People of the Philippines vs. Leonito Macagaling y Atillano

In a prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm under P.D. No. 1866, the lack of a license or permit is an essential negative ingredient that the prosecution must prove; a conviction cannot rest on a police witness’s bare, undocumented conclusion and an insufficiently identified firearm. The decision also reaffirmed that an accused who admits killing but invokes self-defense bears the burden of proving self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.

Leonito Macagaling y Atillano was charged in three consolidated criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, arising from the deaths of Dennis Macagaling, his nephew, and Teotimo Fameronag, and from the alleged possession of a .38 caliber revolver and ammunition. The killings were prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code, while the firearm charge was prosecuted under Presidential Decree No. 1866. The Rules of Court governed the burden of proving the negative allegation that Macagaling possessed the firearm without legal authority. The cases were jointly tried under the continuous trial system.

On May 2, 1991, the barangay fiesta of Calabasahan, Concepcion, Romblon, included a coronation ball at the public plaza. Among those present were Antonieto Fabella, barangay captain of San Pedro and brother-in-law of Dennis Macagaling; Anita Macagaling, Dennis’s mother; Pfc. Roque Fesalbon, investigator of the local police station; and Roger Lacambra, stepson of Teotimo Fameronag. At about 10:00 P.M., Fabella saw Leonito Macagaling point and fire a gun at his own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. The bullet missed Dennis but wounded Teotimo Fameronag on the right chest, causing him to collapse in front of Dennis. Dennis tried to escape by running away.

Anita saw Dennis running in a wobbly manner and embraced him to prevent him from falling. Leonito grabbed Dennis’s hair, yanked his head, and pulled him away from his mother. Anita pleaded, “Don’t, Leonito,” but Leonito pointed the gun at Dennis’s temple and shot him point-blank. Dennis fell down (“sumubasob”) on the cement floor. Leonito then shot the prostrate Dennis three times successively on the neck, uttering “Putang ina mo,” and tried to leave. Pfc. Fesalbon, who was at the barangay tanod outpost near the plaza, heard a gunshot, went out to investigate, and saw Teotimo Fameronag fall. He proceeded to the scene, saw Dennis lying on the floor while Leonito held a firearm, and, sensing that Leonito was about to flee, fired three warning shots. Leonito initially refused to hand over his gun but later relented. With Pfc. Sofronio Fabregas, Fesalbon arrested Leonito and took him to his house near the scene. Fesalbon inspected the gun and found five empty shells and one live bullet; the serial number had been erased. Roger Lacambra also heard the gunshots, saw people screaming and scampering away, and later saw Fameronag staggering toward him. Fameronag fell and asked for help; with his co-dancers, Lacambra brought him to a hospital in Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, and later to the provincial hospital of Calapan, where he expired. Fesalbon later verified that Fameronag had one gunshot wound while Dennis had been shot four times. The motive for the killing may have been Leonito’s suspicion that Dennis was divulging information about Leonito’s participation in illegal fishing, a charge that had been dismissed. Anita Macagaling testified that her family incurred P15,000.00 in funeral and burial expenses, P2,000.00 for trips, and P19,000.00 in litigation expenses. Concepcion Vda. de Fameronag testified that she spent P40,000.00 for burial and wake and incurred P31,500.00 in litigation, transportation, and other incidental expenses.

The defense presented a different account. Rosauro Fabreag, Jr. testified that between 5:30 and 6:00 P.M. of the same day, he saw Dennis Macagaling drinking with Nonoy Fabellon, Roger Lacambra, and two others in a store near his house. Dennis invited him to join, and he accepted. While drinking, Dennis showed him a gun tucked on his waist. At about 6:00 P.M., after a couple of drinks, Fabreag left the group, which appeared very drunk. William Ferrancullo, a barangay tanod of Calabasahan and a relative of appellant, testified that in the evening of May 2, 1991, he and other barangay officials were assigned by Barangay Captain Feras to oversee the proceedings and maintain peace and order at the plaza. At about 9:30 P.M., he was at the gate and noticed a group of five apparently drunken men enter the dance hall. Later, he went to the barangay tanod outpost a few meters from the gate. He suddenly heard a gunshot from the direction where the intoxicated persons were seated. Rushing to investigate, he met Teotimo Fameronag, who appeared to have been shot. He saw Fameronag fall and noticed Dennis Macagaling holding a gun and threatening to shoot anyone who came near. Frightened, Ferrancullo did not move from where he stood.

