People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Del Pilar Rosario C. Casa

A conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs cannot rest solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the poseur-buyer, especially when the other buy-bust team members did not see the transaction. In warrantless seizures, the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs must generally be conducted at the place of seizure; deviation to the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team requires a practicable justification, and the saving clause applies only if there are justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved.

Ma. Del Pilar Rosario C. Casa was charged in two amended informations with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, for the alleged sale of 0.13 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of 11 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing approximately 10.99 grams of the same drug. The offenses were alleged to have been committed on July 21, 2015, after R.A. No. 10640 took effect on August 7, 2014, so the amended Section 21 chain of custody rule governed. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the Regional Trial Court's joint judgment of conviction.

On July 21, 2015, in Dumaguete City, Ma. Del Pilar Rosario C. Casa was charged in two amended informations with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. The sale charge alleged that she sold and delivered to a poseur-buyer one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.13 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly called "shabu"; the possession charge alleged that she kept and possessed 11 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing an approximate aggregate weight of 10.99 grams of shabu. She pleaded not guilty on July 31, 2015.

According to the prosecution, sometime in the last week of June 2015, the Special Operations Group of the Negros Oriental Police Provincial Office received information from a confidential informant that a certain "Mah-mah" a.k.a. "Madam," later identified as accused-appellant, was engaged in the illegal drug trade in Barangay Cadawinonan Housing Project. Senior Police Officer IV Allen Jude Germodo instructed Police Officer I Darelle Jed Delbo to verify the information through casing and surveillance, and PO1 Delbo confirmed that accused-appellant was engaged in illegal drug activities. On July 21, 2015, at around 3:00 p.m., SPO4 Germodo conducted a briefing for a buy-bust operation; PO1 Delbo was designated as poseur-buyer, Police Officer I Archimedes Olasiman as immediate backup, and Police Officer III Rulymar Laquinon prepared five P100.00 bills as buy-bust money. The pre-arranged signal was for PO1 Delbo to call SPO4 Germodo's cellular phone. At around 3:50 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area; PO1 Delbo and the confidential informant rode a motorcycle while the rest followed in a Nissan Frontier vehicle. PO1 Delbo and the informant saw accused-appellant sitting on a chair along a narrow street. Accused-appellant approached them and asked if they wanted to buy shabu and how much; PO1 Delbo replied "kinye," meaning P500.00 worth of shabu. Accused-appellant asked for the money, and PO1 Delbo gave her the P500.00 buy-bust money. Accused-appellant then gave PO1 Delbo one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO1 Delbo examined it, confirmed it was shabu, and immediately called SPO4 Germodo. Upon seeing the backup team running toward them, PO1 Delbo announced his authority in Visayan, arrested accused-appellant, and informed her of her constitutional rights.

Thereafter, PO1 Delbo placed masking tape on the sachet and marked it "MC-BB 7/21/15." After marking that sachet, he confiscated a plastic container which contained 11 sachets of white crystalline substance and marked them "MC-P1 7/21/15" to "MC-P11 7/21/15," respectively. He also marked the plastic container and a cellular phone he recovered. SPO4 Germodo decided to conduct the inventory at the SOG office for security reasons. PO1 Delbo had custody of all the items seized. At the SOG office, PO1 Delbo conducted an inventory in the presence of accused-appellant and the required witnesses who had just arrived. PO3 Laquinon wrote the entries in the Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized, which was signed by PO1 Delbo, SPO4 Germodo, PO1 Olasiman, DOJ representative Anthony Chilius Benlot, media representative Glenn Serion, and Barangay Captain Gilieta Josy Binondo. PO1 Delbo prepared a memorandum request for laboratory examination and drug test. He brought accused-appellant to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital for physical examination, then proceeded to the crime laboratory. Police Officer III Edilmar Manaban received the seized items contained in a tape-sealed brown envelope from PO1 Delbo, checked the contents, resealed the envelope, and kept it in his locker. The next day, he submitted the sealed brown envelope to Police Chief Inspector Josephine Llena, forensic chemist, who conducted the laboratory examination. The examination revealed that the seized items yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride, and accused-appellant's urine sample also yielded positive results. PCI Llena stipulated that she kept the evidence in the vault of the crime laboratory to which only she had access. The other buy-bust team members were positioned 10 to 15 meters away from the area, but they admitted they did not see the alleged transaction. IO1 Ivy Claire Oledan, who was designated to search accused-appellant after the arrest, testified that she did not recover or confiscate anything from accused-appellant's body.

Accused-appellant testified that on July 21, 2015, she was on her way to her mother's house in Balayagmanok, Valencia, Negros Oriental, on board a scooter driven by a certain "Benjie." They stopped at the Cadawinonan Housing Project area to buy gas for the scooter. She was sitting along the inner portion of one of the alleys when two male persons dragged her to the main road and told her that they had bought drugs from her. She tried to resist and told them that she would cooperate only if they allowed her to contact her lawyer. She was then forced to board a white pick-up where three other police officers were inside. She later found out that the male persons who dragged her from the alley were PO1 Delbo and SPO4 Germodo. She denied the charges and claimed that she was not doing anything illegal when she was arrested and that she saw the drugs for the first time at the SOG office. She believed that the police officers accused her of selling illegal drugs because her husband, Aurelio Casa, Jr., from whom she had been estranged for six years, was engaged in selling illegal drugs. She wanted to file a case against the police officers but was advised not to pursue it to avoid more trouble.

