People of the Philippines vs. Ludring Valdez, et al.

A conviction for murder may rest on circumstantial evidence where (a) more than one circumstance is proved, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are established, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt; and the defense of alibi cannot prevail where the accused's own testimony places him at or near the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Ludring Valdez, a cattle trader, was one of four persons charged with the killing of Eusebio Ocreto in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The prosecution's principal eyewitness was Amanda Tabion, a public school teacher who had known the victim since childhood and who testified that she recognized the accused under the moonlight. The killing occurred on January 9, 1993, before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, which amended the Revised Penal Code; the penalty for murder in this case is therefore governed by the unamended Article 248.

On January 9, 1993, at around 11:00 in the evening, Amanda Tabion, a public school teacher, was in her house in Sto. Domingo, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, when she heard a motorcycle stop in front of her house and loud voices outside. One of the voices sounded as if someone were being tortured, so Amanda went out of her house to investigate. Stepping out to the back of her house, she saw four men surrounding Eusebio Ocreto, whom she had known since childhood. Wondering what the men were up to, she hid behind a plant and watched them. Moonlight illuminated the four accused — Allan Valdez, Ludring Valdez, Itong Tabion, and Jose Taboac, Jr. — and Amanda recognized them from a distance of ten meters. Accused Ludring Valdez, who was facing Amanda, repeatedly hit Eusebio Ocreto on the head and body using large stones or boulders, while the other accused looked on. Eusebio remained lying on the ground, unmoving.

After a few seconds, Ludring Valdez stopped hitting Eusebio. Thereafter, the four accused carried the body of Eusebio on their shoulders and boarded a tricycle. They headed towards the provincial road leading to Nancayasan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Amanda returned to her house, shivering with fear. She learned the following morning that Eusebio Ocreto was missing.

On January 10, 1993, at 5:00 in the afternoon, the headless body of a man was found. It was brought immediately to the funeral parlor for autopsy. Dr. Ramon Gonzales, municipal health officer of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, conducted a postmortem examination of the body, which policemen identified as Eusebio Ocreto's. Dr. Gonzales observed that the victim sustained thirteen stab wounds at the back of the body and opined that the different sizes of the wounds showed that they might have been inflicted by two or more assailants. He was not able to determine which of the stab wounds were fatal because of the decapitation, and he was not able to examine the head of the deceased. The decapitated head of Eusebio Ocreto was discovered two days afterwards, buried one foot deep more than one hundred meters away from where the body of the victim was found; when it was dug up, it was in a state of decomposition. The place where the victim was attacked and assaulted was fifty meters away from where his head was found, and fifteen meters away from where the body was located.

Accused Ludring Valdez denied the accusations and testified that on January 9, 1993, he was at the house of Gregorio Saculles in Barangay Sto. Domingo, San Manuel, Pangasinan, where the friends of the father of the bride had gathered to celebrate the wedding of Saculles' daughter. At around 9:00 in the evening, after consuming several bottles of beer, he left the party together with Renato Rebebes, Juanito Tabion, Gil Tabion, Jose Taboac, Jr., and Allan Valdez; they rode a tricycle and parted ways at the crossing of Sto. Domingo, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Afterwards, he and his son Allan walked approximately fifty meters to their house, reaching it at around 10:00 in the evening; he went to sleep and did not leave his house thereafter. The following day, he joined Jose Taboac, Jr., Amandito Tabion, Allan Valdez, Vilma Valdez, and Remedios Romero on a tricycle to San Manuel, Pangasinan, to attend the wedding ceremony of Saculles' daughter. The ritual began at 9:00 in the morning and ended two hours later; after the ceremony they proceeded to the house of Gregorio Saculles to eat and drink more beer, and the reception ended at around 2:00 in the afternoon. They returned to Sto. Domingo, Urdaneta, Pangasinan at around 3:00 in the afternoon and stayed in the house of accused Ludring Valdez until 4:00 in the afternoon, when his friends left and he stayed home.

