People of the Philippines vs. Modesto Tee

A search warrant describing the objects to be seized as “an undetermined amount of marijuana” satisfies the constitutional requirement of particularity where the nature of the prohibited substance makes a more precise description impractical, and the description is as specific as the circumstances ordinarily allow. Where the law prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, irrespective of the quantity of dangerous drugs involved.

Taxi driver Danilo Abratique, acting on requests from Modesto Tee, helped transport large quantities of marijuana to a rented room and to Tee’s residence. Alarmed by the nature of the goods, Abratique and his relatives disclosed the matter to NBI agent Edwin Fianza. NBI and PNP NARCOM operatives conducted a warrantless seizure of 336.93 kilograms of marijuana at the rented room and thereafter obtained a search warrant for Tee’s residence, where they seized an additional 591.81 kilograms. Two separate informations were filed against Tee; the trial court acquitted him in the case involving the warrantless seizure but convicted him for the marijuana seized under the warrant, sentencing him to death.

• Parties and Relationship: Modesto Tee, a Chinese national and businessman residing in Baguio City, was well acquainted with Danilo Abratique, a taxi driver whose wife was the sister of Tee’s sister-in-law.
• Initial Storage of Marijuana: In late June 1998, Tee asked Abratique to find a place to store smuggled cigarettes. Abratique introduced him to Albert Ballesteros, who rented out his house in Bakakeng, Baguio City. Tee brought several boxes purportedly containing “blue seal” cigarettes to the premises. Ballesteros later discovered the boxes contained marijuana and, together with Abratique, prevailed upon Tee to remove them. Tee then used Abratique’s taxi to transport the boxes to his residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City.
• Second Haul of Marijuana: On June 30, 1998, Tee hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet, ostensibly to buy strawberries. Upon arrival, Tee directed Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where several sacks of marijuana were loaded into the taxi. At Tee’s request, Abratique found another storage place — his grandmother’s house at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., QM Subdivision, Baguio City, managed by his aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Tee and Abratique unloaded and stored the marijuana there.
• Discovery and Law Enforcement Involvement: Disturbed by the nature of the stored goods, Nazarea confided to her daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, whose brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent. Alice and Abratique telephoned Edwin Fianza and disclosed the situation.
• July 1, 1998 Operations:
  • Warrantless Seizure at Dr. Cariño St.: NBI agents conducted a stakeout at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St. on the morning of July 1, 1998, having been tipped that Tee would retrieve the drugs. PNP NARCOM personnel were also surveilling the premises based on a separate informant’s tip. The two units agreed on a joint operation. When Tee failed to appear and the operation risked compromise, the NBI obtained the consent of Nazarea Abreau to enter the rented room. The search yielded four boxes and thirteen sacks of marijuana weighing 336.93 kilograms. This warrantless seizure became the subject of Criminal Case No. 15822-R.
  • Application for Search Warrant: That evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied for a search warrant before RTC Judge Antonio Reyes at his residence. Judge Reyes ordered the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah Muñoz, to be summoned to record the proceedings. Judge Reyes personally examined Lising and Abratique under oath, then issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) directing the search of Tee’s residence for “an undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp.”
  • Execution of Search Warrant: NBI operatives, accompanied by PNP NARCOM personnel, served the warrant on Tee at his Green Valley residence. The search, witnessed by Tee’s family, barangay officials, and members of the media, uncovered 26 boxes and one sack of dried marijuana in the water tank, garage, and storeroom, with a total weight of 591.81 kilograms. Photographs were taken during the search. The seized items were submitted for forensic examination and were confirmed by NBI Forensic Chemist Maria Carina Madrigal to be marijuana.
  • Appellant’s Defense: Tee contended that the physical evidence was illegally obtained because the search warrant was a general warrant and the examining judge failed to exhaustively examine the applicant and witness. He argued that Abratique’s testimony was hearsay and that Abratique’s own involvement in transporting marijuana rendered him an unreliable informant. Tee did not testify; his sole defense witness was his mother, who testified on matters unrelated to the charge.
  • Trial Court’s Findings: The RTC acquitted Tee in Criminal Case No. 15822-R, ruling that the warrantless seizure was unreasonable and the 336.93 kilograms of marijuana were inadmissible. In Criminal Case No. 15800-R, however, the RTC found the search warrant valid and the evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, convicting Tee and sentencing him to death.

