People of the Philippines vs. Norberto Manero, Jr., et al.

Conspiracy is established when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it, and it is not essential that all accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense; participation in any act showing singularity of purpose and unity in execution suffices. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible prosecution witnesses, and the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

The case arose from the murder of Fr. Tulio Favali, an Italian Catholic missionary of the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers laboring in the hinterlands of Mindanao. The accused were members of a group that included the Manero brothers and Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) members who conspired to liquidate suspected communist sympathizers. The offenses were committed on 11 April 1985 in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato, and the cases were consolidated in Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato.

On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto, and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago, and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, and his two unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following: "NPA vs. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" referred to Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" was Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader; Domingo Gomez was another lay leader. On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.

At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two unidentified companions nailed a placard on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades bearing the same inscriptions as those on the cigarette wrapper except for the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo." Some two hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the same message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery. At 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil." They were met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name was included in the placards. Without provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of "Bantil," who was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear were hit. As "Bantil" ran away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto, but only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" managed to seek refuge in the house of Domingo Gomez. Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to surround the house and not allow anyone to get out so that "Bantil" would die of hemorrhage.

At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle and entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway, opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire, and burned the motorcycle. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr., who simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance.

In seeking exculpation, appellants contended that the trial court erred in disregarding their defenses of alibi, arguing that there was no prior agreement to kill, that the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali, that there was only one gunman, Edilberto, and that there was no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting. Accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claimed they were harvesting palay the whole day some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Roger Bedaño alleged he was on an errand for the church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato, that morning, taking along his wife and sick child for medical treatment, and arrived in La Esperanza past noontime. All appellants contended that it was only after they heard gunshots that they rushed to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by their fellow CHDF members, and proceeded together to the crime scene.

Two eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo, testified that they were both inside the eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning when the Manero brothers, together with appellants, first discussed their plan to kill some communist sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in the company of the Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot, and at 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, appellants were very much at the scene of the crime when Fr. Favali was brutally murdered.

• Defense of Alibi: Appellants contended that the trial court erred in disregarding their respective defenses of alibi, which, if properly appreciated, would establish that there was no prior agreement to kill.
• Identity of Intended Victim: Appellants argued that the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali, and that there was only one gunman, Edilberto.
• Lack of Participation: Appellants argued that there was absolutely no showing that they cooperated in the shooting of the victim despite their proximity at the time to Edilberto.

• Positive Identification: The prosecution presented two eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo, who positively identified the appellants as being present at the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 11 April 1985.
• Conspiracy Through Concerted Acts: The prosecution established that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but vital cogs in perpetrating the crimes, having assumed fighting stances, surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez, and stood guard with firearms ready on the road when Edilberto shot Fr. Favali.

• Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in disregarding the appellants' defense of alibi.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established despite the appellants not having delivered the fatal shots themselves.
• Moral Damages: Whether the award of moral damages to the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers was proper.
• Civil Indemnity: Whether the civil indemnity of ₱12,000.00 should be increased and to whom it should be paid.

• Defense of Alibi: No. The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by prosecution witnesses, and appellants failed to prove the required physical impossibility of being present at the crime scene.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through the concerted acts of all the accused, and the act of one conspirator is the act of all; the precise extent or modality of participation of each becomes secondary.
• Moral Damages: No. A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because it cannot experience physical suffering or wounded feelings; the heirs never presented evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish.
• Civil Indemnity: The civil indemnity is increased from ₱12,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased, not the PIME congregation.

• Defense of Alibi: It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The appellants failed to prove the required physical impossibility, as the places where they were allegedly situated were proximate to the locus criminis. No physical impossibility exists where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance. More important, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by prosecution witnesses. Two eyewitnesses testified that appellants were at the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and their alibi, being negative in nature, cannot prevail.

• Conspiracy: There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense; it is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose and unity in its execution. The trial court's findings unmistakably showed a community of design as evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. The appellants were positively identified in the carinderia at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, seen again at 4:00 o'clock near the house of Rufino Robles when Edilberto shot him, surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where Robles fled, followed Fr. Favali to Gomez's house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle, stood guard with firearms ready on the road when Edilberto shot Fr. Favali, and joined in the enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest. These were overt acts to ensure the success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. While appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts. The conspirators expressly agreed that Fr. Favali was a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest, and witness Manuel Bantolo testified that all appellants agreed and laughed at the suggestion.

• Moral Damages: The award of moral damages to the PIME Brothers is not proper. There is nothing on record which indicates that the deceased effectively severed his civil relations with his family or disinherited any member thereof when he joined his religious congregation. A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish, or moral shock. Neither can moral damages be awarded to the heirs of the deceased pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, because the heirs never presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish. Moral damages and their causal relation to the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant.

