while Arevalo laughed; on February 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, appellants took turns raping her; on February 3, Arevalo slapped and pulled her hair before raping her, and Organista followed while Arevalo held her down; and on February 12 and 13, appellants again raped her. Throughout, Arevalo sold the women’s sexual services to other men for a fee, and on February 9 he warned Acosta that he had already killed a man, so she did not dare remove her blindfold.

On the night of February 14, 2001, after appellants had fulfilled their lustful designs and prostituted the women to other men, they had a drinking spree in Arevalo’s room and fell asleep. Acuña got the key to the door from Arevalo’s pocket, dragged Acosta with her, and together they escaped and reported their ordeal to the Makati police around 9:30 in the evening. A team of Makati policemen and barangay tanods, accompanied by the two women, went to Arevalo’s house; when Arevalo opened the door, the women identified him, and although he tried to escape, he was immediately arrested. The police and the women then proceeded to Organista’s residence, which Arevalo had pointed out; when Organista opened the door, the women identified him, and he too tried to escape but was immediately apprehended. The following day, the complainants were physically examined by Dr. Miriam S. Guialani, deputy chief of the Women’s Crisis and Child Protection Center of the PNP in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Guialani found infected erosions or abrasions at the 8 and 9 o’clock positions in the labial fold of Acuña’s external genitalia, hematoma, infection, and fresh lacerations in the hymen at the 2 and 4 o’clock positions, with the hymen very red and swollen and a foul-smelling yellowish vaginal discharge indicative of a sexually transmitted disease; she noted clear evidence of previous penetrating trauma. For Acosta, Dr. Guialani found healed lacerations at the 4, 7, and 8 o’clock positions in the hymen, edema and swelling at the hymenal rim and mucosal tissues, and clear evidence of previous trauma.

The defense presented a different account. Arevalo testified that since December 27, 2000, he had been in Ormoc, Leyte with his wife and two children; that on February 10, 2001, he returned to Manila to borrow money from his brother Tony to put up a sari-sari store; that at around 4:00 p.m. he went to Luneta where policemen were arresting vagrants and helped the two women, Ruth and Apple, by giving them food and clothing; that they went with him to Makati and arrived at his house around 11:30 p.m.; that the next day he brought the women to Organista’s house, where Organista gave Acosta P10.00; that the women left around 1:30 p.m.; and that at around 1:00 a.m. he saw policemen with the two women, and one policeman boxed him, so he pointed out Organista’s house. Organista claimed he could not remember where he was from January 23 to 26, 2001, because he had been treated with ECI about five times at the National Mental Health Hospital since 1983, which weakened his memory, and he corroborated Arevalo’s testimony that he gave P10.00 for Acosta’s food. Avelina Organista testified that her son was treated at the National Mental Health in 1983, that his last examination was in 1997, that after that examination he could no longer work and had to be bound because he was uncontrollable, and that he even threatened to kill her; she said that on the dates of the alleged rapes he was at home with her. Dr. Pia Alma de Jesus of the National Center for Mental Health testified that she first saw Organista for treatment on April 11, 2001, that hospital records showed he had been mentally ill since 1982 or 1983 and had 23 admissions, and that during his last admission he was given oral medication to control psychotic symptoms like illusions and hallucinations; she said failure to regularly take the medication could cause a relapse that would render him unfit for trial. Jesus Ocampo, driver and all-around helper of Arevalo’s brother Tony, testified that he usually saw Arevalo on Tuesdays because Arevalo used to ask Tony for money.

The RTC found the victims’ positive and straightforward testimonies, corroborated by the medical reports, sufficient to prove appellants’ guilt; having observed their demeanor, the trial court found them credible and found no ill motivation on their part to impute such serious offenses. It found many inconsistencies in Arevalo’s defenses of denial and alibi: he could not state with certainty whether he and his family had left for Ormoc City or Valencia, Leyte; he failed to present bus tickets despite saying he would; the brother’s helper contradicted his claim of being at his brother’s house on February 10, 2001; and the brother’s residence was in Project 2, not Project 3 as Arevalo repeatedly testified. Organista’s insanity defense also failed: although he had been confined at the National Center for Mental Health, his last discharge was in 1997, outside the period of the rapes; his mother said he never left her side, but he declared he was an electrician and mason and had received no complaints from people he worked with from 1999 to March 2001; and when the police and victims went to his house, he tried to escape, which the trial court took as indicative of guilt and awareness of wrongdoing.

