People of the Philippines vs. Nelson Sia, Jr. y Aculña

Treachery is appreciated even if the crime is committed in the presence of other persons who could lend aid or defense to the offended party, so long as the victim was deprived of any opportunity to defend himself or herself or retaliate; Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code refers only to the defense that may be made by the offended party, not by others. Likewise, objections to the sufficiency of an Information for failure to allege factual averments on treachery are waived if the accused enters a plea without first filing a motion for a bill of particulars or a motion to quash.

Nelson Sia, Jr. y Aculña, the accused-appellant, and the victims, Hector Iniaki Lontoc, Jr. y Madrigal and Jerome Sumulong y Gapasin, were residents of Barangay Calzada-Tipas, Taguig City. Neil Sia, the accused-appellant’s uncle, was also a resident of the same area. The prosecution arose under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes Murder, and Article 51, which prescribes the penalty for principals of attempted crimes, with treachery as a qualifying circumstance under Article 14. The Rules of Court provisions on the sufficiency of Informations and the Civil Code provisions on temperate damages supplied the procedural and civil-law backdrop.

On December 1, 2015, at around 11:35 p.m., Neil Sia, also identified as Jonjon Sia or Nelson or Neil Sia, went to the Barangay Hall of Barangay Calzada-Tipas, Taguig City, and insisted that the barangay and police officers then present apprehend two persons riding a motorcycle who were allegedly carrying a firearm. Police Officer I Eric O. Guzman, a member of the Philippine National Police then on duty in Barangay Calzada-Tipas, and Barangay Security Force Maximo S. Estacio, a barangay officer, attended to Neil Sia’s complaint. Following Neil Sia’s statements, PO1 Guzman, Estacio, and other barangay tanods proceeded to F. Manalo Street, Barangay Calzada-Tipas, to apprehend the individuals allegedly carrying a firearm. There, they saw a motorcycle with two men on board pass by the area, but the officers were unable to apprehend them. PO1 Guzman and Estacio decided to wait around the area in case the suspected individuals returned. Later, the motorcycle carrying the two individuals returned. PO1 Guzman immediately flagged down the vehicle, which turned out to be driven by Hector Iniaki Lontoc, Jr., accompanied by his back rider, Jerome Sumulong.

Jerome narrated that on December 2, 2015, at around 12:10 a.m., he and Hector were on their way home on board a motorcycle, with Hector as the driver and Jerome as the back rider. As they were traversing F. Manalo Street, Barangay Calzada-Tipas, Taguig City, PO1 Guzman, who had his gun pointed at them, flagged them down. This prompted them to stop and raise their hands. PO1 Guzman approached Jerome and Hector and asked them if they were carrying firearms because he received reports that they were armed. Jerome replied that he and Hector were not carrying any firearm, explaining that they were in the area only to retrieve a watch that they pawned. PO1 Guzman then proceeded to frisk Hector and Jerome. During the encounter, PO1 Guzman was in the two o’clock position of Jerome and Hector and was about half an arm’s length away from them. Six to seven barangay tanods were likewise present and surrounded Jerome and Hector. In the middle of the discussion, five to six gunshots coming from the right back side of PO1 Guzman were suddenly heard. Hector immediately slumped down. Jerome thought that Hector was only trying to dodge the bullets, but when he looked closer, he noticed that Hector was already bleeding from the head, with his eye socket open and internal organs leaking out. When Jerome tried to assist Hector, he noticed that he was also bleeding from his left forearm, and it was only then that he realized that he had also suffered a gunshot wound. Jerome asserted that when he looked at the source of the gunfire, he saw accused-appellant hiding near a wall just behind PO1 Guzman, holding a gun and firing the shots. The gun held by accused-appellant was pointed at him and Hector, and the shots were directed at them. He mentioned that he knew accused-appellant because they lived in the same area; that he and Hector did not have any prior grudge with accused-appellant; and that he did not know why accused-appellant would shoot at them.

