People of the Philippines vs. Mayor Pablo Sola, et al.

An order granting bail to an accused charged with a capital offense without first giving the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong is void for violating procedural due process; the bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded for a bail hearing. The Supreme Court may also order a change of venue to avoid a miscarriage of justice, resolving doubts in favor of transfer where witness safety is threatened.

The People of the Philippines and Mayor Pablo Sola, together with several other accused, were the parties in seven murder cases arising in Negros Occidental. The petition invoked Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution, which empowers the Supreme Court to order a change of venue to avoid a miscarriage of justice, and Article IV, Section 18, which provides that persons charged with capital offenses are not bailable when evidence of guilt is strong. The accused included local officials of Kabankalan, and the cases were pending in courts in Negros Occidental.

On September 15, 1980, acting on evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the dead bodies of seven persons believed to be in the possession of accused Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. The following day, elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company, armed with the warrant, proceeded to Sola's place. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet, and Bienvenido Emperado.

On September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven separate complaints for murder against Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao, and fourteen other persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139, and 4140 of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused and issued an order for their arrest.

Without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong, the municipal court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and were released from detention. In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial were held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan, which is about 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused were officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and had been released on bail; most of the accused remained at large; and reports had been made to police authorities of threats on the families of the witnesses.

Private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu filed a petition in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People vs. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The petition sought the setting aside, by certiorari, of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan's order granting bail and a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The Solicitor General, while noting that any petition on behalf of the People could only be instituted by him, did not press the legal point and adopted the petition's two-pronged thrusts. The change-of-venue issue became moot after the Supreme Court transferred the cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, and the respondents' comments dealt solely with the cancellation of the bail bonds.

• Change of Venue: Petitioner sought transfer of the criminal cases from Himamaylan because the prosecution's witnesses feared for their safety, at least two accused were officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and had been released on bail, most accused remained at large, and threats against the witnesses' families had been reported to the police.
• Cancellation of Bail Bonds: Petitioner sought certiorari to set aside the Municipal Court of Kabankalan's order granting bail to the accused in capital offense cases, because the prosecution was not given the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt was strong before bail was granted.
• Adoption by the Solicitor General: The Solicitor General adopted the petition's two-pronged thrusts, although he observed that a petition on behalf of the People can only be instituted by the Solicitor General and that the private prosecutors' assertion of acting subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal did not improve their legal standing.

• Change of Venue: Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to the transfer but preferred a court anywhere in Metro Manila; respondent Pablo Sola stated that he had no objection to the transfer; respondent Francisco Garcia confined his comment to the cancellation of the bail bonds.
• Cancellation of Bail Bonds: Respondents asserted, as noted by the Court, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching, which supposedly sufficed; the Court rejected this as not curing a jurisdictional infirmity.

• Change of Venue: Whether the venue of the criminal cases should be transferred to avoid a miscarriage of justice because the prosecution's witnesses feared for their safety if trial proceeded in Himamaylan.
• Cancellation of Bail Bonds: Whether the Municipal Court of Kabankalan's order granting bail to respondents charged with capital offenses is void for failure to give the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong, and whether the bail bonds should be cancelled.

• Change of Venue: Moot and academic. The Supreme Court had already transferred the cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, and the Constitution authorizes a change of venue to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
• Cancellation of Bail Bonds: Yes. The order granting bail without hearing the prosecution is void for violating procedural due process; the bail bonds must be cancelled and the cases remanded for a bail hearing.

• Change of Venue: Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution expressly empowers the Supreme Court to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. People vs. Gutierrez was cited, where Justice J. B. L. Reyes stated that compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know makes a mockery of the judicial process and betrays the purpose for which courts have been established. The Solicitor General's comment explained that the witnesses were fearful for their lives, afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during trial, and might either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives. Respondent Florendo Baliscao was not averse to the transfer but preferred Metro Manila, while respondent Pablo Sola had no objection. Although the fear, objectively viewed, might be less than terrifying to some, the question is the effect on the witnesses who will testify; in case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. The plea could have been made administratively, but the procedure followed was justified because cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. The issue became moot after the cases were transferred.
• Cancellation of Bail Bonds: Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. People vs. San Diego was relied upon for the rule that whether the motion for bail of a defendant in custody for a capital offense is resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence it may desire to introduce before the court resolves the motion for bail. If the prosecution is denied that opportunity, there is a violation of procedural due process, and the order granting bail is void on that ground. Justice Cardozo's statement in Snyder vs. Massachusetts was also invoked: justice is due to the accused and the accuser alike, and fairness must keep the balance true. The norm of due process requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. The fact that the municipal judge's questions before granting bail could be characterized as searching did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. Accordingly, the order granting bail was nullified, and Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio was directed to hear the bail petitions with the prosecution duly heard on whether the evidence of guilt was strong.

• Change of venue to avoid a miscarriage of justice — Under Article X, Section 5(4) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The Court recognized that witness fear can justify transfer; the question is the effect on the witnesses who will testify, and in case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. The plea may even be made administratively, but the procedure followed was justified because cancellation of bail bonds was also sought.
• Bail in capital offenses and procedural due process — Under Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution, persons charged with capital offenses are not bailable when evidence of guilt is strong. Before granting bail in such cases, whether in a summary proceeding or during regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to introduce. Denial of that opportunity violates procedural due process and renders the order granting bail void. Searching questions by the judge do not cure the jurisdictional infirmity.
• Public responsibility for prosecution — The decision observed that responsibility for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public officials concerned; the private prosecutors' filing of the petition did not improve their legal standing, although the Court still acted because of the importance of the questions raised.

• "The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice."" — This passage states the constitutional power invoked for the transfer of venue.
• "In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established." — This is the Court's rationale for change of venue, quoted from People vs. Gutierrez.
• "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground." — This is the controlling rule on bail in capital offenses, quoted from People vs. San Diego.
• "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." — This passage, quoted from Justice Cardozo in Snyder vs. Massachusetts, underscores that due process protects both the accused and the prosecution.

• People vs. Gutierrez, L-32282-83, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 172 — Cited for the rule on change of venue; the Court noted that the Constitutional Convention of 1971 incorporated its ruling, and quoted Justice J. B. L. Reyes's statement that compelling prosecution to trial where witnesses cannot reveal what they know makes a mockery of the judicial process.
• People vs. San Diego, L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522 — Cited as authoritative doctrine on bail in capital offenses; the Court quoted it to hold that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present evidence before bail is resolved, and that denial renders the bail order void for procedural due process.
• Snyder vs. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1933) — Cited for Justice Cardozo's statement that justice is due to the accused and the accuser alike, and that fairness must keep the balance true.

• Article X, Section 5(4), Constitution — Empowers the Supreme Court to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The Court invoked this provision in transferring the cases and in discussing the change-of-venue issue.
• Article IV, Section 18, Constitution — Provides that all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, and that excessive bail shall not be required. The Court applied this provision to hold that bail cannot be granted to a capital-offense accused without first hearing the prosecution on the strength of the evidence of guilt.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur. Barredo and Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.