The RTC gave credence to PO1 Delbo's testimony over accused-appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up. It held that the prosecution established the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, that the arresting officers followed the required procedure, and that the integrity of the seized drugs was properly preserved. It opined that the police officers regularly performed their duties and that their narration of what transpired during the buy-bust operation was credible. The CA affirmed, holding that accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment operation, that all elements of the crimes were established, that the police officers preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, and that accused-appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up could not prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

• Uncorroborated Poseur-Buyer Testimony: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Delbo, which she claimed was incredible, inconsistent, and contrary to normal human experience and behavior.
• Lack of Corroboration: Accused-appellant maintained that none of the prosecution witnesses corroborated PO1 Delbo's testimony that an actual buy-bust operation had taken place.
• Noncompliance with Section 21: Accused-appellant averred that no photograph of her was taken by the police officers and that she was not present during the inventory of the seized items; she claimed that the police officers' noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 justified her acquittal.
• Insufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Poseur-Buyer Testimony: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the sole testimony of PO1 Delbo was sufficient to prove that a buy-bust operation actually transpired.
• Elements Proven: The OSG urged the Court to affirm the RTC decision because the prosecution duly proved all the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
• Chain of Custody Compliance: The OSG insisted that the chain of custody rule was complied with and that the arresting officers preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
• Presence During Inventory and Photographs: The OSG claimed that accused-appellant was included in the photographs taken during the inventory, as testified by PO1 Olasiman, the designated photographer, and that the DOJ representative testified that accused-appellant was present during the conduct of inventory.

• Credibility of Uncorroborated Poseur-Buyer Testimony: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Delbo, which was alleged to be incredible, inconsistent, and contrary to normal human experience and behavior.
• Compliance with Section 21: Whether the prosecution established compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to prove the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

• Credibility of Uncorroborated Poseur-Buyer Testimony: Yes. The trial court erred in relying on the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Delbo; the other buy-bust team members admitted they did not see the alleged sale, and sheer reliance on the lone testimony of a poseur-buyer does not satisfy proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Compliance with Section 21: No. The prosecution failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, because the inventory did not state that it was conducted in the presence of accused-appellant, the transfer of venue to the police station was not justified by a practicable reason, and the saving clause requisites were not met.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: No. The elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were not established beyond reasonable doubt, and the chain of custody rule was not properly complied with; acquittal was therefore proper.

• Credibility of Uncorroborated Poseur-Buyer Testimony: To sustain a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration, and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. It is essential that a transaction or sale actually took place and that the corpus delicti be presented in court. For illegal possession, the prosecution must establish (1) that the accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a prohibited drug, (2) that such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. In both cases, the identity of the seized drugs must be established with moral certainty, and it must be proven with exactitude that the substance bought or recovered during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence. The prosecution has the heavy burden of establishing these elements and must rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. Considering the gravity of the penalty, courts should be careful in receiving and weighing the probative value of the testimony of an alleged poseur-buyer, especially when it is not corroborated by any of his teammates in the alleged buy-bust operation. In this case, the prosecution relied on seven witnesses, but the witnesses other than PO1 Delbo did not actually see the alleged sale. The buy-bust team members were positioned only 10 to 15 meters away, yet they admitted they did not see the transaction. It was highly improbable that none of the backup officers present at the crime scene would notice the sale that allegedly transpired when they should have been surreptitiously watching accused-appellant. The RTC and the CA merely relied on the uncorroborated testimony of PO1 Delbo. The existence of the alleged transaction hinged solely on the poseur-buyer's testimony because all the other witnesses admitted not seeing the transaction. With respect to illegal possession, the circumstances were also doubtful and unclear. According to PO1 Delbo, accused-appellant approached them and asked if they wanted to buy shabu and how much; PO1 Delbo replied that they wanted to buy "kinye," meaning P500.00 worth of shabu; accused-appellant asked for the money and PO1 Delbo gave her the P500.00 buy-bust money; accused-appellant then "picked a plastic container at the left front pocket" and "picked one (1) [sachet] and gave it to [him]." After all these events — from the time he called the backup team, the arrest of accused-appellant, and up to the marking of the seized items — PO1 Delbo claimed that accused-appellant was still holding the purported plastic container from which the plastic sachet came. The Court found it incredible that accused-appellant was holding a plastic container supposedly containing dangerous drugs in the open and in plain view of PO1 Delbo for an extended period of time. PO1 Delbo also claimed that he already knew that the plastic container held dangerous drugs even if he had not yet examined it. None of the witnesses testified on PO1 Delbo's act of recovering the other sachets of purported shabu from the plastic container that accused-appellant was supposedly holding. IO1 Oledan, who was designated to search accused-appellant after the arrest, testified that she never recovered any contraband from accused-appellant. Thus, the Court was not convinced that the prosecution proved that a transaction involving dangerous drugs had taken place, and the prosecution also failed to establish that accused-appellant indeed possessed dangerous drugs due to the uncertainty on how the items were seized from her.