Because of his police training, PO1 Guzman dodged the bullets by turning and getting out of the line of fire. When PO1 Guzman turned around to address the assailant, he saw accused-appellant shooting a gun. He responded by firing a shot at accused-appellant using his service firearm. He mentioned that he was about five to six meters away from accused-appellant and that he saw accused-appellant’s face because the area was fairly lit by a street light. PO1 Guzman’s return fire hit accused-appellant at the abdomen, who then ran away towards a dark area of the barangay. PO1 Guzman gave chase but was unable to apprehend accused-appellant. Later, PO1 Guzman saw a tricycle being driven by Neil Sia with accused-appellant as passenger. PO1 Guzman tried to stop Neil Sia from leaving, but the latter was adamant that he had to bring his nephew, the accused-appellant, to the hospital because of an injury. Neil Sia then drove away to bring accused-appellant to Rizal Medical Center, where an operation was conducted to remove a bullet from accused-appellant’s body. Neil Sia thereafter informed the officers of Barangay Calzada-Tipas that he brought accused-appellant to Rizal Medical Center. In response, PO1 Guzman followed accused-appellant to Rizal Medical Center, where he arrested accused-appellant after a successful operation.

Meanwhile, Hector and Jerome were brought to Cruz-Rabe Hospital for medical attention. Hector was pronounced dead, with “gunshot wound to the head” listed as the cause of death in the Certificate of Death. As to Jerome, he was transferred to Rizal Medical Center for further medical attention, where the gunshot wound on his forearm was treated. The Medical Certificate issued to Jerome indicated that the injury he suffered was a “gunshot wound, forearm, left.” Jerome was admitted at Rizal Medical Center for treatment at around 1:30 a.m. of December 2, 2015, and he was discharged on the same day at 7:30 a.m. According to Jerome, he incurred medical expenses in the total amount of PHP 1,942.10, as evidenced by several receipts. Because his injury required about 30 days to heal, Jerome could not immediately go to work and lost income of around PHP 10,000.00 to PHP 15,000.00. Jerome further testified that after the incident, he was always frightened whenever he heard something similar to a gunshot, and that if he were to quantify his emotional suffering, it would amount to around PHP 250,000.00. The prosecution presented Jerome and PO1 Guzman as its witnesses. It also identified Estacio as its witness; however, the defense stipulated on the nature of Estacio’s testimony, particularly that he would corroborate the testimony of PO1 Guzman and that he could identify his name and signature appearing on the Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-aaresto, jointly executed by PO1 Guzman and Estacio. With those stipulations, Estacio’s testimony was dispensed with.

Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. Supposedly, at around 12:00 a.m. of December 2, 2015, he went out of his residence in Barangay Calzada-Tipas after he saw a crowd milling outside. As he was walking, he suddenly heard a gunshot and felt pain in his stomach; when he looked at his abdomen, he noticed that he was bleeding. He then tried to enter his residential compound, but he collapsed nearby. Neil Sia, his uncle, brought him to Rizal Medical Center for treatment. Accused-appellant insisted that he had nothing to do with the shooting of Jerome and Hector. He asserted that he did not even know that there was a shooting incident involving them. He further stated that he did not report his injuries to the police, and that he met police officers at the Rizal Medical Center to arrest him. Accused-appellant’s testimony was corroborated by his uncle, Neil Sia. Neil Sia averred that on the day of the incident, Jerome and Hector suddenly arrived at the area and caused a disturbance by heckling and challenging him and accused-appellant to a fight. Neil Sia then called the barangay tanods to respond to the situation, which caused Hector and Jerome to leave the area. After about two minutes, Hector and Jerome returned and continued to challenge Neil Sia and accused-appellant to a fight. During the time of the alleged shooting incident involving Jerome and Hector, Neil Sia heard only one gunshot and did not hear any other gunshots. According to Neil Sia, accused-appellant was merely standing around when he was hit by gunfire. He also denied knowledge of any shootout that occurred. He insisted that he was only aware of accused-appellant as the person who suffered an injury from the gunshot that he heard on that day.

The RTC found that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses sufficiently established the identity of accused-appellant as the assailant who fired the gunshots, resulting in the death of Hector and injury to Jerome. It further found that the attack was attended with treachery because accused-appellant fired at his victims suddenly and without warning, thereby preventing Hector and Jerome from defending themselves and ensuring that the victims would be harmed by the barrage of gunfire. The CA determined that the prosecution’s evidence sufficiently identified accused-appellant as the assailant because the area where the incident occurred was fairly lit by a street light. It also agreed that the attack upon the victims was attended with treachery because accused-appellant fired the shots suddenly and without warning, thereby preventing the victims from defending themselves.

