People of the Philippines vs. Mamerto Narvaez

The defense of property under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code may be appreciated as a privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense when unlawful aggression against property rights is present, but the means employed to repel the aggression is disproportionate to the attack. The killing is thereby reduced from murder to homicide, and the penalty is lowered by two degrees pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

The case arose from a long-drawn legal battle between Fleischer and Company, Inc., of which deceased Davis Fleischer was secretary-treasurer and deceased Flaviano Rubia was assistant manager, on the one hand, and land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant Mamerto Narvaez, on the other. Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, South Cotabato, establishing his residence and cultivating the area. Fleischer and Company filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area, and after a public auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, the company was the only bidder. The settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in 1950 to annul the order of award, but lost, and the Court of Appeals affirmed on August 16, 1965, resulting in the ouster of the settlers by order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24, 1966. On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Civil Case No. 755 was filed to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award, which was still pending at the time of the incident.

Appellant Mamerto Narvaez was a settler in Maitum, South Cotabato, who had established his residence, built his house, and cultivated the area since 1937. After a long legal battle over the land, Fleischer and Company obtained an award of the contested property, and appellant was among those ejected. To avoid trouble, appellant voluntarily dismantled his first house, built in 1947 at a cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway, where he also operated a store and a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the house, with a concrete pavement between them used for drying grains and copra.

On February 21, 1967, appellant entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 for a consideration of P16.00 monthly, although he never paid the agreed rental. On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter terminating the agreement and giving him six months to remove his house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the land, with the period to expire on December 31, 1966. On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway, with some posts planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, cutting diagonally across its center, and the last post just adjacent to appellant's house. The fence, when finished, would have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side.

At about 2:30 p.m. on August 22, 1968, appellant, who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. Looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar, while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. Appellant addressed the group, saying "Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good," addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: "No, gademit, proceed, go ahead." Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shooting. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons.

The prosecution claimed that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in question when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway. The trial court found appellant guilty of two counts of murder, qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua in each case.

• Defense of Person: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person, claiming that he shot the victims from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities, and that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be exempt from criminal liability.
• Defense of Rights: Appellant argued that the lower court also erred in convicting him although he acted in defense of his rights, invoking the justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Lawful Exercise of Ownership: The prosecution claimed that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in question when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway, and that the act of killing of the two deceased by appellant was not disputed.

• Defense of Person or Rights: Whether appellant acted in defense of his person or of his rights, thereby exempting him from criminal liability under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was sufficiently established.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether appellant should be credited with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.

• Defense of Person or Rights: No. The defense of property was incomplete because the means employed by appellant, firing his shotgun from his window and killing his two victims, was disproportionate to the attack on his property. However, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense was appreciated pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Treachery: No. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased, the element of a sudden unprovoked attack being lacking.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not sufficiently established, there being no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly appreciated, and passion and obfuscation also attended the commission of the crime.

• Defense of Person or Rights: The Court reviewed the circumstances prior to the shooting and found that five persons, consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house, using tools which could be lethal weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. The jeep which they used was parked just a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. The Court held that there was aggression on the part of the victims, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights. The aggression was unlawful because at the time of the incident, Civil Case No. 755 for annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending, and Fleischer had given appellant up to December 31, 1968 within which to vacate the land. The Court cited Articles 536 and 539 of the Civil Code, which provide that no one may acquire possession through force or intimidation and that every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession. The Court also cited Article 429 of the Civil Code, which provides that the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. However, the Court found that when appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack. The third element of defense of property, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant, was present, as there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise produced by the victims and their laborers. Since not all the elements for justification are present, appellant should be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Treachery: The Court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased, citing People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), where the element of a sudden unprovoked attack was lacking. The Court also cited People vs. Cañete (44 Phil. 481), which held that alevosia cannot be appreciated where the slayer acted instantaneously, as it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made.
• Evident Premeditation: The Court found that the only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, a laborer of Fleischer and Company, who testified that on August 20, 1968, two days before the incident, appellant and his wife talked to him, with Mrs. Narvaez telling him that if they fenced their house, there is a head that will be broken, and appellant adding "Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his head but I will be the one." The Court held that this single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, citing People vs. Ordioles (42 SCRA 238), which held that there must be direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, and People vs. Gida (102 SCRA 70), which required a showing that the accused premeditated the killing, that the culprit clung to his premeditated act, and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The Court also noted the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer, which neutralizes his credibility. Evident premeditation was further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The Court found that the trial court properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting. The Court also found that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime, as appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed, and considering the antecedent facts of the case, where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to the "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded. The Court held that appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense and by two generic mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation. Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same, and considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional. And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.