• Insanity: Appellant Organista argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of insanity despite strong evidence; he claimed his insanity could be deduced from his inability to remember the events due to treatments at the National Center for Mental Health since 1983, Dr. de Jesus’s testimony on psychotic symptoms and possible relapse, his violent and destructive behavior before and after the rapes, and a New Bilibid Prison certification that he still suffered from chronic schizophrenia.
• Conspiracy: Appellants contended that conspiracy did not attend the rapes committed from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Appellants maintained that the evidence of the prosecution was weak and that their defenses of alibi and denial should have entitled them to acquittal; they also argued that the Informations did not allege with specificity that two persons had raped the victims, so the rapes should not have been qualified and the death penalty should not have been imposed; the penalty for each conviction should have been reclusion perpetua.
• Mitigating Illness: Organista added that, assuming guilt, he should have been entitled to the mitigating circumstance of illness that diminishes an offender’s exercise of will power under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Alibi and Denial: Whether the defenses of alibi and denial should have resulted in acquittal.
• Insanity: Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of insanity in favor of Organista.
• Mitigating Illness: Whether Organista is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of illness under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed between appellants in the rapes committed from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Whether appellants should be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to death despite the Informations not alleging with specificity that two or more persons committed the rape.
• Civil Liability: Whether the awards of damages should be modified.

• Alibi and Denial: No. Denial and alibi are weak defenses and cannot overcome the positive, consistent, and straightforward testimonies of the victims; alibi requires proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the locus delicti, which appellants failed to show.
• Insanity: No. Insanity as an exempting circumstance requires complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the crime; prior confinement in a mental institution and intermittent insanity do not prove insanity at the time of the rapes.
• Mitigating Illness: No. It was not shown that Organista’s mental illness at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the commission of the crime diminished his will power.
• Conspiracy: Partly meritorious. Conspiracy existed only in the rape of Acuña on February 14, 2001, where Arevalo removed her clothes and encouraged Organista with “Kaya mo yan pre”; no conspiracy attended the separate rapes of Acosta on January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Simple rape only. The Informations did not allege any aggravating circumstance; under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specified, so the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua applies, not death.
• Civil Liability: Modified. For each count of simple rape, the victim is entitled to P50,000 civil indemnity and P50,000 moral damages; exemplary damages are deleted because no aggravating circumstance was proven.