• Identification: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution witnesses could not have properly identified the assailant during the shooting because the attack happened during midnight, when it was dark.
• Sufficiency of Informations: Accused-appellant argued that his acquittal was proper because the facts constituting the qualifying circumstance of treachery were not alleged in the Informations filed with the RTC.
• Treachery — First Element: Accused-appellant maintained that treachery was not adequately proven by the prosecution because it did not establish that the alleged mode of the attack was consciously adopted by accused-appellant to perpetrate the crimes charged and prevent the purported victims from defending themselves.
• Treachery — Presence of Law Enforcers: Accused-appellant argued that any allegation of treachery was negated because the attack was committed in the presence of police and barangay officers, who could have aided or defended the supposed victims.
• Intent to Kill: Accused-appellant argued that there was no intent to kill Jerome because the injury that Jerome suffered was minor and there was insufficient evidence proving that Jerome was specifically targeted by accused-appellant.

• Identification: The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the prosecution’s witnesses positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant and they were in a position to do so because the area was fairly lit by a street light.
• Waiver: The People argued that accused-appellant was deemed to have waived any objection to the sufficiency of the Informations because he did not file any motion to quash before he entered his plea in the subject criminal cases.
• Treachery: The People argued that there was treachery because the attack was so sudden that Jerome and Hector had no opportunity to flee or defend themselves.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The People argued that the evidence against accused-appellant was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Identification: Whether the CA erred in finding that the shooter could be identified by the prosecution witnesses at the locus criminis.
• Sufficiency of Informations: Whether accused-appellant may be convicted of Murder and Attempted Murder even though the Informations did not contain factual averments on treachery.
• Treachery: Whether the attack upon the victims was attended by treachery.
• Intent to Kill: Whether there was intent to kill when Jerome was fired at.
• Temperate Damages: Whether the award of temperate damages to Jerome should be reduced to conform to law and jurisprudence.

• Identification: No. The courts a quo correctly relied on the prosecution witnesses; the locus criminis was fairly lit by a street light, and no ill motive was shown.
• Sufficiency of Informations: Yes, conviction may stand. Any objection to the Informations’ lack of factual averments on treachery was waived by accused-appellant’s voluntary plea without a motion for a bill of particulars or a motion to quash.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery attended the execution of the crimes because the attack was sudden and without warning, and accused-appellant consciously hid behind a wall and positioned himself at a safe distance.
• Intent to Kill: Yes. Intent to kill was established by the use of a gun and the firing of five to six shots; the minor injury to Jerome did not negate intent to kill.
• Temperate Damages: Modified. The CA’s award of PHP 50,000.00 temperate damages to Jerome was reduced to PHP 20,000.00, representing PHP 5,000.00 for medical expenses and PHP 15,000.00 for lost income.

• Identification: The Court found no merit in the claim that darkness prevented identification. The prosecution witnesses positively identified accused-appellant because the scene of the crime was fairly lit by a street light. Illumination from a street light, lamp post, kerosene or wick lamp, moonlight, starlight, flashlight, torch, and lighting from a nearby establishment have all been deemed sufficient for visibility and identification of the accused. When the conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to foster any ill motive against the accused, the witness’s testimony as to the manner of the commission of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator must be accepted. Jerome testified that he did not have any prior quarrel with accused-appellant and did not even know why accused-appellant shot him and Hector; accused-appellant presented no evidence showing that Jerome harbored ill feelings against him or had reason to lie under oath. PO1 Guzman was a police officer on duty, and Estacio was a barangay officer also on duty; as public officers enjoying the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, their testimony must be given full faith and credence, especially absent proof that they fabricated the charges or bore improper motives. Accused-appellant’s reliance on the statement that he fled to a “dark area” was misleading because that statement referred to the area where accused-appellant proceeded after he was shot in the abdomen by PO1 Guzman and tried to flee, not to the place where the shooting occurred. The fact that other areas of the community had no lighting did not mean that the locus criminis was equally deprived of illumination.

