People of the Philippines vs. Nestor G. Soriano

Where the properties burned are inhabited houses or dwellings and no qualifying circumstance converts the offense to Destructive Arson under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. A mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, of the Revised Penal Code may reduce the penalty under Art. 64, par. 2.

Nestor G. Soriano and Honey Rosario Cimagala were live-in partners with a son, Nestor, Jr., nicknamed "Otoy." Honey worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro Manila beer house and occupied a house owned by her aunt Fe Cimagala on Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City. The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, classifies Destructive Arson under Art. 320, while PD 1613 governs other cases of arson, including the burning of an inhabited house or dwelling.

Nestor G. Soriano and Honey Rosario Cimagala were live-in partners with a son, Nestor, Jr., nicknamed "Otoy." Honey worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in a Metro Manila beer house and occupied a house owned by her aunt Fe Cimagala on Datu Abing Street, Calinan, Davao City. About midnight of 17 September onto the early dawn of 18 September 1998, Soriano and Honey were arguing concerning their son Otoy. Honey's brother, Oscar Cimagala, had taken the child out without Soriano's consent; Soriano wanted Honey and Otoy to return with him to Manila, but Honey refused.

As their discussion wore on, Soriano intimated to Honey his desire to have sex with her. Honey did not relent; she kicked him. Incensed, Soriano retorted that she was now arrogant and proud of her brother who supported her and her children, and added that since he returned from Manila, the house had become "unlucky." In the heated exchanges, Soriano struck Honey in the forehead. Honey snapped back that he was hurting her just like what he did to her in Manila. Soriano then moved away as he muttered, "It is better that I burn this house," and took a match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a cigarette, and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honey's room.

Honey, with her naked body draped in a towel, instinctively took off her covering and doused the flame with it. She rushed to her cabinet to get a T-shirt and put it on, but Soriano went to her room and set on fire her clothes in the cabinet. Honey fled to the ground floor; Soriano followed her. As the conflagration engulfed the second story, Honey frantically shouted to her uncle Simplicio Cabrera, who was residing next door, "Boy is setting the house on fire." On the ground floor Soriano grappled with Honey and choked her as he dragged her towards the kitchen. She told him it would be better for him to kill her than to set the house on fire as it would endanger the neighboring houses. After initially pointing a knife at Honey, Soriano laid down his knife and hurriedly went back to the second floor only to see the entire area in flames. They had no choice but to leave as the fire spread rapidly to the neighboring houses. As a result, the house occupied by Honey was totally burned together with five neighboring houses owned individually by Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braña, Simplicio Cabrera, and Perla Clerigo.

The prosecution presented Honey Rosario Cimagala, Oscar Cimagala, Fructuosa Jambo, Ruth Fernandez, Orlando Braña, Simplicio Cabrera, and Perla Clerigo, among others, as witnesses. Accused-appellant was the lone witness for his defense. The trial court found Honey's categorical testimony positively identifying accused-appellant as the one responsible for the burning of the house of Fe Cimagala in the early morning of 18 September 1998 credible, and rejected accused-appellant's denial as uncorroborated. It also found that the lovers' quarrel between Soriano and Honey ignited the chain of events that led to the conflagration.

• Denial: Accused-appellant denied the crime, but the decision does not recount further legal arguments or claims advanced by him.

• Classification of Arson: Whether the burning of the Cimagala house and neighboring houses constitutes Destructive Arson under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, or Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613.
• Special Aggravating Circumstance: Whether the special aggravating circumstance of being motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned was established.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated.
• Damages: Whether actual or compensatory and moral damages were properly awarded, and whether temperate and exemplary damages should be granted.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the guilt of accused-appellant for arson was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Classification of Arson: Simple Arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613. The properties burned were specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings; no qualifying circumstance converted the offense to Destructive Arson.
• Special Aggravating Circumstance: Not established. Accused-appellant acted on impulse, heat of anger, or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Yes. A circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation was present, warranting imposition of the penalty in its minimum period under Art. 64, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
• Damages: Actual or compensatory and moral damages were not supported by evidence. Temperate damages of ₱250,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱50,000.00 each were awarded.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt through Honey's categorical testimony; denial is insufficient.