• Alibi and Denial: The positive, consistent, and straightforward testimonies of the victims sufficiently established appellants’ culpability. Denial, to merit credibility, must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability, which appellants failed to show. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus delicti or its immediate vicinity. Arevalo merely testified that he was in Ormoc, Leyte, from December 27, 2000, to February 10, 2001, and failed to present the bus tickets he said he would retrieve. Organista’s mother said he stayed with her during the entire period, but their house was near Arevalo’s, so it was not unlikely for him to be in the vicinity. The trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility, absent arbitrariness, is final and conclusive; a woman who declares she has been raped says in effect all that is necessary to show rape, and her credible testimony can support conviction. The medical examination corroborated the victims’ accounts.
• Insanity: The law presumes everyone sane, and the accused who pleads insanity bears the burden of proving it. To be adjudged insane under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused must have been completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time the crime was committed. Evidence must relate to a reasonable period before or after the commission of the crime, and the inquiry should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act was committed. Organista’s prior confinement did not prove insanity during the rapes; he had been discharged from the mental hospital well before January-February 2001. Dr. de Jesus began treating him only in April 2001, two months after the incidents; she said he had been considered treated on his 1997 discharge and did not categorically state that he suffered a relapse before the rapes. The prosecution showed he knew what he was doing: he went to Arevalo’s house, cooperated day after day, continued to rape Acuña after being coaxed, and tried to flee when police arrived. His claimed amnesia did not prove insanity; his selective memory undermined his credibility.
• Mitigating Illness: Organista was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) because it was not shown that his mental illness at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the commission of the crime diminished his will power. The same evidence that failed to establish insanity also failed to establish diminished will power.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy must be shown to have been committed as clearly and convincingly as the offense itself. For Acuña, her account showed that only Arevalo, not Organista, raped her from January 23 to 26, 2001, and no conspiracy attended those rapes. On February 14, 2001, both appellants raped her: Arevalo removed her clothes before Organista raped her, and when she pushed Organista away, Arevalo, who was in the same room, egged him on by saying “Kaya mo yan pre.” An overt act in furtherance of conspiracy may consist of lending moral assistance to co-conspirators even through mere presence at the scene; Arevalo’s presence and words encouraged Organista. For Acosta, the records did not support conspiracy: on January 23, 2001, appellants separately raped her one after the other; only Arevalo raped her on January 24; on January 25 and 26, appellants again separately raped her one after the other; and only Arevalo raped her on February 14. The Court also modified the counts: from January 23 to 26, only Arevalo was liable for Acuña’s rapes; for Acosta, both appellants were liable on January 23, 25, and 26, but only Arevalo on January 24. Acuña testified Organista raped her only on February 14; she said he subsequently raped Acosta, but Acosta was silent on whether Organista raped her on that date, so the doubt was resolved in his favor and he was acquitted of the offense allegedly committed on that date. Other counts were undisturbed.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Article 266-B provides that simple rape is punished by reclusion perpetua, while rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court erred in appreciating the circumstance of rape by two or more persons twice—once as a qualifying and then as an aggravating circumstance. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, require the complaint or information to state qualifying and aggravating circumstances with specificity. No aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Informations. Under People vs. Sabredo, where no aggravating circumstance is alleged and proven, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, appellants were guilty only of simple rape and the penalty for each count was reclusion perpetua, not death.
• Civil Liability: Prevailing jurisprudence holds that for each count of simple rape, the victim should be awarded P50,000 as civil indemnity and another P50,000 as moral damages. Moral damages may be granted to rape victims without proof other than the fact of rape. The award of P100,000 to each victim as exemplary damages was deleted because no aggravating circumstance was proven.

• Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged — Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the complaint or information must specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this rule to hold that because the Informations did not allege that the rapes were committed by two or more persons, the appellants could not be convicted of qualified rape or sentenced to death; they were liable only for simple rape and reclusion perpetua.
• Rape by two or more persons as a qualifying/aggravating circumstance — Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code imposes reclusion perpetua to death when rape is committed with a deadly weapon or by two or more persons. The Court held that the trial court improperly appreciated this circumstance twice—as both qualifying and aggravating—and that absent allegation in the Information, the higher penalty could not be imposed.
• Conspiracy; overt act through moral assistance — Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the offense itself. An overt act in furtherance of conspiracy may consist of lending moral assistance to co-conspirators, including through mere presence at the scene. The Court found conspiracy only in the February 14, 2001 rape of Acuña, where Arevalo removed her clothes and encouraged Organista with “Kaya mo yan pre”; no conspiracy attended the separate rapes of Acosta.
• Insanity as an exempting circumstance — The law presumes sanity, and the accused bears the burden of proving insanity. To be exempt under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused must have been completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the crime. Prior confinement in a mental institution or intermittent insanity does not suffice; the accused must prove insanity at the time of the offense. Organista failed to do so.
• Mitigating circumstance of illness under Article 13(9) — The illness must diminish the offender’s exercise of will power without depriving consciousness of the acts, and it must be shown at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the crime. Organista failed to prove this.
• Alibi and denial — Denial and alibi are weak defenses. Denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability, and alibi requires proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the locus delicti or its immediate vicinity. Appellants failed to satisfy these requirements.
• Credibility of witnesses — The trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility is final and conclusive absent arbitrariness or oversight of facts of weight and substance. A woman who declares she has been raped says in effect all that is necessary to show rape, and her credible testimony can support conviction. The victims’ positive testimonies, corroborated by medical evidence, were upheld.
• Civil liability for simple rape — For each count of simple rape, the victim is entitled to P50,000 civil indemnity and P50,000 moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded without proof other than the fact of rape. Exemplary damages require an aggravating circumstance and were deleted because none was proven.