• Invalidity of Search Warrant — General Warrant: Appellant contended that the warrant’s description “an undetermined amount of marijuana” was too general and void for vagueness, as Abratique could have estimated the quantity. He further argued that merely citing Republic Act No. 6425 without specifying the particular section constituted a general warrant.
• Invalidity of Search Warrant — Insufficient Examination: Appellant maintained that Judge Reyes failed to exhaustively examine the applicant and witness, improperly relying on Abratique’s statements without probing Abratique’s participation in the offense and his motive for informing.
• Invalidity of Search Warrant — Indefinite Place: Appellant argued that the address indicated in the warrant did not clearly identify the place to be searched.
• Invalidity of Search Warrant — Excessive Force: Appellant asserted that unnecessary force was used during the execution of the warrant.
• Violation of Right to Speedy Trial: Appellant claimed that the prosecution’s unjustified delay in presenting witness Abratique, who failed to appear on twenty hearing dates, violated his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Reopening the Case: Appellant argued that the trial court exhibited partiality and gravely abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to reopen the case to present Abratique’s testimony after having been directed to rest.
• Insufficiency of Evidence — Incredible Witness: Appellant assailed Abratique’s credibility, characterizing his testimony as profuse with lies, contrary to human nature, and self-exculpatory; he also questioned Abratique’s motive and demanded Abratique’s equal prosecution.

• Search Warrant Particularity: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that a search warrant is issued upon a finding of probable cause that a place contains prohibited drugs, not a specific amount, and that it is impossible to determine the exact quantity beforehand. The description sufficiently limited the objects to a specific prohibited drug.
• Sufficiency of Examination: The OSG pointed out that Abratique possessed personal knowledge of the marijuana, having personally assisted in loading and transporting it, and therefore the NBI did not rely on hearsay. Judge Reyes personally examined the applicant and witness, and his determination of probable cause is entitled to deference.
• Definiteness of Place: The OSG argued that the address was as specific as possible and that the NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the premises prepared by Abratique.
• No Prejudice from Reopening: The OSG maintained that the trial court’s order was in the interest of substantial justice; the prosecution had not formally rested and the additional testimony was merely the completion of an unfinished testimony, with no prejudice to the accused who had full opportunity to present counter-evidence.
• No Speedy Trial Violation: The OSG argued that the two-month delay was not unreasonable, that the prosecution was not capricious but instead sought arrest warrants for Abratique to compel attendance, and that appellant failed to object or move for appropriate remedies during trial.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The OSG contended that Abratique testified in a straightforward manner and his testimony, corroborated by the physical evidence of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana found at appellant’s residence, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Particularity of Description: Whether the search warrant’s description “an undetermined amount of marijuana” satisfies the constitutional requirement that things to be seized be particularly described.
• Judicial Examination: Whether the examining judge failed to exhaustively examine the applicant and his witness as required for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
• Definiteness of Place: Whether the address stated in the search warrant sufficiently identified the place to be searched.
• Execution of the Warrant: Whether unnecessary force was used during the execution of the search warrant.
• Right to Speedy Trial: Whether the repeated absences of the prosecution witness, causing twenty hearing postponements, violated appellant’s right to a speedy trial.
• Reopening of Case: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to complete the testimony of its witness after having been ordered to rest its case.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the testimony of Danilo Abratique, proved appellant’s guilt for illegal possession of marijuana beyond reasonable doubt.
• Imposable Penalty: Whether the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty given the quantity of marijuana involved and the absence of modifying circumstances.

