People of the Philippines vs. Mario Ablao

A killing is homicide, not murder, when treachery and evident premeditation are not proved as indubitably as the crime itself; a wound at the back does not by itself establish treachery, and knowledge of a political feud does not prove evident premeditation in the particular charge. Generic aggravating circumstances, such as disregard or insult of rank, need not be alleged in the information and may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the sentence.

Mario Ablao, the accused-appellant, is the brother of then Mayor Bruno Ablao of Lumban, Laguna. Andres Manambit, Sr., the victim, was a Barangay Captain and President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Lumban, Laguna. At the time of the incident, a session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Lumban was being held in connection with a referendum scheduled the following day. The record also refers to a political feud and a series of violence in Lumban, Laguna, and to the appellant’s alleged involvement in another killing.

On December 16, 1977, in Lumban, Laguna, a session of the Sangguniang Bayan was being held in a canteen near the municipal building in connection with a referendum scheduled the following day. Andres Manambit, Sr., a Barangay Captain and President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Lumban, was among those attending. Mario Ablao, then 18 years old and the brother of Mayor Bruno Ablao, was also at the canteen; according to him, he had been summoned by his brother and was standing by the door watching a basketball game outside.

According to the prosecution, at about 5:00 p.m., Lt. Domingo Gapas, the station commander of Lumban, heard a gunshot inside the canteen. He ran toward the place and saw Mario Ablao coming out of the door carrying a .45 caliber pistol. Upon seeing Gapas, Ablao fired at him but missed. Gapas chased Ablao, who ran toward Caliraya mountain, but failed to catch him. When Gapas returned, he found Manambit lying face down in front of the canteen door, already dead, with a bullet wound on the right side of his neck. Gapas later gathered witnesses who pointed to Mario Ablao as the assailant.

Dr. Maximo Reyes of the NBI performed an autopsy and issued Necropsy Report No. 77-104. The report showed a gunshot wound over the occipital region, with the bullet entering from the back and lodging in the left side of the face. Dr. Reyes testified that the cause of death was hemorrhage secondary to the gunshot wound to the head, that death was instantaneous, and that the location of the wound indicated the gunman was behind the victim at a distance of about 24 inches. Based on the size of the wound, the caliber of the gun used was possibly a .45.

Other prosecution witnesses corroborated parts of the incident. Abraham Abayari, a barrio captain attending the session, testified that after leaving the canteen he heard a shot, looked to his left, and saw Mario Ablao firing at Lt. Gapas. Felix de Ramos, a businessman near Manambit, testified that a shot rang out, he closed his eyes in fear, and when he opened them Manambit was already lying dead on the ground; he then heard two more shots and saw a person being chased by two policemen.

Mario Ablao gave a different account. He testified that on the afternoon of December 16, 1977, he went to the municipal building on instructions from his brother Mayor Bruno Ablao, then went to the canteen where his brother was. He stood by the door watching basketball. When the people in the session stood up to leave, he approached his brother, who was paying the bill, and followed him out. While they were going out, he suddenly heard a shot. His brother then handed him a gun and told him to run away with it. He ran toward the Lumban Elementary School, heard another shot, and stayed at the back of the school until late evening. He later went to his brother’s house; the mayor gave him money and told him to go to Manila and wait for instructions. He hid in Metro Manila and Nueva Ecija for about two and a half years. He claimed he did not know who shot Manambit because he was behind his brother looking at the basketball players. He also testified that he surrendered to Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez on July 16, 1980, and that he had returned to Lumban on August 17, 1980, when his father died.

The trial court relied on circumstantial evidence because no eyewitness was willing to directly point to Ablao as the killer. It found that Manambit fell near where Ablao had stationed himself; that Ablao was the first person seen running out of the canteen with a .45 pistol after the shooting; that no one else could have shot the victim, especially not the mayor; that Ablao shot at Lt. Gapas; that he fled and hid for two and a half years; that the fatal wound was caused by a .45 caliber bullet similar to the gun he carried; and that he was the only person present who went into hiding. The trial court also found that the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstance of disregard or insult of rank because the victim was a Barangay Captain and President of the Association of Barangay Captains.

• Identity of the Killer: Appellant denied shooting Andres Manambit and contended that the .45 pistol he carried was handed to him by his brother, Mayor Bruno Ablao, who died during the trial.
• Flight and Hiding: Appellant maintained that he hid because he was only 18 years old, confused, afraid, and under his brother’s moral ascendancy, having merely obeyed his brother’s order to hide.
• Murder Qualification: Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove that the crime was murder because the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation were not established.
• Death Penalty: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.
• Prejudicial Statements: Appellant argued that the trial court should not have mentioned the alleged series of violence and political vendetta in Lumban, Laguna, nor the fact that he was a suspect in the killing of Judge Sobejana and his son, because these statements were not in evidence and tended to prejudice him.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Disregard or Insult of Rank: Appellant contended that it was error to consider disregard or insult of rank as an aggravating circumstance because it was not alleged in the information and there was no proof that he deliberately insulted or disregarded the deceased’s rank.