• Civil Indemnity and Exemplary Damages: The civil indemnity of ₱12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali is increased to ₱50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence, to be paid to the lawful heirs, not the PIME. Considering that the brutal slaying was attended with abuse of superior strength, cruelty, and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 may be awarded to the lawful heirs even though not proved nor expressly pleaded in the complaint.

• Defense of Alibi — The accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but must also prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The defense cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by prosecution witnesses. In this case, appellants failed to prove physical impossibility given the proximity of their alleged locations to the crime scene, and their alibi was negative in nature compared to the positive declarations of eyewitnesses.

• Conspiracy — There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense; it is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose and unity in its execution. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each becomes secondary. In this case, the appellants' concerted acts—standing guard, surrounding the house, and joining in the merriment—constituted overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

• Moral Damages for Juridical Persons — A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish, or moral shock. It is only when a juridical person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation, that moral damages may be awarded. The PIME Brothers congregation was not entitled to moral damages in this case.

• Exemplary Damages in Criminal Offenses — Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs even though not proved nor expressly pleaded in the complaint. The brutal slaying attended with abuse of superior strength, cruelty, and ignominy justified the award of ₱100,000.00 in exemplary damages.

• "It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the defense of alibi and its requirement of physical impossibility, which the appellants failed to satisfy.

• "There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present." — This passage defines conspiracy and establishes that not all conspirators need to commit every act of the offense, a principle directly applied to hold the appellants liable.

• "Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act of one is the act of all the other conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary." — This passage articulates the rule that once conspiracy is established, individual participation becomes secondary, which was the basis for affirming the appellants' conviction despite their not firing the fatal shots.

• "A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock." — This passage states the rule that juridical persons cannot recover moral damages, which was the basis for deleting the award to the PIME Brothers congregation.

• People vs. Pugal, G.R. No. 90637, 29 October 1992 — Cited for the rule that the defense of alibi requires proof of physical impossibility of being at the crime scene.
• People vs. Bañez, G.R. No. 95456, 18 September 1992 — Cited for the proposition that the defense of alibi is feeble where physical impossibility is not proven.
• People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 105964, 4 November 1992 — Cited for the rule that no physical impossibility exists where it takes only fifteen to twenty minutes by jeep or tricycle to traverse the distance.
• People vs. Abuyan, Jr., G.R. Nos. 95254-55, 21 July 1992 — Cited for the rule that no physical impossibility exists even if the distance between two places is merely two hours by bus.
• People vs. Antud, G.R. No. 95684, 27 October 1992 — Cited for the rule that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Serdan, G.R. No. 87318, 2 September 1992 — Cited for the rule that alibi, being negative in nature, cannot prevail over positive declarations.
• People vs. Hasiron, G.R. No. 100797, 15 October 1992 — Cited for the definition of conspiracy, citing Art. 8 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Sabornido, G.R. No. 102141, 18 September 1992 — Cited for the rule that it is not essential that all accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense.
• People vs. Martinado, G.R. No. 92020, 19 October 1992 — Cited for the rule that participation in an act where there is singularity of purpose and unity in execution suffices for conspiracy.
• People vs. de los Reyes, No. L-44112, 22 October 1992 — Cited for the rule that the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
• Simex International (Manila), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013, 19 March 1990 — Cited for the rule that a juridical person is not entitled to moral damages.
• Raagas vs. Traya, 130 Phil. 846 (1968) — Cited for the rule that moral damages and their causal relation to the defendant's acts should be satisfactorily proved by the claimant.
• Darang vs. Belizar, No. L-19487, 31 January 1967 — Cited for the rule that in order for moral damages to be awarded, there must be proof of moral suffering.
• Dempsey vs. RTC, Br. 75, G.R. No. 77737-38, 15 August 1988 — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. Marciales, G.R. No. 61961, 18 October 1988 — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal offenses with aggravating circumstances.
• Singson vs. Aragon, 92 Phil. 514 (1953) — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages may be awarded even though not proved nor expressly pleaded in the complaint.

• Art. 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as the agreement of two or more persons to commit a felony and decide to commit it; applied to establish the appellants' liability for the acts of their co-conspirators.
• Art. 70, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the successive service of penalties; cited in the trial court's order that the penalties shall be served successively in the order of their respective severity.
• Art. 2206(3), Civil Code — Provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased; applied to determine that the heirs, not the PIME congregation, were the proper claimants, but they failed to prove mental anguish.
• Art. 2230, Civil Code — Provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; applied to justify the award of ₱100,000.00 in exemplary damages to the lawful heirs.

Cruz, Padilla, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concurred.