• Classification of Arson: Arson is the malicious burning of property. Under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD 1613, arson is classified into Destructive Arson and other cases of arson, based on the kind, character, and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. Art. 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories, and other military, government, or commercial establishments, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. PD 1613 governs Simple Arson, including under Sec. 3, par. 2, the burning of any inhabited house or dwelling, punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The second Amended Information described the structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The properties burned were houses or dwellings. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. In case of ambiguity in the construction of penal laws, such laws are construed strictly against the government and literally in favor of the accused. The applicable provision is therefore Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, not Art. 320, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code.

• Special Aggravating Circumstance: Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of Simple Arson, the penalty under Sec. 3 shall be imposed in its maximum period, including where the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned. The special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred cannot be appreciated where the accused acted more on impulse, heat of anger, or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. The act committed neither appeared heinous nor represented a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from acts punishable under Art. 320. No qualifying circumstance was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson.

• Mitigating Circumstance: A circumstance similar and analogous to passion and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, of the Revised Penal Code was present. An impulse of invidious or resentful feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion and obfuscation; the accused who acts with these feelings suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent, a reduction in mental and rational faculties. The lovers' quarrel between Nestor Soriano and Honey Rosario Cimagala ignited the chain of events that led to the conflagration. Passions were inflamed due to the impending return of Soriano to Manila and the prospect of leaving behind his son Otoy. His efforts to win back Honey were thwarted, and his resentment came from the realization that he may never see his son again, bringing a reduction of his rational faculties. Accused-appellant was in a state of extreme emotional stress. Under Art. 64, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, when only a mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree to the imposable penalty is prision mayor, and the indeterminate prison term was fixed accordingly.

• Damages: Actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged. The records did not adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties; the trial court granted the award solely on the bare assertions of the complaining witnesses. Moral damages cannot be awarded absent an evidentiary basis. Accused-appellant's civil liability is beyond cavil, but the amount of indemnity must be resolved. Temperate or moderate damages may be awarded under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code because the victims suffered some pecuniary loss although the amount cannot be proved with certainty. Temperate damages of ₱250,000.00, considered reasonable under the circumstances, were awarded to each complaining witness or their heirs. Exemplary or corrective damages of ₱50,000.00 each were also awarded to correct future conduct of this nature and preserve the public good.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Intent may be an ingredient of arson but may be inferred from the acts of the accused; there is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act. When there is an eyewitness to arson, the witness can give in detail the acts of the accused, and the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness. Factual findings of the trial court and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed absent cogent reason. Honey Rosario Cimagala's categorical testimony positively identified accused-appellant as the one responsible for the burning of the house of Fe Cimagala in the early morning of 18 September 1998. The accused's denial cannot be an adequate defense. Mere denial, particularly when not corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial is negative and self-serving evidence and is seldom given weight in law. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require absolute certainty; only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The required quantum of proof was satisfied.

• Destructive Arson vs. Simple Arson — Arson is classified into Destructive Arson under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and other cases of arson under PD 1613, based on the kind, character, and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the damage caused. Destructive Arson covers structures such as buildings, edifices, hotels, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories, and military, government, or commercial establishments, and is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Simple Arson under PD 1613 includes the burning of any inhabited house or dwelling under Sec. 3, par. 2, punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The Court applied this classification because the properties burned were specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings, and no qualifying circumstance converted the offense to Destructive Arson.

• Strict Construction of Penal Laws — In case of ambiguity in the construction of penal laws, such laws are construed strictly against the government and literally in favor of the accused. The Court applied this rule to resolve the classification of the offense in favor of Simple Arson under PD 1613 rather than Destructive Arson under Art. 320.

• Special Aggravating Circumstance of Spite or Hatred — Under Sec. 4 of PD 1613, if special aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of Simple Arson, the penalty under Sec. 3 shall be imposed in its maximum period, including where the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned. The circumstance cannot be appreciated where the accused acted more on impulse, heat of anger, or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred. The Court found that accused-appellant acted on impulse and heat of anger, not real spite or hatred.

