People of the Philippines vs. Melchor Estomaca y Garque

A plea of guilty to a capital offense is valid only where the trial court conducts a searching inquiry that establishes both (1) the voluntariness of the plea and (2) the accused's full comprehension of the consequences of the plea; an arraignment that fails this requirement — including one conducted without a showing that the complaint was read in a language or dialect known to the accused — is void, and any judgment of conviction rendered upon it is likewise void.

Appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque, an illiterate laborer, was the father of the complainant, the eldest daughter of his wife by a prior marriage. The offenses charged were committed in San Joaquin, Iloilo, and were governed by Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993 and reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal and/or automatic review shortly after the Court's adjudgment in People vs. Alicando, which involved the same trial court, the same presiding judge, the same government counsel de oficio, and the same substitute counsel de parte, and which likewise turned on the validity of an arraignment conducted in a capital case.

On May 24, 1994, five separate complaints were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Iloilo City, charging Melchor Estomaca y Garque, an illiterate laborer who had not finished Grade I, with rape committed on five separate occasions against his own daughter. The complainant, identified in the opening of the decision as Estelita Estomaca and in the trial court's findings as Melita Estomaca, was the eldest daughter of the accused by her mother's second husband; she had a full-blood younger brother about twelve years old and two half-blood sisters from her mother's first marriage who were residing in Manila.

According to the complainant, she was first raped in July 1993 at the family residence at Barangay Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo — the subject of Criminal Case No. 43567. The offense was repeated before Christmas of December 1993 (Criminal Case No. 43568), in January 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43569), in February 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43570), and on March 6, 1994 (Criminal Case No. 43571). The two complaints subject of the joint judgment on review alleged that the accused, taking advantage of his superior strength and abuse of confidence and trust as the complainant's father, had sexual intercourse with her by means of force, threat and intimidation, she being fifteen years of age at the time.

On June 14, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of his government counsel de oficio, Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera. The records are inconsistent as to what actually took place. The trial court's decision dated July 15, 1994 declared that he entered a plea of guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571 and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43569 and 43570. The transcript, however, recorded only that the interpreter read the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect and that the accused pleaded guilty to all five cases. When the court explained that a plea of guilty to five offenses would mean five sentences, appellant stated through the interpreter that he had performed only two acts, in December 1993 and March 1994, and that the other charges were not true and might have been committed by the complainant's boyfriend. The court thereupon treated the plea as not guilty in three charges and guilty in two, dispensed with pre-trial, and announced that it would receive evidence.

At the subsequent hearing, the presiding judge again had appellant stand before him and asked whether he understood that the crime of rape carried the death penalty under the new law if he pleaded guilty, whether he still insisted on his plea of guilty, and whether the plea was voluntary. To the question whether the plea was his voluntary will without force or intimidation from anyone, appellant answered, "No, Your Honor." He likewise stated that he would not present evidence, and the court allowed the prosecution to present its evidence.

On June 29, 1994, the complainant herself testified that she was raped by her father once in December 1993 and again on March 6, 1994. Both incidents, according to her, took place inside their residence at Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Tiolas, San Joaquin, Iloilo, at nighttime, and on those two occasions she tried to resist her father's assaults to no avail. After the last rape, she gathered enough courage to flee from their home and thereafter reported the incidents to her mother, who was then living separately from them. Appellant was later apprehended and has since been under detention.

On the authority of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the lower court imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault supposedly perpetrated in December 1993 and the supreme penalty of death with respect to the rape allegedly committed on March 6, 1994. In each of the said cases, he was further ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

• Validity of the Arraignment: Whether the arraignment of the accused was valid where the complaints were read to him only in "Ilonggo/local dialect," with no showing that he understood that medium, and where the records did not show that he or his counsel had been furnished copies of the complaints with the list of witnesses.
• Searching Inquiry: Whether the trial court conducted the requisite searching inquiry sufficient to establish the voluntariness of the plea of guilty and the accused's full comprehension of its consequences, including the mandatory imposition of the death penalty.
• Effect of an Invalid Arraignment: Whether a valid judgment of conviction may be rendered upon an invalid arraignment.

• Validity of the Arraignment: No. The arraignment was invalid because the reading of the complaints in "Ilonggo/local dialect" was not shown to have been in a language or dialect known to the accused, and the records did not establish compliance with the requirement that he and his counsel be furnished copies of the complaints with the list of witnesses.
• Searching Inquiry: No. The trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry, its questions having been merely formulary and insufficient to establish the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of its consequences, particularly the certainty of the death penalty.
• Effect of an Invalid Arraignment: No. Pursuant to Binabay vs. People, no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment; the judgment of conviction was therefore void and had to be set aside.

