People of the Philippines vs. Mizpah R. Reyes

The ten-year prescriptive period for falsification of a public document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code commences from the registration of the falsified notarized document with the Register of Deeds, which constitutes constructive notice to the whole world, and not from the offended party’s actual discovery of the forgery.

The parcel of land in Lipa City was originally registered in the names of the deceased spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo under TCT No. T-7471. Their children included accused Mizpah R. Reyes and complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara, and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza. Falsification of a public document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code carries prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, and prescribes in ten years under Article 90; Article 91 provides that the prescriptive period runs from discovery by the offended party, authorities, or their agents. The rule that registration in a public registry is constructive notice to the whole world supplied the legal backdrop for determining when discovery occurred.

The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa City, registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. Both are now deceased, the husband having died on September 6, 1970 and the wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by their children: accused Mizpah R. Reyes and complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara, and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.

In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City that the property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, single, under TCT No. T-9885. The conveyance was effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26, 1961. Upon examination of the document, they found that the signatures of their parents were allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married to Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950.

The document was referred by the complainants to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination of the signatures of their parents, and a report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch XIII, Lipa City on October 18, 1984 two informations both for falsification of public document. The first, Criminal Case No. V-1163, charged accused with making it appear in the notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo participated in the sale by falsifying Pampo’s signature. The second, Criminal Case No. V-1164, charged accused with making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale, more specifically, by stating that she was single.

• Obiter Dictum in Cabral: Petitioner contended that the statement in Cabral vs. Puno regarding constructive notice and the commencement of the prescriptive period was not doctrine but merely an obiter dictum.
• Limited to Land Registration/Civil Cases: Petitioner argued that the rule on constructive notice is limited in application to land registration cases and that haste should be avoided in applying civil-law presumptions to criminal suits.
• Different Policy for Criminal Prescription: Petitioner maintained that the law on prescription of crimes is founded on a principle different from that of prescription of civil actions, and that this difference precludes application of the constructive-notice rule in criminal actions.
• Actual Discovery: Petitioner argued that the prescriptive period should commence in June 1983, when the complainants actually discovered the fraudulent deed of sale, not from the deed’s registration on May 26, 1961.

• Prescription: Respondent maintained that the criminal action or liability had been extinguished by prescription, invoking Cabral vs. Puno.
• Non-Compliance with P.D. No. 1508: Respondent argued that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and her person because of non-compliance with the pre-conciliation requirement of P.D. No. 1508.

• Prescription: Whether the crime of falsification of a public document charged in the two informations had prescribed.
• Commencement of Prescriptive Period: Whether the ten-year prescriptive period commenced from the registration of the notarized deed of sale with the Register of Deeds on May 26, 1961, or from the complainants’ actual discovery in June 1983.
• Applicability of Constructive Notice in Criminal Cases: Whether the rule on constructive notice—that registration is notice to the whole world—applies in interpreting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Cabral vs. Puno: Whether the statement in Cabral vs. Puno on constructive notice and prescription is merely an obiter dictum and without legal basis.

• Prescription: Yes. The crime had prescribed. Falsification of a public document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, and prescribes in ten years under Article 90. The informations were filed on October 18, 1984, more than ten years after the deed was registered on May 26, 1961.
• Commencement of Prescriptive Period: From registration. Under Article 91, the period runs from discovery by the offended party, authorities, or their agents; registration of the notarized deed with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice to the whole world, so discovery is deemed to have occurred on May 26, 1961.
• Applicability of Constructive Notice in Criminal Cases: Yes. The rule on constructive notice may be applied in criminal actions. Although caution is observed in using civil-law presumptions in criminal statutes, application is warranted where it favors the accused, since criminal prescription is construed liberally in favor of the accused.
• Cabral vs. Puno: No. The statement in Cabral vs. Puno was not a mere obiter dictum; although prescription was not squarely in issue, the statement was not totally irrelevant to the disposition and was not without legal basis.

• Prescription: Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code imposes prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 for falsification of a public document. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, the crime prescribes in ten years under Article 90, paragraph 3. Article 91 provides that the prescriptive period commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961, while the criminal informations were filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten years later. The crime for which the accused was charged had therefore prescribed, and the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court’s order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.
• Commencement of Prescriptive Period: Registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world; the record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein; and all persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. The Court cited Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Pauli, and Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. In Gatiaoan vs. Gaffud, the Court explained that the presumption arising from constructive notice is irrebuttable and cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. In De la Cerna vs. De la Cerna, registration of an extrajudicial partition was held to be constructive notice that the heirs had repudiated the fiduciary relationship. In Armentia vs. Patriarca, the Civil Code phrase “from the time of discovery” in annulment actions was interpreted to mean from the time the notarial document was registered, a rule parallel to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the discovery of the falsified deed by the offended party is deemed to have taken place upon its registration on May 26, 1961.
• Applicability of Constructive Notice in Criminal Cases: Petitioner argued that the rule on constructive notice is limited to land registration cases and civil actions, and that the law on prescription of crimes rests on a different principle. The Court acknowledged that caution should be observed in applying civil-law rules of construction to criminal statutes, but held that it will not hesitate to do so if the factual and legal circumstances warrant. In Mercado vs. Santos, the Court applied the conclusive effect of a will’s probate to bar a criminal action for forgery of the will. The Court also explained that civil prescription is a statute of repose, while criminal prescription is more than a statute of repose—it is an act of grace whereby the State surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute after a fixed period. Because criminal prescription is construed liberally in favor of the accused, the application of the constructive-notice rule to Article 91 is proper, as it reckons the prescriptive period earlier, from the time the notarized deed was recorded.
• Cabral vs. Puno: In Cabral vs. Puno, the information for falsification of a public document was filed on September 24, 1974, while the notarized deed of sale was registered on August 26, 1948. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused on the ground that the resolution granting the motion to quash had become final and executory, and it also stated that the complainant had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered. Although prescription was not squarely in issue in Cabral, the statement on prescription and constructive notice was not totally irrelevant to the disposition of the case and was not without legal basis. The contention that it was a mere obiter dictum therefore did not persuade.

