People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Oandasan

A plea of not guilty entered during a preliminary investigation before a municipal court that lacks jurisdiction over the offense is no plea at all for purposes of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt; the accused may still be credited with a plea of guilty entered upon arraignment in the court of competent jurisdiction before trial. Incomplete self-defense is a privileged mitigating circumstance where unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation are present but reasonable necessity of the means employed is absent.

Mariano Oandasan was prosecuted for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, an offense originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance. The Municipal Court of Flora, Mountain Province, before which the complaint was first lodged, was limited to conducting a preliminary investigation and had no jurisdiction to try the charge or render judgment on a plea.

Mariano Oandasan was charged with homicide for the death of Quirino Duldulao. The criminal complaint was lodged with the Municipal Court of Flora, Mountain Province. At the preliminary investigation in that court, Oandasan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The case was thereafter elevated to the Court of First Instance of Cagayan for trial on the merits, where the prosecuting attorney filed a formal indictment for homicide. Upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance, Oandasan pleaded guilty. Before sentence, he presented evidence to prove the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender, aside from his plea of guilty.

According to the trial court’s recitation of Oandasan’s testimony, he saw the deceased Quirino Duldulao chasing his son. Not content with that and unable to catch the son, Duldulao threw his wooden club at the son, but the son was not hit. Oandasan approached Duldulao and asked him why he was chasing the son and why he threw the club. Instead of answering, Duldulao clubbed Oandasan, hitting him on the left shoulder. Oandasan stepped backward and, remembering that he had a sharp-pointed knife, drew it. Duldulao again struck Oandasan on the head with the club, prompting Oandasan to stab Duldulao on the front. The deceased sustained two wounds, one at the epigastric region and the other on the right hand.

The trial judge’s decision of September 27, 1967 ignored the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance “in view of his former plea of not guilty before the municipal court of Flora, Mt. Province.” It did not take incomplete self-defense into account as a privileged mitigating circumstance. It merely accorded Oandasan the benefits of provocation together with voluntary surrender as ordinary mitigating circumstances. It sentenced him for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code to an indeterminate penalty of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased P6,000 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay costs.

The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the trial court’s decision. The trial court’s factual findings, which the Supreme Court adopted for its analysis, were that the deceased chased and threw a club at Oandasan’s son, that the deceased clubbed Oandasan on the left shoulder and later on the head, and that Oandasan stabbed the deceased, who sustained two wounds.

• Plea of Guilty: Petitioner argued that his plea of guilty should be considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Petitioner maintained that the trial court should have appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense because the facts showed unlawful aggression by the deceased and lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
• Penalty Reduction: Petitioner prayed for a two-degree reduction of the penalty.

• Plea of Guilty: The Solicitor General, appearing for plaintiff-appellee, joined the accused in arguing that the plea of guilty should be considered in his favor.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: The Solicitor General joined the submission that the facts showed unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation, carving out incomplete self-defense.
• Penalty Reduction: The Solicitor General recommended a two-degree reduction of penalty.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the accused, who pleaded not guilty during preliminary investigation in the municipal court but pleaded guilty upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance, is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed for homicide should be reduced by two degrees in light of incomplete self-defense, the plea of guilty, voluntary surrender, and absence of aggravating circumstances.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: Yes. The plea of not guilty at preliminary investigation in the municipal court was no plea at all for mitigation because that court had no jurisdiction over homicide; the plea of guilty before the Court of First Instance, made before trial, should be counted under Article 13(7).
• Incomplete Self-Defense: Yes. Unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation were present; only reasonable necessity of the means employed was absent, so incomplete self-defense was a privileged mitigating circumstance.
• Penalty: Yes. The penalty should be reduced by two degrees—one under Article 69 for incomplete self-defense and another under Article 64(5) for the mitigating circumstances—resulting in an indeterminate penalty of four months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as maximum.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: The general rule is that if an accused charged with an offense cognizable by the municipal court pleads not guilty there and, on appeal to the Court of First Instance, changes his plea to guilty upon rearraignment, he is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt. The rationale is that the spontaneous willingness to admit the offense is absent, and allowing the benefit would let an accused speculate by pleading not guilty below and guilty only after conviction on appeal. This case, however, fell outside that rule because the municipal court was only conducting a preliminary investigation. It had no jurisdiction over homicide and could not have rendered judgment on the plea; it had to elevate the case to the Court of First Instance even if the plea were guilty. For purposes of the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt, therefore, the plea of not guilty at the preliminary investigation was no plea at all. The accused was entitled to a preliminary investigation as a statutory grant and to know whether probable cause existed; his plea of not guilty before the municipal court could not be taken against him. The proper forum for a plea in mitigation was the court with jurisdiction over the homicide charge, the Court of First Instance, where Oandasan properly pleaded guilty upon arraignment before trial. Under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code, voluntary confession of guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence is mitigating, and the plea of guilty here was made upon arraignment, before trial. It should be counted in his favor.
• Incomplete Self-Defense: The trial court’s own findings established that Oandasan saw the deceased chasing his son and throwing a wooden club at the son; when Oandasan asked why, the deceased clubbed him on the left shoulder; Oandasan drew a sharp-pointed knife; the deceased struck him on the head with the club; and Oandasan then stabbed the deceased, who sustained two wounds. These facts showed unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Oandasan. The only element absent to exempt Oandasan totally from criminal liability under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense was thus present.
• Penalty: Under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, a penalty lower by one or two degrees is imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable because of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify or exempt from criminal liability under Articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions are present. Incomplete self-defense entitled Oandasan to a one-degree reduction under Article 69. Under Article 64(5), when there are mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law is imposed in the period the court deems applicable according to the number and nature of the mitigating circumstances. The plea of guilty, voluntary surrender, and absence of any aggravating circumstance entitled him to another degree reduction. The Court found support in prior cases where incomplete self-defense, with concurring mitigating circumstances, resulted in a two-degree reduction for homicide. Homicide is penalized by Article 249 with reclusion temporal; two degrees lower is prision correccional. With the mitigating circumstances attendant, the penalty should be fixed within the medium period at two years, four months and one day. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, whose applicability is based on the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not on what may be imposed in the court’s discretion, the minimum should be within the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, fixed at four months. The maximum is two years, four months and one day of prision correccional.