• Validity of the Arraignment: Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court, who must furnish the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, read the same in the language or dialect known to him, and ask him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is mandatory, and the whole of Section 1 must be strictly followed, as it implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him. The transcript recorded only a bare and cryptic reading — "(Reading the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect)" — stated in the singular although five complaints were involved, leaving the Court to speculate whether all five were actually read, translated or explained on a level within the comprehension of an accused with limited education. The records did not show whether appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses. Nor was there any statement of record that appellant fully understood the "Ilonggo/local dialect" medium. The Court took judicial notice that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and throughout Antique, including San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which appellant and his family are natives, the local dialect is "kinaray-a," which is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional language, and vice versa. Since the complaints were in English and in technical legal language, the records were silent on whether and how the indictments were translated into Ilonggo and/or "kinaray-a," or whether appellant was truly made aware of the charges and the consequences of his plea.

• Searching Inquiry: The trial court must fully discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry in such a way as would indubitably show that the accused made not only a clear, definite and unconditional plea, but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and full realization of the consequences thereof. To ask an accused about his educational attainment and then warn him that he might have admitted the crime because of his poor intelligence is not the logical approach in assaying the sufficiency of his plea of guilty, and a mere warning that he could possibly face death or a life sentence is not enough. Although there is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge should conduct a proper searching inquiry, the court may require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges, make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to furnish and explain missing details of significance. The court should also be convinced that the accused has not been coerced or placed under duress, which it can do by ascertaining from the accused the manner in which he was brought into custody, whether he had the assistance of competent counsel during custodial and preliminary investigations, and the conditions under which he was detained and interrogated; a series of questions directed at defense counsel as to whether counsel had conferred with and completely explained to the accused the meaning of a plea and its consequences would likewise be a well-taken step. The original records and rollo were completely bereft of any document or record concerning appellant's apprehension, detention and prior investigation, whether custodial or preliminary. The searching inquiry must focus on (1) the voluntariness of the plea and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea; the trial court's questions failed to show either, and the records revealed no information about the personality profile of the accused — his age, socio-economic status, and educational background were not plumbed. Appellant's low intelligence quotient and lack of education combined to deprive him of fully understanding what appeared to him as mysterious rituals and unfamiliar jargons, and his answers during the irregular arraignment were neither responsive nor rational. The judicial conscience cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by an accused with a befuddled state of mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law.

• Effect of an Invalid Arraignment: Pursuant to Binabay vs. People, no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since the arraignment of appellant was void, the judgment of conviction rendered against him was likewise void; in fairness to him and in justice to the offended party, the cases were remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that it will not hesitate to impose capital punishment when all the requisites therefor have been met in accordance with law, but it cannot hold a life forfeit, no matter how despicable the offender, when effective protection for his basic rights was denied because of poverty or ignorance, nor will it render a death sentence merely to make a meretricious obeisance to the vengeful call for blood.

• Searching Inquiry in Pleas of Guilty to Capital Offenses — Where an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a searching inquiry focused on two matters: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the accused's full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. The inquiry must be such that the trial judge is totally convinced that the plea has all the earmarks of a valid and acceptable confession upon which an eventual judgment of conviction can stand. The Court enumerated permissible modes of inquiry: requiring the accused to narrate the incident, to reenact the manner of perpetration, or to furnish and explain missing details; ascertaining the manner of his custody, whether he had competent counsel during custodial and preliminary investigations, and the conditions of his detention and interrogation; and questioning defense counsel on whether counsel had conferred with and explained to the accused the meaning and consequences of the plea. In this case, the trial court's formulary questions failed to establish either voluntariness or comprehension, and the records contained no personality profile of the accused.

• Invalid Arraignment Voids the Judgment — No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Because the arraignment is the stage at which the issues are joined in a criminal action, without it the proceedings cannot advance further, and if held defectively, the proceedings are void. The Court applied this doctrine in setting aside the judgment of conviction and remanding the cases for further proceedings.

• Reading of the Complaint in a Language or Dialect Known to the Accused — Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the complaint or information be read to the accused in the language or dialect known to him, a requirement that is mandatory and implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him. Where the records do not show that the accused understood the medium used, the requirement is not satisfied.