• Sufficiency of Informations: Under People vs. Solar, an Information where treachery is alleged to exist must have factual averments on how the person charged had deliberately employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the act that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make. It is not enough for the Information to state that the killing was attended “with treachery” because such statement is a mere legal conclusion and not a factual averment. However, objections against alleged defects in the sufficiency of the Information may be waived by the accused by voluntarily entering a plea without first filing either a motion for a bill of particulars under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court or a motion to quash under Section 3(e) in relation to Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that the Information does not conform substantially to the form prescribed by Sections 6 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. The reason is that defects in the form or sufficiency of the allegations in the Information are generally curable by amendment under Section 4, Rule 117. When a motion to quash is filed because the facts charged do not constitute an offense or the Information does not conform to the prescribed form on the required factual averments, the trial court must deny the motion and grant the prosecution the opportunity to correct the defect and file an amended Information. It is only when the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the Information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment, that the motion to quash may be granted. This procedure prevents undue delays and unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds. Thus, objections as to matters of form or substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal; if the accused fails to avail himself or herself of the appropriate remedies before entering a plea, the accused is deemed to have waived any objections thereto and is conclusively presumed to have understood the felonious acts imputed against him or her. Here, accused-appellant did not file a motion to quash or a motion for a bill of particulars before he entered his plea; consistent with Solar, he is deemed to have sufficiently understood the nature and cause of the accusations against him, and his belated objection as to the sufficiency of the Informations raised for the first time on appeal will no longer be entertained.

• Treachery: Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The elements are: (1) the assailant employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods, or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself or herself or to repel the aggression, and thereby ensuring the crime’s commission without danger or risk of personal injury to the offender resulting from the acts of the person attacked. There must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed. As to the first element, accused-appellant argued that the presence of PO1 Guzman, Estacio, and other tanods negated treachery, but the law clearly refers to a defense that may be made by the offended party, not any other person. The Court has appreciated treachery even in crimes committed in a heavily populated area, or even if the victim was in the presence of several companions during the attack, because the defense or retaliation must come from the victim, not from anyone else. The Court clarified its prior rulings in People vs. Nemeria and People vs. Germina: in both cases, the victims were aware of the impending attack from the accused and had the opportunity to flee or defend themselves, and in Germina the accused acted out of passion and in the heat of anger, which contradicts the deliberate adoption required for treachery. In contrast, People vs. Costelo appreciated treachery notwithstanding the fact that the murder was committed in a densely populated area because the attack was so sudden that the victim was deprived of any chance to defend herself or escape. The Court declared that Costelo, not Germina or Nemeria, conforms to the definition of treachery in Article 14. Applying Costelo, treachery attended the execution of the crimes charged because Hector and Jerome were caught by surprise by the hail of gunshots from accused-appellant, which prevented them from defending themselves. The presence of law enforcers during the attack could not, by itself, negate treachery because the circumstances showed that the execution of the crimes ensured their commission without risk of personal injury to accused-appellant arising from the acts of the victims to defend themselves. The mode of attack was sudden and without warning: the victims were in the middle of a discussion with the law enforcers when they were abruptly shot at by accused-appellant, who suddenly emerged from behind PO1 Guzman. The barrage of fire was so swift and sudden that Hector died instantaneously from the gunshot wound to his head, while Jerome did not even immediately discern his injury until he saw his own blood dripping from his forearm. As to the second element, the Court has determined its presence when the accused deliberately hid themselves from behind an object or structure before the attack, when they placed themselves at a safe distance away from the victims before shooting them, or when they concealed the gunshots behind noise and merriment. Here, accused-appellant was hiding near a wall behind PO1 Guzman when he attacked the victims, and PO1 Guzman stated that accused-appellant was about five to six meters away from the police officer and the victims. Accused-appellant concealed himself from a wall and positioned himself at a safe distance away from his victims, which both indicate that he consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack to ensure the commission of the crimes charged without risk of injury from any defense that the victims might make. The records also support the conclusion that accused-appellant targeted the victims: Jerome categorically testified that he saw accused-appellant pointing the gun at him and Hector, and PO1 Guzman similarly testified that the gun was pointed towards the area where he and the victims were located. Other law enforcers were present at the scene, yet Jerome was adamant that he saw accused-appellant pointing the gun at him and Hector. PO1 Guzman was nearer to accused-appellant and at his line of fire, yet the police officer was unharmed; if PO1 Guzman or the other tanods were the target, accused-appellant would have directed the shots at him at the very first instance, yet only Jerome and Hector were injured. The fact that other persons were left unharmed although they were along the line of fire was taken as an indicator that the intended victim and sole target of the accused was the person who died or who was injured from the gunshots. Even assuming arguendo that Jerome and Hector were not the intended victims, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; treachery may still be appreciated even if the actual victims are different from the intended victims of the accused, either because of mistake in the person of the victim (error in personae) or mistake in the blow (aberratio ictus).

