People of the Philippines vs. Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche

A conviction for murder and frustrated murder stands where the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, after deliberately entering the victims’ dwelling under a pretext, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed them, thereby employing treachery and committing the crimes in the victims’ dwelling; the information sufficiently alleges treachery by specifying the attendant circumstance, and evident premeditation is appreciated only for the victim who was the object of the preconceived plan, not for the unexpected intervening victim.

Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche had been employed as a messenger in the law firm of Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde. He was dismissed upon the recommendation of Pelagio’s secretary, who reported that dela Cruz had been absent without leave at least three times. Pelagio and Juliana Ricalde were husband and wife, and Rebecca R. Ricalde was their 19-year-old daughter; the family resided at Cinco Hermanos Subdivision, Marikina City.

On November 20, 1999, around 10:00 a.m., Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche went to the Cinco Hermanos Subdivision in Marikina City. He presented an I.D. bearing the name Allan B. Reyes to Sgt. Robert D. Esgana, the guard-on-duty at Gate 3, who recorded the entry in his logbook. Dela Cruz proceeded to the house of Pelagio Ricalde. Rebecca Ricalde, Pelagio’s 19-year-old daughter, met him at the gate; he told her that her father had told him to go there. He entered through the small gate in the garage that was already opened, and Rebecca walked ahead of him to fetch her father. When the father and daughter returned, dela Cruz was already in the kitchen. According to Rebecca, she first heard the two converse quietly as dela Cruz asked her father for a job recommendation. She noticed dela Cruz’s blue backpack. Suddenly, she heard her father scream, “Becca, tulungan mo ako.” She screamed, “Daddy, Daddy,” as she ran towards him, and noticed dela Cruz holding a knife. She screamed for help and saw her mother, Juliana, rushing in. Her father was covered with blood, and she sought help to rush him to the hospital.

According to Pelagio, dela Cruz was a messenger in his law firm who got fired based on his secretary’s recommendation that dela Cruz had been absent without leave at least three times. This information was corroborated by Priscila M. Dimaano, Pelagio’s secretary. When his daughter informed him that dela Cruz wanted to talk to him, he met with dela Cruz, who was by then already in their kitchen. He told dela Cruz that he did not have his stationery with letterhead and had to still check with the companies he knew which had vacancies. He said that he would write dela Cruz a recommendation letter which the latter could pick up from the office. As he escorted dela Cruz out towards the garage gate, dela Cruz suddenly stabbed him at the back and kept on stabbing him until he lost his balance. When he managed to turn and face dela Cruz, the latter kept on stabbing him frontally. He tried to put his arms around dela Cruz, but his attacker shook him off. As he ran towards the kitchen, dela Cruz chased and kept on stabbing him at the back of his left shoulder. At this point, Juliana appeared and rushed to him begging, “Leo, tama na, tama na, tama na.” Dela Cruz dropped the knife and ran towards the garage.

As Juliana was attending to her husband, dela Cruz suddenly reappeared and stabbed her at the back with a letter opener. As she jerked backward, she received another stab below the left shoulder. She tried to ward off the letter opener with her left hand, but again was stabbed at the back of her left arm. Pelagio shouted, “Huwag Leo, si Julie yan.” When the letter opener broke, dela Cruz dropped the instrument and rushed outside where he was apprehended by Godofredo E. Meriel, the guard-on-duty at Gate 1.

Meriel, SPO4 Conrado J. Cruz, and SPO4 Jaime E. Gamueda all identified dela Cruz as the person who was arrested in connection with the incident in the Ricalde residence. SPO4 Gamueda, who recovered the weapons used in the stabbing, identified the same in court. SPO4 Celso J. Cruz, the evidence custodian of the Marikina Police, identified the kitchen knife and the letter opener, one bloodied yellow and blue backpack, one striped blue and white t-shirt with the word MAUI printed on it with the initials “J.G.,” and one khaki pants marked Geraldo Jelleni with initials “J.G.” Dr. Bu C. Castro, medico-legal officer of St. Luke’s Medical Center, examined and described the wounds of Pelagio. He said that the first and second wounds of Pelagio could have been fatal were they not timely treated; that the knife was made of aluminum softer than Pelagio’s bone and was bent as it hit the bone; and that Pelagio also sustained multiple bruises in the body. Dr. Noel B. Minay, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the post-mortem on Juliana. He described eight stab wounds inflicted on Juliana, and said the first wound caused her internal bleeding that proved fatal. All the wounds were inflicted by a pointed instrument with one-sided blade. Three of them were inflicted on her back. Forensic chemist Aida V. Magsipoc testified that the DNA profile of the bloodstain on the backpack and on the khaki pants, which were presented in evidence, matched the DNA profile of Pelagio although the stains in the t-shirt did not.

