People of the Philippines vs. Olarte

The filing of a complaint for libel with the justice of the peace court interrupts the running of the two-year prescriptive period under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, because justices of the peace are vested with authority to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal actions for libel, and Republic Act No. 1289 — in substituting "shall" for "may" in Article 360 — was intended to regulate only venue, not to divest them of that authority.

The crime of libel was governed prior to the Revised Penal Code by Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, under which criminal libel cases fell within the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance by reason of the penalty prescribed, considered in relation to section 56 of Act No. 136. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as originally enacted, named the Court of First Instance as the court with which criminal and civil actions for written defamation could be filed, and Republic Act No. 1289, approved on June 15, 1955, amended that provision by substituting "shall" for "may" and confining venue to the province or city where the accused or the offended party resides. The offended party, Visitacion M. Meris, and the defendant, Ascencion P. Olarte, were the parties to the libel charge, the resolution of which turned on whether the amendment altered the authority of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigations.

Ascencion P. Olarte was charged with libel under an information alleging that "on or about the 24th day of February, 1954 and subsequently thereafter," she had wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously written certain letters that were libelous, contemptuous, and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M. Meris, with the evident and malicious purpose of insulting, dishonoring, humiliating, and bringing into contempt the good name and reputation of the complainant. According to an affidavit attached to the complaint filed with the justice of the peace court, one defamatory letter was received by Meris on February 27, 1954, and there were other libelous letters, seemingly written after the first, which were received on or about March 1 and 13, April 26, and May 9, 1954.

On January 7, 1956, Meris lodged the corresponding charge of libel with the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan, who assigned it to an assistant provincial fiscal. Upon the latter's advice, on February 22, 1956, she filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, a complaint for libel against Olarte. The defendant waived her right to a preliminary investigation, whereupon the justice of the peace court forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, in which the corresponding information was filed on July 3, 1956. Olarte seasonably moved to quash the information upon the ground of prescription of the offense, and, after due hearing, the court of first instance granted the motion and dismissed the case, with costs de oficio.

The issue in the lower court, as well as on appeal, was whether the statute of limitations was suspended by the filing of the complaint in the peace court on February 22, 1956, as claimed by the appellant, or continued to run until July 3, 1956, when the information was filed with the court of first instance, as contended by the defendant. The trial judge adopted the latter alternative and accordingly held that the prescriptive period had expired before the filing of the information.

• Interruption of Prescription: The offended party-appellant maintained that the statute of limitations was suspended by the filing of the complaint with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, on February 22, 1956, such that the crime of libel had not been extinguished by prescription.
• Authority of Justices of the Peace: The appellant argued that justices of the peace had authority to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal actions for libel, and that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court constituted the institution of criminal proceedings that interrupted the prescriptive period under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Construction of Republic Act No. 1289: The appellant contended that Republic Act No. 1289 was intended to regulate only venue and did not divest justices of the peace of their authority to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases.

• Continuation of Prescriptive Period: The defendant-appellee contended that the prescriptive period continued to run until July 3, 1956, when the information was filed with the Court of First Instance, and that the offense had therefore prescribed.
• Construction of Article 360: The defendant argued that the substitution of the verb "shall" for "may" in the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1289, showed that it is the filing of the information with the Court of First Instance that interrupts the running of the prescriptive period, not the presentation of the complaint in the justice of the peace court.
• Purpose of the Amendment: The defendant urged that the Revised Penal Code, as originally enacted and as amended, would have merely provided that the criminal and civil actions for written defamation may or should be filed with the "proper court," instead of naming particularly the "court of first instance," had the framers of the law not intended to divest justice of the peace courts of the authority to conduct preliminary investigation in criminal actions for libel.
• Reliance on People vs. Tayco: The defendant invoked People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, for the proposition that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court, and that the "proper court" for purposes of suspending the running of the statute of limitations in libel cases is the Court of First Instance, not the justice of the peace court.

• Interruption of Prescriptive Period: Whether the filing of the complaint for libel with the justice of the peace court interrupted the running of the two-year prescriptive period under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Authority of Justices of the Peace: Whether justices of the peace had authority to conduct preliminary investigations in criminal actions for libel.
• Dismissal of the Appeal: Whether the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the brief for the appellant was prepared and the steps leading to its presentation were taken by the private prosecutors rather than by the Solicitor General.