• "The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the bladed weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor in determining whether appellant should be meted the death penalty is the presence of an aggravating circumstance which attended the commission of the crime. A perusal of the records shows that none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the prosecution. Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied." — The Court quoted People vs. Sabredo to explain that absent an alleged and proven aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty must be imposed, which led to the reduction from death to reclusion perpetua.
• "The law presumes everyone to be sane. The accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity incurs the burden of proving it. To be adjudged insane under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he or she must have been completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time the crime was committed." — This passage states the controlling standard for insanity as an exempting circumstance and explains why Organista’s defense failed.
• "To be appreciated, conspiracy must be shown to have been committed as clearly and convincingly as the offense itself." — This passage states the quantum of proof for conspiracy and frames the Court’s finding that no conspiracy attended the separate rapes of Acosta.
• "We have held that an overt act in furtherance of conspiracy may consist of lending moral assistance to the co-conspirators even through one’s mere presence at the scene of the crime." — This passage defines an overt act in conspiracy and supports the finding that Arevalo conspired with Organista in the February 14, 2001 rape of Acuña.

• People vs. Sabredo, 331 SCRA 682, May 11, 2000 — Quoted by the Court for the rule that where no aggravating circumstance is alleged and proven, the lesser penalty shall be applied; this supported reducing the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. Lachica, 382 SCRA 162, May 9, 2002 — Cited for the rule that denial and alibi are weak defenses and that alibi requires proof of physical impossibility to be at the locus delicti.
• People vs. Lozano, 371 SCRA 546, December 7, 2001 — Cited to support the rule that denial cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties.
• People vs. Palaña, 379 SCRA 553, March 20, 2002 — Cited for the requirement that denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.
• People vs. Cana, 381 SCRA 435, April 22, 2002 — Cited on alibi and on the award of moral damages to rape victims.
• People vs. Baldosa, 381 SCRA 712, May 7, 2002 — Cited on the trial court’s evaluation of witness credibility.
• People vs. Santos, 380 SCRA 608, April 11, 2002 — Cited for the rule that the trial court’s credibility findings are final and conclusive absent arbitrariness.
• People vs. Baluya, 380 SCRA 532, April 11, 2002 — Cited for the rule that a woman’s declaration of rape, if credible, is sufficient to support conviction.
• People vs. Aquino, 366 SCRA 266, September 28, 2001 — Cited for the requirement that conspiracy be proved as clearly and convincingly as the offense itself.
• People vs. Arofo, 380 SCRA 663, April 11, 2002 — Cited for the rule that an overt act in conspiracy may consist of moral assistance through mere presence at the scene, and for moral damages.
• People vs. Condino, 369 SCRA 325, November 19, 2001 — Cited on the presumption of sanity and the requirement to prove insanity at the time of the crime.
• People vs. Legaspi, 357 SCRA 234, April 20, 2001 — Cited on insanity, prior confinement, and civil liability for simple rape.
• People vs. Austria, 328 Phil. 1208, July 31, 1996 — Cited on the standard for insanity and the need to examine the accused’s mental state before or at the time of the crime.
• People vs. Tabugoca, 349 Phil. 236, January 28, 1998 — Cited for the rule that failure to remember does not prove insanity at the time of the crime.
• People vs. Rodriguez, 376 SCRA 408, February 6, 2002 — Cited on civil indemnity and moral damages for simple rape.
• People vs. Garcia, 381 SCRA 722, May 7, 2002 — Cited on civil indemnity and moral damages for simple rape.

• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Defines rape. The convictions were under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 2.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 — Provides that simple rape is punished by reclusion perpetua; when committed with a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied the lesser penalty because no aggravating circumstance was alleged.
• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Provides the exempting circumstance of insanity. The Court held that Organista failed to prove complete deprivation of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the rapes.
• Article 13(9), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of illness that diminishes the exercise of will power without depriving consciousness of the acts. The Court held it was not proven.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the Sabredo quotation: the presence of an aggravating circumstance is crucial in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Lists aggravating circumstances. The Sabredo quotation noted that none was alleged or proven.
• Article 2219(3) and Article 2217, Civil Code — Cited by the trial court as basis for moral damages. The Supreme Court modified the awards to P50,000 civil indemnity and P50,000 moral damages per count of simple rape.
• Section 8, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires the complaint or information to state the designation of the offense, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify qualifying and aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this to hold that the death penalty could not be imposed because the Informations did not allege any aggravating circumstance.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — Cited in the Sabredo quotation regarding the penalty for rape.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Azcuna, J., on official leave – official business.