People of the Philippines vs. Lozada

A conviction for robbery with homicide may rest on circumstantial evidence where the circumstances form an unbroken chain proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the death penalty is properly imposed when conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of a motor vehicle are proved; extrajudicial confessions not in writing and signed as required by Republic Act No. 7438 are inadmissible.

Rosita Sy owned Wilrose Drugstore in Bacolod City. Reynaldo Lozada and Geraldine Belleza, together with Ronnie Sanchez and Rey Andales (at large), were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which authorized the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The case reached the Supreme Court on review after the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty.

On the early morning of 14 October 1998, the lifeless body of Rosita Sy was found inside her car along a remote hacienda road in Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City. The post mortem examination showed that Rosita Sy had died at approximately eleven o'clock on the evening of 13 December 1998 caused by cardio-respiratory arrest, shock, hemorrhage, severe internal lacerated liver, right lobe, and ruptured heart due to a single stab wound inflicted on the right side of her body just below the ribs. Her bag, containing at least P4,000.00 cash and her ring worth P2,000.00, was missing. The police apprehended Reynaldo Lozada and Geraldine Belleza who, together with Ronnie Sanchez and Rey Andales (at large), were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The evidence for the prosecution hinged much on the testimony of Reynaldo Diaz, who recounted the events of 11 and 13 October 1998. On 11 October 1998, at about eight-thirty in the evening, Reynaldo Diaz, a trisikad driver, went to a coffee shop in front of Rizal Theater, along Luzuriaga Street, Bacolod Central Market, Bacolod City. He saw his old acquaintance Ronnie Sanchez. He and Sanchez, a taxi driver, talked for a while and in the course of their conversation, Sanchez disclosed to Diaz his plan to rob Rosita Sy, the owner of Wilrose Drugstore, later that evening. Out of curiosity, Diaz asked Sanchez how he would accomplish the scheme and who would help him carry it out. Sanchez replied that they should first wait for some friends who would be coming over to finalize the "whole thing." Sanchez then asked Diaz if he would be interested to join the group. Diaz responded in the affirmative. After a little while, Geraldine Belleza arrived, driving a white Kia Pride taxicab. Soon, Rey Andales also arrived. The two were introduced to Diaz. Later, Lozada came in at the coffee shop. Diaz immediately recognized him because he was also a trisikad driver. Sanchez approached Lozada and invited him to join in. Lozada agreed. Sanchez then discussed the plan to the group. He told them that Rosita Sy would normally leave Wilrose Drugstore around ten-thirty to eleven o'clock in the evening carrying with her a substantial sum of money. The group would wait for her on board the white Kia Pride taxi and then tail her. The moment she would reach Lopue's East, the group would bump her vehicle, drive past her and stop a few distance away from the car. Once Rosita Sy would have alighted from her car to check the damage, Sanchez was to kill her to ensure the group's anonymity. Appellants Lozada and Belleza agreed. The latter volunteered to drive the taxicab that would be used to perpetrate the crime.

When he realized that Rosita Sy would not only be robbed but also killed as well, Diaz changed his mind about joining the group. Without expressing this intention to the group he excused himself by saying that he would have to get a weapon. Purposely, he delayed his return. After an hour, he saw the group still in the coffee shop. He was informed that they failed to catch up with Rosita Sy because they had to wait for Diaz. The malefactors decided to instead pursue the plan on 13 October 1998 since it was again Belleza's turn to drive the taxicab to be used. On the night of 13 October 1998, Diaz deliberately stayed away from the designated meeting place. The following day, he heard over the radio that the lifeless body of the owner of Wilrose Drugstore was found in a remote hacienda road in Barangay Estefania. Immediately, he informed Bert Grajo, the owner of the house where he was staying about the plan hatched by Lozada, Belleza, Sanchez and Andales.

