People of the Philippines vs. Nicomedes Fabro

An extrajudicial confession is admissible where the accused, after being informed of his constitutional rights, waives them in writing and in the presence of an independent counsel who is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney with interests adverse to the accused; once the prosecution shows compliance with these constitutional requirements, the burden shifts to the accused to prove by clear, convincing and competent evidence that the confession was obtained through force, duress or intimidation.

The 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, and its Article III, Section 12 and Section 17 govern the custodial investigation of persons suspected of committing offenses thereafter. Nicomedes Fabro stood charged, together with Francisco Dimalanta, Amado Alcala, William Hoge and a certain "John Doe," with the murder of Dionisio Joaquin, an organizer of a labor strike then being conducted at Casa Blanca in Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The confession at the center of the appeal was taken on April 13, 1987 at the CIS Office in Camp Maquinaya, Olongapo City, with Atty. Isagani Jungco, President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Zambales Chapter), present as assisting counsel.

In the second week of April 1987, a strike was held by workers on the premises of Casa Blanca located at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. Dionisio Joaquin was one of the organizers of that strike, and he sought the assistance of friends, among them Anthony Beck, a stevedore and resident of Olongapo City. At about 6:00 P.M. on April 11, 1987, Joaquin and Beck were at the Whisky Bar fronting Casa Blanca, conversing while resting at the veranda of the bar and facing the picket line being conducted by their co-strikers. Both fell asleep on chairs near each other, their feet resting on the veranda railings, having lacked sleep the previous nights.

Beck fell asleep at about 4:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 12, 1987. Shortly thereafter, at about 5:00 to 5:30 in the morning, he was awakened by a gun report. Opening his eyes, he saw Joaquin dead, with a single bullet wound on the forehead and blood oozing from his head. Seeing a man running away from where he and Joaquin were seated, Beck gave chase. The fleeing man turned left on an alley and then right on another, and Beck lost him at the second turn. He then saw an old man who inquired why he was chasing the fleeing man; Beck told the old man of the shooting incident, and the old man told him that the man he had been running after was "Badong," later identified as the accused Nicomedes Fabro.

Police officers from the Olongapo Metrodiscom, led by Sgt. Felipe Bolina, proceeded to Fabro's residence at about noon that same day but failed to apprehend him, as he was allegedly then asleep. Fabro was surrendered by his sister to the CIS the following day. At 6:00 o'clock in the evening of April 13, 1987, Fabro was interrogated by CIS personnel and grilled for about two hours. At that juncture, CIS investigator Santiago requested Fabro to sign a document, which turned out to be his extrajudicial confession or admission (Exhibit "F"). According to Fabro, he was not allowed to read the document and its contents were not read to him, although a certain Atty. Isagani Jungco was present when he signed it. Co-accused Francisco Dimalanta likewise executed an extrajudicial statement, but Dimalanta was never presented in court as a defense witness, as he and Alcala jumped bail during trial.

The defense presented Fabro as its only witness and offered no documentary evidence. Fabro testified that at two o'clock in the morning of April 12, 1987, he stopped ferrying passengers and slept on a sofa at the Whiskey River Club, located on a terrace of the club. When he lay down, another person was seated on the sofa about one arm's length away, asleep, whose face he knew but whose name he did not. While sleeping, he was awakened by the shout of one of his companions saying "may binaril, may binaril"; the shout was very loud, and after shouting, the man ran towards Olongapo City. Fabro claimed that he was standing and looking at the bloodied person, who was more or less two arms' length away from him at the balcony of the Whiskey River Club. He further claimed that he was made to sign a document without being allowed to read its contents, and that investigator Santiago told him that if he would not sign the document, something would happen to him; Atty. Jungco was present when he signed his name, but the document was already prepared and ready for signature.