It was only on January 10, 1993 that Ludring Valdez learned of Eusebio Ocreto's death. He knew the deceased because they used to attend town occasions such as birthday parties, and he claimed to have had a good relationship with him, not having any misunderstanding, quarrel, or animosity with each other. He knew Amanda Tabion, who testified against him, and alleged that they were not on speaking terms even before the incident; he claimed that Amanda hated him because of his financial success in the cattle market and his meager donation of five pesos to her daughter's solicitation envelope at one time. On March 14, 1993, he went to Ilocos Sur with his son Allan Valdez because they were suspected of killing Eusebio Ocreto, and he stayed in Ilocos for several months, fearful of the threats of relatives of the deceased against his life. Accused Jose Taboac, Jr. dispensed with the presentation of his evidence and submitted the case for decision.

The trial court credited the testimony of Amanda Tabion and found that the killing was attended with cruelty because the deceased was stoned, stabbed, and beheaded, and on that basis convicted Ludring Valdez and Jose Taboac, Jr. of murder.

• Credibility of Amanda Tabion: Accused-appellant Ludring Valdez contended that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Amanda Tabion, imputing ill motive on her part against him.
• Defense of Alibi: Accused-appellant alleged that the trial court should have credited his alibi.

• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Amanda Tabion notwithstanding the ill motive imputed to her.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting accused-appellant's defense of alibi.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether circumstantial evidence sufficed to establish accused-appellant's involvement in the death of the victim.
• Qualification of the Killing: Whether the killing was attended with cruelty, qualifying it as murder rather than homicide.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant was proper.

• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: No. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded deference absent any indication that it overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion.
• Defense of Alibi: No. Alibi must be supported by proof that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed and was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The requisites of Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Evidence were satisfied, the combination of proven circumstances producing a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Qualification of the Killing: Yes. Cruelty attended the killing, the victim having been stoned, stabbed, and beheaded, which increased his suffering and caused unnecessary physical pain before death.
• Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. The crime was committed before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, and in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the medium period of the prescribed penalty applies.

• Credibility of the Prosecution Witness: The settled rule is that the Court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion. Amanda Tabion was in a position to witness the incident, considering her proximity to the scene of the crime, her familiarity with accused-appellant, and the illumination provided by the moonlight over him. Though subjected to rigorous cross-examination, she neither faltered in her positive identification of accused-appellant nor gave any statements materially inconsistent with her entire testimony. The motive imputed to her — resentment arising from accused-appellant's financial success in the cattle market and his meager five-peso donation to her daughter's solicitation envelope — was too trivial to be taken seriously. Her testimony was therefore worthy of credit.

• Defense of Alibi: For alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The distance from the house of Gregorio Saculles to the scene of the crime was only 200 meters, a distance that does not preclude accused-appellant from being at the place of the crime at the time of its commission. Moreover, accused-appellant's own alibi placed him at the scene of the crime on the date in question precisely around the time of the killing, for he admitted that he was at the crossing of Sto. Domingo, Urdaneta, Pangasinan approximately an hour before the victim's death.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Although the witness failed to see the actual killing, circumstantial evidence established accused-appellant's involvement in the death of the victim. Circumstantial evidence suffices for sustaining a conviction if the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution witness saw accused-appellant stoning the victim and later being one of the persons carrying the body of the deceased to a place nearby; the body of the deceased was found at the place where accused-appellant was on the night in question, near the place where the head of the deceased was found; accused-appellant admitted that he was in the vicinity of the crime scene on that night; and the victim was last seen alive in the company of accused-appellant. Considering the pieces of evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the person who committed the crime charged, he was held liable for the death of the victim.

• Qualification of the Killing: The trial court found that the killing was attended with cruelty because the deceased was stoned, stabbed, and beheaded, and that finding was affirmed. There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. The test is whether accused-appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering, or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. The evidence showed that the deceased was inflicted with numerous wounds before he was killed; such acts increased the victim's suffering and caused unnecessary physical pain before his death. The killing was therefore murder, not homicide.

• Penalty: The crime occurred on January 9, 1993, before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, which amended the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for murder in this case is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the medium period, or reclusion perpetua, was correctly imposed. As to damages, the amounts awarded as indemnity for the victim's death and actual damages supported by receipts were sustained; the moral damages awarded by the trial court were reduced to P50,000.00, keeping in mind that the purpose for awarding moral damages is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings.

• Deference to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility — Appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion. The Court applied the rule in sustaining the credence given to Amanda Tabion's testimony, noting her proximity to the scene, her familiarity with accused-appellant, the moonlight that illuminated him, and her unwavering positive identification under rigorous cross-examination.