Dela Cruz denied the accusations against him. He admitted that he went to the Ricalde residence to ask for a job recommendation from Pelagio upon Pelagio’s instruction, which Pelagio denied. Dela Cruz said he traveled one and a half hours and took three rides to get there. He presented his I.D. card to the guard-on-duty and saw the guard make an entry in the logbook. He said he was frisked and his bag was inspected. He claimed that he was frequently at the Ricalde residence and had at times, when the owners were abroad, slept there and watched the place for them. According to him, when Rebecca led him in and when Pelagio saw him, Pelagio was red-eyed and was furious when he reminded Pelagio that it was the latter who had told him to be there. At this juncture, Pelagio shouted at him, “Shit, bullshit, putang ina,” then shoved him towards the garage gate. Still furious, Pelagio continued shouting, “Tang-ina mo, wala akong kakilalang Leo.” Dela Cruz recalled that as he was leaving, Pelagio was blocking the gate so he just stared back. Then, Pelagio grabbed a kitchen knife in the nearby sink, three steps away from the gate. Pelagio was about to stab him so he grabbed the knife and stood up. As Pelagio was still blocking his exit, he saw Juliana hand a knife to Pelagio. It appeared to him that Pelagio was in a daze and did not recognize anyone. Pelagio tried to stab him but started hitting Juliana instead. According to dela Cruz, Pelagio stopped only when Juliana dropped to her knees. He saw Pelagio embrace Juliana. Then, dela Cruz added, he rushed outside where he was apprehended and brought to the Marikina Police Station. He said he did not know how Pelagio got his wounds and how the knife was bent as he was busy grappling for the knife. During rebuttal, Rebecca testified that there was no sink in the garage, disputing dela Cruz’s story that Pelagio got the knife from there. She said that the sink was located in the generator/engine room that could be accessed through a door with an iron shutter that was always locked. This information was corroborated by SPO4 Gamueda. Dr. Rocco B. Paragas, resident surgeon at the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center, treated dela Cruz. He testified that dela Cruz had contusions on the right hand and left thigh and had wounds on the fifth digit of the right hand. The wounds were probably caused by a sharp object like a knife. They could also be defense wounds. The hematomas on the hand and on the left thigh were probably caused by hitting a blunt object or falling hard atop a hard object. He first explained that it was improbable for dela Cruz to have the incise wounds in the fifth digit of the right hand, considering the relative positions of the protagonists as they grappled for the knife, but did not rule out the possibility that the incise wounds were sustained if dela Cruz’s fingers slipped towards the knife, as he was being stabbed by the attacker or when while holding the knife, he hit a hard object.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed on the facts surrounding the attack. Pelagio’s testimony was found credible, unwavering, and consistent, and his categorical identification of appellant as the assailant was corroborated by Rebecca’s testimony and the medical findings of Dr. Castro and Dr. Minay. The defense’s account that Pelagio suddenly attacked appellant and accidentally hit Juliana was found improbable, and appellant’s claim that Pelagio obtained a knife from a nearby sink was contradicted by Rebecca and SPO4 Gamueda.

• Burden of Proof and Presumption of Innocence: Petitioner argued that in criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution and that unless there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, the constitutional presumption of innocence applies; the prosecution allegedly failed to satisfy this burden.
• Treachery: Petitioner contended that treachery was not present; the informations did not allege treachery with specificity, so it could only be a generic aggravating circumstance and he should only be charged with homicide and frustrated homicide; his wounds showed that Pelagio resisted his attack; and the alleged attack on Juliana was an afterthought since Juliana saw the danger to her life.