• Constructive Notice by Registration — Registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world; the record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable; all persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. The Court applied this to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, holding that discovery by the offended party is deemed to have occurred upon registration of the falsified notarized deed, so the prescriptive period runs from that date.
• Prescription of Falsification of Public Document — Under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, falsification of a public document is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. Under Article 90, paragraph 3, it prescribes in ten years. Under Article 91, the period commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, authorities, or their agents; the Court construed discovery to include constructive notice from registration.
• Liberal Construction of Criminal Prescription in Favor of the Accused — Prescription of crimes is an act of amnesty and liberality on the part of the State, and interpretation most favorable to the accused must be adopted. Applying the constructive-notice rule to Article 91 is favorable to the accused because it starts the prescriptive period earlier, from the date the notarized deed was recorded.
• Applicability of Civil-Law Constructive Notice to Criminal Cases — Although caution should be observed in applying civil-law rules of construction to criminal statutes, courts may do so when the factual and legal circumstances warrant. Mercado vs. Santos applied the conclusive effect of a will’s probate to bar a criminal action for forgery, showing that civil-law presumptions can affect criminal liability.
• Statute of Repose vs. Act of Grace — Civil prescription is a statute of repose designed to suppress stale claims and secure reliable evidence. Criminal prescription is more than a statute of repose; it is an act of grace whereby the State surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute after a fixed period. This distinction does not, however, preclude application of the constructive-notice rule in criminal cases.

• "The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein." — States the constructive-notice doctrine that the Court applied to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
• "The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds." — Explains why the constructive-notice rule is applied in criminal prescription: it favors the accused and aligns with liberal construction.
• "In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed." — Applies the rule to the facts and supplies the ratio for affirming the quashal.
• "Although caution should be observed in applying the rules of construction in civil cases in the interpretation of criminal statutes, the Court will not hesitate to do so if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant." — Addresses the petitioner’s argument that civil-law constructive notice cannot be used in criminal cases.

• Cabral vs. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 606 — Relied upon by the Court of Appeals and invoked by the accused; the Court held that its statement on constructive notice and prescription was not totally irrelevant to the disposition and not without legal basis, rejecting the claim that it was a mere obiter dictum.
• Gatiaoan vs. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706 — Explained that the presumption from constructive notice is irrebuttable and cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith; a purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record.
• Armentia vs. Patriarca, G.R. No. L-18210, December 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 1253 — Interpreted the Civil Code phrase “from the time of discovery” in annulment actions as reckoning from registration of the notarial document, a rule parallel to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938) — Applied the conclusive effect of a will’s probate to bar a criminal action for forgery of the will, supporting the application of civil-law presumptions in criminal cases.
• People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 389 (1923) — Described criminal prescription as an act of amnesty and grace and held that statutes of limitation are liberally construed in favor of the accused.
• Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915) — Early authority for the rule that registration in a public registry is notice to the whole world.
• Penales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73611, October 27, 1986, 115 SCRA 223 — Explained civil prescription as a statute of repose, contrasted with the more fundamental principle behind criminal prescription.

• Article 172, Revised Penal Code — Defines falsification of a public document and imposes prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00; the penalty classification determines the prescriptive period.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten years; applied to falsification of a public document.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the prescriptive period commences from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, authorities, or their agents; the Court construed “discovered” to include constructive notice arising from registration.
• Article 89, Revised Penal Code — Provides that prescription of the crime is a ground for total extinction of criminal liability; cited in the discussion of Cabral vs. Puno.
• Section 52, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Cited as authority for the rule that registration is notice to the whole world and that the record is constructive notice of its contents.
• Article 391, Civil Code — Provides that an action for annulment must be brought within four years and, in case of mistake or fraud, from the time of discovery; interpreted in Armentia vs. Patriarca as reckoning from registration, a rule parallel to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Sections 2(f) and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court — Cited in Cabral vs. Puno for the rule that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
• Section 625, Code of Civil Procedure (now last paragraph of Article 838, Civil Code) — Provides that the allowance of a will is conclusive as to its due execution; applied in Mercado vs. Santos to bar a criminal action for forgery of a probated will.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.