• Alibi — For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (1) that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, and (2) that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The defense failed on both counts: the distance from the house of Gregorio Saculles to the scene was only 200 meters, which does not preclude presence, and accused-appellant's own testimony placed him at the crossing of Sto. Domingo approximately an hour before the victim's death.

• Circumstantial evidence — Circumstantial evidence suffices for sustaining a conviction if the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found all three requisites satisfied by the eyewitness account of the stoning and the carrying of the body, the location of the body near where the head was found and where accused-appellant had been on the night in question, accused-appellant's admission that he was in the vicinity, and the fact that the victim was last seen alive in his company.

• Cruelty as a qualifying circumstance — There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. The test is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering, or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. The numerous wounds inflicted on the deceased before he was killed increased his suffering and caused unnecessary physical pain before death, qualifying the killing as murder.

• Penalty for murder committed before Republic Act No. 7659 — Where the crime was committed before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, the prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; in the absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the medium period, or reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed. Because the killing occurred on January 9, 1993, the unamended Article 248 governed, and reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.

• Moral damages — The purpose for awarding moral damages is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings. The Court accordingly reduced the trial court's award of P200,000.00 in moral damages to P50,000.00.

• "In numerous cases, the Court has stated that it will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses, in the absence of any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion." — This states the settled standard of appellate deference to the trial court's credibility findings, which the Court applied in sustaining the credence given to the prosecution eyewitness's testimony.

• "However, for alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that he was so far away that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission." — This articulates the two-fold requisites of the defense of alibi, which the Court found unsatisfied given the short distance between the party attended and the scene and accused-appellant's own admission placing him near the locus criminis.

• "Circumstantial evidence suffices for sustaining a conviction if the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." — This is the canonical formulation of the circumstantial-evidence test under Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, which the Court applied to uphold the conviction despite the witness not having seen the actual killing.

• "There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act. The test is whether accused-appellant deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse." — This defines cruelty as a qualifying circumstance and supplies the controlling test, which the Court applied to the stoning, stabbing, and beheading of the victim to qualify the killing as murder.

• People vs. Gallardo, G.R. No. 113684, January 25, 2000 — Cited as authority for the rule that the Court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of witness credibility absent a showing that it overlooked material facts or gravely abused its discretion.
• People vs. Enolva, G.R. Nos. 131633-34, January 25, 2000 — Cited alongside Gallardo for the same rule on deference to the trial court's credibility findings.
• People vs. Jose, G.R. No. 130666, January 31, 2000 — Cited as authority for the requisites of alibi.
• People vs. Quillosa, G.R. No. 115687, February 17, 2000 — Cited alongside Jose for the requisites of alibi.
• People vs. Dando, G.R. No. 120646, February 14, 2000 — Cited alongside Jose and Quillosa for the requisites of alibi.
• People vs. Lacanieta, G.R. No. 124299, April 12, 2000 — Cited as authority for the definition of cruelty as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Basao, 310 SCRA 743 (1999) — Cited as authority for the test of cruelty: whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong or inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.
• People vs. Derilo, 338 Phil. 350 (1997) — Cited as authority for the penalty prescribed for murder committed before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659.
• People vs. Ravanes, 348 Phil. 689 (1998) — Cited alongside Derilo for the penalty for murder under the unamended Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Arinque, 347 Phil. 571, 586 (1997) — Cited as authority for the rule that moral damages are awarded to compensate the heirs for injuries to their feelings, not to enrich them.
• People vs. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643, 668 (1999) — Cited alongside Arinque for the same rule on moral damages.

• Article 248, paragraph 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. The information charged the killing under this provision, and the qualifying circumstance of cruelty brought the killing within murder rather than homicide.
• Rule 133, Section 5, Revised Rules of Evidence — Sets out the requisites of circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction: more than one circumstance, proof of the facts from which the inferences are derived, and a combination of all circumstances producing a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied these requisites in upholding the conviction.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — The amendatory law to the Revised Penal Code that had not yet taken effect when the crime was committed on January 9, 1993. Because the crime preceded its effectivity, the penalty for murder under the unamended Article 248 — reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, with reclusion perpetua as the medium period — governed.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Santiago, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, JJ.