• Proof of Guilt: Respondent submitted that appellant’s guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: Respondent insisted that treachery was present because Pelagio was totally caught off-guard by appellant’s sudden attack, and because the attack on Juliana was so sudden that it was impossible for her to defend herself.
• Evident Premeditation: Respondent claimed that evident premeditation was present since appellant planned the death of the victims as reflected in the following circumstances: (1) he traveled one and a half hours to reach the Ricalde residence; (2) he presented a fake I.D. upon entering the subdivision; and (3) he was armed with a knife and a letter opener when he went there; despite sufficient time for reflection, appellant went on with his criminal plan.
• Dwelling: Respondent contended that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was present because the crimes were committed in the house of the victims, who had not provoked appellant.
• Sufficiency of Informations: Respondent contended that the informations specifically alleged the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and dwelling, citing People vs. Aquino for the rule that the words “aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” “qualified by,” “aggravating,” or “aggravated by” need not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the information.

• Proof of Guilt: Whether the prosecution proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the commission of the crimes and was sufficiently alleged in the informations to qualify them as murder and frustrated murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes.
• Dwelling: Whether dwelling attended the commission of the crimes.
• Penalty and Monetary Awards: Whether the penalties and monetary awards should be modified in light of Republic Act No. 9346 and current jurisprudence.

• Proof of Guilt: Yes. Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt through positive identification, credible testimony, and corroborating medical evidence; the defense was improbable and contradicted by the evidence.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery attended both crimes because the suddenness of the attacks ensured their commission and deprived the victims of any opportunity to defend themselves; the informations sufficiently alleged the attendant circumstances despite not using the word “qualifying.”
• Evident Premeditation: Yes as to Pelagio; No as to Juliana. Only the attack on Pelagio was evidently premeditated; the assault on Juliana lacked the required sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution.
• Dwelling: Yes. The crimes were committed in the victims’ domicile, and the garage where the incidents took place is an integral part of the residence.
• Penalty and Monetary Awards: Modified. The death penalty for murder was reduced to reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole under Republic Act No. 9346; the indeterminate sentence for frustrated murder was affirmed; and the monetary awards were adjusted as ordered.

• Proof of Guilt: The prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the constitutional presumption of innocence applies unless that burden is satisfied. The Court found Pelagio’s testimony to the minutest detail and his categorical identification of appellant as the assailant credible, unwavering, and consistent. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed on the facts surrounding the attack. Positive identification made with moral certainty suffices to convict the accused. The testimony concerning Juliana’s death and Pelagio’s near death acquired greater weight because it was supported by the testimonies and medical findings of Dr. Castro and Dr. Minay. Appellant’s defense suggesting that Pelagio, for no motive or reason at all, would suddenly harm and violently kill his wife was highly improbable. Pelagio’s testimony was corroborated by Rebecca, who heard her father’s cry for help and saw dela Cruz with a knife. Appellant’s testimony that Pelagio got a knife from a nearby sink was contradicted by Rebecca, who testified that the sink was in the generator/engine room, not the garage, and her testimony was corroborated by a police officer who had no reason to lie. Testimonial evidence, to be credible, should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be credible in itself, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.

• Treachery: Treachery was present because the suddenness of appellant’s attack on the victims ensured the commission of the crimes, giving no opportunity for Pelagio and Juliana to defend themselves. At the time of the attack, Pelagio was talking with appellant on the way out and did not have the slightest idea he was going to be stabbed. Treachery also accompanied the death of Juliana. Juliana was by her fallen husband when appellant reappeared with a letter opener; the attack on her was instantaneous, and she was not ready to fight back, thinking appellant had left. In People vs. Vallespin, even if the victim is warned of the danger to her person, treachery may still be appreciated as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend herself or to retaliate. Appellant’s contention that the informations failed to allege treachery with specificity was rejected. The informations sufficiently apprised appellant of the nature of the charges against him, i.e., that treachery, evident premeditation, and dwelling attended the killing of Juliana and the attack on Pelagio. It is not the use of the words “qualifying” or “qualified by” that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category. When treachery is present, an allegation of abuse of superior strength can no longer be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance. The same holds true with the circumstance of disregard of the respect on account of rank, age, or sex, which in this case could not be aggravating. The Court also found that disguise, fraud, or craft did not attend the commission of the crimes, and that there was no intellectual trickery nor cunning resorted to by appellant to lure his victims into a trap and conceal his identity.