• Intent to Kill: Intent to kill may be proven by: (1) the means used by the malefactor; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactor before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and (5) the motives of the accused. The use of a deadly weapon, such as a gun, is evidence of intent to kill. Continuously firing a gun at the victim likewise shows intent to kill. Here, accused-appellant used a deadly weapon, a gun, to execute the crimes charged against him. He repeatedly fired five to six shots at his victims. Hector even instantaneously died from the gunshot wound to the head caused by accused-appellant. All these circumstances establish accused-appellant’s intent to kill Jerome. The fact that Jerome suffered only a minor injury is immaterial as this does not negate intent to kill on the part of accused-appellant, but merely demonstrates that the latter missed his shots, thereby failing to consummate the crime of Murder against Jerome. In any case, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, intent to kill may still be appreciated even if the actual victims are different from the intended victims of accused-appellant, either because of mistake in the person of the victim (error in personae) or mistake in the blow (aberratio ictus). There is intent to kill as long as the circumstances show its existence, even if the actual victim is not the one intended by the accused. As to the elements of an attempted felony, under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The elements of attempted murder against Jerome are present: (1) accused-appellant commenced the commission of murder by suddenly and without warning shooting at Jerome, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk of personal injury to himself by any defense that may be raised by the victim; (2) Jerome did not die from the attack because his injury was non-fatal, being only to his left forearm, such that accused-appellant was not able to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the felony of Murder; and (3) Jerome lived not because accused-appellant spontaneously desisted from the attack but due to cause or accident independent of accused-appellant’s own volition. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder.

• Temperate Damages: Although the error on the award of temperate damages to Jerome was unassigned, the Court found it proper to rectify it to make it conform to law and jurisprudence. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. When the court is convinced that there has been loss, though not proven with certainty, the judge is empowered to calculate moderate damages, rather than let the complainant suffer without redress from the defendant’s wrongful act. The allowance of temperate damages when actual damages were not adequately proven is ultimately a rule drawn from equity. In People vs. Jugueta, the Court held that temperate damages in the amount of PHP 50,000.00 may be awarded in consummated homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. However, Jugueta does not provide a standard amount of temperate damages that may be awarded when the homicide or murder committed by the accused is only at the attempted or frustrated stage. Jurisprudentially, temperate damages to victims of attempted homicide or murder have been pegged at PHP 50,000.00, PHP 25,000.00, and PHP 20,000.00. The standard temperate damages in Jugueta pertain to burial and funeral expenses suffered following the victim’s death; in attempted or frustrated homicide or murder cases, the actual damages suffered by the victim that need to be compensated would necessarily differ and will have to be decided on a case-to-case basis. Instead of burial and funeral expenses, the victim of an attempted or frustrated homicide or murder would have suffered loss due to hospitalization or medical expenses, as well as loss of earning capacity while incapacitated due to injuries. The damages suffered would depend on the nature and number of the wounds, the extent and severity of the injury, the number of days that the victim was hospitalized, and the amount of income that the victim lost while incapacitated. Case law provides that temperate damages for hospitalization and medical needs may be based on the expenses claimed to have been incurred by the victim, though not proven by receipts. In other cases where temperate damages are awarded as indemnity for loss of earning capacity and where the claimant failed to produce documentary evidence to prove the claim, the damages awarded took into consideration the nature of the victim’s employment. In People vs. Angeles, the Court clarified that courts must not award temperate damages higher than the amount of pecuniary loss that the victim himself claimed to have suffered. The rule is that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him, for an award of damages is not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the losing party. Here, Jerome claimed pecuniary losses for medical expenses and lost income. The records show that Jerome was treated for his injury, though he was discharged from the hospital on the same day. As proof of medical expenses, he only produced receipts in the amount of PHP 1,942.10. He also claimed to have lost income in the amount of around PHP 10,000.00 to PHP 15,000.00, which was unsupported by evidence; he did not disclose his source of income and his basis for stating that he lost earnings in the amount he claimed. Given the situation, the Court found it proper and reasonable to reduce the award of temperate damages to Jerome from PHP 50,000.00 to PHP 5,000.00 for the medical expenses that he incurred, and PHP 15,000.00 for the income that he lost while recovering from his forearm injury, or a total amount of PHP 20,000.00. The reduced award is more reasonable and commensurate to the pecuniary loss that Jerome claims to have suffered by reason of the crime committed by accused-appellant.

