People of the Philippines vs. Maximo R. Race, Jr.

Carnal knowledge of a woman who, by reason of mental retardation or imbecility, is incapable of giving valid consent constitutes rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, even without proof of force or intimidation; and an information alleging that the victim is retarded and an imbecile sufficiently charges rape under the circumstance that the woman is deprived of reason.

Maria Pura, forty years old, was a deaf-mute who was also mentally retarded and imbecilic; she was cross-eyed, a polio victim standing less than four feet tall, and could communicate only by nodding her head and making signs. She lived in the Pura residence on Magallanes Street, Masbate, Masbate, together with relatives including her sisters Elvira Collantes and Elena Alim and the latter's son Noel Abila. Maximo Rosero Race, Jr., also known as "Jun," was a neighbor known to the family who frequently slept outside the extension of the Pura house, particularly in the Pura store attached to it, and who had in the past been allowed to use the toilet built outside the house.

Maria Pura, forty years old, was a deaf-mute who was also mentally retarded and imbecilic; she was cross-eyed, a polio victim who stood less than four feet tall, and could communicate only by nodding her head and making signs. She lived in the Pura residence on Magallanes Street, Masbate, Masbate, together with relatives including her sisters Elvira Collantes and Elena Alim and the latter's son Noel Abila. Maximo Rosero Race, Jr., also known as "Jun," was a neighbor known to the family who frequently slept outside the extension of the Pura house, particularly in the Pura store attached to it, and who had in the past been allowed to use the toilet built outside the house.

On the morning of 14 September 1988, Elvira Collantes left her sister Maria alone in the house to go to the market. Race, who had asked Elvira's permission to use the outdoor toilet, was the only other person then in the house. At around ten o'clock that morning, Noel Abila, who had just come home from school, heard a voice, ran to the kitchen from which it came, and saw Race putting on his pants. In the adjacent dining room Noel found his aunt Maria, laughing at Race. When Noel asked her what Race had done to her, she moved her body forward and backward in a push-pull motion. Noel thereupon accused Race of raping Maria and threatened to report the incident; Race slapped Noel and left the house for the place where he drank liquor.

Noel informed his uncle Glen Collantes, Elvira's husband, who brought Race before Maria; she pointed at Race and again made the push-pull movement, laughing as she did so. Elena Collantes, who was working at the D'SAN Restaurant, went home upon learning of the incident and, together with their mother, proceeded to the Municipal Hall to lodge a complaint. The following day, Maria was examined in their house by Dr. Artemio Capellan, the Municipal Health Officer. His medical certificate reported no extragenital injuries; a hymenal opening originally linear in shape with an old laceration corresponding to the 5:00 and 7:00 o'clock positions; a hymenal orifice that admitted the vaginal speculum without resistance; and, on microscopic examination, the presence of human semen and dead sperm. Dr. Capellan testified that Maria had had sexual contact, that the healed hymenal laceration had been caused a day before, and that some of the sperm found in her vagina were still living when examined.

Race denied the charge. According to him, he had asked Elvira Pura-Collantes' permission to use the toilet outside the Pura house; he did not enter the kitchen or borrow cellophane from Noel Abela. When he came out of the toilet, Noel shouted at and teased him, and he became angry, slapped Noel, and threw one of his slippers at him. Noel ran away crying and called for his mother, who arrived home and scolded Race. He maintained that he did not rape Maria Pura and that the Puras were merely angry with him because he had slapped Noel, noting that the nearest house to the Puras was only a meter away and that many people were around when the slapping occurred.

The trial court convicted Race, reasoning that Maria Pura, being a deaf-mute and mentally retarded, could not give consent and that moral compulsion amounting to intimidation had been employed. It also appreciated the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion on the basis of Race's admission during cross-examination that he had previously been convicted of homicide and was out on parole at the time of the rape. In the course of the trial, the court had the victim brought before it and observed that she was less than four feet tall and cross-eyed and that, when asked her name, she merely nodded her head and, though apparently trying to speak, could not talk. No expert witness was presented to testify on her imbecility.