• Interruption of Prescriptive Period: Yes. The filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, interrupted the running of the statute of limitations, and the crime of libel had not been extinguished by prescription.
• Authority of Justices of the Peace: Yes. Justices of the peace were vested with authority under Act No. 194, as well as under the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948, to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities, without regard to the limits of imposable punishment.
• Dismissal of the Appeal: No. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied, the office of the provincial fiscal and the Solicitor General having acquiesced in and supported the action taken by the complainant.

• Interruption of Prescriptive Period: Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel shall prescribe in two years, and Article 91 provides that the period shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The issue was whether the statute of limitations was suspended by the filing of the complaint in the peace court on February 22, 1956, or continued to run until July 3, 1956, when the information was filed with the Court of First Instance. The Court held that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court interrupted the running of the statute of limitations, because justices of the peace had authority to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases. The Court relied on U.S. vs. Lazada, 9 Phil. 509, 511, which held that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the institution of criminal proceedings and suspended during the continuance thereof; on People vs. Parao, 52 Phil. 712, 715, which broadened the doctrine by declaring that steps taken by the municipal president directed towards the investigation of the crime and the apprehension of the criminals partook of the nature of a judicial proceeding that interrupts the running of the statute of limitations; and on People vs. Joson, 46 Phil. 380, 385, which held that the filing of the complaint had the effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive period, so that an information was not necessary therefor. The Court distinguished People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, on the ground that the offended party therein merely lodged an "accusation" with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, without a complaint in the sense in which the term is used in the Rules of Court, and that the accusation was not filed with a court of justice; in the case at bar, there was a formal complaint filed with a justice of the peace court. The Court likewise held that People vs. Felisa Te, et al., 107 Phil. 355, did not constitute a precedent on the question, because the doctrine laid down therein had no bearing on whether the filing of a complaint with a justice of the peace court interrupts the running of the period of prescription in cases of written defamation; the issue there was the retrospective operation of Republic Act No. 1289, and the decision in fact acknowledged the power of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases.
• Authority of Justices of the Peace: The Court held that the theory of the defense was untenable. Prior to the approval of the Revised Penal Code on December 8, 1930, the crime of libel was governed by Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, which prescribed a fine of not exceeding two thousand dollars or imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or both; courts of first instance had original jurisdiction to hear and decide criminal cases for libel, despite the silence of Act No. 277 thereon, because section 56 (6) of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission vested upon said courts original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed. The Court found that the framers of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and those of Republic Act No. 1289 did not intend to modify the conditions obtaining under Act No. 277 insofar as jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal and civil actions for libel were concerned. Barely two months prior to the passage of Act No. 277, or on August 10, 1901, the Philippine Commission had approved Act No. 194, section 1 of which vested in every justice of the peace in the Philippine Islands the authority to make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to have been committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law vested in the judges of Courts of First Instance. The Court held that there was nothing in Act No. 277 to indicate an intent to divest justices of the peace of such authority; that repeals or amendments by implication are neither presumed nor favored; that every statute should be harmonized with other laws in the absence of a clear inconsistency; and that the jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear and determine criminal actions is far from inconsistent with the authority of justices of the peace to make preliminary investigation in such actions. The Court further held that the substitution of "shall" for "may" in Article 360 did not show that a complaint for libel filed with a justice of the peace court is not the action contemplated therein, because the possession of original jurisdiction by courts of first instance was due neither to the change from "may" to "shall" nor to the specific mention of said courts in Article 360, but to the nature of the penalty imposable. The Court emphasized the difference between jurisdiction to hear and decide a criminal case, on the one hand, and the authority to make in such case a preliminary investigation, on the other. The Court also noted that Congress did not intend to disturb the status quo as regards jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions for libel, as shown by the explanatory note to House Bill No. 2695, the congressional deliberations, and the remark of a member of the Lower House that "We are now talking about venue, not jurisdiction." The Court further observed that if the lawmakers intended to change the laws, jurisprudence, and established practice concerning preliminary investigations in criminal actions for libel and the interruption of the period of prescription, they would have enacted a provision analogous to section 187 of Republic Act No. 180 (Revised Election Code), which vested in the Court of First Instance exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations; Republic Act No. 1289 contained no such provision.
• Dismissal of the Appeal: The Court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that the office of the provincial fiscal and the Solicitor General had acquiesced in and supported the action taken by the complainant, and the Solicitor General had adopted the brief for the appellant as its own.