The trial court leaned towards the version of the prosecution. It found indubitable that in the early morning of April 12, 1987, between 5:00 and 5:30, Dionisio Joaquin, who was sleeping side by side with Anthony Beck on the terrace of the Whisky Bar opposite Casa Blanca, was shot in the head at close range by Fabro, and that the deceased was found on a chair, his feet raised on the veranda and his head inclined back. Beck, awakened by the shot, chased the person he saw running away and later positively identified Fabro when the latter was mixed with other people getting clearance at the 164th PC Company Office. Sgt. Bolina learned the identity of the fleeing man as Fabro and requested the latter's parents to surrender him. The trial court declined to give credence to Fabro's uncorroborated claim that he was asleep at the terrace of the Whiskey Club at the time of the incident, and rejected his contention that he was coerced into signing a confession, since the solitary verbal threat allegedly made by the investigator was vague and not backed up by the use of actual physical force. Crediting the presence of Atty. Jungco, who assisted the appellant and his co-accused during the custodial investigation and in the execution of their respective sworn statements, the lower court admitted the extrajudicial confessions in evidence. Fabro's confession narrated how Dimalanta offered him P10,000.00 to kill a man, how the gun was given to him, and how they observed the movements of the victim up to the time of the killing, with Alcala and Dimalanta present and awaiting the outcome of the shooting. Dimalanta's confession coincided in all material points, narrating how he was promised P10,000.00 by a certain Bill Hoge, how he was paid P5,000.00 as initial payment, and how that initial payment was shared by the three accused. On these findings, the trial court established the existence of conspiracy among the three accused, found Beck's testimony unbiased, truthful and credible, and held that the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and consideration of price or reward.

• Defense of Alibi: Appellant faulted the trial court for not considering the defense of alibi when there was doubt as to the identity of the suspect. He argued that although alibi is the weakest defense, it gains strength when there is doubt as to the identity of the suspect; that although he admitted sleeping next to the victim when the latter was shot, Witness Beck could not have seen the face of the person running away from the crime scene since it was still dark at that time and Beck had just awakened, so it would have taken some time before his eyes could have adjusted; and that the identification by Beck was "coached and suggested" by the investigators who fetched him and prepared his second statement.
• Inadmissibility of the Confession: Appellant maintained that his admissions and confessions were inadmissible as violative of the Constitution. Specifically, he contended that (a) his confession was extracted under threat and intimidation; (b) the lawyer's (Atty. Jungco's) participation was only as a witness during the signing of the prepared confession and not during the investigation or interrogation itself; and (c) he was made to sign the confession without having read it and without the presence of counsel.
• Hearsay Evidence: Appellant argued that the statements and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were hearsay because his identification was hearsay — his name having been allegedly given to Witness Beck by a certain Eduardo Ragonton, who was not presented as a witness.
• Presumption of Conspiracy: Appellant faulted the trial court for presuming that conspiracy exists, although the defense raised this issue without elaborating further or offering any evidence in support thereof.

• Voluntariness and Effective Assistance of Counsel: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, maintained that the testimony of Atty. Jungco was replete with details as to how he informed and warned appellant of the consequences of the waiver of his right to counsel, so that there was no room for doubt that appellant was indeed assisted by counsel when he waived his right to counsel during the time that his statement was taken, and not only at the time he signed it as claimed by appellant.
• Prosecution's Version of the Facts: Respondent, through the Solicitor General's Appellee's Brief, set out the prosecution's version of the facts, which the Court adopted as the narration of the events leading to the killing and which established that appellant was identified by eyewitness Anthony Beck and that his confession was executed in the presence of Atty. Jungco.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: Whether appellant's extrajudicial confession was inadmissible for having been extracted through threat and intimidation and without the effective assistance of counsel, in violation of Article III, Sections 12 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
• Defense of Alibi/Denial Against Positive Identification: Whether the trial court erred in not considering the defense of alibi when there was doubt as to the identity of the suspect.
• Hearsay: Whether the statements and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the identification of appellant by Anthony Beck, were hearsay.
• Existence of Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in presuming that conspiracy existed among the accused.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: Whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and consideration of a price or reward attended the killing, and whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in appellant's favor.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: No. The confession was properly admitted by the trial court, the prosecution having shown that appellant was informed of his constitutional rights and waived them in writing and in the presence of an independent counsel, and appellant having failed to prove by clear, convincing and competent evidence that it was obtained through force, duress or intimidation.
• Defense of Alibi/Denial Against Positive Identification: No. Appellant's defense was more accurately a denial, since he admitted being at the scene of the crime; giving it a different name does not increase its probative value, and it cannot prevail over the positive identification by eyewitness Beck and appellant's own confession.
• Hearsay: No. While the name of appellant supplied by another person to Witness Beck may be considered hearsay, appellant's identity, which Beck personally knew because he had seen his face, is not hearsay.
• Existence of Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was indubitable, the acts of the accused showing that they were animated by the same purpose and united in their execution, and conspiracy may be inferred when two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part in acts apparently independent but in fact connected.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: Yes, all three circumstances were proven, but only one will be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder, the two others serving only as generic aggravating circumstances; the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender offsets one generic aggravating circumstance, so that the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

• Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Confession: The Court addressed this assigned error ahead of the first in view of the incriminatory nature of the confession. A confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime. Before it can be admitted in evidence, three requisites must be satisfied: (1) it must be given freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery; (2) it must be knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights; and (3) it must be given intelligently, with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences. Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal experience of mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability. A confession meeting all these requisites constitutes evidence of a high order, supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which took effect on February 2, 1987, requires that a person under investigation be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and that these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel; Section 17 guarantees the right against self-incrimination, and any confession obtained in violation of these provisions is inadmissible in evidence. The defense's claims of threat and intimidation, of Atty. Jungco's participation being limited to witnessing the signing of a prepared confession, and of appellant having signed without reading the document, were uncorroborated and anemic, and appeared to be a mere subterfuge designed to impute constitutional infirmity to the custodial interrogation. The more credible evidence was the rebuttal testimony of Atty. Jungco, who testified that after he apprised appellant of his constitutional rights to be silent and to have counsel during the investigation, the latter waived them in his presence; that he was present when appellant signed his waiver of the right to counsel and when appellant signed the last page of his statement; and that the admonition was given in Tagalog and English and was understood by appellant. This adherence to the Constitution was confirmed by the confession itself, which began with a Pasubali informing appellant of his constitutional rights and a Pagpapatunay confirming that he understood them, both parts serving as written proof of the waiver. The Constitution further requires that counsel be independent; he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco fell under none of these disqualifications, and no evidence showed that he had any interest adverse to the accused; he was President of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and not a lackey of the lawmen. Doubts as to his independence, arising from the fact that he was engaged by the CIS investigators, were dispelled by the circumstance that he was sent to the CIS Office by Sgt. Bolina, who personally knew appellant's parents and was a friend of his brother-in-law, and who took the trouble to ensure that a lawyer was present during the taking of appellant's statement even though Bolina himself would not be there. Appellant failed to overcome the presumption that Atty. Jungco regularly performed his official duty as an officer of the court in giving assistance to persons undergoing custodial interrogation. Once the prosecution has shown that the confession was obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantee, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used rests on the accused. Appellant failed to present any convincing evidence of force or intimidation: the confession was sworn and subscribed before Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and should have voiced his objection, and who certified that he personally examined appellant and was convinced that the statement was given freely and voluntarily and that appellant understood its contents; appellant voiced no complaint, or even any mention thereof, to his sister and relatives who visited him at Camp Maquinaya where he was detained for one year; and the confession contained exculpatory claims and facts that only appellant could have known. The trial court's finding that appellant was never hurt by any of the CIS investigators, and that the only alleged threat was the vague statement that "if I will not sign it something will happen to me," with nothing mentioned about actual physical force, was affirmed. The confession was thus properly admitted as part of the prosecution evidence.
• Defense of Alibi/Denial Against Positive Identification: The defense's contention that alibi gains strength where there is doubt as to the identity of the suspect did not inspire belief. Beck claimed that he saw appellant running away from the scene of the shooting and, in answer to the trial judge's clarificatory questions during cross-examination, replied that when he opened his eyes after hearing the gun report, he saw a person who immediately ran away; he testified that he saw appellant's face while chasing him, although he did not catch up with him. From the time he was awakened until he lost appellant during the chase, Beck saw appellant's face, and subsequently, in open court, he pointed to appellant as the man he had chased. The defense's claim that the time of the incident (5:00 to 5:30 a.m. in mid-April) afforded insufficient daylight for clear and positive identification did not persuade. Because appellant admitted that he was at the scene of the crime, his defense was actually and more accurately a denial