Bert Grajo testified that, upon hearing the Diaz story, he went to see team leader SPO4 Esperidion Estana of Police Station IV. At that time, however, SPO4 Estana was already at the crime scene investigating the incident. Grajo then proceeded to Wilrose Drugstore to speak with the family of Rosita Sy. Not having been able to talk to them, he just left word with one of the employees. The latter promptly called Police Station IV and told them about the "message" relayed by Grajo. SPO4 Estana narrated that he asked Grajo to bring Diaz to the police station. At the station, Diaz informed SPO4 Estana of the names and addresses of the alleged conspirators. Forthwith, SPO4 Estana organized a team that would effect the arrest of the assailants. The team, together with Diaz and Grajo, proceeded to the residence of Lozada who, upon seeing the police, tried to flee but SPO1 Jose Pahayupan was quick to collar him. SPO1 Pahayupan recovered from Lozada a black purse containing two (2) lipsticks, one (1) wallet with money, and a pawnshop receipt for the pledge of a ring later recognized to belong to the victim. The purse and wallet were identified to be those of the victim by the latter's daughter. SPO2 Johnny Herboso testified that at the police station, Lozada confessed to him his participation in the robbery. Lozada gave the names and addresses of Belleza, Sanchez and Andales.

On 15 October 1998, appellant Belleza was apprehended by members of the City Director Squad. He was turned over to Police Station IV. Belleza admitted before SPO4 Estana that he was the one who drove the white Kia Pride taxicab when they robbed and killed Rosita Sy. He named appellant Lozada, Andales, and Sanchez as his cohorts in committing the crime. He led the police to the place where he hid the keys and bag of Rosita Sy. Lucia Caballero testified (at rebuttal) that she was the owner of the Kia Pride Taxi driven by Belleza. She confirmed that it was Belleza who was the assigned driver of the taxicab on 13 October 1998. The following day, Belleza returned the taxicab, reporting to its owner that the left front light of the vehicle had been hit and damaged by an "insane person."

The defense was one of denial coupled with alibi. Reynaldo Lozada claimed that at around six o'clock on the afternoon of 13 October 1998, he was at home cooking supper. He did not report for work that day because it was his rest day. He slept at about nine o'clock in the evening. When he woke up the following day, he was not feeling well so he decided not to go to work as well. At five o'clock in the afternoon, two policemen arrived at his house and, without any warrant, arrested and subsequently searched him. Nothing was found in his possession except his belt with a buckle knife. In jail, he met for the first time his co-accused Belleza. He was maltreated by the police and, out of fear, he admitted his participation in the crime. Geraldine Belleza, for his part, maintained that on the evening of 13 October 1998, he was on duty as a barangay tanod, roving with the purok president of Greensville Subdivision, the areas of Estefania, Greensville I and Camingawan proper. In the morning of the following day, he went to Talisay to gather sea crabs and thereafter spent the rest of the day with his wife and children. On 15 October 1998, his uncle Walter Nepomuceno, a member of the Talisay police, informed him that the authorities in Bacolod City were looking for him about the Rosita Sy rob-slay. Since he had nothing to do with the crime, he willingly submitted himself for investigation. He denied knowing his co-accused and surrendering a lady's bag and a bunch of keys to the police. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of Lozada and Belleza beyond reasonable doubt for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

