People of the Philippines vs. Ng Pek

The crime of bribery is attempted, not consummated, when the public officer refuses the offer or delivery of money and does not allow himself to be corrupted. Where the information is ambiguous as to whether the crime was attempted, frustrated, or consummated, such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused.

The case involves a charge of corruption of a public official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to the third paragraph of Article 210 of the same Code. The accused was charged with offering and delivering one peso to a police officer to dissuade him from arresting the accused for a violation of a city ordinance. The offense charged falls under the statutory framework defining corruption of public officials and the degrees of felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

On September 23, 1947, in the City of Manila, the accused Ng Pek allegedly offered and delivered the amount of one peso to Patrolman M. Garcia in order to dissuade him from complying with his duty of arresting the accused for a violation of City Ordinance No. 2646 and filing charges against him. The information charged the appellant with attempted bribery, adding, in the language of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, that the accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of bribery as a consequence by reason of a cause other than his own voluntary desistance, that is, because the police officer did not allow himself to be corrupted.

When the case was called for arraignment on November 3, 1947, the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and entered a plea of guilty. The trial court forthwith sentenced him to two months and one day of arresto mayor and a fine of P3, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused appealed, contending that the lower court erred in considering his statement during arraignment as a plea of guilty and in sentencing him forthwith without giving him a chance to defend himself.

The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime charged in the information, which, according to the Solicitor General, was frustrated corruption of a public official. However, the penalty imposed by the trial court corresponded to that of consummated corruption of a public official. The Supreme Court noted the ambiguity in the information, which alleged both that the accused offered and delivered the money and that he did not perform all the acts of execution because the police officer did not allow himself to be corrupted.

• Plea of Guilty: The appellant contended that the lower court erred in considering the statement given by the accused during his arraignment to the complaining witness as a manifestation or declaration of a plea of guilty.
• Right to Defend: The appellant contended that the lower court erred in forthwith sentencing the accused to a prison term of two months and one day and a fine of P3 on the day of the arraignment, without giving him a chance to defend himself.

• Nature of the Crime: The Solicitor General contended that the crime charged in the information was frustrated corruption of a public official.

• Plea of Guilty: Whether the lower court erred in considering the accused's statement during arraignment as a plea of guilty.
• Right to Defend: Whether the lower court erred in forthwith sentencing the accused without giving him a chance to defend himself.
• Nature of the Crime: Whether the crime alleged in the information was attempted, frustrated, or consummated corruption of a public official.
• Propriety of the Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court was proper given the nature of the crime committed.

• Plea of Guilty: No. The record shows that when the case was called for arraignment, the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and then and there entered a plea of guilty. The first assignment of error was based on allegations of fact not proven during trial and not appearing in the record.
• Right to Defend: No. The plea of guilty necessarily foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself and left the court with no other alternative than to impose the penalty prescribed by law.
• Nature of the Crime: Attempted. The crime committed was attempted corruption of a public official, following the uniform holding of the Court in similar cases where the public officer refused to be corrupted.
• Propriety of the Penalty: No. The penalty imposed by the trial court corresponded to that of consummated corruption of a public official, but the crime was attempted. The proper penalty was destierro in its minimum and medium periods, which is two degrees lower than arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods.

• Plea of Guilty: The first assignment of error was premised upon allegations of fact which were not proven during the trial and do not appear in the record. The Court cannot sustain an assignment of error based on such allegations. The record shows that when the case was called for arraignment on November 3, 1947, the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel and then and there entered the plea of guilty.

• Right to Defend: The plea of guilty necessarily foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself and left the court with no other alternative than to impose the penalty prescribed by law. Therefore, the second assignment of error was also devoid of merit.

• Nature of the Crime: The offense charged in the information falls under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, entitled "Corruption of Public Officials," in relation to the third paragraph of Article 210 of the same Code. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime charged in the information, which, according to the Solicitor General, was frustrated corruption of a public official. However, the penalty imposed by the trial court corresponded to that of consummated corruption of a public official. The information charged the appellant with attempted bribery, alleging that he offered and delivered one peso to Patrolman M. Garcia, but adding that the accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of bribery as a consequence by reason of a cause other than his own voluntary desistance, that is, because the police officer did not allow himself to be corrupted. This additional allegation seems to contradict the main allegation that the accused offered and delivered the money to the police officer. Assuming that the accused really offered and delivered the money to the police officer, there is no question that the latter refused to be corrupted. In similar cases, the Court has repeatedly held the crime to be attempted, citing U.S. vs. Paua, U.S. vs. Camacan, U.S. vs. Tan Gee, U.S. vs. Sy-Suikao, and U.S. vs. Te Tong. The Court did not feel inclined to disturb that ruling in the absence of compelling reasons and in view of the ambiguity of the information to which the appellant pleaded guilty, which ambiguity should be resolved in his favor. Therefore, the crime committed was attempted corruption of a public official.