rather than alibi, and giving it a different name does not increase its probative value. A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is independently assessed; when the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible. The well-settled rule is that the assessment by the trial court of credibility and weight of evidence is accorded the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of substance which would have affected the result of the case. Beck's testimony that appellant was the man he chased contravened the contention that appellant was sleeping one arm's length away from the victim, that he was only awakened by shouts that somebody was shot, and that he stayed at the crime scene for a time during the investigation; moreover, the denial was directly contravened by his confession that he shot the victim. In light of that confession, the denial was actually a belated retraction of the confession, and the rule in this jurisdiction is that repudiation and recantation of confessions obtained in accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable and have negligible probative weight. The trial court's finding that appellant's denial was totally unconvincing rested on four circumstances: that he just happened to be asleep at the terrace of the Whisky Bar; that he, a resident nearby, for no explainable reason elected to sleep on the same veranda during the very same night that the victim was shot; that he was awakened only by the shouting of people and not by the sound of the gunshot; and that he stayed at the scene of the crime for about thirty minutes without anybody noticing that he was there at all.
• Hearsay: The defense's claim that the identification of appellant was hearsay because his name was allegedly given to Witness Beck by a certain Eduardo Ragonton, who was not presented as a witness, could not be sustained. The fact remained that Witness Beck was able to identify appellant in open court because he had seen the latter's face that fateful night. While Beck may not have known the name of appellant, he was certain about the latter's identity. Appellant's name, which was supplied by another person to Witness Beck, may be considered hearsay, but appellant's identity, which the said witness personally knew, is not.
• Existence of Conspiracy: The defense raised this issue without elaborating further or offering any evidence in support thereof. Conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused appeared indubitable. The confession of Fabro confirmed that Dimalanta and Alcala were his co-conspirators and narrated how Dimalanta offered him P10,000.00 to kill a man, how the gun was given to him, and how they observed the movements of the victim up to the time of the killing, with Alcala and Dimalanta present and awaiting the outcome of the shooting. Dimalanta's confession coincided in all material points with that of Fabro, narrating how he was promised P10,000.00 by a certain Bill Hoge, how he was paid P5,000.00 as initial payment, and how that initial payment was shared by the three accused. The acts of the accused showed that they were animated by the same purpose and were united in their execution; when, by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object — each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment — conspiracy may be inferred. From appellant's confession, it was clear that Dimalanta offered him money to kill Joaquin; that, together with Alcala, they observed the movements of the victim; that prior to the shooting they had attempted to kill the victim at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that at the time of the shooting on April 12, 1987, Dimalanta and Alcala were at or near the scene of the crime, acting as lookouts and awaiting the outcome of the killing.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: That the crime was committed in consideration of a price was satisfactorily shown by appellant's confession: Dimalanta was promised P10,000.00 by Hoge to look for a killer, P5,000.00 was actually paid, Dimalanta in turn secured the services of the triggerman Fabro in exchange for money, and Alcala was paid for his participation in the plan. Evident premeditation was manifest from the fact that on April 10, 1987 appellant was approached and hired by Dimalanta to kill the victim; that appellant clung to his determination to kill the victim even after an unsuccessful first attempt on April 11, 1987 at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that a sufficient lapse of time had passed giving appellant a chance to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Treachery was shown by the fact that appellant, after several days of observing the movements of the victim, shot the latter while he was asleep; the means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and showed that such method was deliberately or consciously adopted. Although all three circumstances of price, premeditation and treachery were proven, only one will be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder, and the two others can be used only as generic aggravating circumstances. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, however, should also be appreciated in appellant's favor, as he surrendered to the CIS in Camp Maquinaya on April 13, 1987, thereby offsetting one generic aggravating circumstance; accordingly, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

