People of the Philippines vs. Naño Milflores y Laksa

A single act that produces one death and multiple serious injuries constitutes a single complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and the filing of two separate informations for that one offense does not place the accused in double jeopardy where the first case has not been terminated by conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without his consent. The technical defect of splitting the charge is cured where the informations are filed on the same date and the cases are jointly tried, no substantial prejudice having been caused the accused.

Victoria Remolar Javier, a public school teacher in Baguio City, was married to Antonio Javier, who had previously been married to Florencia Tactay, then still living and by whom he had children; the resulting animosity between the two women formed the backdrop of the case. Victoria engaged the services of Naño Milflores y Laksa, who held himself out as a palmist and fortune teller at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, in an effort to recover her husband. The case turns principally on Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes complex crimes, and on Article 47 of the same Code, which bars the imposition of the death penalty upon a person over seventy years of age.

On the morning of November 27, 1967, at about 7:45 o'clock, an old man approached the house at 2233 Garrido Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, calling out the name of one of its occupants, "Mrs. Javier." Florencia Tactay Javier came out and met the caller, who handed her a large paper bag containing pechay, upo, and sigarillas and then left without answering her inquiry as to who had sent it. She carried the bag inside and placed it on a chair in a room where Ana, Letty, Abe, Felicidad, and her two children were gathered, and began to empty it. The bag emitted smoke and a whistling sound; Florencia withdrew in alarm, but Felicidad Mique went near and looked inside. A deafening explosion followed, boring a hole through the table and the cement floor and scattering fragments of utensils and furniture throughout the room. Felicidad Mique, a twenty-one-year-old student, died within fifteen minutes of arrival at St. Anne's Hospital from profuse exsanguinating hemorrhage, collapse of the vena cavae, and shock caused by twenty-three penetrating blast wounds; Abelardo Mique Olivar, Romana Mique, Isabelo Lapitan, Benedicto Mique, Florencia Tactay Javier, Anaflor Javier, and Ariel Javier all sustained injuries and were forwarded to the Philippine General Hospital for further treatment.

The explosion was the culmination of a marital entanglement that had begun years earlier. Victoria Remolar Javier, a public school teacher, had married Antonio Javier on April 28, 1964, in Guinayangan, Quezon Province, only to discover that he had previously been married to Florencia Tactay, who was then still living and by whom he had children. Florencia filed a bigamy charge against Antonio in Baguio City and an administrative charge against Victoria; she later desisted after Victoria promised to cease living with Antonio, and the administrative charge was dropped upon a finding that Victoria had married Antonio without prior knowledge of the earlier marriage.

Sometime in March 1967, Victoria consulted Naño Milflores, who advertised his services as a palmist and fortune teller at Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and asked whether she still had a chance to live again with Antonio. Milflores assured her of a "100% chance" on condition that she pay him P375.00 as a fee for the temple, promising to use his spiritual power to make Antonio return to her voluntarily. Victoria paid him P5.00 for the initial consultation and later the P375.00, and she gave him the address of Antonio's other wife at 2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, Manila. Milflores told her he would work for about seven to nine weeks, within which period Antonio would return. When he demanded another P375.00 for things he needed in the temple, Victoria paid the amount the following day; he then asked for P200.00 and P175.00 more, so that by June 1967 Victoria had given him P1,130.00 in all. Antonio did not return. Victoria demanded the return of her money when she saw Milflores at least twice in July and August, but he told her to be patient and assured her that Antonio would return. In September and the last week of October 1967, Milflores became angry at Victoria because of her insistence that he return her money.