Leonito Macagaling claimed that he was in his residence at Calabasahan, getting ready to rest, when he heard a gunshot from the direction of the plaza. Still in short pants and undershirt, he hurried to the plaza and saw the group of Dennis Macagaling, Willy Ferrancullo, Willito Bruit, and Carlito Macagaling. He approached them and, when about two meters away, became aware that Dennis was intoxicated and holding a gun. Leonito asked Dennis to drop the gun, but Dennis retorted, “Isa ka pa.” Without warning, Dennis fired at him but missed. Leonito dashed toward Dennis and tried to wrestle the gun away. A struggle for the firearm ensued, and they grappled for it on the floor. While wrestling, the gun went off and hit Dennis. Leonito stood up, went home, and informed his wife. His wife observed bruises and cleaned them. Shortly thereafter, policemen Fesalbon and Fabregas, together with Ferrancullo, arrived and asked if the gun was his. He denied ownership. When informed that Dennis was dead, Leonito said it was not his fault. The policemen left. Fesalbon, Fabregas, and Ferrancullo returned to the crime scene and decided to bring Fameronag, still alive, to Pinamalayan for treatment. Because no doctor was then available in the barangay, the body of Dennis Macagaling was examined by a rural health midwife, Avemie F. Fabroa, who submitted her medical findings. Leonito also recounted an incident in October 1990 when he slapped Diomedes, Dennis’s younger brother, over an agreement to work in Leonito’s fishing operations. Dennis later confronted Leonito, and during a heated exchange, Dennis warned him, “You watch out.” Leonito also claimed that Pfc. Fesalbon harbored a grudge against him arising from a 1976 dance hall incident in Sampong, Calabasahan, where Leonito filed an administrative case against Fesalbon, Luvizmindo Fabroa, and Sofronio Fabregas before the National Police Commission, and Fesalbon retaliated with a criminal case for less serious physical injuries; both cases were dismissed after settlement.

The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and rejected the defense. It found that Dennis sustained four gunshot wounds, one in the temple and three in the neck, while Fameronag sustained one gunshot wound. It also found that defense witness Ferrancullo either did not see the incident or narrated it differently, and that his testimony contained grave contradictions on serious matters. The trial court further found that appellant offered no defense or explanation for the death of Fameronag.

• Self-Defense: Appellant maintained that he acted in self-defense when Dennis Macagaling, who was intoxicated and armed, fired at him without warning; he wrestled the gun away, and it discharged accidentally, hitting Dennis.
• No Defense for Fameronag: Appellant offered no defense for the killing of Teotimo Fameronag; his position amounted to a complete denial of responsibility for that death.
• Ownership of Firearm: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in holding that the gun was owned by him without convincing proof; even assuming he handed the gun to Pfc. Fesalbon after arriving at the scene, that fact did not prove ownership.
• Right to Counsel: Appellant asserted that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his choice when, instead of granting his counsel’s motion for postponement, it appointed Atty. Cesar M. Madrona of the Public Attorney’s Office as counsel de oficio.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant contended that Antonieto Fabella did not mention the specific names of the parties in his affidavit; that the prosecution witnesses, except Pfc. Fesalbon, were close relatives of the victims; and that their testimonies contained inconsistencies, including the location of Leonito at the first gunshot, the number of warning shots fired by Fesalbon, and whether Fesalbon was alone in blocking appellant’s path.
• Motive and Bias: Appellant claimed that Pfc. Fesalbon harbored a grudge against him arising from a 1976 incident and the filing and dismissal of administrative and criminal cases between them.

• Strength of Prosecution Evidence and Counsel: The Solicitor General maintained that, given the demonstrated strength of the prosecution evidence, it was unlikely that Atty. Ferancullo’s presence during the entire proceedings would have materially affected the result of the cases.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant’s claim of self-defense for the killing of Dennis Macagaling was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
• Murder vs. Homicide: Whether treachery and evident premeditation qualified the killing of Dennis Macagaling to murder.
• Aberratio Ictus and Complex Crime: Whether the killing of Teotimo Fameronag was accidental or constituted homicide, and whether appellant should have been convicted of a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Right to Counsel: Whether the trial court’s appointment of counsel de oficio deprived appellant of his constitutional right to counsel of choice.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies and their relationship to the victims impaired their credibility.
• Illegal Possession — Ownership and Animus Possidendi: Whether ownership of the firearm was essential to the offense of illegal possession and whether appellant had animus possidendi.
• Illegal Possession — Proof of Lack of License and Identification: Whether the prosecution sufficiently identified the firearm and proved the essential negative ingredient that appellant lacked a license or permit.