• Requisites for the Admissibility of an Extrajudicial Confession — In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given: (1) freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery; (2) knowingly, based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights; and (3) intelligently, with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences. Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal experience of mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability. A confession meeting all these requisites constitutes evidence of a high order, supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. The Court applied each requisite to Fabro's extrajudicial confession and found all of them satisfied.
• Waiver of the Rights to Silence and to Counsel — Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution requires that the rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of one's own choice cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and any confession obtained in violation thereof is inadmissible in evidence. The Court found the requirement satisfied by the written waiver embodied in the Pasubali and Pagpapatunay portions of the confession, signed by appellant in the presence of Atty. Jungco.
• Independence of Assisting Counsel — The Constitution requires that counsel be independent; he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco, as President of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, fell under none of these disqualifications, and no evidence showed that he had any interest adverse to the accused.
• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duty — Appellant failed to overcome the presumption that Atty. Jungco regularly performed his official duty as an officer of the court in giving assistance to persons undergoing custodial interrogation, the overwhelming evidence being that he performed such duty faithfully.
• Burden of Proving Involuntariness of a Confession — Once the prosecution has shown that the confession was obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantee, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used to obtain it rests upon the accused, who must establish the allegation by clear, convincing and competent evidence. Unc corroborated and anemic allegations of a solitary verbal threat, unsupported by any showing of actual physical force and unaccompanied by any complaint to the administering fiscal, to visiting relatives, or by any medical examination, are insufficient.
• Alibi or Denial vis-à-vis Positive Identification — Alibi is the weakest defense, easily fabricated and concocted, and gains strength only when there is doubt as to the identity of the suspect. Where the accused admits that he was at the scene of the crime, his defense is more accurately a denial, and giving it a different name does not increase its probative value. A denial remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is independently assessed; when the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible.
• Hearsay: Name Distinguished from Identity — The name of the accused supplied by another person to a witness may be considered hearsay, but the identity of the accused, which the witness personally knew because he had seen his face, is not hearsay.
• Conspiracy Inferred from Acts — When, by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object — each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of sentiment — conspiracy may be inferred.
• Repudiation and Recantation of Confessions — Repudiation and recantation of confessions which have been obtained in accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable and have negligible probative weight.
• Aggravating Circumstances in Murder — Although the circumstances of price or reward, evident premeditation and treachery may all be proven, only one will be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder, and the two others can be used only as generic aggravating circumstances. Evident premeditation and offer of money, reward or promise are not incompatible and may be appreciated together, one being independent of the other.
• Treachery — Treachery is shown where the means of execution (1) gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) showed that such method was deliberately or consciously adopted. It attended the killing where the appellant, after several days of observing the movements of the victim, shot the latter while he was asleep.
• Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — Voluntary surrender is appreciated in the accused's favor where he surrendered to the CIS in Camp Maquinaya on April 13, 1987, and it offsets one generic aggravating circumstance.
• Credibility Assessment on Appeal — The assessment by the trial court of the credibility and weight of evidence is accorded the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of substance which would have affected the result of the case.
• Dismissal of Appeal for Jumping Bail — Under Rule 124, Section 8 of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92, an accused who jumps bail during the pendency of his appeal is deemed to have abandoned it, and the appeal is dismissed; the trial court should not have allowed the appeal of Dimalanta and Alcala since they jumped bail prior to such appeal.