• Identity of the Killer: Whether the trial court erred in holding that accused-appellant Mario Ablao shot and killed Andres Manambit.
• Murder vs. Homicide: Whether the prosecution proved the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation to sustain a conviction for murder.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Disregard or Insult of Rank: Whether disregard or insult of rank may be appreciated despite not being alleged in the information and whether the evidence proved it.
• Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed.
• Prejudicial Prefatory Statements: Whether the trial court erred in mentioning the alleged series of violence and political vendetta in Lumban, Laguna, and the appellant’s alleged involvement in the Sobejana killing.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated.
• Unlicensed Firearm: Whether the allegation that the firearm used was unlicensed was proved.

• Identity of the Killer: No. The conviction is supported by circumstantial evidence whose combination proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt under Section 5, Rule 133; the appellant was seen running from the scene with a .45 pistol, shot at Lt. Gapas, and hid for two and a half years.
• Murder vs. Homicide: No. Treachery and evident premeditation were not proved as indubitably as the crime itself; the crime is homicide only.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Disregard or Insult of Rank: Yes. As a generic aggravating circumstance, it may be proved during trial even if not alleged in the information; the evidence showed the shooting occurred in the session hall immediately after the meeting with Sanggunian members around, and the appellant knew the victim’s rank.
• Death Penalty: No. Since the crime is homicide, not murder, the death penalty was improper; the indeterminate penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law was imposed.
• Prejudicial Prefatory Statements: Partially meritorious. The statements were material to the issues of evident premeditation and treachery, but the Court discounted those qualifying circumstances; the judgment is based only on evidence presented.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. It was not spontaneous; the appellant hid for two and a half years, and any surrender was due to the Sobejana killing.
• Unlicensed Firearm: No. No proof was presented that the firearm used was unlicensed.

• Identity of the Killer: No eyewitness directly identified Ablao, so conviction rested on circumstantial evidence. The Court agreed with the trial court that the following circumstances, taken together, proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the victim fell very near the place where the appellant stationed himself; (2) the appellant was the first person seen coming out of the door running and carrying a .45 pistol after the shooting; (3) there was nobody else who could have shot the victim, especially not the mayor; (4) the appellant shot at Lt. Gapas upon seeing him; (5) the appellant ran away and remained in hiding for two and a half years; (6) the fatal wound was caused by a .45 caliber bullet or slug similar to the bullets of the gun carried by the appellant; and (7) from all the people present during the killing, only the appellant went into hiding. The Court cited Section 5, Rule 133, and jurisprudence holding that circumstantial evidence may sustain conviction when the combination of circumstances proves guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The defense’s claim that Mayor Bruno Ablao handed him the gun was improbable; the mayor would not have implicated his innocent brother in a capital offense, and the claim appeared to be a last-minute concoction to shift blame to a dead co-accused. The claim that he hid out of youth, confusion, and moral ascendancy was also rejected: if he was merely obeying his brother, he had no reason to shoot at Lt. Gapas; his acts showed cool-headedness and dangerous criminality, not fear. The Court also reasoned that an 18-year-old would not spend the productive years of his life hiding for a crime he did not commit, and that the guilty flee while the innocent are bold.

• Murder vs. Homicide: The trial court’s conclusion that the crime was murder was not supported by the established facts and law. Treachery and evident premeditation, the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, were not sufficiently proved. Qualifying circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. There was no direct evidence on how the shooting was committed, and no particulars as to the manner in which the aggression began and developed. Dr. Reyes’s testimony that the fatal wound was at the back of the victim’s head was not conclusive proof of treachery; a wound at the back does not by itself compel a finding of treachery, which must rest on positive proof rather than an inference from hypothetical fact. The facts preceding the actual shooting were not in the records. As for evident premeditation, there was no clear and convincing proof of (1) the time when the appellant determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to that determination, and (3) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect on the consequences. The trial judge’s and the populace’s knowledge from other cases that feuding enemies were gunning for each other did not show evident premeditation in this particular charge. Thus, the crime was homicide, not murder.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Disregard or Insult of Rank: The Court held that generic aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the information, may be proven during trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence, citing People vs. Ang. The aggravating circumstance of disregard or insult of rank was appreciated because the appellant shot the victim while still in the session hall immediately after the meeting and with other Sanggunian members still around, which indubitably proved that he deliberately intended to disregard or insult the victim’s rank. Moreover, the appellant was the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay in their place and was expected to be in close coordination with the victim; he knew the political clout and official position of the victim vis-a-vis his brother, the mayor, and the victim was his elder counterpart in the barangay movement.