• Compliance with Section 21: Even on the basis of the chain of custody rule, the guilt of accused-appellant was not proven. Chain of custody means the duly recorded, authorized movements and custody of the seized drugs at each stage, from the moment of confiscation to the receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination until presentation in court. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was amended by R.A. No. 10640, which became effective on August 7, 2014. Since the alleged offense was committed on July 21, 2015, after the amendment, the provisions of R.A. No. 10640 apply. Section 21(1) consists of three parts. The first part requires that the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were confiscated or seized, or his or her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. R.A. No. 10640 now only requires two witnesses: an elected public official and either a representative from the NPS or the media. If the insulating witnesses required by law are not present during the physical inventory and photographing, it constitutes noncompliance with the chain of custody rule. The law requires the accused, or his or her representative or counsel, or the insulating witnesses to be present during the inventory. However, the accused, or his or her representative or counsel, is not required to sign the copies of the inventory or the seized items; only the signatures of the insulating witnesses are mandatory in the inventory report. In People vs. Lim, the Court provided guidelines: the apprehending or seizing officers must state in their sworn statements or affidavits their compliance with Section 21(1); in case of nonobservance, they must state the justification or explanation and the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items; if there is no justification or explanation in the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case but must refer it for further preliminary investigation; if the case is filed despite the absence, the court may refuse to issue a commitment order or warrant of arrest or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause. The accused shall not be required to affix his or her signature on the seized item and the inventory report; instead, the apprehending officers shall state in their inventory report that it was conducted in the presence of the accused, or his or her representative or counsel, and the insulating witnesses. Only the signatures of the insulating witnesses are mandatory. The inventory report should be attached to the sworn statements or affidavits of the apprehending officers. The second part of Section 21(1) provides that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. In Tumabini vs. People, the Court explained that the difference between a search warrant and a warrantless search with regard to a buy-bust operation is the venue of the physical inventory and taking of photographs. When drugs are seized pursuant to a search warrant, the physical inventory and taking of photographs shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant was served. When the seizure is pursuant to a warrantless search, such as a buy-bust operation, the inventory and taking of photographs may be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team, whichever is practicable. However, recent jurisprudence clarified that even in a warrantless seizure, the general rule remains that inventory and taking of photographs must be conducted at the place of seizure. In People vs. Musor, the Court declared that the phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. Only when the same is not practicable does the law allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or at the office of the apprehending officer or team. In People vs. Tubera, the prosecution did not even attempt to explain why it was impracticable to conduct the inventory and taking of photographs at the place of seizure, which led to acquittal. In People vs. Dumanjug, the Court rejected the argument that a crowd of 200 people justified transferring the venue. In Lim, the Court reiterated that the inventory and taking of photographs in case of warrantless seizures must be conducted at the place of seizure unless there is a threat of immediate or extreme danger, in which case the inventory and taking of photographs can be conducted at the nearest police station. In People vs. Salenga, the Court held that the police officers' flimsy excuse that the crowd was getting bigger at the place of seizure was an invalid reason to conduct the inventory at the nearest police station. In People vs. Taglucop, the Court settled the place of the conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs under Section 21(1). There, the warrantless search was pursuant to a buy-bust operation; the inventory and taking of photographs were conducted at the nearest police station, not at the place of seizure. The prosecution established that it was practicable to conduct the inventory and taking of photographs at the nearest police station because of several reasons, such as the gathering crowd, it was already raining, and the place was unsafe. These justifications were consistently included in the judicial affidavits immediately executed by the police after the buy-bust operation. The Court underscored that the police officers had the expertise to decide whether it was practicable to conduct the inventory and taking of photographs at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station. As current jurisprudence stands, in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and taking of photographs generally must be conducted at the place of seizure. The exception to this rule is when the police officers provide justification that: (1) it is not practicable to conduct the same at the place of seizure; or (2) the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger at the place of seizure. In People vs. Pacnisen, the Court reminded that in buy-bust situations or warrantless arrests, the physical inventory and photographing are allowed to be done at the nearest police station or at the office of the apprehending officer or team, whichever is practicable, but even in these alternative places, such inventory and photographing are still required to be done in the presence of the accused and the insulating witnesses. The 2021 Revised Philippine National Police Operational Procedures is in accordance with this interpretation: for warrantless seizures like buy-bust operations, the photographing, marking, and physical inventory must be done at the place of apprehension, unless for justifiable reasons, they may be made at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer or team, ensuring that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items remain intact and preserved, with the justification clearly stated in a sworn affidavit. During the deliberations, an alternative proposition was raised that in a warrantless seizure involving dangerous drugs, the police officers do not need to provide any reason before conducting the inventory at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team. The Court found this alternative proposition not warranted. First, the law itself recognizes that the conduct of the inventory at the nearest police station or office is not absolute, unbridled, and unrestrained because of the phrase "whichever is practicable." A plain reading shows that this phrase is a qualifier; only when the police officers offer a practicable reason for the conduct of the inventory at the nearest police station or office shall the law allow a deviation on the location of the inventory. Absent such practicable reason, the police officers should instead conduct the inventory and taking of photographs at the place of seizure. The Court cited Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. vs. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. on the plain meaning rule. Second, while Senators Grace Poe and Vicente Sotto III made sponsorship speeches for Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, expressing that they proposed to make the conduct of the inventory "not difficult" for law enforcement agencies, such purported change of policy is not reflected in the text of the contested proviso regarding the place of inventory. When Section 21 was amended by R.A. No. 10640, it still kept and unequivocally sustained the phrase "whichever is practicable." Statutes should be construed as a whole and not as a series of disconnected articles and phrases. The Court cited Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Romulo. If R.A. No. 10640 deleted the phrase "whichever is practicable," the Court would not have difficulty in accepting the alternative proposition, but the existing law retains that phrase. Third, the alternative proposition would render the phrase "whichever is practicable" nugatory, inoperable, and virtually non-existent. Without the stringent compulsion of the law, no police officer would genuinely conduct the inventory at the place of seizure simply because they have uninhibited discretion to undertake the inventory at the nearest police station or office. The Court gave an example of a buy-bust operation in broad daylight in a remote area where the quantity of illegal drug seized is less than one gram, the police secured the attendance of all required witnesses at the exact time and place of seizure, and there was no threat to safety, but the nearest police station was 30 kilometers away; under the alternative proposition, the police could conduct the inventory 30 kilometers away without any rhyme or reason. Senior Associate Justice Leonen added that the requisite that the physical inventory and taking of photographs must be done immediately after seizure and confiscation serves to account for the time frame within which custody of the contraband transfers from the accused to the apprehending officer; when this interval increases, the exhibit becomes susceptible to contamination or tampering, and the requirement must be accomplished in the place of seizure to satisfy immediacy. Associate Justice Caguioa, in his Separate Concurring Opinion, expounded that strict compliance with the immediate inventory and photographing requirement offers an independent and impartial source of evidence on the very facts of the case and a guarantee that there was little to no time for pernicious interference to taint the chain; the element of immediacy is grounded on the reality that as the time gap from seizure to inventory and photographing widens, the greater its vulnerability to contamination or abuse becomes. Fourth, the apprehension that requiring the police officers to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure may be too difficult is more apparent than real. In Taglucop, the inventory and taking of photographs were conducted at the nearest police station because the prosecution established that it was practicable to do so due to the gathering crowd, rain, and unsafe place. When police officers provide a sensible reason that is practicable, consistent, and not merely generic or afterthought excuses, courts will recognize that they may conduct the inventory at the nearest police station or office. Such reason must be indicated in the affidavits of the police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation, pursuant to the guidelines in Lim. The police officers have the expertise to decide whether it is practicable to conduct the inventory and taking of photographs at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station. The fear that police officers would not be able to provide a practicable reason is unfounded. Section 21(1) regarding the venue is neither difficult nor impossible to implement. The law does not require the impossible. The Court recognizes the proficiency and skill of police officers to determine whether it is clearly not practicable to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure during a warrantless seizure. Only when the police officers fail to comply with the modest and straightforward task of providing a practicable reason for conducting the inventory at the nearest police station or office, instead of at the place of seizure, shall it result in a deviation from the chain of custody rule. The failure to observe this requirement was demonstrated in People vs. Tubera, People vs. Dumanjug, People vs. Musor, and Salenga, which led to noncompliance with Section 21. Justice Caguioa also emphasized that a buy-bust operation is a pre-planned operation, so the enforcement authorities would easily have enough time and opportunity to make the necessary preparations to conduct the inventory and photographing without moving or altering the original position of the seized items at the place of apprehension; the buy-bust team should not simply be sanctioned to choose, at their convenience, to conduct the inventory at the nearest police station or office. Senator Sotto's sponsorship speech emphasized that the safety of law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography, and the preservation of the seized illegal drugs, may be threatened by immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure; this concern is addressed because when the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger at the place of seizure, such would be a valid justification to conduct the inventory at the nearest police station or office. Finally, the Court must return to the purpose and intent of the chain of custody rule under Section 21. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. Compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any prosecution that follows a buy-bust operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit, and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. As explained by Senior Associate Justice Leonen, to prevent tampering, substitution, and planting of evidence, strict adherence with Section 21 is necessary; partial or approximate compliance is insufficient. Such a rigid application of the rule is appropriate due to the fungible nature of the corpus delicti in drugs cases, especially when the amount involved is minuscule. The purpose of the chain of custody rule is to guarantee that the item seized from the accused would be the very same item presented in court, preventing planting or tampering of evidence. Section 21 was placed as a safeguard to those accused in drug offenses in accordance with the presumption of innocence under the Constitution. The interpretation approved by the Court strikes a harmonious balance between protecting the accused against planting and switching of dangerous drugs immediately after the purported seizure and efficiently facilitating the conduct of the inventory of the seized dangerous drugs at the place of seizure, unless for practicable and safety reasons provided by law enforcement agencies, the inventory should be conducted at the nearest police station or office. The alternative proposition is not in accordance with the spirit and intent of the chain of custody rule. In any case, even if the police officers do not absolutely and perfectly comply with the requirements of Section 21, particularly as to the proper place of the conduct of the inventory, they still have the opportunity to apply the saving clause. The third and final portion of Section 21(1) refers to the saving clause: noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items. This portion was initially found in the IRR of R.A. No. 9165; with R.A. No. 10640, it is now included in the text of the law. While the chain of custody has been a critical issue leading to acquittals in drug cases, noncompliance with the prescribed procedures does not necessarily result in the conclusion that the identity of the seized drugs has been compromised so that an acquittal should follow. The last portion of Section 21(1) provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of noncompliance will irretrievably prejudice the prosecution's case. In People vs. Luna, the Court laid down the requisites to apply the saving clause: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. If these two elements concur, the seizure and custody over the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid; the integrity of the corpus delicti remains untarnished. Before the prosecution can rely on this saving mechanism, the apprehending team must first recognize lapses, and if any are found to exist, they must justify the same accordingly. Whenever the first prong is not complied with, the prosecution shall not be allowed to invoke the saving clause to salvage its case. In Valencia vs. People, the Court underscored that the arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under Section 21, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground; otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience. In People vs. Acub, the Court also did not apply the first prong of the saving clause because, despite the blatant lapses, the prosecution did not explain the arresting officers' failure to comply with the requirements in Section 21. The second prong requires that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. According to People vs. Adobar, the integrity of the seized illegal drugs, despite noncompliance with Section 21, requires establishing the four links in the chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. The first link refers to seizure and marking. Marking means the apprehending officer or poseur-buyer places his or her initials and signature on the seized item. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus preventing switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. The second link is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. The investigating officer shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the proper transfer of the evidence to the police crime laboratory for testing; the investigating officer's possession of the seized drugs must be documented and established. The third link is the delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drugs to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, the laboratory technician will test and verify the nature of the substance. The fourth link refers to the turnover and submission of the dangerous drug from the forensic chemist to the court. In drug-related cases, it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies on the details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination: when and from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or other things accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was in. The forensic chemist must also identify the name and method of analysis used in determining the chemical composition of the subject specimen. When the prosecution fails to prove its compliance with the mandatory requirements under the first and second parts of Section 21(1), its only recourse is to invoke the saving clause. However, the saving clause, as an exception to the rule of strict compliance, is not a talisman that the prosecution may invoke at will. It is the burden of the prosecution in the application of the saving clause to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved in all four links in the chain of custody. Applying the foregoing, the prosecution failed to prove that it had complied with Section 21. The Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized was signed by PO1 Delbo, SPO4 Germodo, PO1 Olasiman, DOJ representative Benlot, media representative Serion, and Barangay Captain Binondo. Both required insulating witnesses were present. However, the inventory is missing a very crucial information: that the inventory was done in the presence of the accused, or her representative or counsel. The law requires the fact that the accused, or her representative or counsel, was present at the conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs to be stated in the inventory. The accused shall not be required to affix her signature on the seized item and the inventory report; instead, the apprehending officers shall state in their inventory report that it was conducted in the presence of the accused, or her representative or counsel, and the insulating witnesses. Another defect is the place of the conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs. As a general rule, the inventory and taking of photographs must be conducted at the place of seizure. Only when the same is not practicable does the law allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the office of the apprehending officer or team. Here, the Joint Affidavit of PO1 Delbo and PO1 Olasiman states that the team leader decided to conduct the inventory at the police station "for security purposes." The mere general invocation of "security purposes," without any explanation or detail, is not sufficient to justify that it was actually not practicable to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure. In Salenga, the police officers simply gave a flimsy excuse that the crowd was getting bigger at the place of seizure in justifying the transfer of venue to the nearest police station; the Court explained that such general excuse was an invalid reason because it was not proven that it was indeed not practicable to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure. Accordingly, the prosecution failed to prove its compliance with