People of the Philippines vs. Marasigan

Murder is qualified by treachery when the attack is sudden, unexpected, and executed without risk to the assailant, rendering the victim unable to defend herself; a suicide pact does not negate treachery or evident premeditation, and a person 18 years and 11 months old is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of youth under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Octavio Marasigan was a commerce student at the Ateneo de Manila, and Elisa Jereos was a pre-medical student at the University of Santo Tomas. The two began a romantic relationship in June 1938, though Elisa simultaneously maintained ties with cadet Ramon Gelvezon, another suitor. The Revised Penal Code provisions governing murder (Article 248), aggravating circumstances including treachery (Article 14[16]) and evident premeditation (Article 14[13]), and mitigating circumstances (Article 13) framed the legal controversy, as did the last paragraph of Article 133 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, which barred imposition of the death penalty absent a unanimous vote of the Supreme Court.

Octavio Marasigan, a commerce student at the Ateneo de Manila, fell in love with Elisa Jereos, a pre-medical student at the University of Santo Tomas, in June 1938. Elisa accepted him the following month, and they thereafter maintained a daily correspondence. Before accepting Marasigan, Elisa had already been in a relationship with cadet Ramon Gelvezon, who remained one of her suitors. On the morning of October 20, 1938, Marasigan, Elisa, and their friend Monserrat Montelibano traveled to Baguio City aboard the Ilocos Express. Upon arrival, Marasigan lodged in Room 21 of the Zigzag Hotel, while Elisa and Monserrat shared Room 19, separated by another room. That afternoon, the three visited Teachers' Camp, where Elisa introduced Gelvezon to Monserrat and Marasigan.

On October 22, the three returned to Teachers' Camp, where Gelvezon hosted them at a basketball game. That evening, Gelvezon telephoned Elisa; after their conversation, she handed the phone to Marasigan, who exchanged courteous words with his rival, each offering to let the other continue courting Elisa. Shortly after, Elisa went to Teachers' Camp with Gelvezon and stayed until about 9:00 p.m. Marasigan and Monserrat went to find her; as she emerged from the showhouse, they took her back to the hotel. On the way, Marasigan reproached her, saying he would rather see her dead than lost. The following morning, October 23, Marasigan and Elisa attended Mass together. Upon leaving the church at about 6:00 a.m., they boarded a taxi, and Marasigan instructed the driver to take them to Mines View Park. En route, Elisa directed the driver to turn back to the hotel, but Marasigan again instructed the driver to proceed toward Mines View Park. When the taxi reached the Post Office, the driver stopped because he heard the door open; seeing that Elisa had opened it, he asked which passenger he should obey. The driver observed that Elisa was pale and trying to jump out unless taken to the hotel. The driver took them back to the Zigzag Hotel. Before arriving, Elisa accepted Marasigan's invitation to go for a drive at 5:00 p.m.

At about 1:30 p.m., Elisa suffered a heart attack; the attending physician administered an injection and prescribed rest, advising her not to go out. Gelvezon visited her and remained in her room until 4:00 p.m. During this time, Elisa lay in bed, and Marasigan entered her room five times while Gelvezon was present. Before leaving the hotel, Gelvezon, Marasigan, Elisa, and Monserrat went to the hotel lounge, where Gelvezon and Elisa danced to a phonograph. When Gelvezon and Monserrat were about to leave for a tea at Teachers' Camp, Elisa expressed a desire to accompany them, but Marasigan told her not to go. As soon as Gelvezon and Monserrat departed, Marasigan called a taxi driven by Nicomedes Abonejar. Marasigan and Elisa boarded, and he instructed the driver to take them to Teachers' Camp.

Along Leonard Wood Road, near Teachers' Camp, Abonejar suddenly heard Elisa cry out in fear and terror. Looking into his rearview mirror, he saw Marasigan stabbing Elisa with a double-edged pocket knife marked Exhibit "AA." He stopped the car and saw that Marasigan had wounded Elisa in the chest while she tried to parry the blows with her hands. Abonejar alighted and saw Marasigan wounding himself with the same weapon. He flagged down a passing taxi and begged its driver to report the incident to the police. A group of officers led by Sergeants Bugayong and Floresca arrived shortly and found Elisa dead, lying on her back on the floor of the taxi with her head toward the left door, and Marasigan seated in the back seat, hunched over her body. Both were bleeding profusely; the bloodstained knife and Elisa's purse were found inside the vehicle. Elisa's body bore two grave and mortal chest wounds, one wound on the right shoulder, three on the back, one on the right forearm, several on the fingers of both hands, a contusion on the left shoulder, and scratches on the right forearm and arm. Marasigan had two self-inflicted wounds that required prolonged hospitalization.