Meanwhile, Alexis Nazario, a student, and Desiderio Juvida, known as "Pops" in the vicinity, were conversing at the corner of Cagayan and Mabuhay Streets, a block from Garrido Street, when they heard the explosion and saw a person walking hurriedly from Garrido to Mabuhay. The man's face was painted black, and he wore a checkered polo shirt with black pants and black shoes. Nazario, who was only eight to ten meters away, pointed him out to Juvida, thinking he was a thief; when the blast was heard, the man began to run. Juvida asked Nazario to chase him, but Nazario failed to overtake him because he was running fast, and the man escaped toward Tejeron Street. The explosion drew many onlookers and the police chief, Gen. Ricardo Papa, who took immediate steps to investigate; Sgt. B. Brown, Det. N. Bonifacio, and Pat. Alejandro Yatco of the Manila Police Department responded. Alex Tumale, a thirty-one-year-old security guard of the United Equity Agency assigned to the RCPI, claimed that he was the intended victim and implicated Theodore Laudet, an RCPI striker, as the person he had seen carrying a paper bag with three companions in front of his house before the explosion. Investigators also learned of Antonio Javier's double marriage and of the quarrel between Florencia and Victoria for his sole possession. On November 28, 1967, at 4:30 a.m., Laudet was investigated and brought before Florencia Javier, Isabelo Lapitan, and Tumale, all of whom failed to identify him; Florencia and Lapitan said the suspect was older, stouter, and had his face painted black. Laudet accounted for his whereabouts, was subjected to a polygraph, cleared himself, and was released.

On November 30, 1967, at about 10:00 a.m., Sgt. P. Briones, Det. Dionisia Nena Tuason, and Pat. Alejandro Yatco left for Baguio to investigate Victoria Remolar Javier. They were referred to her father, Pat. Pedro Remolar of the Baguio Police Department, from whom they learned that Victoria had left for an unknown destination. Victoria, then teaching at the Ambuklao Elementary School, had heard over her transistor radio on November 29, 1967, that her name was being implicated in the bomb explosion; she went home to Baguio City to seek her parents' advice and was shown a newspaper account implicating her. She decided to see the family lawyer, Atty. de Guzman. On November 30, 1967, at about 7:00 a.m., before she could leave the house, she received a telephone call from a person who identified himself as Naño Milflores, who told her to go to his office at Magsaysay Avenue and bring P1,000.00 so that he could help extricate her from suspicion in connection with the bomb slaying. She proceeded to his office with her sister Gertrudis. Milflores expressed surprise that she had come with a companion, saying, "Why did you come with a companion? I told you to come alone." Touching her head, he told her, "Loko loko ka ba? Ang hirap hirap ng kaso mo. Now you need money so that you will not be involved in this case anymore," and asked the sisters to produce P1,000.00 because he knew somebody at the Manila Police Department who could help her. Gertrudis left to secure the money and returned with P200.00; Milflores remarked, "Bakit iyan lang? O, sigue, tama na." The three then proceeded to the Dangwa Bus Station, where Milflores secured two tickets without the knowledge of Victoria and her sister and hurriedly urged Victoria to board the bus for Manila, leaving Gertrudis behind. The two arrived at Angeles City and proceeded to Milflores' office there, where Victoria passed the night. Early the next morning, December 1, 1967, at about 4:00 a.m., Milflores and Victoria proceeded to Manila in his jeep, arriving at about 6:00 a.m. She was introduced to Atty. Ben Dimaunahan, who tried to gather facts from her about the bomb killing; she had no information to give. In the afternoon, at about 3:00 o'clock, Atty. Dimaunahan informed the Manila Police Department, through Lt. A. Lim, that he had with him Victoria Remolar Javier, the person sought in the bomb-slaying probe, and that they were going to the police headquarters with Milflores, a magician, illusionist, and marriage counselor of 423 Angeles City, Pampanga, and one Oscar Alayon, their driver. Victoria was interviewed and allowed to go home but advised to return for confrontation. She told Capt. Lim that aside from the P200.00 Milflores received from her sister in Baguio, he had also received P210.00 from her in Angeles City, and that Milflores had told her these amounts would be given to the lawyer who would help her. Capt. Lim told her she had been swindled, and from then on she began to suspect Milflores.