Section 21. The first requisite of the saving clause was not complied with. The inventory/receipt of property seized was signed only by the insulating witnesses. It was not signed by accused-appellant, even though required by the law. When questioned regarding the circumstances surrounding the inventory, the prosecution witnesses focused instead on explaining the absence of accused-appellant in the pictures during the conduct of the inventory. PO1 Delbo insisted that accused-appellant was present during the inventory, but she did not appear in the photographs because she was avoiding the police officers. PO1 Olasiman testified that accused-appellant was crying during the inventory and did not want to be seated with the insulating witnesses. However, the prosecution witnesses were so focused on justifying the absence of accused-appellant in the photographs that they forgot to explain why there was no statement in the inventory report whether accused-appellant was present during the conduct of the inventory. Assuming that accused-appellant was indeed present at the inventory but expressly refused to sign the inventory report, the police officers could have indicated such fact in the inventory report. Under the Guidelines of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, if the accused, her representative, or any of the insulating witnesses refused to sign the inventory, the police officers may state in the inventory report that such person "refused to sign." However, the police officers failed to do so. The inventory/receipt of the property seized only contained accused-appellant's bare name; it did not expressly state that accused-appellant was indeed present during the conduct of the inventory, as required by law. This engenders doubt that the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same drugs presented in court. Further, the inventory and taking of photographs were not conducted at the place of seizure; they were conducted at the police station. The Joint Affidavit of PO1 Delbo and PO1 Olasiman merely gave a general invocation of "security purposes" for the transfer of venue. When the prosecution was given an opportunity during trial to explain the reason for the change of venue, the prosecution witnesses gave conflicting justifications. PO1 Delbo stated that the team leader decided to transfer venue for security purposes because, at that time, they recently lost a team member; however, the connection of that incident with the current buy-bust operation was not explained. PO1 Delbo did not expound on whether there was existing danger at the same place or vicinity, or against the same group, where the buy-bust operation was being conducted. Such general excuse of "security purposes" is not sufficient to establish that the place of seizure is not a practicable place to conduct the inventory and photography of the seized items. PO1 Olasiman gave a different explanation: he said that the team leader instructed them to transfer venue because there was already a lot of people in the area. In Salenga, the Court held that the mere fact that the crowd was getting bigger at the place of seizure is not sufficient to justify the transfer of venue to the nearest police station. The explanations provided by PO1 Delbo and PO1 Olasiman are conflicting, insufficient, and do not salvage the general invocation of "security purposes" to establish that it was practicable to change venue to the nearest police station. This situation is different from Taglucop because the prosecution failed to substantiate that it was practicable to change the venue of the conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs, and the police officers gave conflicting statements to justify such change of venue. Accordingly, the first requisite of the saving clause was not proven by the prosecution. It failed to establish that the apprehending team recognized the lapses under Section 21 and also failed to justify the said lapses. Even the second requisite of the saving clause was not proven because the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized were not preserved; particularly, there were breaks in the first and fourth links in the chain of custody. As to the first link, the marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered from accused-appellant was irregularly done. It was not compliant with paragraph 2.35, Section 2-6 of the 2014 Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operations and Investigation, which provides: "The seizing officer must mark the evidence with his initials indicating therein the date, time and place where the evidence was found/recovered or seized." Based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly PO1 Delbo, only the initials of accused-appellant and the date were inscribed on the specimens, omitting the initials of the seizing officer, time, and place of the buy-bust operation, in clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures for the conduct of its operations. PO1 Delbo marked the sachets with "MC-BB 7/21/15," "MC-P1 7/21/15" to "MC-P11 7/21/15." The initials "MC" refer to Marfy Calumpang, "BB" refers to the buy-bust operation, "P" refers to possession of illegal drugs, while "7/21/15" refers to the date of the incident. There were no initials of the seizing officer, time, and place of the buy-bust operation. While PNP Manuals are not the absolute and controlling requirement for the conduct of the first link under Section 21(1), noncompliance thereof still contributes to the uncertainties on whether the marking was properly done by the police officers involved; such uncertainties thicken the cloud of doubt surrounding the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. On the other hand, the fourth link refers to the turnover and submission of the dangerous drug from the forensic chemist to the court. In drug-related cases, it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies as to details pertinent to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination: when and from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or other things accompanied it; description of the specimen; and the container it was in. The forensic chemist must also identify the name and method of analysis used in determining the chemical composition of the subject specimens. In this case, PCI Llena did not testify in court. Instead, the parties merely entered into general stipulations on her testimony. While stipulations regarding prosecution witnesses are allowed, these stipulations must be complete and must establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. At the very least, the stipulations must state that the laboratory personnel documented the chain of custody each time a specimen is handled or transferred until the specimen is disposed. The stipulations must also specify how the seized items were handled, stored, and safeguarded pending their presentation in court. In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Caguioa pointed out that in People vs. Ubungen, the Court laid down the minimum stipulations before the testimony of the forensic chemist may be dispensed with: that it should be stipulated that the forensic chemist would have testified that he took the precautionary steps required to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item, thus: (1) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and intact; (2) that he resealed it after examination of the content; and (3) that he placed his own marking on the same to ensure that it could not be tampered pending trial. In addition, the stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic chemist should include the management, storage, and preservation of the illegal drug allegedly seized after its qualitative examination. However, the stipulations in the present case are bereft of information regarding the condition of the seized items while in PCI Llena's custody and the precautions she undertook to preserve their integrity. Absent any testimony on the management, storage, and preservation after the qualitative examination of the illegal drugs allegedly seized, this again adds doubt whether the fourth link was duly complied with. This unquestionably contributes to doubts on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. In Mallillin vs. People, the Court explained that as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Similarly, in People vs. Plaza, the Court held that even if the first three links may have been substantially complied with, the fourth link is where the Court takes issue. It has been held that there is a gap or break in the fourth link of the chain of custody where there is absence of evidence to show how the seized shabu was handled, stored, and safeguarded pending its presentation in court. In some instances, when the stipulation failed to identify who received the shabu at the crime laboratory and who exercised custody and possession before and after it was examined, the Court similarly considered that there was a gap in the chain of custody. The utter lack of details on the condition and handling of the seized drugs from the period after its examination until the same were brought to the trial court results in a gap in the chain of custody of the seized drugs, thereby casting serious doubt on the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti. In sum, accused-appellant must be acquitted because the elements of the crime of sale and possession of dangerous drugs were not established. In addition, the chain of custody rule was not properly complied with because the inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items did not follow Section 21(1). The prosecution likewise cannot benefit from the saving clause under the same law because it failed to establish justifiable reason for the noncompliance with Section 21(1), and failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved due to doubts over the first and fourth links in the chain of custody.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: In convicting accused-appellant, both the RTC and the CA relied so much on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty of the police officers and the weak defense offered by accused-appellant. However, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police officers cannot trump the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The unjustified procedural lapses committed by the arresting officers in this case militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against accused-appellant, as there is no sufficient safeguard that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had not been compromised. Thus, accused-appellant's acquittal is in order.