• "In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given: 1. Freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or trickery; 2. Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights; and 3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences." — This passage states the canonical three-fold test for the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession, the framework against which the Court measured Fabro's statement and the doctrinal core of the decision.
• "The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused." — This defines the constitutional standard of independence for assisting counsel and supplies the test by which the Court validated Atty. Jungco's participation in the custodial investigation.
• "Indeed, appellant's name which was supplied by another person to Witness Beck may be considered hearsay; but appellant's identity which the said witness personally knew is not." — This is the Court's crisp resolution of the hearsay objection, drawing the line between a name relayed by a third person and an identity personally perceived by the witness.
• "Although all three circumstances (price, premeditation and treachery) were proven, only one will be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder and the two others can be used only as generic aggravating circumstances." — This states the rule on the treatment of multiple qualifying and aggravating circumstances in murder, which, together with the appreciation of voluntary surrender, fixed the imposable penalty at reclusion perpetua.

• People vs. Januario, G.R. No. 98252, February 7, 1997 — Cited for the definition of a confession as a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or participated in the commission of a crime.
• U.S. vs. Corrales, 28 Phil. 362 (1914) — Cited alongside Januario for the same definition of a confession.
• People vs. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980) — Cited for the requisites of admissibility of a confession, particularly that it must be given freely and voluntarily and intelligently, with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences.
• People vs. Saligan, 101 SCRA 264 (1980) — Cited for the rule that once the prosecution has shown that the confession was obtained in accordance with the constitutional guarantee, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used rests upon the accused.
• Antillon vs. Barcelon, 27 Phil. 148 (1917) — Cited for the imposition of a high degree of proof to overthrow the presumption of truth in the recitals contained in a public instrument executed with all the legal formalities.
• People vs. Pia, 145 SCRA 581 (1986) — Cited for the rule that where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion, duress or violence on their person — such as failing to complain to the officers who administered the oaths, failing to institute criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators, the absence of marks of violence, and the failure to submit to medical examination — their confession should be considered voluntary.
• People vs. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 (1994) — Cited for the disqualifications of an assisting counsel who cannot be considered independent.
• People vs. Barlis, 231 SCRA 427 (1994) — Cited for the presumption that counsel regularly performed his official duty as an officer of the court in giving assistance to persons undergoing custodial interrogation.
• People vs. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992) — Cited for the rule that the accused's failure to voice out his complaints is tantamount to a manifestation that he indeed waived his right to counsel in the presence of the assisting lawyer.
• People vs. Oracoy, 224 SCRA 506, 768 (1993) — Cited for the rule that repudiation and recantation of confessions obtained in accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable and have negligible probative weight.
• U.S. vs. Manalinde, 14 Phil. 77 (1909) — Cited for the holding that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and offer of money, reward or promise are not incompatible and may be appreciated together, one being independent of the other.
• People vs. Azugue, G.R. No. 110098, February 26, 1997 — Cited for the rule on inferring conspiracy from the acts of two or more persons proceeding toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object.
• People vs. Abalos, 258 SCRA 523 (1996) — Cited, together with People vs. Porras and People vs. Panlilio, as basis for increasing the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.
• People vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364 (1991) — Cited for the significance of a confession containing exculpatory claims as an indication of its voluntariness.
• People vs. Damaso, 190 SCRA 595 (1990) — Cited for the evidentiary value of facts contained in a confession that only the accused could have known.

• Article III, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, provides that these rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and declares inadmissible in evidence any confession or admission obtained in violation of the provision. The Court applied it as the controlling standard for the custodial investigation conducted on April 13, 1987, and found the written waiver executed in the presence of Atty. Jungco sufficient compliance.
• Article III, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The Court cited it as the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination complementing the custodial investigation rights under Section 12.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. The trial court invoked it in imposing the maximum penalty of death, later reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and penalty with modification only as to the civil indemnity.
• Rule 124, Section 8, Rules of Court — Authorizes the dismissal of an appeal, upon motion of the appellee or on the court's own motion, if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail, or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. The Court applied it in deeming the appeals of Dimalanta and Alcala dismissed.
• Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92 — Lays down the policies and guidelines on the cancellation of bail bonds of accused convicted of capital offenses in the Regional Trial Court, including the rule that an accused charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua who is out on bail and is convicted shall have his bond cancelled and be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal, and that failure to surrender within the prescribed period results in forfeiture of the bond, issuance of an order of arrest, and dismissal of the appeal under Section 8, Rule 124. The Court cited it in connection with the dismissal of the appeals of the two co-accused who jumped bail.
• Rule 114, Section 3, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Cited in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 as the basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail, pursuant to which an accused charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua is no longer entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals, since his conviction imports that the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.