On December 2, 1967, a Saturday, after Victoria had been extensively interrogated, Florencia Tactay was invited to the Manila Police Department, accompanied by her husband Antonio Javier. A police line-up was conducted, and Florencia requested that Milflores' face be painted black; she then pointed to him as the very person who had handed her the paper bag containing the vegetables and the fatal bomb, and stated that he had the same tone of voice as the caller. The line-up was conducted in the presence of police authorities and other persons, including newspaper reporters Tony Alba of ABS Channel 5, Alfredo Santiago of the Evening News, and Fred Cruz of the Manila Times, and pictures were taken during the confrontation. Alexis Nazario and Desiderio Juvida were recalled to the office, and both fingered Milflores as the person they had seen running away from the house of Mrs. Javier; their statements were reduced to writing. Milflores was investigated and denied any criminal participation. He admitted that he had come to know Victoria sometime in June 1967, when she came to his booth in Baguio City to seek his advice concerning her marital problems with Antonio Javier; that he had asked her to pay him certain amounts for his spiritual advice; and that all in all he had received from her more or less P800.00. He maintained his innocence and claimed that he had merely given her spiritual advice as a minister of the Will of Christ Chapel.

Victoria's statement was taken on December 3, 1967. At 11:00 a.m. that day, the police searched Milflores' Willy's Mitsubishi jeep, with Plate No. 1678-67 Manila, parked in front of the headquarters. Found in the glove compartment were one piece of cotton blackened with dye, one strip of cotton wrapped in paper, one plastic pitcher-type bottle, one pallet of black dye powder, and a receipt from the Talayan Quezon Boulevard gas station for the purchase of one liter of oil dated November 25, 1967. A further search yielded a small box containing a brown ladies' clutch bag, a white ladies' plastic bag, a forceps, a speculum, a plastic bag with fifteen rounds of .22 caliber short bullets, three more rounds of the same ammunition, a TVR issued by the TRAFCON in his name, a piece of candle, a set of keys, four envelopes addressed to him, a crucifix, and an envelope containing forty units of sweepstakes tickets for the December 17, 1967 draw. Confronted with these articles, Milflores denied their presence in his jeep and claimed they must belong to his sons. At 12:00 o'clock noon on December 3, 1967, he was taken to the crime scene, where Nazario and Juvida pointed to the front of House No. 2463 Cagayan Street as the place where they had seen him, his appearance having attracted them because his face was painted black. He was then placed under arrest and booked for murder and frustrated murder on seven counts, and charges were preferred against him with the Fiscal's Office.

The trial court found that Milflores had been positively identified as the man who delivered the fatal bag, that he had a motive for the offense arising from his failed dealings with Victoria Remolar, and that blackening materials were in his possession — findings which the Supreme Court, after reviewing the record, held to be fully supported by the evidence.

• Double Jeopardy: Appellant argued that the murder charge in Criminal Case No. 88174 rested on the very same facts alleged in the multiple frustrated murder charge in Criminal Case No. 88173, the single act of delivering the bomb having caused both the injuries of seven persons and the death of Felicidad Mique; that the separate information placed him in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, in violation of Section 2(h), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and Article III, Section 1, paragraph 20 of the Constitution; and that under Yap vs. Lutero, conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy so long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations.
• Motive and Prior Misdeeds: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving full weight and credit to evidence of his alleged previous misdeeds as a basis for inferring motive, invoking Section 46 of Rule 130, which provides that unless in rebuttal, the prosecution cannot prove the bad moral character of the accused.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellant contended that the prosecution evidence failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, that the testimonies and circumstantial evidence against him were excessively overweighed while his own evidence was hardly credited, and that the identifying witnesses had only a passing glimpse of the person they saw running from the scene. He likewise raised the defense of alibi.

• Complex Crime and Splitting of Cause of Action: The Solicitor General submitted that Criminal Cases Nos. 88173 and 88174 were the results of appellant's single act and should have been incorporated in one criminal information in accordance with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the same being a complex crime, and cited People vs. Cano for the doctrine discouraging the splitting of an action in complex crimes.
• Cure of the Technical Defect: The People maintained that the joint hearing conducted by the trial court cured the technical defect of splitting the cause of action, the inconvenience sought to be prevented having been avoided, since the informations were filed at the same time and there was a joint hearing in both cases.
• Inapplicability of Appellant's Authorities: Respondent argued that the cases cited by appellant in support of his defense of double jeopardy cannot be applied because there was only one injured party in those cases while there were several injured parties here, and because the filing of the information and the hearings in those cases were made one after the other, whereas the informations here were filed on the same date, citing Melo vs. People.
• Admissibility of Motive Evidence: Counsel for the People countered that what the lower court considered in determining appellant's motive was evidence of a series of events and acts indicating his specific intent, system, scheme, and plan to commit the crimes for which he had been indicted, which kind of evidence is admissible under Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the filing of a separate information for murder, after appellant had already been arraigned on the charge of multiple frustrated murder arising from the same act, placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
• Motive and Prior Misdeeds: Whether the trial court erred in crediting evidence of appellant's alleged previous misdeeds as a basis for inferring motive.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The first information did not include Felicidad Mique among the offended parties, and the defense of double jeopardy requires that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent.
• Motive and Prior Misdeeds: No error. Motive becomes relevant only where there is doubt as to whether the accused is the one who committed the crime charged, and lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the accused's participation are definitely proved.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. Appellant was definitely and indubitably identified as the man who handed the bag with the fatal bomb to Florencia Tactay Javier, and the black dyeing materials found in his jeep constituted the strongest mute evidence of his guilt.

• Double Jeopardy: The first information for frustrated murder, Criminal Case No. 88173, did not include Felicidad Mique among the victims or offended parties; she was precisely the deceased named in the murder case, Criminal Case No. 88174. It was therefore impossible for appellant to have been in jeopardy in the first case, and counsel's invocation of double jeopardy was off tangent. The real legal error of the prosecution consisted of having filed two separate informations for a single offense, since the injuries suffered by the offended parties in Criminal Case No. 88173 resulted from the same act that caused the death of Felicidad Mique — the explosion of the bomb handed by appellant to Florencia Tactay Javier — and the crime for which appellant could be made to answer was the single complex offense of murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is in law only one offense because only one penalty can be imposed, notwithstanding that the act may involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses. The technical error of the fiscal in filing two separate informations caused appellant no substantial prejudice: the cases were filed on the same date and jointly tried, so that in effect appellant was prosecuted under a single information, and to yield to counsel's contention would give premium to technicality and sacrifice substantial justice while duplicating a full-dressed trial already conducted. More fundamentally, when appellant invoked double jeopardy, the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even begun; settled jurisprudence holds that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice, for the primary basis of the defense is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent, as held in Bulaong vs. People, Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, and Buscayno vs. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25.
• Motive and Prior Misdeeds: It would be idle to discuss at length the opposing views on the admissibility of the evidence of appellant's dealings with Victoria Remolar; what transpired between them furnished a well-founded clue to the reason for appellant's act of delivering the fatal bag of vegetables containing the bomb to Florencia Tactay Javier. Even that observation was superfluous, because the determination of motive becomes relevant only where there is doubt as to whether or not an accused is the one who committed the crime charged. Lack of motive does not preclude conviction of the offense when the crime and the participation of the accused are definitely proved, as in these cases, consistent with People vs. Lumantas, People vs. Dorico, and People vs. Herila.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Appellant more or less admitted, expressly or impliedly, his meetings and conversations with Victoria Remolar, whom he made believe he had spiritual powers to help her solve her triangular marriage affair, and he did not deny receiving money from her several times in consideration of his promise that Antonio would soon be hers alone. As he in truth did not possess the spiritual means he pretended to have and was in fact deceiving Victoria to fleece money from her, it was inescapable to believe that upon being finally cornered by her, he concocted the idea of making Antonio a widower freed from his marriage to Florencia. Appellant's contention that Florencia had insufficient basis for identifying him was untenable: she had immediately described his general build and appearance to the investigators and readily identified him in the police line-up, in the presence of pressmen, after he was made to paint his face black the same way he had on the morning in question, and she could identify him by his voice because he had called out for "Mrs. Javier" twice at the door. As to witnesses Juvida and Nazario, they came face to face with appellant, who passed by them at a distance of only about two meters while walking at a fast clip from Cagayan Street to Mabuhay Street with his face painted black; when they heard the explosion and saw him start running, Juvida instructed Nazario to chase him, though the latter failed because appellant escaped among the many people on Tejeron Street. Their identification was not a mere glimpse, and appellant's behavior — walking fast after delivering the bomb and then running upon the explosion — was not in conflict with common experience and the ordinary instincts of human nature. The black dyeing materials found in his jeep constituted the strongest mute evidence that he was the black-painted man seen by Florencia, Juvida, and Nazario. His defense of alibi could not prevail over the clear and convincing affirmation of credible witnesses, as held in People vs. Gonzaga, quoting People vs. Caroz, United States vs. Roque, and United States vs. Lasada. The crimes proven constituted the complex crime of murder with multiple frustrated murder, the result of a single act — the delivery of the bomb which exploded as intended — with use of explosive as the qualifying circumstance, attended by evident premeditation, craft, and dwelling.

• Complex Crime under Article 48, Revised Penal Code — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. There is in law only one offense because only one penalty can be imposed, notwithstanding that the act may in fact involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses. Applied here, the single act of delivering the bomb that killed Felicidad Mique and injured seven others gave rise to one complex crime of murder with frustrated murder, not to two distinct prosecutions.
• Double Jeopardy; Requisites — The defense of double jeopardy presupposes that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case, or that the same has been terminated without his consent. The mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Applied here, no jeopardy had attached or been terminated when appellant raised the defense, and the first information did not even include the deceased Felicidad Mique among the offended parties.
• Splitting of Cause of Action in Complex Crimes — The prosecution should not split the action against the accused in complex crimes, as such splitting works unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice and requires the presentation of substantially the same evidence in different courts. The defect, however, is technical and is cured where the informations are filed on the same date and the cases are jointly tried, no substantial prejudice having been caused the accused.
• Motive — Motive becomes relevant only where there is doubt as to whether or not the accused is the one who committed the crime charged. Lack of motive does not preclude conviction of the offense when the crime and the participation of the accused are definitely proved. Evidence of a series of events and acts indicating a specific intent, system, scheme, and plan to commit the crime may be admitted under Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Alibi — Alibi cannot stand and prevail over the clear and convincing affirmation of credible witnesses. Where proof of the accused's presence at the scene is clear and positive, the defense of alibi is unavailing.
• Article 47, Revised Penal Code — The death penalty shall not be imposed upon a person who is more than seventy years of age at the time of the commission of the offense or at the time of the rendition of judgment. Applied here, although the complex offense warranted the extreme penalty of death, appellant's age of more than seventy years compelled the affirmance of the reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court.

• "There is in law only one offense because there is only one penalty that can be imposed notwithstanding that the act may in fact involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the complex crime: the single act of delivering the bomb, which killed one and injured seven, gave rise to only one offense under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and the two informations filed by the fiscal were legally erroneous.
• "It is settled jurisprudence in this Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the double jeopardy rule as applied to the splitting of charges, and the ground on which the first assignment of error was overruled.
• "But even this observation seems superfluous, for the determination of motive becomes relevant only where there is doubt as to whether or not an accused is the one who committed the crime charged. Withal, lack of motive does not preclude conviction of the offense when the crime and participation of the accused are definitely proved, as in these cases." — This passage disposes of the second assignment of error and states the settled rule on the limited relevance of motive in criminal prosecutions.
• "Our review of the evidence leads Us to no other conclusion that appellant has been definitely and indubitably Identified as the man who handed the bag with the fatal bomb to Florencia Tactay-Javier." — This is the Court's conclusion on the sufficiency of the identification evidence, resting on the positive testimony of three eyewitnesses and the black dyeing materials recovered from appellant's jeep.

• People vs. Cano, G.R. No. L-19660, May 24, 1966 — Cited by the Solicitor General, and quoted by the Court, for the doctrine discouraging the splitting of the action against the accused in complex crimes; the Court held that the joint hearing in the cases at bar cured the technical defect.
• Bulaong vs. People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense does not give rise to a valid plea of double jeopardy absent a prior conviction, acquittal, or termination without the accused's consent.
• Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21, No. L-46366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 10 — Cited alongside Bulaong for the same rule on the requisites of double jeopardy.
• Buscayno vs. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, No. L-58284, Nov. 19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273 — Cited for the same settled rule that the primary basis of double jeopardy is a prior conviction, acquittal, or termination of the first case without the accused's consent.
• Yap vs. Lutero, G.R. No. L-1266, April 30, 1959 — Cited by appellant for the proposition that conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy so long as jeopardy has attached under one information; distinguished by the Court because the cited cases involved only one injured party, whereas the case at bar involved several.
• Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 769 — Cited by the Solicitor General in arguing that the authorities relied upon by appellant are inapplicable, the informations in the present cases having been filed on the same date rather than one after the other.
• People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 764 — Cited for the rule that lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the participation of the accused are definitely proved.
• People vs. Dorico, L-31568, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 172 — Cited with Lumantas for the same rule on motive.
• People vs. Herila, L-32785, May 21, 1973, 51 SCRA 31 — Cited with Lumantas and Dorico for the same rule on motive.
• People vs. Gonzaga, L-34418, May 26, 1977, 77 SCRA 140 — Quoted at length by the Court for the doctrine that the identification of an accused by credible witnesses negates the claim of alibi.
• People vs. Caroz, 68 Phil. 521 (1939) — Quoted within the Gonzaga citation for the rule that alibis cannot stand and prevail over the clear and convincing affirmation of credible witnesses.
• United States vs. Roque, 11 Phil. 422 — Cited within the Gonzaga quotation as the 1908 decision first announcing the doctrine that alibi cannot prevail against positive identification.
• United States vs. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910) — Cited within the Gonzaga quotation for the rule that alibi cannot avail as against the positive and direct testimony of prosecution witnesses.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The Court applied this provision in holding that the single act of delivering the bomb, which caused the death of Felicidad Mique and injuries to seven others, constituted one complex crime of murder with frustrated murder, such that the filing of two separate informations was a legal error.
• Article 47, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed upon a person who is more than seventy years of age. The Court applied this provision in affirming the reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court, notwithstanding that the complex offense warranted the extreme penalty of death, because appellant was then more than seventy years old.
• Section 2(h), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Lists as a ground for a motion to quash the fact that the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged. Appellant invoked this provision in moving to dismiss Criminal Case No. 88174; the Court held the ground unavailable because no prior jeopardy had attached or been terminated.
• Article III, Section 1, paragraph 20, Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, and that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Appellant invoked this provision; the Court held it inapplicable for want of a prior terminated jeopardy.
• Section 46, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that unless in rebuttal, the prosecution cannot prove the bad moral character of the accused. Appellant invoked this provision against the trial court's reliance on his alleged previous misdeeds; the Court held the point immaterial because motive is relevant only where identity is in doubt.
• Section 48, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Governs the admissibility of evidence of similar acts to prove a specific intent, system, scheme, or plan. The People invoked this provision to justify the motive evidence considered by the trial court.

Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.