People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Calimlim y Muyano

A qualifying circumstance that would elevate the penalty for rape to death must be alleged in the information; otherwise, only the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua may be imposed, regardless of the presence of ordinary aggravating circumstances. The Court also held that the accused waives his right to question the legality of his arrest by entering a plea of not guilty without first moving to quash the information on that ground.

The accused-appellant Manuel Calimlim was charged with four counts of rape under Republic Act No. 7659, which amended the Revised Penal Code provisions on rape. The private complainant, Lanie S. Limin, was a fourteen-year-old minor who had been living with the family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer for three years. The Ferrers were the victim's relatives, with Cresencia Ferrer being the victim's aunt through her grandmother's sister. The case arose in the Poblacion of Manaoag, Pangasinan, and involved allegations of rape committed with force and intimidation against a minor.

Lanie S. Limin, a fourteen-year-old girl, had been living with the family of Kagawad Manny Ferrer and Cresencia Ferrer for three years. On the night of April 2, 1995, she was left alone in one of the two houses of the Ferrers, as her usual companions, the Ferrers' sons, were out for the night. The Ferrers were in the other house about fifteen meters away. At around 11:30 P.M., she was awakened when she heard somebody, later identified as appellant, enter her room. Appellant immediately poked a knife at the left side of her neck and said, "Accompany me because I killed my wife."

She was dragged to the pig pen, about 8-9 meters away from where she slept, then forcibly taken back to her room, then to her cousin's room, and to the kitchen. In each of these places, appellant forcibly had sexual intercourse with her while poking a knife against her neck. She first recognized appellant while in the kitchen when she was able to remove the cloth covering his face. She knew appellant because she had seen him always following her whenever she went to school. After the fourth intercourse, appellant threatened to kill her if she reported the incidents. Despite the threat, she told her cousin, Manicris Ferrer, who reported the matter to Dr. Nancy Quinto, who lived nearby. On cross-examination, complainant stated that she did not struggle, shout, or resist because she was afraid appellant might kill her.

Cresencia Ferrer testified that Lanie was her niece, born in Sexmoan, Pampanga, on June 13, 1981, and became her ward starting October 25, 1993. On the evening of April 2, 1995, Cresencia was in her shop in front of their house, and Lanie was left alone in the other house. The following morning, Lanie was crying and did not want to rise. At around 8:00 A.M., Manicris and Dr. Quinto told Cresencia that Lanie had been raped. When confronted, Lanie narrated her ordeal and pointed to appellant as her rapist. The women brought Lanie to the Community Hospital in Baritao, where she was medically examined, and then reported the matter to the police.

SPO1 Mario Suratos testified that he was the duty officer when the rapes were reported to their station by Kagawad Ferrer, not by the victim herself. Dr. Ricardo Ferrer, who conducted the physical examination on Lanie, testified that there was minimal vaginal bleeding and lacerations in the hymen at the 9:00, 6:00, and 3:00 o'clock positions, all fresh, indicating insertions within the past 24 hours. There was also a whitish vaginal discharge positive for spermatozoa. On cross-examination, Dr. Ferrer stated that the lacerations could have been caused by hard objects other than a penis, such as fingers or a thumb, and that it was possible the spermatozoa was artificially placed inside the vagina, though it was not possible to determine the identity of the person who emitted it.

Appellant denied the accusations, claiming he was in his house on the evening of April 2, 1995, and went to sleep at 10:00 P.M. He recalled having sex with his wife in the early morning of April 3, 1995. He averred he was being used as a scapegoat by the Ferrers, who hated him because he did not vote for Ferrer during the last elections and because of a disagreement about a waiting shed constructed in front of his house. He asserted that as a hollow blocks maker, a physically draining job, he was often tired and weak and had little strength to engage in sex more than once a month. His wife, Erlinda Pimentel Calimlim, testified that appellant slept from 10:00 P.M. until 5:00 A.M. the following morning. His daughter, Marlene P. Calimlim, testified that her father was with them that evening and that her parents slept at 10:00 P.M., and she sensed they engaged in sexual intercourse at around 2:00 A.M. of April 3, 1995.

• Credibility of Complainant: Appellant argued that complainant's story was unlikely and defied imagination, asserting that a man like him could not consummate four rapes in just one night within a short time.
• Consent/Resistance: Appellant pointed out that complainant's testimony showed she did not exert tenacious resistance, implying that if there was intercourse, she had consented to it.
• Motive to Fabricate: Appellant asserted he was being made a fall guy by complainant's guardians, who held a grudge against him because he did not vote for Ferrer in the last elections and because of the waiting shed disagreement.
• Constitutional Rights: Appellant claimed he was denied his right against warrantless arrests, his right to remain silent, and his right to due process, including not being allowed to submit counter-affidavits during the investigation and not being accorded the right to counsel when brought to the PNP investigative body.