• Defense of Property (Incomplete) — Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, defense of one's person or rights is a justifying circumstance requiring: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In this case, unlawful aggression against appellant's property rights was present, and lack of sufficient provocation was established, but the means employed was disproportionate to the attack. Since not all elements for justification were present, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense was appreciated pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Unlawful Aggression on Property — Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind. An actual physical invasion of property which the possessor has the right to resist, pursuant to Article 429 of the Civil Code, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. The deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him, and the assault on appellant's property therefore amounts to unlawful aggression.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — To appreciate alevosia, it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a situation where the slayer acted instantaneously. The element of a sudden unprovoked attack is lacking where there is provocation on the part of the deceased.
• Evident Premeditation — There must be direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim; it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime. There must be a showing that the accused premeditated the killing, that the culprit clung to his premeditated act, and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of the act.

• "Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522)." — This passage defines the standard for unlawful aggression and was applied to find that the actual physical invasion of appellant's property constituted unlawful aggression.
• "The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to the attack." — This passage articulates the basis for finding the defense incomplete, as the means employed was not reasonably necessary to repel the attack on property.
• "As WE have consistently held, there must be 'direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime' (People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238)." — This passage states the canonical formulation for evident premeditation and was applied to reject the aggravating circumstance for lack of sufficient evidence.

• People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522 — Cited for the definition of illegal aggression as equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind.
• People vs. Manlapaz, 55 SCRA 598 — Cited for the proposition that the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is lacking where there is provocation on the part of the deceased, thus treachery cannot be appreciated.
• People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481 — Cited for the rule that alevosia cannot be appreciated where the slayer acted instantaneously, as it must clearly appear that the method of assault was deliberately chosen to accomplish the act without risk to the assailant.
• People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238 — Cited for the requirement of direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim to appreciate evident premeditation.
• People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation: showing that the accused premeditated the killing, clung to his premeditated act, and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime.
• Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, 43 SCRA 397 — Cited for the proposition that the award for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction, applied to reduce the civil liability of appellant.

• Article 11, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — The justifying circumstance of defense of one's person or rights, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
• Article 13, paragraph 6, Revised Penal Code — The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, applicable when not all the elements for justification are present.
• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Retroactive effect of penal laws favorable to the accused, applied to give retroactive effect to Republic Act No. 5465.
• Article 39, Revised Penal Code — Subsidiary imprisonment, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, made applicable to fines only and not to reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings.
• Article 64, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Rules for the application of penalties when there are mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances, allowing the penalty to be reduced by one degree.
• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — The penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The crime of murder, as cited in the trial court's decision.
• Article 429, Civil Code — The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
• Article 536, Civil Code — In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto; he who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court.
• Article 539, Civil Code — Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
• Article 30, Civil Code — Recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.
• Republic Act No. 5465 — Amendment making the provisions of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code applicable to fines only and not to reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Vasquez, and Relova, JJ., concurred. Aquino, J., was on leave. Plana, J., concurred in the result.

• Abad Santos, J., dissenting — The dissent argued that the self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers to unlawful aggression on persons, not property, and therefore the defense of property should not be appreciated as a justifying or mitigating circumstance in prosecutions for murder or homicide.
• Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting in part — While agreeing with the order to release the appellant, the dissent argued that an attack on the person defending his property is an indispensable element where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically defended is only property. Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life, and defense of property can only be invoked when it is coupled with some form of attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. The mere utterance "No, gademit proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which entitles appellant to the penalty of self-defense. The dissent agreed that the crime is homicide but without any privileged mitigating circumstance, and that the maximum sentence appellant should have served was prision mayor plus the indemnification to each group of heirs of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and attorney's fees.