• Warrantless Arrest: Appellant Lozada argued that the trial court erred in not finding his warrantless arrest to be unlawful.
• Warrantless Search: Appellant Lozada argued that the trial court erred in not declaring as unconstitutional the search conducted on his person and in not holding the items seized from him inadmissible in evidence.
• Extrajudicial Confession: Appellant Lozada argued that the trial court erred in allowing the use of his alleged extra-judicial confession against him.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Appellant Lozada argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Appellant Belleza argued that the trial court erred in convicting him on the mere basis of circumstantial evidence.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: The Solicitor General maintained that the warrantless arrest was valid under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: Whether the trial court erred in not finding Lozada's warrantless arrest to be unlawful.
• Validity of Warrantless Search: Whether the trial court erred in not declaring the search conducted on Lozada's person unconstitutional and the items seized from him inadmissible in evidence.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the trial court erred in allowing the use of Lozada's alleged extra-judicial confession against him.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Belleza on the mere basis of circumstantial evidence.
• Guilt and Conspiracy: Whether appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and whether conspiracy attended its commission.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: Whether the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of a motor vehicle were proved and whether the death penalty was correctly imposed.
• Damages: Whether the damages awarded to the heirs of the victim should be modified.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: No. The arrest was valid under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure because the police had probable cause based on personal knowledge of facts from their investigation; any objection was in any event waived for failure to raise it at or before arraignment.
• Validity of Warrantless Search: No. The search on Lozada was incident to a lawful arrest; Belleza waived his right against a warrantless search by voluntarily disclosing where he hid the victim's keys and bag.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Yes. The trial court erred in allowing their use; Republic Act No. 7438 requires an extrajudicial confession to be in writing and signed by the person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, and the supposed confessions were merely recounted by investigating officers.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No. Conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence satisfying the requisites of Rule 133, Section 4; the circumstances formed an unbroken chain proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Guilt and Conspiracy: Yes. The elements of robbery with homicide and conspiracy were proved beyond reasonable doubt; the act of one conspirator may be imputed to all.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: Yes. Evident premeditation and use of a motor vehicle were alleged and proved; the death penalty was correctly imposed under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
• Damages: Modified. The heirs were awarded P75,000.00 civil indemnity, P87,303.70 actual damages, P50,000.00 moral damages, and P25,000.00 exemplary damages.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest: Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested committed it. Personal knowledge is based on probable cause, meaning an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion founded on facts sufficiently strong to create a probable cause of guilt. The police had facts from their investigation, including Diaz's disclosure of how the plan to commit the offense was hatched, giving sufficient and reasonable grounds to suspect appellants. Even assuming error, any objection to an arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused's person must be made at or before arraignment; otherwise it is waived. Appellants pleaded not guilty and participated in trial without questioning the legality of their arrest. People vs. Tonog, Jr. and People vs. Gallarde were cited.
• Validity of Warrantless Search: The search conducted on Lozada was an incident to the arrest and should be upheld. Belleza, on the other hand, waived his right against a warrantless search when he voluntarily disclosed where he hid the keys and the bag of Rosita Sy and where the items were recovered.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The extrajudicial confessions made by Lozada and Belleza were inadmissible in evidence. Republic Act No. 7438 requires an extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation to be in writing and signed by such person; otherwise it is inadmissible. The supposed confessions were merely recounted on the witness stand by the investigating officers, not written and signed as required.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: While there may be no eyewitnesses to a crime, conviction could still be reached on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence included Diaz's testimony detailing the plan to rob and kill the victim and how it was to be carried out; the discovery of the victim's body at the place where it was expected to be; the recovery of the victim's purse, lipsticks, wallet, and pawnshop receipt from Lozada; the recovery of the victim's black bag and keys at the place disclosed by Belleza; the testimony of the taxicab owner that Belleza was the assigned driver on the day of the crime; and the return of the taxicab with a damaged front headlight and a lame excuse. These circumstances constituted an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding appellants responsible. The recovery of the loot gave rise to the legal presumption of guilt, and the absence of an explanation of how appellants came into possession of the victim's personal effects gave rise to a reasonable presumption that they could have been the authors of the crime. Denial and alibi are weak defenses and cannot prevail over credible evidence, particularly when they do not demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the place and time of the offense.
• Guilt and Conspiracy: The taking with animo lucrandi of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or using force upon things constitutes robbery, and the complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, someone is killed. All these elements were satisfactorily shown by the prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decide to commit it. The prosecution narrated in detail how appellants and their co-accused agreed to a common design to rob and kill the victim. The subsequent discovery of the victim's lifeless body and the recovery of the victim's belongings in the possession of appellants confirmed the execution of the plan. Where conspiracy is shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each accused becomes secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators. In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is not necessary to identify who among the conspirators inflicted the stab wound on the victim.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Penalty: The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of a motor vehicle were both alleged and proved. Where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberations and selection of method, time, and means of executing the crime, evident premeditation can be considered. Its elements are: (1) the time when the offenders determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offenders clung to their determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to allow the offenders to reflect upon the consequences of the act. The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to facilitate escape. Appellants used a taxicab to tail the victim in her car, bump her vehicle, drive past her, and eventually rob and kill her. Under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, any person guilty of robbery with homicide shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of a motor vehicle, the death penalty was correctly imposed.
• Damages: The P50,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim was increased to P75,000.00 considering that the crime was committed under circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty. The award of P200,000.00 moral damages was lowered to P50,000.00, in keeping with prevailing jurisprudence. Apart from the actual damages in the amount of P87,303.70, duly supported by receipts, the heirs of the victim were also entitled to P25,000.00 exemplary damages in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime.

• Warrantless Arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 — A peace officer or private person may arrest without warrant when an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested committed it. Personal knowledge is based on probable cause, or reasonable grounds of suspicion founded on facts sufficiently strong to create a probable cause of guilt. The Court applied this to uphold the arrest because the police had facts from their investigation, including Diaz's disclosure.
• Waiver of Objection to Illegal Arrest — Any objection to an arrest or to the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused's person must be raised at or before arraignment; otherwise it is waived. Appellants pleaded not guilty and participated in trial without questioning the arrest, so they could no longer impugn its validity.
• Search Incident to Lawful Arrest — A search conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest is valid. The search on Lozada was upheld on this ground. Belleza separately waived his right against a warrantless search by voluntarily disclosing where he hid the victim's keys and bag.
• Extrajudicial Confession under Republic Act No. 7438 — An extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation must be in writing and signed by such person; otherwise it is inadmissible in evidence. The Court held the confessions of Lozada and Belleza inadmissible because they were merely recounted by investigating officers and not reduced to writing and signed as required.
• Circumstantial Evidence — Conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the circumstances formed an unbroken chain proving appellants' guilt.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where conspiracy is shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each accused becomes secondary, and the act of one may be imputed to all conspirators. The Court found conspiracy from the detailed plan to rob and kill the victim and its execution.
• Robbery with Homicide — Robbery is the taking, with animo lucrandi, of personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or using force upon things. The complex crime of robbery with homicide arises when, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, someone is killed. All elements were satisfactorily shown.
• Evident Premeditation — Where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of attendant deliberations and selection of method, time, and means of executing the crime, evident premeditation can be considered. Its elements are: (1) the time when the offenders determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination; and (3) a lapse of time between determination and execution sufficient to allow them to reflect on the consequences. The Court found these elements evident from the planned robbery and killing.
• Use of Motor Vehicle as Aggravating Circumstance — The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to facilitate escape. Appellants used a taxicab to tail the victim, bump her vehicle, drive past her, and eventually rob and kill her.
• Presumption from Recovery of Loot — The recovery of loot from the accused at the time of arrest gives rise to a legal presumption of guilt; the absence of an explanation of how they came into possession of the victim's personal effects gives rise to a reasonable presumption that they could have been the authors of the crime. The Court applied this to Lozada's possession of the victim's purse, wallet, lipsticks, and pawnshop receipt.
• Denial and Alibi — Denial and alibi are weak defenses and cannot prevail over credible evidence, particularly when they do not demonstrate the physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the place and time of the offense. The Court rejected appellants' defenses.