• Treachery; presence of third persons — Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery requires (1) that the assailant employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) that said means, methods, or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The defense contemplated by law is that of the offended party, not third persons; hence, the presence of police, barangay officers, or other persons does not negate treachery if the victim was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself or herself. The Court clarified People vs. Nemeria and People vs. Germina: no treachery was found in those cases because the victims were aware of the impending attack and had the opportunity to flee or defend themselves, and in Germina the accused acted in the heat of anger. People vs. Costelo controls: treachery may be appreciated even in a densely populated area if the attack was sudden and the victim was deprived of any chance to defend herself or escape.

• Waiver of objections to sufficiency of Information — Failure to file a motion for a bill of particulars under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court or a motion to quash under Section 3(e) in relation to Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court before entering a plea waives objections to defects in the form or sufficiency of the Information, including the lack of factual averments on treachery. Defects in the form or sufficiency of the allegations are generally curable by amendment under Section 4, Rule 117; objections cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Positive identification; visibility — Illumination from a street light, lamp post, kerosene or wick lamp, moonlight, starlight, flashlight, torch, and lighting from a nearby establishment may be sufficient for visibility and identification of the accused. When the conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to foster any ill motive against the accused, the witness’s testimony as to the manner of the commission of the crime and the identity of the perpetrator must be accepted. Public officers on duty enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

• Intent to kill — Intent to kill may be proven by the means used by the malefactor; the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the malefactor before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; the circumstances under which the crime was committed; and the motives of the accused. The use of a deadly weapon, such as a gun, is evidence of intent to kill, and continuously firing a gun at the victim likewise shows intent to kill. A minor injury does not negate intent to kill; it may merely show that the accused missed his shots.

• Attempted felony — Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder.

• Error in personae and aberratio ictus — Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Treachery may still be appreciated even if the actual victims are different from the intended victims of the accused, either because of mistake in the person of the victim (error in personae) or mistake in the blow (aberratio ictus).

• Temperate damages — Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Article 2225 provides that temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances. The PHP 50,000.00 standard in People vs. Jugueta applies to consummated homicide or murder cases for burial and funeral expenses; attempted or frustrated homicide or murder cases are decided on a case-to-case basis, considering hospitalization or medical expenses and loss of earning capacity. Under People vs. Angeles, courts must not award temperate damages higher than the amount of pecuniary loss that the victim himself claimed to have suffered.

• Appellate review of unassigned errors — In criminal appeals, the appeal opens the entire case for review; the appellate court may examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law, even on unassigned errors.