Marasigan admitted killing Elisa but claimed her death resulted from a mutual suicide pact. The defense argued the crime was homicide, not murder. The trial court found treachery present, which qualified the crime as murder, and appreciated evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance, compensated by the mitigating circumstance of youth. The trial court convicted Marasigan of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with accessories of law, P2,000 indemnity to the victim's heirs, and costs.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Passion/Obfuscation: Marasigan argued that the sixth mitigating circumstance under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated in his favor, as he acted under powerful stimuli that naturally produced passion and obfuscation (arrebato y obcacion).
• Evident Premeditation Not Proven: Marasigan contended that the facts did not support the conclusion that evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) was present.
• Treachery Not Proven: Marasigan asserted that the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia) was not established by the evidence.
• Voluntary Surrender Analogy: Marasigan maintained that his physical condition at the time of apprehension by authorities constituted a circumstance similar and analogous to voluntary surrender under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Crime Is Homicide, Not Murder: Marasigan argued that the crime committed was simple homicide, not murder, and that mitigating circumstances should reduce his liability accordingly.
• Suicide Pact Defense: Marasigan claimed that the killing resulted from a mutual pact to commit suicide, which negated both treachery and evident premeditation.
• Indeterminate Sentence: Marasigan contended that he was entitled to an indeterminate sentence under Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225.
• Youth as Mitigating Circumstance: The defense argued that Marasigan's youth should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the trial court having so found based on his age of 18 years and 11 months and the Civil Code provision setting majority at 21.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The Solicitor General argued that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation (with cunning or astucia embedded therein), abuse of confidence, and use of a motor vehicle were present, with no mitigating circumstance sufficient to compensate any of them.
• Abuse of Confidence: The prosecution maintained that abuse of confidence should be appreciated because, as the victim's boyfriend, Marasigan exceeded the trust she had placed in him.
• Use of Motor Vehicle: The prosecution argued that the use of a motor vehicle was an aggravating circumstance because the crime was committed in a taxi called and utilized by Marasigan himself.
• Youth Not a Mitigating Circumstance: The Solicitor General opined that the mitigating circumstance of youth did not apply because Marasigan was over 18 years of age when the crime was consummated.

• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia) was proven to qualify the killing as murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) was established by the evidence.
• Suicide Pact: Whether the alleged mutual suicide pact negated treachery and evident premeditation or justified the killing.
• Passion/Obfuscation: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation (arrebato y obcacion) under Article 13(6) of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated.
• Voluntary Surrender Analogy: Whether Marasigan's condition at the time of apprehension was analogous to voluntary surrender under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Youth as Mitigating Circumstance: Whether Marasigan's age of 18 years and 11 months entitled him to the mitigating circumstance of youth under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Proper Penalty: Whether Marasigan was entitled to an indeterminate sentence and what penalty should be imposed given the appreciated circumstances.

• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was established because the attack was sudden and unexpected, and the confined space of the taxi rendered the victim unable to defend herself, satisfying the elements under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Evident Premeditation: Yes. The evidence showed Marasigan conceived the idea of killing on October 22, persisted on October 23, wrote farewell letters, and prepared the weapon, satisfying all requisites of evident premeditation under Article 14(13).
• Suicide Pact: No. No evidence demonstrated a suicide pact; even if one existed, it would not justify the killing or negate treachery and premeditation, as Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes assisting in a suicide.
• Passion/Obfuscation: Yes. Jealousy was the motive that induced the crime, constituting a powerful stimulus adequate to produce passion and obfuscation under Article 13(6).
• Voluntary Surrender Analogy: No. Marasigan's condition at apprehension could not be equated with voluntary surrender because that mitigating circumstance is founded on repentance, which was absent.
• Youth as Mitigating Circumstance: No. Marasigan was 18 years and 11 months old at the time of the crime, not under 18; Article 13(2) grants the benefit only to those under 18 or over 70, and the Court is not authorized to extend the statutory age limit.
• Proper Penalty: No. Marasigan was not entitled to an indeterminate sentence. The proper penalty for murder with aggravating circumstances would be death, but for lack of unanimity, reclusion perpetua was imposed under Article 133 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3.