• Reasonable Doubt — Opportunity of Another: Petitioner argued that reasonable doubt existed because the scene of the crime was in a well-populated area, the incident occurred in broad daylight, and many people were outside the house at the time, making it possible that another man or a neighbor of the Puras, and not the accused, had assaulted Maria Pura.
• Parole Status: Petitioner maintained that, being on parole and knowing that any violation of its terms and conditions would result in his rearrest to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence, it was unlikely that he would commit another crime.
• Absence of an Eyewitness: Petitioner contended that there was no reliable eyewitness to the crime charged.
• Candor of the Accused: Petitioner asserted that he had manifested his honesty by not denying that he slapped Noel Abela after the latter made fun of him when he came out of the toilet.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the information properly charges the accused with the commission of rape.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether, assuming the information is sufficient, the evidence for the prosecution established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes. Although the information did not specifically describe any of the circumstances under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the allegation that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman who is retarded and an imbecile sufficiently alerted him that the charge was rape under the circumstance that the woman is deprived of reason.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The confluence of circumstantial evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carnal knowledge of Maria Pura, and her mental deficiency rendered her incapable of giving rational consent, so that neither force nor intimidation was required.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the complaint or information for rape clearly describe the specific circumstances which would make the carnal knowledge of a woman qualify as rape, so as to duly inform the accused of the nature of the accusation, this being one of his constitutional rights under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The accusatory portion of the information in this case did not specifically describe any of the circumstances under Article 335, and the Court observed that the information was hurriedly and poorly crafted, the prosecutor even having misspelled the words "feloniously" and "imbecile." This notwithstanding, the allegation that the accused had sexual intercourse with a woman who is retarded and an imbecile implies that the victim was not in full possession and control of her moral reasoning faculty, and this was sufficient to alert the accused that the charge against him was for rape under the circumstance that the woman is deprived of reason. The Court defined an imbecile as "a mentally defective person of the second lowest order of intellectual potential (mental age between 3 and 7 years), usually requiring custodial and complete protective care," and imbecility as a form of mental disease consisting in mental deficiency either congenital or resulting from an obstacle to the development of the faculties supervening in infancy, imbeciles being totally incompetent for any process of reasoning or any general observation or abstract ideas.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The trial court convicted the accused on two circumstances: the use of intimidation and the inability of the offended party to give consent because she was a deaf-mute, retarded, and an imbecile. The first was without basis, as no evidence was adduced to prove it; the trial court merely inferred it from what it described as "moral compulsion," which it ascribed to the fact that the accused was known to the woman and even slept outside her family's house. These were inferences running riot which elementary logic and common sense reject. What had to be determined was whether Maria Pura, before, during, and even after the sexual intercourse on 14 September 1988, suffered from mental retardation or imbecility which deprived her of reason at the time the appellant had carnal knowledge of her. Absent an admission by the accused, the resolution of this issue would have depended on the trial court's conclusion that Maria Pura was a deaf-mute, retarded, and an imbecile; on Dr. Capellan's finding in his examination report that she was mentally retarded; on the testimony of Noel Abela that when the victim was asked what the accused did to her she demonstrated a push-pull movement and was laughing while looking at the accused; and on the court's own view of the woman when she was brought to court, where she was observed to be less than four feet tall and cross-eyed and, when asked her name, merely nodded her head and could not talk. No expert witness was presented to testify on her imbecility. The appellant, however, readily admitted in his Brief that Maria Pura was mentally deficient, describing her as "physically and mentally deficient being a deaf-mute, retarded and (sic) imbecile." Maria Pura was therefore incapable of giving rational consent to the sexual act and was, in effect, deprived of reason. Citing People vs. Manlapaz, the Court held that sexual intercourse with a woman deprived of reason is rape because she is incapable of giving rational consent, and that it is not necessary that the deprivation of reason be complete, it being enough that there is an abnormality or deficiency of mind that diminishes it. The same rule prevails in American jurisprudence: an accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had sexual intercourse with a female who was mentally incapable of validly consenting to or opposing the carnal act, and in this species of rape neither force upon the part of the man nor resistance upon the part of the woman forms an element of the crime, legal consent presupposing an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences. This rule was reiterated in People vs. Gallano, People vs. Asturias, People vs. Sunga, and People vs. Palma. In Asturias, the Court in effect held that if the mental level of a woman above twelve years old is that of a child below twelve years old, even if she voluntarily submitted to the accused's desires, or even if the circumstances of force or intimidation, or of the victim being deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, are absent, the accused would still be liable for rape under the third paragraph of Article 335, the reason being that if intercourse with a victim under twelve years old is rape, then carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child below twelve years of age would also constitute rape. On the evidence, the confluence of the following circumstances unerringly established the commission of the act: (1) when Elvira Collantes left the house on the morning of 14 September 1988, only Maria Pura and the appellant were left therein; (2) Noel Abela, upon arriving home at 10:00 o'clock that morning, chanced upon the accused closing the zipper of his pants in the kitchen while Maria was at the adjacent dining room, laughing at the accused; (3) when Noel asked Maria what the accused had done to her, she moved her body forward and backward, and she repeated this motion when asked by Glen Collantes, her brother-in-law, pointing at the same time to the accused; and (4) upon examining Maria the following day, Dr. Capellan noticed the presence of "human semen and dead sperm," indicating that she had sexual intercourse within the past twenty-four hours. These circumstances satisfied the requisites of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Affirmance of the conviction was thus inevitable. The Court nevertheless modified the award of indemnity to P40,000.00 pursuant to People vs. Arenas, which involved the rape of a mentally retarded woman; held that the four-fifths credit for preventive imprisonment was improper, the accused being entitled to full credit under the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code since there was no evidence that he had not agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners; and set aside the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion, which was neither alleged in the information nor proved by the prosecution, the only information elicited being that the accused had earlier been convicted of homicide, had served his sentence, and had later been released, the fact of his being out on parole having been brought out only upon questioning by the court after the termination of the cross-examination. For reiteracion to exist, it is necessary that the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty; the appellant's earlier conviction for homicide, punishable by reclusion temporal, carried a penalty that is not equal or greater but definitely lower than that provided for ordinary rape, which is reclusion perpetua.