• "The law clearly refers to a defense that may be made by the offended party, not any other person." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting accused-appellant’s argument that the presence of police and barangay officers negated treachery; it confines the defense relevant to treachery to that of the victim.
• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim," depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself or herself or to repel the aggression, and thereby ensuring the crime's commission without danger or risk of personal injury to the offender resulting from the acts of the person attacked. — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of treachery, drawn from Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code and applied to the sudden shooting of Hector and Jerome.
• "In treachery, there must be clear and convincing evidence on how the aggression was made, how it began, and how it developed." — This passage sets the evidentiary standard for treachery and supports the Court’s review of the prosecution’s account of the attack.
• "The use of a deadly weapon, such as a gun, is evidence of intent to kill. Continuously firing a gun at the victim likewise shows intent to kill." — This passage supplies the rule for finding intent to kill despite Jerome’s non-fatal forearm injury, based on accused-appellant’s use of a gun and repeated firing.

• People vs. Solar, 858 Phil. 884 (2019) — Held that an Information alleging treachery must contain factual averments, not a mere legal conclusion; also clarified that objections to the sufficiency of the Information may be waived by a voluntary plea without a motion for a bill of particulars or a motion to quash. The Court applied Solar to find waiver.
• People vs. Costelo, 375 Phil. 381 (1999) — Treachery was appreciated despite the murder being committed in a densely populated area because the attack was sudden and the victim was deprived of any chance to defend herself or escape. The Court declared Costelo conforms to Article 14 and applied it here.
• People vs. Nemeria, 312 Phil. 531 (1995) and People vs. Germina, 352 Phil. 754 (1998) — Clarified: no treachery because the victims were aware of the impending attack and had the opportunity to flee or defend themselves; Germina also involved the accused acting in the heat of anger. Distinguished from this case.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Set PHP 50,000.00 temperate damages for consummated homicide or murder when no burial and funeral expenses are proven; no standard amount for attempted or frustrated stage. Used by the Court to modify the damages award.
• People vs. Angeles, 859 Phil. 652 (2019) — Temperate damages cannot be higher than the pecuniary loss claimed by the victim. Applied to reduce the award to Jerome.
• People vs. Labiaga, 714 Phil. 77 (2013) — If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder. Cited for the Attempted Murder conviction.
• People vs. Oandasan, Jr., 787 Phil. 139 (2016) — Treachery was appreciated when the accused suddenly appeared from behind a dump truck and shot the victims without warning. Cited as analogous to the sudden attack in this case.
• People vs. Llobera, 765 Phil. 897 (2015) — Treachery where the accused blindsided the victim by emerging from behind a structure to shoot. Cited as analogous.
• People vs. Bendecio, 882 Phil. 649 (2020) — Discussed intent to kill and error in personae or aberratio ictus; treachery may be appreciated even if the actual victims differ from the intended victims. Cited in the Court’s intent-to-kill and treachery analysis.
• People vs. Lira, G.R. No. 235991, March 18, 2021 — Unassigned errors in criminal appeals may be corrected because the appeal opens the entire case for review. Cited for modifying the temperate damages despite the error being unassigned.
• People vs. Paran, 882 Phil. 683 (2020) — Visibility and absence of ill motive; testimony on identity accepted. Cited in the identification discussion.
• Anisco vs. People, 890 Phil. 772 (2020) — Enumerated the factors for proving intent to kill. Applied by the Court in finding intent to kill Jerome.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Murder; treachery is a qualifying circumstance. Applied to the killing of Hector.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon principals of attempted crimes. Applied to Attempted Murder.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Applied to qualify both crimes.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines attempt as the commencement of the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, the offender not performing all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Applied to Jerome.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Applied to error in personae and aberratio ictus.
• Article 2224, Civil Code — Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. Basis for the temperate damages award.
• Article 2225, Civil Code — Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances. Applied to reduce the award to Jerome.
• Article 2199, Civil Code — One is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Cited in relation to People vs. Angeles.
• Rule 116, Section 9, Rules of Court — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. Failure to file waived the objection.
• Rule 117, Section 3(e), Section 9, and Section 4, Rules of Court — Motion to quash for nonconformity with the prescribed form; waiver for failure to assert grounds before plea; amendment of complaint or information. Applied to find waiver.
• Rule 110, Sections 6 and 9, Rules of Court — Sufficiency of complaint or information and cause of accusation, including qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Cited in the waiver discussion.
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — The accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Cited in relation to the waiver of objections to the Informations.
• Rule 122, Rules of Court — Governs appeals in criminal cases. Basis for the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concur.