• Plea of Not Guilty at Preliminary Investigation; Mitigating Confession — A plea of not guilty entered in a municipal court that is merely conducting a preliminary investigation is not a plea for purposes of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt, because that court has no jurisdiction over the offense and cannot render judgment on the plea. The proper forum for a plea in mitigation is the court with jurisdiction; a plea of guilty entered there upon arraignment before trial may be credited under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code. The general rule denying the mitigating circumstance applies only where the accused first pleads not guilty in a court with jurisdiction and later changes his plea to guilty on appeal or rearraignment.
• Incomplete Self-Defense as Privileged Mitigating Circumstance — Self-defense under Article 11(1) requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. When unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation are present but reasonable necessity of the means employed is absent, the accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and the penalty is reduced under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Two-Degree Reduction of Penalty — Incomplete self-defense justifies a one-degree reduction under Article 69. Ordinary mitigating circumstances, such as voluntary confession of guilt and voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, justify another degree reduction under Article 64(5). When both are present, the penalty may be reduced by two degrees, as in this case.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law Application — The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies based on the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law, not on the penalty that may be imposed in the court’s discretion. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty must be within the penalty next lower in degree than the penalty imposed; here, from prision correccional to arresto mayor, fixed at four months.
• Preliminary Investigation as Statutory Grant — The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant that cannot be withheld; withholding it would transgress constitutional due process. Because the municipal court was only conducting a preliminary investigation and had no jurisdiction over homicide, the accused’s plea of not guilty there could not be taken against him for purposes of the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt.

• "For purposes of applying the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt, the plea of not guilty upon arraignment at preliminary investigation in the municipal court is no plea at all." — The Court used this formulation to distinguish a preliminary investigation before a court without jurisdiction from a plea in the court competent to try the homicide charge, allowing the later plea of guilty to be credited as mitigating.
• "The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense is here present." — This states the conclusion that the trial court’s own findings established unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient provocation, with only reasonable necessity of the means employed absent.
• "A two-degree reduction of penalty — one degree, by Article 69, and another degree, by Article 64(5)." — This is the Court’s canonical statement of how incomplete self-defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances combined to lower the homicide penalty by two degrees.
• "Calling the Indeterminate Sentence Law into operation — whose applicability is based "upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the court" — the minimum of the penalty then should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto mayor, which we fix at four (4) months." — This passage states the rule for fixing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence after the penalty was reduced by two degrees.

• People vs. Lucero, 49 Phil. 160, 162 — Cited as precedent where incomplete self-defense, accompanied by provocation analogous to arrebato y obcecacion and youthfulness, resulted in a two-degree reduction of the penalty for homicide.
• People vs. Jaurigue, 76 Phil. 174, 182-183 — Cited as precedent where incomplete defense of honor with four generic mitigating circumstances lowered the homicide penalty by two degrees.
• People vs. Maula (unreported), L-7191, October 18, 1954 — Cited as precedent where incomplete self-defense, concurred in by minority of the accused as a privileged mitigating circumstance and by voluntary surrender, brought down the penalty for homicide by two degrees.
• People vs. Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239, 242 — Cited for the rule that the applicability of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is based on the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law, not on the penalty that may be imposed in the court’s discretion.
• People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 117 — Cited for the rule that the minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree.
• People vs. Fortuno, 73 Phil. 597, 598 — Cited for the principle that the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt is not available where the accused’s spontaneous willingness to admit the offense is absent, as when he first pleaded not guilty in a court with jurisdiction.
• People vs. Coronel, L-19091, June 30, 1966; People vs. Buco, L-19831, September 5, 1967, citing People vs. Quijano, 74 Phil. 223, 225 — Cited for the rule that voluntary confession of guilt, to be mitigating, must be made before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal. The Court used this as the base penalty before reducing it by two degrees.
• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code — Provides that a mitigating circumstance is present when the accused had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. The plea of guilty upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance was credited under this provision.
• Article 13(4), Revised Penal Code — Defines provocation as an ordinary mitigating circumstance. The trial court credited provocation together with voluntary surrender, but the Supreme Court held that the facts also established incomplete self-defense, which was the privileged mitigating circumstance applied.
• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides for exemption from criminal liability when the accused acts in defense of his person. The Court found that only reasonable necessity of the means employed was absent, giving rise to incomplete self-defense.
• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify or exempt from criminal liability, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. This justified one degree of reduction for incomplete self-defense.
• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law shall be imposed in the period the court may deem applicable. This justified the second degree of reduction.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum of the indeterminate penalty within the penalty next lower in degree, based on the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law and not on the penalty that may be imposed in the court’s discretion.

Concepcion, C.J.; Reyes, J.B.L.; Makalintal; Castro; Angeles; Fernando; and Capistrano, JJ., concurred. Dizon, J., took no part; Zaldivar, J., was on leave.