• Chain of Custody Rule under Section 21, R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640 — Chain of custody means the duly recorded, authorized movements and custody of the seized drugs at each stage, from the moment of confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory for examination until presentation in court. Section 21(1) consists of three parts: (1) the first part requires immediate physical inventory and photographing in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his or her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy; (2) the second part provides the place of inventory; and (3) the third part is the saving clause. The Court applied this rule and found noncompliance because the inventory did not state accused-appellant's presence, the venue was not justified, and the saving clause requisites were not met.

• Place of Inventory and Photographing in Warrantless Seizures — As a general rule, in warrantless seizures such as buy-bust operations, the physical inventory and photographing of seized drugs must be conducted at the place of seizure. The exception is when the police officers provide justification that: (1) it is not practicable to conduct the same at the place of seizure; or (2) the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger at the place of seizure. The reason must be practicable, consistent, and not merely generic or afterthought excuses, and must be indicated in the affidavits of the police officers. The Court applied this rule and held that the general invocation of "security purposes" and the conflicting explanations of PO1 Delbo and PO1 Olasiman were insufficient.

• Saving Clause under Section 21(1), R.A. No. 9165, as amended — The saving clause provides that noncompliance with the requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items. The requisites are: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. The saving clause is not a talisman that the prosecution may invoke at will. The Court applied this rule and held that neither requisite was met.