• Credibility of Complainant: The Office of the Solicitor General stressed that complainant's testimony deserves full faith and credit, there being no showing that she was impelled by any improper motive in filing her complaint.
• Lack of Resistance: The victim did not show tenacious resistance since, being a young girl, she was easily awed and overpowered by appellant; her lack of resistance could be attributed to paralyzing fear.
• Impossibility Claim: Contrary to appellant's claim, there was no impossibility nor improbability about complainant's story.
• Trial Court Findings: The findings and evaluation of the trial court regarding credibility of prosecution witnesses should be given great respect since the trial court was in the best position to observe demeanor, attitude, and manner of witnesses.
• Defense of Denial and Alibi: The defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by complainant.
• Penalty Recommendation: The OSG recommended that the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua, not death, because the informations did not allege the qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon," and recommended an increase in damages.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to complainant's testimony over appellant's defense of denial and alibi.
• Number of Rapes: Whether appellant could be convicted of four counts of rape given the attending physician's finding that if ever there was a crime of rape committed, it could only have been once.
• Lack of Resistance: Whether complainant's failure to tenaciously resist negates the element of force or intimidation in rape.
• Legality of Arrest: Whether appellant's warrantless arrest and alleged denial of constitutional rights during investigation warrant the reversal of his conviction.
• Propriety of Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed given that the qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon" was not alleged in the informations.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's findings on credibility were affirmed, complainant's testimony being candid, straightforward, and convincing, with no ill-motive shown to falsely accuse appellant.
• Number of Rapes: No. Negative testimony on mere possibilities cannot outweigh positive testimony of complainant on the number of sexual violations she endured; rape is an act of depravity and lust with no rhyme nor reason.
• Lack of Resistance: No. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when the victim is intimidated or threatened by a knife; intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the crime.
• Legality of Arrest: No. Appellant waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest by entering a plea of not guilty without moving to quash; moreover, an illegal arrest is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
• Propriety of Death Penalty: No. The qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon" was not alleged in the informations; therefore, only reclusion perpetua could be imposed for each count of rape, regardless of the presence of ordinary aggravating circumstances.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court applied the three guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit. The Court found that complainant had no reason to falsely accuse appellant. The averment that she was influenced by the Ferrers to fabricate the charge was not backed by persuasive proof. The Court noted that a young girl would not concoct a rape charge, allow examination of her private parts, and publicly disclose sexual abuse if her motive were other than to fight for her honor. Complainant's testimony was candid and straightforward, and she cried for several minutes while testifying, enhancing her credibility.

• Number of Rapes: The Court rejected the defense's argument that it was not possible for appellant to consummate four acts of rape in one night. The Court stated that rape is an act of depravity and lust, and there is no rhyme nor reason for beastly acts. Negative testimony on mere possibilities cannot outweigh positive testimony of complainant on the number of sexual violations she endured.

• Lack of Resistance: The Court held that physical resistance need not be established in rape when the victim is intimidated or threatened by a knife. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule. The victim was a minor while her attacker was an armed man boasting he had just killed his wife. A rape victim need not show that she would fight unto death. What is essential is evidence showing that she did not consent to the sexual act while he used force and intimidation.

• Legality of Arrest: The Court ruled that appellant's plea of not guilty effectively waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest, pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The exceptions under paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of that Rule did not apply. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

• Propriety of Death Penalty: The Court found that the qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon" was not alleged in the four informations against appellant. Even if proved during trial, that circumstance could not be used to aggravate appellant's crime because it was not included in the informations. To do so would violate appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. Citing People vs. Motos and People vs. Pailanco, the Court held that where neither the complaint nor the evidence introduced shows any qualifying circumstance that would make the offense fall within the category of rape punishable by death, the only penalty that can be properly decreed is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. A qualifying circumstance may only be taken into account as an ordinary aggravating circumstance when it is not alleged in the information, and the next lower penalty to death being the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, only the same may be imposed regardless of the presence of ordinary aggravating circumstances.

• Guiding Principles in Rape Cases — In reviewing rape cases, the Court applies three guiding principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and the prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The Court applied these principles in affirming the conviction.

• Conviction Based Solely on Victim's Testimony — In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The Court found complainant's testimony to satisfy this standard.

• Physical Resistance Not Required When Intimidated — Physical resistance need not be established in rape when the victim is intimidated or threatened by a knife. Intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule. A rape victim need not show that she would fight unto death; what is essential is evidence showing that she did not consent to the sexual act while the accused used force and intimidation.

• Waiver of Illegal Arrest by Plea of Not Guilty — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information shall be deemed a waiver of any objections, except those based on grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of Rule 117. An illegal arrest is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

• Qualifying Circumstance Must Be Alleged in the Information — A qualifying circumstance that would elevate the penalty to death must be alleged in the information; otherwise, it cannot be used to aggravate the crime, as to do so would violate the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. A qualifying circumstance not alleged in the information may only be taken into account as an ordinary aggravating circumstance, and the next lower penalty to death, being the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, may be imposed regardless of the presence of ordinary aggravating circumstances.

• "In reviewing rape cases, this Court has three guiding principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and the prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense." — This passage articulates the canonical guiding principles applied in all rape cases on appellate review.