• Judicial Notice of Languages and Dialects — The Court took judicial notice, as a matter of public knowledge or ready demonstration, that in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and throughout Antique, including San Joaquin, the local dialect is "kinaray-a," which is not readily understandable to nor spoken by those born to the Hiligaynon regional language or who have lived in Hiligaynon-speaking areas for an appreciable period, and vice versa. The distinction matters because Rule 116 deliberately requires the complaint to be read in the language or dialect known to the accused.

• Duty to Warn of the Mandatory Death Penalty — An accused pleading guilty to a capital offense must be specifically warned that on his plea of guilty he would definitely and in any event be given the death penalty under the law, and must be categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance affect or reduce the death sentence. A mere warning that he could possibly face extreme retribution in the form of death or a life sentence is not enough.

• "A 'searching inquiry,' under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term (because the accused is aware of that) but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony." — Quoted from People vs. Dayot, this passage defines the minimum content of the searching inquiry required before a plea of guilty to a capital offense may be accepted, and anchors the Court's finding that the trial court's warnings were insufficient.

• "The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea." — This is the canonical two-part formulation of the searching-inquiry requirement, quoted from People vs. Alicando and applied to invalidate the arraignment in this case.

• "no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment" — Quoted from Binabay vs. People, this is the ratio decidendi for setting aside the judgment of conviction and remanding the cases for further proceedings.

• "The judicial conscience cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by an accused with a befuddled state of mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law." — This passage states the Court's controlling rationale for rejecting the plea and the conviction, emphasizing the heightened scrutiny required where the penalty is death.

• People vs. Alicando, G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995 — Controlling precedent; the Court expressly adopted its formulation of the searching inquiry and its ruling that a void arraignment produces a void judgment, noting that the same trial court, presiding judge, government counsel de oficio, and substitute counsel de parte were involved in both cases.
• Binabay vs. People, L-31008, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 445 — Controlling precedent for the rule that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment, relied upon to set aside the conviction and remand.
• People vs. Albert, G.R. No. 114001, December 11, 1995 — Followed; source of the discussion on the developmental antecedents of Section 3, Rule 116 and the rationale for avoiding improvident pleas of guilt in capital cases.
• People vs. Dayot, G.R. No. 88281, July 20, 1990, 187 SCRA 637 — Followed; source of the definition of "searching inquiry" and of the caution against pleas entered in the hope of lenient treatment or upon bad advice.
• People vs. Apduhan Jr. — Cited as the decision incorporated into Section 3, Rule 116, and as the origin of the rule that a plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment.
• People vs. De Luna, G.R. No. 77969, June 22, 1989, 174 SCRA 204 — Cited for the rule that a mere warning of possible death or life imprisonment is insufficient.
• People vs. Camay, G.R. No. 51306, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 401 — Cited for the requirement that the trial judge be totally convinced that the plea has all the earmarks of a valid and acceptable confession.
• People vs. Badilla, G.R. No. 69317, September 11, 1985, 138 SCRA 513; People vs. Parba, G.R. No. 63409, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 158; People vs. Petalcorin, et al., G.R. No. 65376, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 685 — Cited collectively for the recommended modes of conducting the searching inquiry, including inquiry into custody, counsel during investigation, and conditions of detention.

• Section 1(a), Rule 116, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requires that the arraignment be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court, who must furnish the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, read the same in the language or dialect known to him, and ask him what his plea is to the charge. The Court held that the requirement is mandatory and that the trial court failed to comply with it.
• Section 3, Rule 116, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the plea of guilty to a capital offense and requires the court to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of its consequences. The Court found this provision violated by the trial court's formulary questioning.
• Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court — Basis for the Court's taking judicial notice of the distinction between the Hiligaynon regional language and the "kinaray-a" local dialect spoken in San Joaquin, Iloilo.
• Sections 7 and 8, Article XIV, 1987 Constitution — Cited in connection with regional languages and dialects, supporting the Court's discussion of linguistic variations relevant to the reading requirement under Rule 116.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — The law that took effect on December 31, 1993 and under which the lower court imposed reclusion perpetua for the December 1993 rape and death for the March 6, 1994 rape; the Court noted that appellant was not specifically warned that his plea of guilty would in any event carry the death penalty under this law.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur. Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., in the result. Torres, Jr., J., took no part. Francisco, J., on leave.