• Four Links in the Chain of Custody — The integrity of the seized illegal drugs, despite noncompliance with Section 21, requires establishing four links: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. The Court found breaks in the first and fourth links due to irregular marking and inadequate stipulations on the forensic chemist's custody.

• Uncorroborated Poseur-Buyer Testimony — Considering the gravity of the penalty for drug offenses, courts should be careful in receiving and weighing the probative value of the testimony of an alleged poseur-buyer, especially when it is not corroborated by any of his teammates in the alleged buy-bust operation. Sheer reliance on the lone testimony of an alleged poseur-buyer in convicting the accused does not satisfy the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this doctrine because the other buy-bust team members admitted they did not see the alleged sale.

• Presumption of Regularity vs. Presumption of Innocence — The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot trump the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. When the evidence against the accused does not meet the standard of proof required in criminal cases, law enforcers cannot seek shelter on the presumption of regularity to determine the guilt of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine because the unjustified procedural lapses negated the presumption of regularity.

• Marking Requirements — Marking means the apprehending officer or poseur-buyer places his or her initials and signature on the seized item. Under the 2014 Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operations and Investigation, the seizing officer must mark the evidence with his initials indicating therein the date, time, and place where the evidence was found, recovered, or seized. While PNP Manuals are not the absolute and controlling requirement for the first link under Section 21(1), noncompliance contributes to uncertainties on whether the marking was properly done. The Court applied this doctrine because PO1 Delbo's markings omitted the seizing officer's initials, time, and place.

• Elements of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession — For illegal sale, the elements are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. For illegal possession, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. In both cases, the identity of the seized drugs must be established with moral certainty. The Court found these elements not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• "Sheer reliance on the lone testimony of an alleged poseur-buyer in convicting the accused does not satisfy the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Ordiz, states the ratio for rejecting the conviction based solely on PO1 Delbo's uncorroborated testimony.
• "As current jurisprudence stand, in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and taking of photographs generally must be conducted at the place of seizure." — This passage states the general rule on the venue of inventory and photographing in warrantless seizures, which the Court applied against the prosecution.
• "The exception to this rule where the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized item may be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer or team is when the police officers provide justification that: It is not practicable to conduct the same at the place of seizure; or The items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger at the place of seizure." — This passage defines the narrow exceptions to the general rule and was applied to reject the general invocation of "security purposes."
• "Indeed, the law requires the fact that the accused, or his or her representative or counsel, was present at the conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs must be stated in the inventory." — This passage identifies a specific defect in the Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized, which did not state accused-appellant's presence during the inventory.