• Treachery: The sole eyewitness, taxi driver Nicomedes Abonejar, testified that the first indication of trouble was when Elisa tried to jump from the moving vehicle, immediately after which Marasigan stabbed her repeatedly with a double-edged knife. The attack was unexpected and sudden, executed without risk to Marasigan because the confined space of the taxi prevented Elisa from defending herself or offering meaningful resistance. That Elisa instinctively parried some blows with her hands did not alter the circumstances of the attack, as this was not an adequate means of defense against an armed assault. The trial court correctly appreciated treachery as the qualifying circumstance under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Evident Premeditation: The record contained abundant details demonstrating premeditation. Marasigan conceived the idea of killing Elisa on the night of October 22, 1938, after reading an intimate passage from one of Gelvezon's letters that aroused his jealousy. He persisted in his plan on the morning of October 23, when he directed the taxi driver to Mines View Park despite Elisa's resistance. Before committing the crime, he wrote farewell letters to his parents, siblings, and a priest, and in a final handwritten note requested that he and Elisa be buried together with the epitaph "They love each other so much that they can't afford to be separated." These circumstances conclusively demonstrated that the crime was committed with evident premeditation under Article 14(13) of the Revised Penal Code, satisfying the requisites that the crime was meditated, means were prepared in advance, and sufficient time elapsed for reflection.

• Suicide Pact: The trial court correctly rejected the suicide-pact defense. No evidence demonstrated the existence of such a pact. Even assuming a pact existed, it would not justify the killing or negate treachery and evident premeditation. Elisa's death was not suicide because it was caused directly by Marasigan, and Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes the act of assisting in a suicide.

• Passion/Obfuscation: The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation under Article 13(6) was appreciated because jealousy was the motive that induced Marasigan to commit the crime. Citing United States vs. Santillan (4 Jur. Fil. 170), the Court reiterated that resentment over rivalry in love relations is a powerful stimulus of jealousy, adequate to produce passion and obfuscation.

• Voluntary Surrender Analogy: The defense's claim that Marasigan's condition at apprehension was analogous to voluntary surrender under Article 13(2) was unfounded. Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance is founded on the culprit's repentance, which could not be equated with Marasigan's physical condition at the time he was apprehended by authorities.

• Youth as Mitigating Circumstance: Marasigan was 18 years and 11 months old at the time of the crime, having declared his age as 19 on both May 8, 1939, and November 25, 1938. Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides the mitigating circumstance of youth only for those under 18 or over 70 years of age. The trial court had appreciated youth based on the Civil Code provision (Article 320, as amended by Act No. 1891) setting majority at 21, reasoning that Marasigan's youth contributed to his lack of mature judgment. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, citing People vs. Sera Josefa (52 Jur. Fil. 213) and People vs. Macabangon (G.R. No. 44783, October 26, 1936), which held that the degree of discernment required for criminal responsibility is not the same as that required for full civil capacity, and that the Court is not authorized to extend the statutory age limit or treat the accused's age as an analogous mitigating circumstance under Article 13(10). The age of 18 years and 11 months is not a mitigating circumstance.

• Proper Penalty: The crime is murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery, penalized by reclusion temporal in its maximum degree to death. The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of confidence, and use of a motor vehicle were appreciated. Abuse of confidence was appreciated because as the victim's boyfriend, Marasigan exceeded the trust she placed in him; use of a motor vehicle was appreciated because the crime was committed in a taxi called and utilized by Marasigan. One aggravating circumstance was compensated by the mitigating circumstance of passion/obfuscation, leaving aggravating circumstances uncompensated, which warranted the maximum penalty of death. However, for lack of unanimity among the members of the Court, the penalty immediately inferior to death—reclusion perpetua—was imposed pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 133 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3. Marasigan was not entitled to an indeterminate sentence under Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the attack is sudden, unexpected, and executed without risk to the assailant, rendering the victim unable to defend herself. The confined space of a motor vehicle may establish treachery because it prevents the victim from defending or escaping. Instinctive parrying of blows does not negate treachery where it is not an adequate means of defense.

• Evident Premeditation (Premeditacion Conocida) — Evident premeditation requires three elements: (1) the crime was meditated and reflected upon by the culprit; (2) the culprit prepared in advance the means deemed suitable for its execution; and (3) sufficient time elapsed for the culprit to coolly consider the consequences. Farewell letters, advance planning of the crime scene, and persistent pursuit of the plan despite the victim's resistance satisfy these requisites.

• Passion and Obfuscation (Arrebato y Obcacion) — Jealousy arising from rivalry in love relations constitutes a powerful stimulus adequate to produce passion and obfuscation, warranting appreciation of the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(6) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Youth as a Mitigating Circumstance — The mitigating circumstance of youth under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code applies only to those under 18 or over 70 years of age. A person 18 years and 11 months old is not entitled to this mitigating circumstance, and the Court may not extend the statutory age limit or treat near-majority age as an analogous circumstance under Article 13(10). The degree of discernment required for criminal responsibility differs from that required for full civil capacity under the Civil Code.