• Evident Premeditation: To prove evident premeditation, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to such determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act. Only the attack on Pelagio was evidently premeditated. As testified to by Rebecca, she had never before the incident seen the knife used by appellant in their home. Pelagio and his secretary also testified that the letter opener had been missing from the law firm after appellant was dismissed from employment. These uncontroverted testimonies constituted direct evidence of appellant’s preconceived plan against Pelagio. Despite the one and a half hours travel time for reflection, appellant still clung to his criminal plan against Pelagio. On the other hand, Juliana’s arrival to help her husband was unexpected. When Juliana rushed to her wounded husband and begged appellant to stop, appellant left, but suddenly reappeared with a letter opener and stabbed Juliana at the back. Appellant’s momentarily leaving the scene did not give him enough opportunity to fully contemplate on his resolution to kill Juliana. The requirement in evident premeditation of sufficiency of time between the criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent affords such opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and consequences of what appellant had planned to do, an interval long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme. In the stabbing of Juliana, this element was wanting.

• Dwelling: Dwelling aggravated the commission of the crimes. Appellant’s greater perversity was revealed when he deliberately entered the victims’ domicile at the pretext of soliciting help from its owners. The garage, where the incidents took place, is undoubtedly an integral part of the victims’ residence.

• Penalty and Monetary Awards: In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, the proper imposable penalty for murder was death. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, applying Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Articles 50, 61, paragraph 2, and 64, paragraphs 3 and 6, the appellate court’s sentence of an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum was affirmed. As to monetary awards, in Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, civil indemnity is mandatory and was modified from ₱50,000 to ₱75,000 to conform with current jurisprudence. Because the prosecution failed to present receipts or other evidence to substantiate actual damages, actual damages could not be awarded; nonetheless, in lieu of actual damages, the heirs of Juliana Ricalde may be awarded temperate damages of ₱25,000, in accordance with current jurisprudence, as it was shown that the family incurred burial and funeral expenses, although the amount could not be proved with certainty. Moral damages were reduced from ₱200,000 to ₱50,000 to conform with current jurisprudence, as moral damages are imposed to compensate the heirs for injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. Exemplary damages of ₱25,000 were properly imposed to serve as an example and deterrent to future similar transgressions; under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Compensation for loss of earning capacity was also proper under Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code. At the time of her death, Juliana was 46 years old and was receiving ₱215,388 per annum as an Associate Professor I with a salary grade of 22 at the University of the Philippines. Applying the formula “Net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living expenses)],” and pegging reasonable and necessary living expenses at 50 percent of earnings in the absence of contrary evidence, the Court arrived at a loss of earning capacity of ₱2,441,064. In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, for the frustrated murder of Pelagio Ricalde, an award of ₱30,000 as civil indemnity was granted without proof other than the commission of the crime and the culprit’s liability therefor. In addition, an award of moral damages of ₱50,000 was proper for the suffering endured by the victim from appellant’s criminal acts.

• Treachery (alevosia) — Treachery was appreciated because the suddenness of appellant’s attack on the victims ensured the commission of the crimes, giving no opportunity for Pelagio and Juliana to defend themselves. The attack on Pelagio was sudden while he was talking with appellant on the way out; the attack on Juliana was instantaneous when appellant reappeared with a letter opener after she thought he had left. Even if the victim is warned of the danger to her person, treachery may still be appreciated as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend herself or to retaliate. When treachery is present, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance.
• Evident premeditation — To prove evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove the confluence of: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to such determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act. The Court found these elements only as to the attack on Pelagio, not as to Juliana, because Juliana’s arrival was unexpected and appellant’s momentary leaving did not give him enough opportunity to fully contemplate his resolution to kill her.
• Dwelling as aggravating circumstance — Dwelling aggravated the commission of the crimes because appellant deliberately entered the victims’ domicile at the pretext of soliciting help from its owners. The garage where the incidents took place is an integral part of the victims’ residence.
• Sufficiency of allegation of attendant circumstances — It is not the use of the words “qualifying” or “qualified by” that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category. The informations sufficiently apprised appellant of the charges because they specifically alleged treachery, evident premeditation, and dwelling.
• Frustrated felony — Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The attack on Pelagio constituted frustrated murder because appellant performed all acts of execution that could have claimed Pelagio’s life, but Pelagio survived due to prompt medical intervention, a cause independent of appellant’s will.
• Death penalty reduction under Republic Act No. 9346 — Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. The proper imposable penalty for murder would have been death, but the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
• Civil liability and damages — Civil indemnity is mandatory and must be granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. In lieu of actual damages, temperate damages may be awarded when burial and funeral expenses are shown but the amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moral damages compensate the heirs for injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them. Exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Loss of earning capacity is recoverable under Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, using the formula “Net earning capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living expenses)],” with reasonable and necessary living expenses pegged at 50 percent of earnings in the absence of contrary evidence.

• “It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category.” — This states the ratio for rejecting appellant’s claim that the informations failed to allege treachery with specificity; it defines the controlling rule on sufficiency of allegations of qualifying circumstances.
• “To prove evident premeditation, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to such determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act.” — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the elements of evident premeditation, applied to hold that only the attack on Pelagio was evidently premeditated.
• “In People v. Vallespin, we ruled that even if the victim is warned of the danger to her person, treachery may still be appreciated as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend herself or to retaliate.” — This passage supports the finding of treachery as to Juliana despite the possibility that she saw the danger to her life.
• “The garage, where the incidents took place, is undoubtedly an integral part of the victims’ residence.” — This passage grounds the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, as the crimes were committed within the victims’ domicile.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Cited as the procedural basis for transferring the cases to the Court of Appeals for review.
• People vs. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 144340-42, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 391 — Cited by the Office of the Solicitor General for the rule that the words “aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” “qualified by,” “aggravating,” or “aggravated by” need not be expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the information.
• People vs. Vallespin, G.R. No. 132030, October 18, 2002, 391 SCRA 213 — Followed for the rule that even if the victim is warned of the danger to her person, treachery may still be appreciated as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend herself or to retaliate.
• People vs. Demate, G.R. Nos. 132310 & 143968-69, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 229 — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363, 369 (1929) — Cited for the requirement of sufficiency of time between the criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent.
• People vs. Garin, G.R. No. 139069, June 17, 2004, 432 SCRA 394 — Cited for the rule that it is the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance, not the use of the word “qualifying,” that raises a crime to a higher category.
• People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 130531, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 330 — Cited for the rule that when treachery is present, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Lapan, G.R. No. 88300, July 6, 1992, 211 SCRA 337 — Cited in relation to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
• People vs. Maguing, G.R. No. 144090, June 26, 2003, 405 SCRA 71 — Cited for the rule that positive identification made with moral certainty suffices to convict the accused.
• People vs. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 727 — Cited for the reduction of the death penalty under Republic Act No. 9346 and for the proper monetary awards.
• People vs. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 535 — Cited for pegging reasonable and necessary living expenses at 50 percent of earnings in the absence of contrary evidence.
• People vs. Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 692 — Cited for the award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 — Defines murder and its penalties, including the attendant circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Applied to qualify the killing of Juliana to murder and the attack on Pelagio to frustrated murder.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines a frustrated felony as one where the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Applied to the attack on Pelagio, who survived due to prompt medical intervention.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Applied to the frustrated murder of Pelagio.
• Article 61, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for graduating penalties when the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent. Applied in determining the penalty for frustrated murder.
• Article 64, paragraphs 3 and 6, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods, including that when only an aggravating circumstance is present, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, and that courts shall not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law in its maximum period. Applied to the indeterminate sentence for frustrated murder.
• Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. Applied to reduce the death penalty for murder to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
• Article 2206(1), Civil Code — Makes the defendant liable for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, with indemnity paid to the heirs. Applied to award ₱2,441,064 to the heirs of Juliana Ricalde.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Allows exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Applied to impose ₱25,000 as exemplary damages.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno; Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Cancio C. Garcia, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and Renato C. Corona are marked “On leave.”