• Particularity of Description: The phrase “an undetermined amount of marijuana” satisfied the constitutional requirement of particularity. The requirement is meant to prevent general warrants authorizing fishing expeditions; technical precision is not demanded, especially where the nature of the goods — illicit drugs — makes further description impractical. The description was as specific as circumstances ordinarily allowed, expressed a conclusion of fact, and limited the seizure to items bearing a direct relation to the offense. The warrant was captioned “For Violation of R.A. 6425, as amended,” and the body clearly stated the specific offense — illegal possession of marijuana — removing any question as to the offense for which it was issued.
• Judicial Examination: The omission of the required depositions from the record was not fatal. The Bill of Rights does not make the attachment of depositions an imperative necessity so long as evidence on record shows what testimony was presented. Judge Reyes personally examined the applicant and witness, and the official presumption of regularity of judicial functions applied absent contrary evidence. Further, appellant waived any objection to the sufficiency of the depositions by not raising it specifically in his motion to quash before the trial court. The examining judge had substantial basis for finding probable cause, relying on Abratique’s personal knowledge.
• Definiteness of Place: The address stated in the warrant, supplemented by a detailed sketch prepared by Abratique, was sufficiently specific to enable the serving officers to identify and distinguish the place from others in the community.
• Execution of the Warrant: No evidence supported appellant’s claim of unnecessary force. The record showed that the warrant was served on appellant, he was given time to read it, and the search was conducted orderly and peaceably in the presence of family, barangay officials, and media.
• Right to Speedy Trial: The right to a speedy trial was not violated. Although witness Abratique caused twenty hearing postponements, there was no showing that the prosecution capriciously caused the absences; the prosecution sought warrants of arrest and urged the NBI to produce the witness. A delay of less than two months was not unreasonable, and appellant neither objected to the delay nor availed himself of remedies such as moving to require bail for the witness. The Speedy Trial Act’s 180-day trial period was not breached, and the right is violated only by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, not by mere mathematical computation of postponements.
• Reopening of Case: The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion. The prosecution had not yet formally rested its case; thus, there was technically nothing to reopen. The reception of additional testimony merely completed Abratique’s unfinished testimony. A trial court may, in the interest of justice, require a material witness to complete testimony and satisfy the court’s mind on material facts. Appellant had full opportunity to present counter-evidence and was not denied his day in court.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs — (1) possession of a prohibited drug, (2) lack of legal authority, and (3) free and conscious possession — were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Abratique’s testimony, despite some self-exculpatory portions, was credible on material points and was corroborated by the physical seizure of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from Tee’s residence. The forensic chemist confirmed the seized articles were marijuana. Possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi; appellant failed to rebut this presumption, as he did not testify and presented no relevant defense evidence.
• Imposable Penalty: The death penalty was improper. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The legislature did not intend the automatic imposition of death based solely on quantity. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, where the law provides two indivisible penalties and neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present, the lesser penalty — reclusion perpetua — must be imposed. The fine of P1,000,000 was within the statutory range and was sustained.

• Particularity of Description in Search Warrants: The constitutional requirement that things to be seized be particularly described is satisfied if the description: (1) is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact—not of law—by which peace officers may be guided; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those bearing a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued. Technical precision is not required where the nature of the illicit goods makes a more detailed description impractical.
• Waiver of Objections to Search Warrant: All grounds and objections to a search warrant available, existent, or known at the time must be raised in the motion to quash; otherwise, they are deemed waived.
• Presumption of Regularity of Judicial Functions: A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, and it is presumed that judicial functions have been regularly performed unless the contrary is shown.
• Substantial Basis for Probable Cause: Probable cause for a search warrant exists where the questions of the examining judge bring out facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought are in the place to be searched.
• Right to Speedy Trial — Factors and Standard: The right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative and is deemed violated only where: (1) proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; (2) unjustified postponements are sought and secured; or (3) without cause or justifiable motive, a long period elapses without trial. A mathematical computation of postponements is insufficient; courts consider the length of delay, reasons, conduct of parties, and prejudice. Delay of less than two months is not unreasonable.
• Reopening of Criminal Cases: A trial court may, in its discretion and in the interest of justice, allow the reopening of a case or the completion of a witness’s testimony even after the prosecution has been directed to rest, provided the accused is not prejudiced or deprived of the opportunity to present counter-evidence.
• Prima Facie Evidence of Knowledge in Drug Possession: Possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge.
• Application of Indivisible Penalties under Article 63, Revised Penal Code: Where the law prescribes two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death), and neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. The quantity of dangerous drugs exceeding the threshold in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425 does not automatically mandate the death penalty.

• “The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.” — This defines the purpose of the particularity requirement.
• “Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description ‘an undetermined amount of marijuana’ must be held to satisfy the requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances.” — Ratio on why the description was valid.
• “The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.” — Standard for evaluating supporting depositions.
• “A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.” — Definition of speedy trial.
• “The legislature never intended that where the quantity involved exceeds those stated in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of death shall automatically be imposed.” — Clarification on the imposition of the death penalty for drug offenses.
• “Possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession.” — Rule on shifting the burden of evidence in illegal possession cases.

• Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937) — Established the true test of sufficiency of depositions for search warrants and held that attachment of depositions, while required by rules, is not a constitutional imperative; also, the purpose of the examining magistrate is to determine probable cause.
• Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) — Adopted the three-part standard for particularity of description: specific as circumstances allow, expresses a conclusion of fact, and limits items to those bearing direct relation to the offense.
• People v. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174 (1993) — Held that the description “illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia” satisfies the particularity requirement.
• People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998) — Stated that the particularity requirement prevents peace officers from exercising discretion over what to seize, avoiding general warrants.
• Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249 (1994) — Established that all available grounds and objections to a search warrant must be raised in the motion to quash; otherwise, they are deemed waived.
• Kalaw v. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852 (1937) / Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650 (1924) / Andres v. Cacdac, Jr., 113 SCRA 216 (1982) — Enumerated the instances when the right to speedy trial is deemed violated: vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; unjustified postponements secured; or long periods elapsing without cause.
• People v. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 (1994) — Held that the Constitution aims to avoid general warrants that authorize fishing expeditions.
• People v. Baludda, 318 SCRA 503 (1999) / United States v. Bandoc, 23 Phil. 14 (1912) — Established that possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of animus possidendi.
• People v. Che Chun Ting, 328 SCRA 592 (2000) / People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998) — Held that the quantity of drugs exceeding the statutory threshold does not automatically mandate the death penalty; Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code must be applied.
• United States v. Vizquera, 4 Phil. 380 (1905) / United States v. Cinco, 8 Phil. 388 (1907) / U.S. v. Base, 9 Phil. 48 (1907) — Upheld the trial court’s discretion to reopen proceedings or recall witnesses in the interest of justice.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — The right against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring probable cause determined personally by a judge, particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Applied to test the validity of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98).
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — The right of the accused to a speedy, impartial, and public trial. Invoked by appellant regarding the delay caused by the absent witness; found not violated.
• Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5, 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (formerly 1985 Rules) — Requisites for issuing a search warrant and the requirement of personal examination under oath. Cited in evaluating the sufficiency of the judicial examination and the consequences of unattached depositions.
• Rule 119, Section 14, Rules of Court — Bail to secure the appearance of a material witness. Noted that appellant failed to invoke this remedy during trial.
• Section 8, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes the illegal possession of prohibited drugs with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine of P500,000 to P10,000,000. The substantive offense under which appellant was charged and convicted.
• Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — Specifies the threshold quantities of dangerous drugs (750 grams or more of marijuana) for the application of the penalty under Section 8. Held not to mandate the automatic imposition of death.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Rules for the application of indivisible penalties; where two indivisible penalties are prescribed and neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances exist, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ. — All concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.

• N/A — No dissenting opinions were recorded.