• Interruption of the Prescriptive Period by the Filing of a Complaint with the Justice of the Peace Court — Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription of the crime of libel is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and the filing of a complaint for libel with the justice of the peace court — which is vested with authority to conduct preliminary investigation in such cases — operates to interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the filing of the complaint with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, on February 22, 1956, interrupted the two-year prescriptive period, such that the crime had not been extinguished by prescription notwithstanding that the information was filed with the Court of First Instance only on July 3, 1956.
• Distinction Between Jurisdiction to Hear and Decide and Authority to Conduct Preliminary Investigation — Jurisdiction to hear and decide a criminal case is distinct from the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation therein. The grant to courts of first instance of original jurisdiction to determine criminal cases for libel is neither a denial to justices of the peace of the authority to conduct preliminary investigation in such cases nor a withdrawal of that authority. The Court applied this distinction in holding that the authority of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases was not divested by the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance over such cases.
• Repeals or Amendments by Implication Not Presumed — Repeals or amendments by implication are neither presumed nor favored; every statute should be harmonized with other laws in the absence of a clear inconsistency between them. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Act No. 277 did not divest justices of the peace of the authority vested upon them by Act No. 194 to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases, there being nothing in Act No. 277 to indicate such an intent.
• Venue Distinguished from Jurisdiction — The amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 1289 to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, substituting "shall" for "may," was intended to regulate only the venue of civil and criminal actions for written defamation and did not disturb the jurisdiction over such actions or the authority of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigations therein. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Republic Act No. 1289 could not be construed as depriving justices of the peace of their authority to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities.
• Preliminary Investigation as a Quasi-Judicial Proceeding — Although Philippine law has vested the power to conduct preliminary investigations in justices of the peace, who are part of the judicial system, as well as in city and provincial fiscals, who belong to the executive department, such investigations are not part of the action proper; they are merely a step preliminary to the proceedings for the redress of a wrong, and neither the government nor the offended party may secure such redress in the course of the investigation. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court nevertheless interrupted the running of the statute of limitations.

• "In view of the foregoing, it is our considered opinion that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, interrupted the running of the statute of limitations, as regards the crime of libel with which defendant herein is charged, and that said crime has not been extinguished, therefore, by prescription, for which reason the order appealed from is reversed, and the records of this case are hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, conformably to law." — This passage states the ratio decidendi and the dispositive ruling of the Court, holding that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for libel.
• "Moreover, said questions fail to take into account the difference between jurisdiction to hear and decide a criminal case, on the one hand, and the authority to make in such case a preliminary investigation, on the other." — This passage articulates the pivotal distinction on which the Court's holding rests, separating the jurisdiction of courts of first instance over libel cases from the authority of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigations therein.
• "Although the Philippine laws have vested the power to conduct preliminary investigations in justices of the peace, which are part of our judicial system, as well as upon city and provincial fiscals, which belong to the executive department, still such investigations are not part of the action proper, as this term is used in said Rule, it being merely a step preliminary to the proceedings for the redress of a wrong, and, hence, neither the government nor the offended party may secure such redress in the course of said investigation." — This passage defines the nature of a preliminary investigation as a quasi-judicial proceeding that does not mark the commencement of a criminal action, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on preliminary investigation.
• "But where as in the case of libel the statute clearly and specifically provides that said complaint must be filed in the Court of First Instance, then only said court has the exclusive original jurisdiction over the case and the filing of such a complaint in said court only can be considered as the commencement of the action that can interrupt the period of prescription." — This passage, drawn from the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Paras, states the contrary view that only the filing of the complaint with the Court of First Instance can interrupt the prescriptive period for libel.