• Rape of a Woman Deprived of Reason — Carnal knowledge of a woman who is mentally incapable of giving valid consent constitutes rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, because she is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal act. In this species of rape, neither force on the part of the man nor resistance on the part of the woman is an element of the crime, and an apparent consent does not avail, legal consent presupposing an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences. It is not necessary that the deprivation of reason be complete; an abnormality or mental deficiency that merely diminishes reason suffices. The Court applied this doctrine to hold the appellant guilty, the victim being a deaf-mute, retarded, and imbecilic woman who was incapable of giving rational consent.

• Mental Age Equivalent to That of a Child Below Twelve — Where the mental level of a woman above twelve years old is that of a child below twelve years old, the accused is liable for rape under the third paragraph of Article 335 even if she voluntarily submitted, or even if the circumstances of force or intimidation, or of the victim being deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, are absent. The rationale is that if intercourse with a victim under twelve years old is rape, then carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child below twelve years of age must also constitute rape. The Court cited this doctrine, drawn from People vs. Asturias, as part of the settled jurisprudence sustaining convictions for the rape of mentally deficient women.

• Sufficiency of the Information in Rape Cases — The proper complaint or information for rape must clearly describe the specific circumstances which would make the carnal knowledge of a woman qualify as rape under Article 335, so as to duly inform the accused of the nature of the accusation, this being one of his constitutional rights. The Court nonetheless held that an information alleging that the accused had sexual intercourse with a woman who is retarded and an imbecile sufficiently alerts the accused that the charge is rape under the circumstance that the woman is deprived of reason, even though the information does not expressly cite that circumstance.

• Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court and found the four enumerated circumstances sufficient to establish carnal knowledge beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of an eyewitness.

• Reiteracion — For reiteracion to exist, it is necessary that the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. The circumstance must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution. The Court set aside its appreciation because it was not alleged and not proved, and because the appellant's prior conviction for homicide, punishable by reclusion temporal, carried a penalty lower than the reclusion perpetua prescribed for ordinary rape.

• Credit for Preventive Imprisonment — An accused is entitled to be credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment under the first paragraph of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, and not the four-fifths credit under the second paragraph, where there is no evidence that he did not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners. The Court accordingly corrected the four-fifths credit granted by the trial court.

• "The proper complaint and information for rape must clearly describe the specific circumstances which would make the carnal knowledge of a woman qualify as such under Article 335. Otherwise stated, the same must concretely describe the crime of rape in any of the specified forms to duly inform the accused of the nature of the accusation; the right to be informed of such accusation is one of his constitutional rights." — This passage states the controlling rule on the sufficiency of an information for rape and anchors it on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; the Court then applied the rule to uphold the information notwithstanding its defective drafting.

• "An accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had sexual intercourse with a female who was mentally incapable of validly consenting to or opposing the carnal act." — This is the ratio decidendi on the substantive charge, drawn from American jurisprudence and adopted as the governing standard for the rape of mentally deficient women.

• "In this species of rape neither force upon the part of the man nor resistance upon the part of the woman forms an element of the crime. If, by reason of any mental weakness, she is incapable of legally consenting, resistance is not expected any more than it is in the case of one who has been drugged to unconsciousness, or robbed of judgment by intoxicants. Nor will an apparent consent in such a case avail any more than in the case of a child who may actually consent, but who by law is conclusively held incapable of legal consent." — This passage supplies the canonical formulation of the elements of rape of a woman deprived of reason and explains why neither force nor resistance need be shown.

• "Besides, for the same to exist, it is necessary that 'the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.'" — This passage states the requisites of reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code, on which basis the Court set aside the aggravating circumstance appreciated by the trial court.

• People vs. Manlapaz, 88 SCRA 704 (1979) — Cited as the principal authority for the rule that sexual intercourse with a woman deprived of reason is rape because she is incapable of giving rational consent; the case involved a thirteen-year-old girl with the mentality of a five-year-old child.
• People vs. Gallano, 108 SCRA 405 (1981) — Cited among the decisions upholding convictions for rape where the victim's mental capacity was impaired; the victim was thirty-one years old with the mental level of a seven-year-old child.
• People vs. Asturias, 134 SCRA 405 (1985) — Cited for the doctrine that if the mental level of a woman above twelve years old is that of a child below twelve, the accused is liable for rape under the third paragraph of Article 335 even if she voluntarily submitted; the victim was seventeen years old with a mental level lower than that of a seven-year-old child.
• People vs. Sunga, 137 SCRA 130 (1985) — Cited among the decisions sustaining convictions for rape of mentally deficient women; the victim was twenty-three years old with the mentality of an eight- to nine-year-old child.
• People vs. Palma, 144 SCRA 236 (1986) — Cited among the decisions sustaining convictions for rape of mentally deficient women; the victim was a fourteen-year-old retardate with an intellectual capacity described as borderline mental deficiency.
• People vs. Arenas, 198 SCRA 172 (1991) — Cited as the basis for increasing the indemnity to be paid to the offended party to P40,000.00; the case likewise involved the rape of a mentally retarded woman.
• People vs. Oso, 62 Phil. 271 (1935) — Cited for the requirement that the complaint or information for rape must clearly describe the specific circumstances which qualify the carnal knowledge as rape.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Defines rape as carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age, and punishes the crime with reclusion perpetua. The Court applied the second circumstance, holding that the victim's mental retardation and imbecility rendered her deprived of reason and incapable of giving rational consent.
• Article 14(10), Revised Penal Code — Defines the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion, which requires that the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. The Court set aside its appreciation because it was not alleged in the information, not proved by the prosecution, and in any event inapplicable since the prior homicide conviction carried a lower penalty than that for ordinary rape.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code — Governs the credit for preventive imprisonment; the first paragraph grants full credit while the second paragraph prescribes a four-fifths credit. The Court held that the accused was entitled to full credit because there was no evidence that he had not agreed to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. The Court used this provision to compare the penalty for the appellant's prior conviction with the reclusion perpetua prescribed for ordinary rape, concluding that reiteracion could not be appreciated.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this provision in upholding the conviction notwithstanding the absence of an eyewitness.
• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Court invoked this provision in explaining why an information for rape must clearly describe the specific circumstances that qualify the act as rape.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Romero, JJ.