• Propriety of the Penalty: The penalty prescribed in the third paragraph of Article 210, in relation to Article 212, of the Revised Penal Code for the consummated crime of corruption of a public official is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value. In accordance with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony should be imposed upon the principal in an attempt to commit a felony. Two degrees lower than arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods is destierro in its minimum and medium periods, pursuant to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217. Conformably to Articles 27 (paragraph 4) and 87 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer six months and one day of destierro or banishment, during which period he shall not be permitted to enter or to be in any place within the radius of twenty-five kilometers from his present place of residence.

• Attempted Bribery — The crime of bribery is attempted when the public officer refuses the offer or delivery of money and does not allow himself to be corrupted. The Court applied this doctrine, following the uniform holding in prior cases, to find that the crime committed was attempted corruption of a public official, not consummated, because the police officer refused to be corrupted.

• Resolution of Ambiguity in Favor of the Accused — Where the information is ambiguous as to whether the crime was attempted, frustrated, or consummated, such ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused. The Court applied this principle because the information contained contradictory allegations — that the accused offered and delivered the money, and that he did not perform all the acts of execution because the police officer did not allow himself to be corrupted.

• Penalty for Attempted Felony — Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony should be imposed upon the principal in an attempt to commit a felony. The Court applied this rule to reduce the penalty from arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods to destierro in its minimum and medium periods.

• "In similar cases this court has repeatedly held the crime to be attempted. (U. S. vs. Paua, 6 Phil., 740; U. S. vs. Camacan, 7 Phil., 329; U. S. vs. Tan Gee, 7 Phil., 738; U. S. vs. Sy-Suikao, 18 Phil., 482; and U. S. vs. Te Tong, 26 Phil., 453.)." — This passage establishes the uniform jurisprudential rule that bribery is attempted when the public officer refuses the offer, which the Court followed in this case.

• "We do not feel inclined to disturb that ruling in this case in the absence of compelling reasons and in view of the ambiguity of the information to which the herein appellant pleaded guilty, which ambiguity should be resolved in his favor." — This passage articulates the principle that ambiguity in the information should be resolved in favor of the accused, which was decisive in classifying the crime as attempted rather than consummated.

• "In accordance with article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony should be imposed upon the principal in an attempt to commit a felony." — This passage states the controlling rule for determining the penalty for attempted felonies, which the Court applied to impose destierro.

• U.S. vs. Paua, 6 Phil., 740 — Followed; one of the prior cases where the Court held the crime of bribery to be attempted when the public officer refused to be corrupted.
• U.S. vs. Camacan, 7 Phil., 329 — Followed; prior case holding the crime of bribery to be attempted under similar facts.
• U.S. vs. Tan Gee, 7 Phil., 738 — Followed; prior case holding the crime of bribery to be attempted under similar facts.
• U.S. vs. Sy-Suikao, 18 Phil., 482 — Followed; prior case holding the crime of bribery to be attempted under similar facts.
• U.S. vs. Te Tong, 26 Phil., 453 — Followed; the most recent prior case where the Court held the crime to be attempted bribery, involving similar facts of offer and delivery of money to a police officer who later arrested the accused.

• Article 212, Revised Penal Code — Defines the offense of "Corruption of Public Officials," under which the accused was charged, in relation to Article 210.
• Article 210, third paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for corruption of public officials, which is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value for the consummated crime.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines an attempt to commit a felony, the language of which was used in the information to allege that the accused did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of a cause other than his own voluntary desistance.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony should be imposed upon the principal in an attempt to commit a felony.
• Article 71, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217 — Defines the degrees of penalties, used to determine that two degrees lower than arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods is destierro in its minimum and medium periods.
• Article 27, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the duration of destierro, which the Court applied in sentencing the accused to six months and one day of destierro.
• Article 87, Revised Penal Code — Defines the penalty of destierro, which consists of banishment and prohibition from entering or being in any place within a specified radius from the accused's place of residence.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concurred.