• People vs. Ordiz, G.R. No. 206767, September 11, 2019, 919 SCRA 149 — Cited for the rule that courts should be careful in receiving and weighing the probative value of the testimony of an alleged poseur-buyer, especially when uncorroborated by teammates, and that sheer reliance on such lone testimony does not satisfy proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Lim, 839 Phil. 598 (2018) — Cited for the guidelines on compliance with Section 21(1), including the requirement that apprehending officers state compliance or justification in sworn statements, and for the rule that immediate inventory and photographing at the place of arrest may be excused only when safety and security are threatened by immediate or extreme danger.
• People vs. Taglucop, G.R. No. 243577, March 15, 2022 — Cited for the settled rule on the place of inventory and photographing, the police officers' expertise in determining practicability, and the sufficiency of justifications such as gathering crowd, rain, and unsafe place when consistently stated in judicial affidavits.
• People vs. Musor, 842 Phil. 1159 (2018) — Cited for the rule that "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means the physical inventory and photographing must be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension, and only when not practicable may they be done at the nearest police station or office.
• People vs. Salenga, G.R. No. 239903, September 11, 2019, 919 SCRA 342 — Cited for the rule that a flimsy excuse that the crowd was getting bigger at the place of seizure is not sufficient to justify transferring the inventory to the nearest police station.
• People vs. Luna, 828 Phil. 671 (2018) — Cited for the requisites of the saving clause: justifiable grounds for noncompliance and preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
• People vs. Adobar, 832 Phil. 731 (2018) — Cited for the four links in the chain of custody that must be established to preserve the integrity of the seized illegal drugs.
• Mallillin vs. People, 576 Phil. 576 (2008) — Cited for the rule that the chain of custody rule requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be, including testimony about every link and the precautions taken to prevent change or tampering.
• People vs. Plaza, 839 Phil. 198 (2018) — Cited for the rule that a gap or break in the fourth link occurs where there is absence of evidence on how the seized shabu was handled, stored, and safeguarded pending presentation in court, or where stipulations fail to identify who received and exercised custody over the drugs.
• People vs. Ubungen, 836 Phil. 888 (2018) — Cited for the minimum stipulations before the testimony of the forensic chemist may be dispensed with: that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and intact; resealed it after examination; and placed his own marking to prevent tampering pending trial.
• People vs. Pacnisen, 842 Phil. 1185 (2018) — Cited for the reminder that in buy-bust situations or warrantless arrests, even if inventory and photographing are done at the nearest police station or office, they must still be done in the presence of the accused and the insulating witnesses.
• Tumabini vs. People, G.R. No. 224495, February 19, 2020, 933 SCRA 60 — Cited for the distinction between a search warrant and a warrantless search with regard to the venue of the physical inventory and taking of photographs.
• Valencia vs. People, 725 Phil. 268 (2014) — Cited for the rule that arresting officers are under obligation to explain why the procedure under Section 21 was not followed and to prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground.
• People vs. Acub, 853 Phil. 171 (2019) — Cited for the rule that the saving clause cannot apply where, despite blatant lapses, the prosecution did not explain the arresting officers' failure to comply with Section 21.
• People vs. Crispo, 828 Phil. 416 (2018) — Cited for the rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot trump the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 — Defines and penalizes the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The Court applied its elements and found them not established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 — Defines and penalizes the illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Court applied its elements and found them not established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Section 21(1), Article II, R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640 — Governs custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and surrendered dangerous drugs. It requires immediate physical inventory and photographing, specifies the required witnesses, provides the place of inventory, and contains the saving clause. The Court found noncompliance with its requirements.
• R.A. No. 10640 — Amended Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and took effect on August 7, 2014. Because the alleged offense was committed on July 21, 2015, the Court applied R.A. No. 10640.
• Paragraph 2.35, Section 2-6, 2014 Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operations and Investigation — Requires the seizing officer to mark the evidence with his initials indicating the date, time, and place where the evidence was found, recovered, or seized. The Court found that PO1 Delbo's markings omitted the seizing officer's initials, time, and place.
• 2021 Revised Philippine National Police Operational Procedures — Provides that for warrantless seizures like buy-bust operations, the photographing, marking, and physical inventory must be done at the place of apprehension, unless for justifiable reasons they may be made at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer or team, with the justification stated in a sworn affidavit. The Court cited this as consistent with its interpretation.
• Guidelines on the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, Section 1, A.1.5 — Provides that if the accused, his or her representative, or any insulating witness refuses to sign the inventory, the police officers may state "refused to sign" above their names in the certificate of inventory. The Court noted that the police officers failed to do so.
• Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1 (2002), Section 1(b) — Defines chain of custody as the duly recorded, authorized movements and custody of seized drugs at each stage, from seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
• Constitution, Article III, Section 14(2) — Guarantees the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The Court held that this right cannot be trumped by the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
• Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court — Cited in People vs. Lim as the basis for the court's discretion to refuse to issue a commitment order or warrant of arrest, or to dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause, when the apprehending officers fail to justify noncompliance with Section 21.

Justices Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, and Marquez concurred. Justice Leonen submitted a Separate Opinion concurring in the acquittal and emphasizing strict compliance with Section 21, the insufficiency of the uncorroborated poseur-buyer testimony, the inapplicability of the saving clause, and the rule that the presumption of regularity cannot excuse noncompliance. Justice Caguioa submitted a Concurring Opinion stressing that marking, inventory, and photographing must generally be at the place of apprehension with the insulating witnesses at or near the place of arrest, that marking and inventory are not separate events, and that failure to comply with PNP operational procedures precludes the saving clause and the presumption of regularity. Justice M. Lopez, though on leave, left his vote and submitted a Concurring Opinion concurring in the acquittal and discussing the immediacy requirement and the PNP manuals. Justice Kho, Jr. submitted a Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, summarized below. Justice Singh, though on leave, left her vote.

• Justice Kho, Jr. — He concurred in the acquittal because the fourth link of the chain of custody was not established; the stipulations on the forensic chemist's testimony lacked information on the condition, management, storage, and preservation of the seized drugs while in PCI Llena's custody. He dissented from the majority's holding that, in warrantless seizures, inventory and photographing must generally be conducted at the place of seizure. In his view, Section 21, as amended, expressly allows these acts at the nearest police station or nearest office of the apprehending officer or team, whichever is practicable, and does not establish a general rule-exception requiring justification for not using the place of seizure. He also maintained that the accused is not required to sign the inventory sheet and that an uncounseled signature is inadmissible.