• Death Penalty: Because the crime was homicide and not murder, the death penalty imposed by the trial court could not stand. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposed the indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years of reclusion temporal. The award of indemnity of P30,000 and costs was affirmed.

• Prejudicial Prefatory Statements: The Court’s judgment as to the author of the killing was based only on the evidence presented. The prefatory statement and the statement that the appellant was one of the suspects in another killing were material insofar as evident premeditation and treachery were concerned, because they showed that the particular killing was part of a liquidation campaign where victims were killed with no mercy and qualms. However, the Court discounted these qualifying circumstances. To the extent that conspiracy and the circumstances raising the crime to murder may not be proved by a judge’s notice of evidence in other cases, the fourth and fifth assigned errors were given partial consideration.

• Voluntary Surrender: Voluntary surrender requires that it be spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. No spontaneous surrender occurred because the appellant hid for two and a half years. Assuming he surrendered, it was because of the Sobejana killing. The mitigating circumstance was therefore not present.

• Unlicensed Firearm: No proof was presented to indicate that the firearm used was indeed unlicensed.

• Circumstantial Evidence — A conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence when the combination of proved circumstances establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt under Section 5, Rule 133. The Court applied this doctrine where no eyewitness directly identified the appellant, but the circumstances of his presence, flight, possession of a .45 pistol, shooting at a pursuer, and prolonged hiding, taken together, proved his guilt.
• Qualifying Circumstances Must Be Proved as Indubitably as the Crime Itself — Treachery and evident premeditation must be established by positive proof, not by inference or conjecture. Treachery cannot be appreciated absent particulars as to how the aggression began and developed; a fatal wound at the back does not by itself prove treachery. Evident premeditation requires clear and convincing proof of the time of determination, an act indicating persistence in that determination, and sufficient lapse of time for reflection. Absent such proof, the killing is homicide, not murder.
• Generic Aggravating Circumstances Need Not Be Alleged in the Information — Generic aggravating circumstances may be proved during trial even if not alleged in the information and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence. The Court applied this to disregard or insult of rank, finding that the appellant shot the victim in the session hall with Sanggunian members around and knew the victim’s official rank.
• Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender requires a spontaneous and unconditional intent to surrender to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of search and capture. It is not present where the accused hid for two and a half years and any surrender was due to another killing.
• Flight and Hiding as Circumstantial Evidence of Guilt — Flight and prolonged hiding may be considered with other circumstances as evidence of guilt; the guilty flee when no man pursueth, while the innocent are as bold as a lion. The Court used the appellant’s two-and-a-half-year hiding as one circumstance supporting conviction.

• "The crime is now homicide with the aggravating circumstance of disregard or insult of rank." — This states the Court’s ultimate classification of the offense after rejecting the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
• "It is well-settled that the circumstance that would qualify the crime to murder have to be proved as indubitably as the crime itself." — This is the ratio for reducing the conviction from murder to homicide and sets the standard for qualifying circumstances.
• "Generic aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the information, may be proven during the trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the sentence." — Quoted from People vs. Ang, this is the controlling rule that allowed disregard or insult of rank to be appreciated despite its omission from the information.
• "In order that voluntary surrender may be appreciated, it is necessary that the same be spontaneous in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture." — This defines the requisites of voluntary surrender and explains why the mitigating circumstance was rejected.

• People vs. Espinosa, G.R. No. 72883, December 20, 1989 — Cited for the principle that the guilty flee when no man pursueth while the innocent are as bold as a lion; used to support the inference from the appellant’s flight and hiding.
• People vs. Agan, G.R. 77713, February 6, 1990; People vs. Asuncion, G.R. No. 83870, November 14, 1989; People vs. Salcedo, G.R. No. 78774, April 12, 1989 — Cited together with Section 5, Rule 133 on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Salcedo was also cited for the rule that qualifying circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.
• People vs. Bacho, G.R. No. 66645, March 29, 1989; People vs. Gaddi, G.R. No. 74065, February 27, 1989 — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be appreciated where there is no evidence of the particulars of the manner in which the aggression began and developed.
• People vs. Marciales, 166 SCRA 436, 449 [1988] — Cited for the rule that treachery must be based on positive proof and not merely on an inference drawn more or less logically from hypothetical facts.
• People vs. Batas, G.R. Nos. 84277-78, August 2, 1989 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation: the time of determination, an act indicating persistence, and sufficient lapse of time for reflection.
• People vs. Ang, 139 SCRA 115, 121 [1985] — Cited for the rule that generic aggravating circumstances, even if not alleged in the information, may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the sentence.
• People vs. Lingatong, G.R. No. L-34019, January 29, 1990 — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender.

• Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides the standard for circumstantial evidence; the Court applied it to hold that the combination of circumstances proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of an eyewitness.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied after the crime was reduced from murder to homicide; the Court imposed an indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years of reclusion temporal.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.