• "The extra-judicial confessions made by appellants Lozada and Belleza, however, are inadmissible in evidence. The supposed confessions have merely been recounted on the witness stand by the investigating officers. Republic Act No. 7438 requires an extra-judicial confession made by the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation to be in writing and signed by such person; otherwise, it shall be inadmissible in evidence." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confessions and the statutory requirement under Republic Act No. 7438.
• "While there may be no eyewitnesses to a crime, conviction could still be reached on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage defines the requisites for circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• "The circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to the reasonable conclusion that the trial court could not have erred in finding appellants to have been the responsible culprits." — This passage applies the circumstantial-evidence doctrine to the facts and explains why the conviction was sustained.
• "Where conspiracy is shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each accused becomes secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators." — This passage states the canonical rule on conspiracy and imputation of criminal liability among conspirators.

• People vs. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 94533, 4 February 1992, 205 SCRA 772 — Cited to uphold a warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 133 of the 1985 Rules because the arresting officer had knowledge of facts gathered personally in the course of investigation indicating that the accused was one of the perpetrators.
• People vs. Gallarde, 382 Phil 718 — Cited for the rule that objection to an illegal arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the accused's person must be raised at or before arraignment; otherwise it is waived.
• People vs. Mantung, G.R. No. 130372, 20 July 1999, 310 SCRA 819 — Cited in connection with robbery with homicide and the legal presumption arising from recovery of loot.
• People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 120642, 02 July 1999, 309 SCRA 622 — Cited for the rule that where conspiracy is shown, the precise modality or extent of participation of each accused becomes secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all conspirators.
• People vs. Conde, G.R. No. 133647, 12 April 2000, 330 SCRA 645 — Cited for the rule that in robbery with homicide, it is not necessary to identify who among the conspirators inflicted the stab wound.
• People vs. Timbang, 74 Phil 295; U.S. vs. Cornejo, 28 Phil 457 — Cited for the rule that where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of attendant deliberations and selection of method, time, and means, evident premeditation can be considered.
• People vs. Gatchalian, G.R. No. 90301, 10 December 1998, 300 SCRA 1; People vs. Manalili, G.R. No. 121671, 14 August 1998, 294 SCRA 220 — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Cuadra, No. L-27973, 23 October 1978, 85 SCRA 576 — Cited for the rule that use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when used to commit the crime or facilitate escape.
• People vs. Lobitania, G.R. No. 142380, 4 September 2002; People vs. Ballenas, G.R. No. 124299, 12 April 2000, 330 SCRA 519 — Cited to support the increase of civil indemnity to P75,000.00.
• People vs. Paraiso, G.R. No. 127840, 29 November 1999, 319 SCRA 422; People vs. Cayago, G.R. No. 128827, 18 August 1999, 312 SCRA 623 — Cited to support the lowering of moral damages to P50,000.00.
• People vs. Echegaray, G.R. No. 117472, 07 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682 — Cited as the source of separate opinions maintaining that Republic Act No. 7659's death penalty is unconstitutional, to which three justices adhered while submitting to the majority.

• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines robbery with homicide and imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied it to affirm the death penalty.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy. The Court applied it to hold that the agreement to rob and kill and the execution of the plan established conspiracy.
• Article 2230, New Civil Code — Basis for exemplary damages. The Court awarded P25,000.00 exemplary damages due to the presence of aggravating circumstances.
• Section 5(b), Rule 113, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Permits warrantless arrest when an offense has just been committed and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested committed it. The Court applied it to uphold the arrest.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets the requisites for circumstantial evidence. The Court applied it to sustain the conviction.
• Republic Act No. 7438, Section 2 — Requires an extrajudicial confession to be in writing and signed by the person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation; otherwise it is inadmissible. The Court applied it to exclude the confessions.
• Section 25, Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83, Revised Penal Code — Requires forwarding certified true copies of the decision and records to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power upon finality. The Court ordered this in the dispositive portion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., were on leave. The decision notes that three justices maintained their adherence to separate opinions in People vs. Echegaray that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional, but submitted to the majority ruling that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed.