People of the Philippines vs. Nelson Bayot y Satina

The death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal and before final judgment extinguishes his criminal liability and the civil liability ex delicto based solely on the offense, rendering the appeal and the challenged conviction ineffectual.

Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with rape committed against AAA, a 44-year-old woman, in an Information dated 29 December 1997. The legal significance of his death during the pendency of his appeal is governed by Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the guidelines laid down in People vs. Bayotas, which distinguish civil liability arising solely from the offense from civil liability based on other sources of obligation.

On or about 17 September 1997, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina allegedly had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with AAA, 44 years old, by means of force, violence, and intimidation, against her will. An Information dated 29 December 1997 charged him with rape. On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty, and trial on the merits followed.

According to the prosecution, AAA testified to her ordeal. The RTC found her testimony simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and without inconsistency. A medical certificate showed a contusion on her vagina at the 6:00 o’clock quadrant of the crevice, which Dr. Rodrigo Cubid explained had been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion.

Appellant, for his part, claimed that he and AAA were sweethearts or lovers. His daughter testified that her father and AAA maintained an illicit relationship, citing an incident when she allegedly saw them holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta and another when she saw them in the act of sexual intercourse. The RTC rejected the “sweetheart” defense as a mere devise to extricate appellant from the consequences of his acts. It found that AAA’s immediate report of the rape carried the stamp of truth and that, if such a relationship existed, AAA would not have pursued the case; despite appellant’s repeated plea for dismissal, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice.

The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant committed rape against AAA. It held that appellant’s claim of being AAA’s lover was self-serving and unsupported by other evidence. The testimony of appellant’s daughter was given no considerable weight: she could not point to any other circumstance supporting her claim except the holding-hands incident, and her testimony could not be stripped of bias and partiality because she was appellant’s daughter. Her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual intercourse deserved scant consideration because she was not present at the commencement of the act and could not state with certainty that there was no struggle on AAA’s part; her testimony on that matter was a mere conclusion of fact.

Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, later informed the Court of Appeals by letter dated 29 May 2006 that appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. The original copy of appellant’s Certificate of Death was attached. Despite this, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed on behalf of appellant to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal dated 31 May 2006. The Court then determined the effect of appellant’s death on the pending appeal.

• Sweetheart Defense: Accused-appellant Bayot maintained that he and AAA were sweethearts or lovers; his daughter testified that they maintained an illicit relationship, including an incident when she allegedly saw them holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta and another when she saw them in the act of sexual intercourse. The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected this claim as self-serving and unsupported.

• Effect of Death Pending Appeal: Whether the death of accused-appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal and before final judgment, extinguished his criminal liability and his civil liability ex delicto based solely on the rape charge.
• Effect on the Challenged Conviction: Whether the Court of Appeals Decision dated 9 May 2006, finding appellant guilty and awarding indemnity and moral damages, became ineffectual and should be set aside.
• Need to Resolve the Appeal on the Merits: Whether the Court still needed to rule on appellant’s guilt or innocence despite his death pending appeal.

• Effect of Death Pending Appeal: Yes. Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal before final judgment extinguishes his criminal liability and the civil liability ex delicto based solely on the offense.
• Effect on the Challenged Conviction: Yes. Because no final judgment had been rendered and the criminal and civil liability ex delicto were extinguished, the Court of Appeals Decision became ineffectual and was set aside.
• Need to Resolve the Appeal on the Merits: No. It was unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal; guilt or innocence became irrelevant because any criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto were totally extinguished by death.

• Effect of Death Pending Appeal: Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. In People vs. Bayotas, the Court laid down guidelines: death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon; the claim for civil liability survives if it may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict under Article 1157 of the Civil Code; where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery may be pursued only by filing a separate civil action, subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused; and the private offended party need not fear forfeiture by prescription where the civil action was instituted together with the criminal action, because the statute of limitations is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case under Article 1155 of the Civil Code. Here, appellant died on 4 December 2004 during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, before final judgment. His civil liability was solely ex delicto, based on the rape charge, and no other source of obligation was shown. Thus, both his criminal liability and his civil liability ex delicto were extinguished.
• Effect on the Challenged Conviction: The criminal action was extinguished because there was no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto was ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it was on the criminal case. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 9 May 2006, which found appellant guilty of rape, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, had become ineffectual.
• Need to Resolve the Appeal on the Merits: As pronounced in People vs. Olaco and People vs. Paniterce, it was already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that he incurred criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and People vs. Bayotas.

• Death of Accused Pending Appeal Extinguishes Criminal Liability and Civil Liability Ex Delicto — Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code totally extinguishes criminal liability by death of the convict as to personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. The criminal action is extinguished because there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished. In this case, appellant died during the pendency of his appeal and before final judgment, and no other source of civil liability was shown, so both liabilities were extinguished and the appeal became moot.
• Bayotas Guidelines on Death of Accused — The Court in People vs. Bayotas laid down four guidelines: (1) death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon; (2) the claim for civil liability survives if it may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts under Article 1157 of the Civil Code; (3) where civil liability survives, an action for recovery may be pursued only by filing a separate civil action, subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused; and (4) the private offended party need not fear forfeiture by prescription where, during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted the civil action together with the criminal action, because the statute of limitations is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case under Article 1155 of the Civil Code. These guidelines were applied to dismiss the criminal case and set aside the Court of Appeals Decision.

• "Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime." — States the ratio decidendi: death pending appeal extinguishes both criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto based solely on the offense.
• "From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case." — Canonical formulation of the rule and its rationale.
• "Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v. Paniterce, it is already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death." — Explains why the Court did not resolve guilt or innocence on the merits.
• "WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio." — Dispositive portion of the Resolution.

• People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239 — Controlling precedent; laid down the guidelines on the effect of the death of the accused pending appeal, which the Court applied.
• People vs. Olaco, G.R. No. 197042, 17 October 2011 — Cited for the rule that death pending appeal extinguishes criminal and civil liability ex delicto and that it is unnecessary to rule on the appeal.
• People vs. Paniterce, G.R. No. 186382, 5 April 2010, 617 SCRA 389 — Cited with Olaco for the same rule; the Court relied on these cases to hold that no ruling on the appeal was necessary.
• People vs. Romero, 365 Phil. 531, 543 (1999) — Cited for the rationale that the criminal action is extinguished because there is no longer a defendant to stand as accused, and the civil action for civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished.
• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Cited as the basis for transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
• People vs. Abungan, 395 Phil. 456 (2000); People vs. Enoja, 378 Phil. 623 (1999); De Guzman vs. People, 459 Phil. 576 (2003) — Cited in the catena of cases supporting the Bayotas guidelines.

• Article 89(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by death of the convict as to personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. Applied because appellant died before final judgment, extinguishing his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
• Article 1157, Civil Code — Enumerates sources of obligation: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, quasi-delicts. Cited in the Bayotas guidelines to explain when civil liability survives death if based on a source other than delict. Here, no other source was shown.
• Article 1155, Civil Code — Provides for interruption of the prescription of actions. Cited in the Bayotas guidelines on interruption of the statute of limitations for the civil liability when the civil action was instituted with the criminal action.
• Section 1, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Cited in the Bayotas guidelines as governing the separate civil action that may be pursued if civil liability survives. Not applied because no surviving civil liability was shown.
• Section 29, Republic Act No. 7610; Section 44, Republic Act No. 9262; Section 40, A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC — Cited in the footnote for confidentiality of proceedings involving violence against women and children, leading to the use of fictitious initials “AAA” and “XXX.”

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno, and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred. No separate concurring opinions are contained in the text.