• People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509 — Distinguished. The Court held that the case was not in point because the offended party therein merely lodged an "accusation" with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, without a complaint in the sense in which the term is used in the Rules of Court, and the accusation was not filed with a court of justice; in the case at bar, there was a formal complaint filed with a justice of the peace court.
• People vs. Felisa Te, et al., 107 Phil. 355 — Distinguished. The Court held that the doctrine laid down therein had no bearing on the question of whether the filing of a complaint with a justice of the peace court interrupts the running of the period of prescription in cases of written defamation; the issue there was the retrospective operation of Republic Act No. 1289, and the decision in fact acknowledged the power of justices of the peace to conduct preliminary investigation in libel cases.
• U.S. vs. Lazada, 9 Phil. 509, 511 — Followed. The Court cited the ruling that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the institution of criminal proceedings and suspended during the continuance thereof.
• People vs. Parao, 52 Phil. 712, 715 — Followed. The Court cited the ruling that steps taken by the municipal president, pursuant to his authority to conduct preliminary investigations in the absence of the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace, directed towards the investigation of the crime and the apprehension of the criminals, partook of the nature of a judicial proceeding that interrupts the running of the statute of limitations.
• People vs. Joson, 46 Phil. 380, 385 — Followed. The Court cited the ruling that the filing of the complaint had the effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive period, so that an information was not necessary therefor.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the crime of libel shall prescribe in two years. The Court applied this provision in identifying the two-year prescriptive period at issue.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. The Court applied this provision in holding that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace court interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
• Article 360, Revised Penal Code (original and as amended by Republic Act No. 1289) — The original third paragraph provided that the criminal action and the civil action for damages in cases of written defamation may be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province wherein the libel was published, displayed, or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed, or composed. Republic Act No. 1289 substituted "shall" for "may" and confined venue to the province or city where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides at the time of the commission of the offense. The Court construed the amendment as regulating only venue and not divesting justices of the peace of their authority to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases.
• Act No. 277, section 2 and section 11 — The old Libel Law, which prescribed a fine of not exceeding two thousand dollars or imprisonment for not exceeding one year, or both, and which provided that suit may be brought in any Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the parties. The Court examined this law to determine the jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions for libel prior to the Revised Penal Code.
• Act No. 136, section 56 (6) — Vested upon courts of first instance original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed. The Court cited this provision in holding that criminal cases for libel fell within the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
• Act No. 194, section 1 — Vested in every justice of the peace in the Philippine Islands the authority to make preliminary investigation of any crime alleged to have been committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law vested in the judges of Courts of First Instance. The Court relied on this provision in holding that justices of the peace had authority to conduct preliminary investigations in libel cases.
• Republic Act No. 296 (Revised Judiciary Act of 1948), section 87, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613 — Vested in justices of the peace the authority to conduct preliminary investigations for any offense alleged to have been committed within their respective municipalities, without regard to the limits of imposable punishment. The Court cited this provision in support of its holding.
• Republic Act No. 180 (Revised Election Code), section 187 — Provided that the Court of First Instance shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations, issue warrants of arrest, and try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of the Code. The Court cited this provision as an example of the kind of provision Congress would have enacted had it intended to change the laws, jurisprudence, and established practice concerning preliminary investigations in criminal actions for libel.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., and Barrera, JJ.

• Chief Justice Paras (joined by Justice Gutierrez David) — The dissent maintained that the question of whether the criminal action had prescribed depended on the interpretation of the provisions of law involved, and that the crime of libel had from the beginning merited special consideration. It emphasized that Act No. 277, section 14, provided that all criminal actions under the Act shall be begun and prosecuted under the sole direction and control of the ordinary prosecuting officers, and that Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code expressly indicated the court wherein the criminal and civil actions for libel were to be filed. The dissent argued that because the crime of libel is transitory and the statute clearly and specifically provides that the complaint must be filed in the Court of First Instance, only that court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case, and only the filing of the complaint in that court can be considered as the commencement of the action that interrupts the period of prescription. It relied on People vs. Feliza Te, 107 Phil. 355, and reasoned that the majority's view would produce a peculiar situation where the filing of the complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court of Balayan interrupted the period of prescription, but the case had to be tried in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The dissent also noted that in the whole Revised Penal Code and other statutes prescribing penal provisions, there is no mention of the court wherein a case should be filed, with the notable exceptions of those relating to violations of the Election Code, the Copyright Law, the Land Registration Act, and the crime of libel, and that the objectives of the amendment — to avoid harassment of newspapermen and to foster the freedom of the press — must have prompted the exception confining to the Court of First Instance exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases.