People of the Philippines vs. Morato

An accused who admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense bears the burden of proving unlawful aggression and the other requisites by clear and convincing evidence; absent unlawful aggression, the killing is not justified, and a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 does not violate double jeopardy because it is a distinct offense.

The prosecution arose from the fatal shooting of Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon at Franco's Chicken House in Puerto Princesa City, where Ernesto Morato and Emmanuel Cacatian were present. The legal backdrop included Presidential Decree No. 1866, which penalized unlawful possession of firearms, and General Orders No. 6 and No. 7, which regulated the carrying of firearms outside residence. The Revised Penal Code governed the murder charge and the defenses of self-defense and defense of stranger.

At around 9 P.M. of February 7, 1989, Andrew de los Santos and Gabby Burgos arrived at Franco's Chicken House on Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa City. Upon entering, Andrew saw Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon sitting on a stool at the bar counter. Andrew sat on the stool to the left of Pat. de Leon, while Gabby took the stool to the right.

At around midnight, Ernesto Morato and Emmanuel Cacatian arrived, proceeded to the bar, and ordered beer. Cacatian sat on the stool second to the right of Pat. de Leon, while Morato joined another group. Later, Andrew noticed Pat. de Leon and Cacatian arguing. Walfrido Ponce de Leon, the owner of the establishment, was summoned by his wife and tried to pacify Pat. de Leon and Cacatian. Andrew approached Cacatian and asked what the problem was, but Walfrido answered that everything was all right and led Andrew aside. Suddenly, Walfrido heard the roar of a gunshot. He looked at the direction where the shot came from and saw Morato holding a gun and shooting Pat. de Leon twice until the latter fell. Morato fled.

Walfrido, Popoy Lanzanas, and Jimmy Manalang brought Pat. de Leon to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Rudolph Bala performed an autopsy and submitted a post mortem report indicating that Pat. de Leon suffered three gunshot wounds: one about 1.5 cm in diameter over the left lateral side of the chest wall, about 2 inches below the left axilla; one about 1.5 cm in diameter over the right lateral aspect of the anterior chest wall, about 1 ½ inches lateral to the right nipple; and one about 1.5 cm over the right middle arm, lateral aspect. The cause of death was shock, secondary to internal hemorrhage, due to multiple gunshot wounds.

Morato admitted killing Pat. de Leon but claimed self-defense and defense of a stranger. According to him, he shot the victim with a gun grabbed from the waist of Andrew de los Santos because the victim was pointing his own gun at Boy Cacatian and appellant, and he had to fire more than once because the victim was still pointing his gun at him. He also testified that when the victim fell, the victim's gun fell on the floor, and that when he left the scene he left Andrew's gun at the scene of the shooting.

The prosecution's evidence contradicted this account. Walfrido and Andrew testified that Morato was behind the victim when the latter was shot. Andrew testified that he was not carrying any firearm at the time, which was corroborated by a certification issued by the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm that Andrew was not on duty and that all firearms issued to him as a prison guard were duly accounted for, with his accountability not involving any .38 caliber handgun. NBI ballistician Brandeis Flores testified that the slug extracted from the victim's body was fired from a .38 caliber firearm. The police did not find any gun at the scene of the shooting. The Firearms and Explosives Section of the Philippine Constabulary certified that Morato was not a duly registered licensee or firearm holder of any caliber. The day following the killing, Morato surrendered to the Provincial Commander after the latter announced over the radio that he would issue a "shoot to kill" order unless Morato voluntarily surrendered, and after Morato's employer persuaded him to surrender.

The trial court found that Morato had shot the victim and possessed a .38 caliber handgun without a permit, and it concluded that he did not voluntarily surrender.

• Constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866: Accused-appellant contended that Presidential Decree No. 1866 is unconstitutional because it is vague, as it does not specifically define the crime of illegal possession of firearms, thereby violating the due process and equal protection clauses.
• Double Jeopardy: Accused-appellant argued that he was placed in double jeopardy when he was charged with and convicted of murder and illegal possession of firearms arising from the same act in two separate informations.
• Self-Defense and Defense of Stranger: Accused-appellant claimed that he shot the victim with a gun grabbed from Andrew de los Santos because the victim was pointing his own gun at Boy Cacatian and appellant, and that he had to fire more than once because the victim was still pointing his gun at him.
• Treachery: Accused-appellant maintained that the trial court erred in assuming that treachery qualified the killing as murder.
• Carrying of Firearm: Accused-appellant asserted that the trial court erred in assuming that he was carrying a firearm.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in not appreciating circumstances favorable to him, specifically voluntary surrender.

• Constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866: Whether Presidential Decree No. 1866 is unconstitutional for vagueness, violating due process and equal protection.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether separate convictions for murder and illegal possession of firearms arising from the same act place the accused in double jeopardy.
• Self-Defense and Defense of Stranger: Whether accused-appellant established self-defense or defense of a stranger to justify the killing.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing as murder.
• Illegal Possession: Whether accused-appellant was guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Penalty: Whether the penalties imposed should be modified.

• Constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866: No. The law is not vague; Section 1 specifically defines unlawful possession, and the decree and related general orders clearly prohibit possessing or carrying a firearm without authority.
• Double Jeopardy: No. Murder under the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession under Presidential Decree No. 1866 are distinct offenses, even if arising from the same act; a subsequent prosecution for a different offense is not barred.
• Self-Defense and Defense of Stranger: No. Accused failed to prove unlawful aggression; evidence showed he shot the victim from behind, and his claim that he grabbed Andrew's gun was contradicted.
• Treachery: Yes. The attack was deliberate, sudden, unexpected, and from behind, qualifying the killing as murder.
• Illegal Possession: Yes. Accused possessed a .38 caliber handgun without permit, as certified by the Firearms and Explosives Section.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. He presented himself to the Provincial Commander the day after the killing; the shoot-to-kill announcement and employer's persuasion did not negate voluntariness.
• Penalty: Modified. Voluntary surrender lowered the murder penalty; illegal possession carries reclusion perpetua under Presidential Decree No. 1866; damages were adjusted.

• Constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866: Accused-appellant argued that the law was vague because it did not specifically define illegal possession of firearms. The first two paragraphs of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 impose the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua upon any person who unlawfully manufactures, deals in, acquires, disposes, or possesses any firearm, and impose death if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The Court found these provisions specific enough. Presidential Decree No. 1866 codified various laws on illegal possession of firearms, and its Section 9 repealing clause did not repeal General Order No. 6 or General Order No. 7. Read together, these laws clearly punish possession of a firearm without a license or permit, or carrying it outside residence without authority. The laws are clear, unambiguous, and constitutional.
• Double Jeopardy: The Court relied on People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601 [1990]. The constitutional right against double jeopardy protects against a second or later prosecution for the same offense. When the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. The offense of illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm is penalized under a special statute, while murder is punished under the Revised Penal Code. These two offenses are different, so the subsequent filing of the murder case did not place accused-appellant in prohibited second jeopardy.
• Self-Defense and Defense of Stranger: Accused-appellant admitted killing the victim but invoked self-defense and defense of a stranger. Where an accused admits killing but invokes self-defense, he assumes the burden of proving the plea by credible, clear, and convincing evidence. The requisites are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The initial and crucial point is unlawful aggression; absent it, self-defense cannot succeed. The evidence disproved accused-appellant's claim. The victim suffered three gunshot wounds, two of them fatal and located on the left and right lateral sides of the chest wall. When the victim was first hit in the arm, he was disabled and his normal movements were impaired; there was no further need to fire two more shots, indicating an unwavering determination to kill. Both Walfrido and Andrew testified that accused-appellant was behind the victim when the latter was shot; with the victim's back turned, it was impossible for the victim to have aimed his gun at accused-appellant. Accused-appellant's assertion that he grabbed the gun from Andrew's waist ran counter to Andrew's testimony that he was not carrying any firearm, corroborated by the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm certification that Andrew was not on duty and all firearms issued to him were accounted for, with no .38 caliber handgun in his accountability. The victim was killed by a .38 caliber gun, as testified by NBI ballistician Brandeis Flores. Accused-appellant also claimed that the victim's gun fell on the floor and that he left Andrew's gun at the scene, but the police found no gun there. Thus, unlawful aggression was not established. The defense of stranger likewise failed because its first requisite is also unlawful aggression.
• Treachery: The evidence showed that the shooting was effected treacherously. There is treachery when the attack is deliberate, sudden, unexpected, and from behind. Accused-appellant shot Pat. Jose Ponce de Leon suddenly and unexpectedly from behind. Treachery qualified the killing as murder.
• Illegal Possession: Accused-appellant had in his possession a .38 caliber handgun for which he had no permit to carry. The Firearms and Explosives Section of the Philippine Constabulary issued a certification that accused-appellant was not a duly registered licensee or firearm holder of any caliber. He was therefore guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
• Voluntary Surrender: The trial court concluded that accused-appellant did not voluntarily surrender, but the Supreme Court agreed with accused-appellant on this point. The evidence showed that on the day following the killing, accused-appellant surrendered to the Provincial Commander. The fact that the Provincial Commander announced over the radio that he would issue a "shoot to kill" order unless accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered, and that accused-appellant was persuaded to surrender by his employer, did not militate against voluntary surrender. Accused-appellant was not arrested and he presented himself to the Provincial Commander to surrender.
• Penalty: In computing the penalty for murder, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. With one mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period, or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in relation to Paragraph 3, Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree ranges from the maximum of prision mayor to the medium of reclusion temporal, or 10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. The Court imposed an indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 18 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. For illegal possession of firearm under Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the penalty is reclusion perpetua. Actual damages of P59,000.00 were awarded, and moral damages were reduced from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00.

• Vagueness and constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1866 — A penal law is not unconstitutional for vagueness where its terms are specific enough to inform persons of the conduct prohibited. Presidential Decree No. 1866, Section 1, read with General Orders No. 6 and No. 7, clearly punishes possession of a firearm without a license or permit or carrying it outside residence without authority. The Court found no due process or equal protection violation.
• Double jeopardy and distinct offenses — The constitutional protection against double jeopardy bars a second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different offense arising from the same act. Murder under the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 are distinct offenses; separate informations and convictions do not violate double jeopardy.
• Self-defense — When an accused admits killing but pleads self-defense, the burden shifts to the accused to prove by credible, clear, and convincing evidence: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. Unlawful aggression is essential; absent it, self-defense fails.
• Defense of stranger — Defense of a stranger requires, like self-defense, unlawful aggression as its first requisite. Since no unlawful aggression was established, the defense failed.
• Treachery — Treachery qualifies a killing as murder when the attack is deliberate, sudden, unexpected, and from behind, ensuring execution without risk to the offender from the victim's defense. The Court found that accused-appellant shot the victim from behind.
• Voluntary surrender — Voluntary surrender is mitigating when the accused, not having been arrested, presents himself to the authorities. A threat of a "shoot to kill" order and persuasion by an employer do not negate voluntariness where the accused was not arrested and surrendered.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law in murder with mitigating circumstance — With one mitigating circumstance, the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in relation to Article 61, Paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree ranges from the maximum of prision mayor to the medium of reclusion temporal. The Court imposed an indeterminate sentence accordingly.
• Illegal possession of firearm — Illegal possession of a firearm is committed by possessing a firearm without a license or permit, or by carrying it outside residence without authority. A certification that the accused was not a registered licensee or firearm holder supports conviction.

• "It is elementary that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of proof of establishing his plea of self-defense by credible, clear, and convincing evidence" — This passage states the burden of proof that defeated accused-appellant's self-defense and defense of stranger claims.
• "There is treachery when the attack is deliberate, sudden, unexpected and from behind" — This defines the canonical formulation of treachery relied upon to qualify the killing as murder.
• "It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy." — Quoted from People vs. Tac-an, this passage disposes of the double jeopardy contention by distinguishing murder from illegal possession of firearms.
• "The stubborn fact remains that he was not arrested and that he presented himself to the Provincial Commander to surrender." — This passage supports the finding of voluntary surrender despite the shoot-to-kill announcement and the employer's persuasion.

• People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601 [1990] — Quoted as controlling precedent on double jeopardy; held that prosecution for a different offense arising from the same act does not violate double jeopardy.
• People vs. Martija, 112 SCRA 528 [1982] — Cited to support the finding that multiple shots after the victim was disabled indicated intent to kill and negated self-defense.
• Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 38 [1989] — Cited for the rule that unlawful aggression is essential to self-defense; absent it, no self-defense can be successfully interposed.
• People vs. Alcantara, 163 SCRA 783 [1988] — Cited in the dispositive for the indeterminate sentence imposed for murder.
• People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243 [1972]; People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48 [1973]; and People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 [1974] — Cited collectively for the rule that the accused who invokes self-defense assumes the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679 [1976] — Cited as representative authority for the rule that treachery exists when the attack is deliberate, sudden, unexpected, and from behind.

• Presidential Decree No. 1866, Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 — Defines unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms and imposes reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua; if homicide or murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm, the penalty is death. The Court found these provisions specific and constitutional; accused-appellant was convicted under Paragraph 2.
• Presidential Decree No. 1866, Section 9 — The repealing clause did not repeal General Order No. 6 or General Order No. 7.
• General Order No. 6 — Provides that no person shall keep, possess, or carry outside of his residence any firearm unless duly authorized.
• General Order No. 7 — Provides that only officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and police officers in the actual performance of official mission or duty may carry firearms outside residence; guards of private security agencies and public or private corporations or firms are authorized to carry their duly licensed firearms only from the premises or offices to their place of work and return.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 11, No. 1 — Sets the requisites of self-defense: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 11, No. 2 — Governs defense of a stranger; its first requisite, like self-defense, is unlawful aggression.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 248 — Prescribes the penalty for murder: reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 61, Paragraph 3 — Used with the Indeterminate Sentence Law to determine the penalty next lower in degree after considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to the murder penalty after voluntary surrender was appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Constitution, due process and equal protection clauses — Accused-appellant claimed Presidential Decree No. 1866 violated these clauses; the Court found no violation.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concurred.