• Mitigating Circumstance Analogous to Passion and Obfuscation — Under Art. 13, par. 10, of the Revised Penal Code, an impulse of invidious or resentful feelings contemplates a situation akin to passion and obfuscation. The accused who acts with these feelings suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent, a reduction in mental and rational faculties. The Court applied this mitigating circumstance because the lovers' quarrel, the impending separation from his son, and his extreme emotional stress reduced accused-appellant's rational faculties.

• Proof of Damages — Actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged. Moral damages cannot be awarded without an evidentiary basis. Temperate or moderate damages may be awarded under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code when the victims suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount cannot be proved with certainty. Exemplary or corrective damages may be awarded to correct future conduct of a socially deleterious nature and preserve the public good. The Court disallowed actual and moral damages but awarded temperate and exemplary damages.

• Denial as Defense — Mere denial, particularly when not corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial is negative and self-serving evidence and is seldom given weight in law. The Court rejected accused-appellant's denial in light of Honey's positive and forthright testimony.

• Intent in Arson — Although intent may be an ingredient of arson, it may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act; when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of wrongful intent. The Court used this principle in affirming the finding of intentional burning.

• Credibility of Witnesses — Factual findings of the trial court and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed absent cogent reason. When there is an eyewitness to arson, the witness can give in detail the acts of the accused, and the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness. The Court found no cogent reason to deviate from the trial court's credibility findings.

• "However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for reclassifying the offense from Destructive Arson to Simple Arson under PD 1613.

• "In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and literally in favor of the accused." — This passage articulates the rule of strict construction of penal laws applied to resolve the classification of the offense in favor of the accused.

• "The special aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego." — This passage defines when the special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred under PD 1613 may be appreciated and explains why it was not applied.

• "In addition, we find that there exists a mitigating circumstance that should have been appreciated by the trial court in determining the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant: a circumstance similar and analogous to passion and obfuscation." — This passage identifies the mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation under Art. 13, par. 10, of the Revised Penal Code, which reduced the penalty.

• People vs. Mahinay, G.R. No. 125311, 17 March 1999, 304 SCRA 767 — Cited for the rule that mere denial by witnesses, particularly when not corroborated or substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
• People vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 100699, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 70 — Cited in connection with the special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred; the Court found the circumstance inapplicable because accused-appellant acted on impulse, heat of anger, or risen temper.
• United States vs. Butardo, 11 Phil. 60, 62 (1908) — Justice Carson's concurring opinion on the graduation of penalties for arson under the Spanish Penal Code; the Court used the exceptional severity standard to assess whether reclusion perpetua was proper.
• U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 440 (1921) — Justice Villamor's concurring opinion explaining the rationale behind penalties for arson; the potential damage to life and property is considered in fixing the grave penalty.

• Art. 320, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 10, RA 7659 — Defines Destructive Arson and imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court found it inapplicable because the properties burned were houses or dwellings and no qualifying circumstance converted the offense to Destructive Arson.
• Sec. 3, par. 2, PD 1613 — Provides that the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any inhabited house or dwelling. This was the provision applied to accused-appellant.
• Sec. 4, PD 1613 — Lists special aggravating circumstances, including being motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned, which would require imposition of the penalty under Sec. 3 in its maximum period. The Court found this circumstance not established.
• Art. 13, par. 10, Revised Penal Code — Recognizes a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion and obfuscation. The Court applied it because accused-appellant acted under an impulse that diminished his reasoning faculties.
• Art. 64, par. 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when only a mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. The Court applied this in reducing the penalty.
• Art. 2224, Civil Code — Allows temperate or moderate damages when the victims suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount cannot be proved with certainty. The Court awarded ₱250,000.00 as temperate damages to each complaining witness.
• Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The Court used this standard in affirming the conviction.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the indeterminate prison term after determining the imposable penalty.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.