• "Physical resistance, however, need not be established in rape when the victim is intimidated, threatened by a knife. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime of rape and not by any hard and fast rule." — This states the doctrine that lack of physical resistance does not negate rape when the victim is intimidated by a deadly weapon.

• "The qualifying circumstance, concerning 'use of deadly weapon,' was not alleged in the four informations against the appellant. Even if proved during trial, still that circumstance could not be used to aggravate appellant's crime, not having been included in the informations. To do so would violate appellant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him." — This is the ratio decidendi for reducing the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• "But here it will be noted that appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations charging him of rape. Thus, he had effectively waived his right to question any irregularity which might have accompanied his arrest and the unlawful restraint of his liberty." — This states the rule on waiver of objections to illegal arrest by entering a plea.

• People vs. Motos, 317 SCRA 96 (1999) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that where neither the complaint nor the evidence introduced shows any qualifying circumstance that would make the offense fall within the category of rape punishable by death, the only penalty that can be properly decreed is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. Pailanco, 322 SCRA 790 (2000) — Cited for the rule that a qualifying circumstance may only be taken into account as an ordinary aggravating circumstance when it is not alleged in the information, and the next lower penalty to death being the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, only the same may be imposed regardless of the presence of ordinary aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. Moreno, 321 SCRA 334 (1999) — Cited for the guiding principles in reviewing rape cases.
• People vs. Quijada, 321 SCRA 426 (1999) — Cited for the guiding principles in reviewing rape cases.
• People vs. Flores, 322 SCRA 779 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim in rape cases if credible.
• People vs. Geromo, 321 SCRA 355 (1999) — Cited for the rule on conviction based solely on victim's testimony.
• People vs. Venerable, 290 SCRA 15 (1998) — Cited for the rule that great weight is given to trial court findings on credibility of witnesses.
• People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 (1997) — Cited for the rule that trial court findings on credibility will not be disturbed on appeal unless facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked.
• People vs. Brigildo, 323 SCRA 631 (2000) — Cited for the rule that a young girl would not concoct a rape charge if her motive were other than to fight for her honor.
• People vs. Rosales, 313 SCRA 757 (1999) — Cited for the same rule on fabrication of rape charges.
• People vs. Gayomma, 315 SCRA 639 (1999) — Cited for the same rule on fabrication of rape charges.
• People vs. Celis, 317 SCRA 79 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that crying during testimony enhances credibility.
• People vs. Mosqueda, 313 SCRA 694 (1999) — Cited for the same proposition.
• People vs. Llamo, 323 SCRA 791 (2000) — Cited for the rule that absent any ill-motive to falsely accuse, complainant's testimony deserves full faith and credence.
• People vs. Abella, 315 SCRA 36 (1999) — Cited for the same rule.
• People vs. Lampaza, 319 SCRA 112 (1999) — Cited for the rule that physical resistance need not be established when the victim is intimidated by a knife.
• People vs. Malabago, 271 SCRA 464 (1997) — Cited for the same rule.
• People vs. Patriarca, 319 SCRA 87 (1999) — Cited for the rule that intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment.
• People vs. Igdanes, 272 SCRA 113 (1997) — Cited for the rule that a rape victim need not show she would fight unto death.
• People vs. Reyes, 315 SCRA 563 (1999) — Cited for the rule that what is essential is evidence showing lack of consent and use of force and intimidation.
• People vs. Manahan, 315 SCRA 476 (1999) — Cited for the same rule.
• People vs. Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226 (1999) — Cited for the same rule.
• People vs. Cantere, 304 SCRA 127 (1999) — Cited for the rule that alibi is less than persuasive and piteously dubious.
• People vs. Gailo, 316 SCRA 733 (1999) — Cited for the rule that alibi corroborated by close relatives is tainted with bias.
• People vs. Briones, 202 SCRA 708 (1991) — Cited for the rule that a plea of not guilty waives the right to question irregularities in arrest.
• People vs. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 (1993) — Cited for the rule that illegal arrest is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment.
• People vs. De Guia, 227 SCRA 614 (1993) — Cited for the same rule.
• People vs. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701 (1994) — Cited for the same rule.
• People vs. Malinao, G.R. No. 137647, February 1, 2001 — Cited for the award of moral and exemplary damages in rape cases.
• People vs. Hofileña, G.R. No. 134772, 334 SCRA 214 (2000) — Cited for the same award of damages.
• People vs. Bation, 305 SCRA 253 (1999) — Cited for the same award of damages.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures; invoked by appellant in challenging his warrantless arrest, but the Court held the issue was waived by his plea of not guilty.
• Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governing warrantless arrests; cited by appellant in challenging his arrest, but the Court held the objection was deemed waived.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor before pleading shall be deemed a waiver of objections, except those based on grounds in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of the Rule; applied to bar appellant's challenge to his arrest.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — The law defining and penalizing rape, including the qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly weapon" that elevates the penalty to death; applied in determining the proper penalty, with the Court holding the qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information.
• Article 355, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — The provision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon; cited in People vs. Pailanco and applied to the present case.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concurred.