• Suicide Pact as Defense — An alleged mutual suicide pact does not negate treachery or evident premeditation and does not justify a killing. Where the victim's death is caused directly by the accused, it is not suicide; Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes assisting in a suicide.

• Imposition of Death Penalty Without Unanimity — Under the last paragraph of Article 133 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, where the Supreme Court fails to reach a unanimous vote on the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty immediately inferior—reclusion perpetua—shall be imposed.

• "Si se considera que la occisa llena de terror trato de saltar del automovil e inmediatamente despues fue agredida y herida repetidas veces por el apelante, es innegable que la agresion era inesperada y repentina y el apelante la efectuo sin riesgo alguno de su persona en vista de que la occisa no podia defenderse ni ofrecer resistencia alguna dado el espacio muy reducido del automovil en donde ambos se encontraban." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for treachery: the suddenness of the attack and the victim's inability to defend herself in the confined space of the taxi satisfied the elements of alevosia.

• "Con respecto a la edad que el acusado tenia al cometer el delito, 19 años y 6 meses, es verdad que para el ejercicio pleno de sus derechos civiles el no estaba entonces capacitado por ser menos de edad segun el Codigo Civil. Pero debe tenerse presente que el grado de discernimiento que se exige de una persona para responder de sus actos criminalmente, no es el mismo que se requiere para la plenitud del ejercicio de los derechos en el terreno civil." — This quotation from People vs. Sera Josefa distinguishes civil capacity from criminal responsibility and establishes that the statutory age thresholds in the Revised Penal Code cannot be judicially expanded.

• "La presentacion voluntaria a las autoridades que se considera por el Codigo Penal Revisado como circunstancia que mitiga el acto delictivo ejecutado por el culpable, reconoce por fundamento su arrepentimiento que en este caso no puede asemejarse a la condicion en que se encontraba el apelante en el momento de su aprehension." — This defines the doctrinal basis of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance—repentance—and explains why the accused's physical condition at apprehension did not qualify.

• People vs. Sera Josefa, 52 Jur. Fil. 213 — Controlling precedent on the issue of youth as a mitigating circumstance. The Court held that the degree of discernment for criminal responsibility differs from that for full civil capacity, and that a person over 18 years of age is fully criminally responsible; the Court cannot extend the statutory age limit or treat near-majority age as an analogous mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Macabangon, G.R. No. 44783 (October 26, 1936) — Followed on the same point: the mitigating circumstance of youth applies only to those under 18 or over 70, and an age of 19 years cannot be treated as an analogous circumstance absent evidence that the accused's age influenced the commission of the crime.

• United States vs. Santillan, 4 Jur. Fil. 170 — Cited for the proposition that resentment over rivalry in love relations is a powerful stimulus of jealousy adequate to produce passion and obfuscation, supporting appreciation of the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(6).

• United States vs. Cornejo, 28 Jur. Fil. 476 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation: the crime must have been meditated, means prepared in advance, and sufficient time elapsed for reflection.

• People vs. Madrid, G.R. No. 41967 — Cited by the Solicitor General for the proposition that cunning or astucia (astucia) may be embedded in evident premeditation.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, qualified by treachery among other circumstances, with reclusion temporal in its maximum degree to death. Applied as the provision under which Marasigan was convicted.

• Article 14(13), Revised Penal Code — Defines evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) as an aggravating circumstance. Applied to Marasigan based on his advance planning, farewell letters, and persistent pursuit of the killing plan.

• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia) as an aggravating circumstance; when it qualifies a killing, the crime becomes murder. Applied as the qualifying circumstance based on the sudden, unexpected attack in the confined space of the taxi.

• Article 13(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of youth for those under 18 or over 70 years of age. The Court held it inapplicable to Marasigan, who was 18 years and 11 months old.

• Article 13(6), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation (arrebato y obcacion) for acting under powerful stimuli that naturally produce such passion. Applied in Marasigan's favor because jealousy was the motive.

• Article 253, Revised Penal Code — Criminalizes the act of assisting in a suicide. Cited to reject the suicide-pact defense, as the victim's death was caused directly by Marasigan.

• Article 133, Revised Administrative Code (last paragraph), as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 3 — Provides that where the Supreme Court does not unanimously vote to impose the death penalty, the penalty immediately inferior—reclusion perpetua—shall be imposed. Applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• Article 320, Civil Code, as amended by Act No. 1891 — Sets the age of civil majority at 21 years. The trial court relied on this provision to appreciate youth as a mitigating circumstance, but the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning.

• Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — The defense argued Marasigan was entitled to an indeterminate sentence under this law; the Court rejected the claim.

Avanceña (Presiding Justice), Diaz, Laurel, and Moran concurred in the decision.