• Self-Defense: No. The claim was rejected; appellant failed to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, and the number and location of the wounds negated accidental shooting.
• Murder vs. Homicide: No. Treachery and evident premeditation were not proven; appellant was correctly convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1814.
• Aberratio Ictus and Complex Crime: Not accidental. The killing of Fameronag was an aberratio ictus; although it could have constituted a complex crime under Article 48, appellant could not be convicted of a complex crime not charged, so simple homicide in Criminal Case No. 1815 was correct.
• Right to Counsel: No. The appointment of counsel de oficio did not violate the right to counsel of choice; appellant’s own counsel handled the defense except during prosecution witnesses, and no material prejudice was shown.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. Relationship to the victim does not disqualify a witness, and the alleged inconsistencies were minor or not inconsistencies; denial is weak against positive credible testimony.
• Illegal Possession — Ownership and Animus Possidendi: Ownership is not the gravamen; possession without license is. However, the evidence showed only transitory possession for a short moment, so animus possidendi was not established.
• Illegal Possession — Proof of Lack of License and Identification: No. The prosecution failed to prove the essential negative ingredient of lack of license and failed to sufficiently identify the firearm; conviction was reversed and appellant acquitted.

• Self-Defense: Where an accused admits the killing but invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in legitimate self-defense; he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s. Appellant’s version was “too good to be true”: he allegedly nonchalantly ordered an armed Dennis to drop his gun, rushed him, wrestled for the firearm, and then calmly went home after the alleged accidental shooting. His failure to seek medical help for Dennis was unusual. The number of wounds—one in the temple and three in the neck—made a single accidental discharge impossible and indicated a determined effort to kill, confirming the prosecution’s theory of aggression. Defense witness Ferrancullo’s testimony was riddled with contradictions and did not corroborate appellant. Self-defense was therefore rejected.

• Murder vs. Homicide: The information in Criminal Case No. 1814 charged murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation, but the People’s evidence did not prove these circumstances. They could not be appreciated against appellant, and the lower court correctly convicted him of homicide.

• Aberratio Ictus and Complex Crime: The killing of Teotimo Fameronag was not accidental; it resulted from aberratio ictus, or miscarriage of the blow, when appellant fired at Dennis but hit Fameronag. As a matter of law, since the death resulted from culpable aberratio ictus, appellant should be punished under Article 48, in relation to Article 4, of the Revised Penal Code. Having committed attempted homicide against Dennis and consummated homicide against Fameronag with one single act, appellant committed two grave felonies and would be liable for a complex crime in the nature of a delito compuesto. However, not having been charged with a complex crime, he could not be convicted of one; hence, the lower court did not err in finding him guilty of simple homicide in Criminal Case No. 1815. Appellant also offered no defense for Fameronag’s death, and denial is inherently weak.

• Right to Counsel: The records showed that appellant was given the right to choose his own counsel. The trial court, in its desire to finish the case under the continuous trial system, made arrangements to avoid unnecessary delay and postponements if appellant’s counsel de parte was absent. Its December 12, 1991 order set specific dates for prosecution witnesses, noting that the witnesses were from the far-flung island municipality of Concepcion in Maestre de Campo Island, Romblon, about seven hours away by boat, and advised appellant of the availability of Atty. Madrona as counsel de oficio whenever Atty. Ferancullo was not available. Appellant was forewarned that legal maneuvers meant to delay the cases would not be entertained. After the prosecution witnesses, Atty. Ferancullo took over the defense; appellant’s own counsel was in charge at all stages except when the prosecution witnesses were testifying. Given the strength of the prosecution evidence, Atty. Ferancullo’s presence throughout the proceedings would not have materially affected the result. No violation of the right to counsel was shown.

• Credibility of Witnesses: A witness’s relation to the victim does not necessarily mean bias. No law disqualifies a person from testifying in a criminal case involving a relative if the person was at the scene and witnessed the criminal act. Being blood relatives of the deceased, the witnesses would not indiscriminately impute the crime to anybody but would identify and seek conviction of the real culprit. The alleged inconsistencies were not material: Fabella testified that Leonito was inside the dance hall when the first gunshot was heard, while Lacambra said he saw Leonito on the street before the first shot—not an inconsistency. Fabella heard two warning shots while Fesalbon declared three; this was a minor detail. Fesalbon did not state that he alone blocked Leonito’s path; he said, “We arrested him,” confirming that Fabregas worked in concert with him. The omission of names in Fabella’s affidavit was not fatal because he gave the names after narrating the incident. For Fameronag’s death, appellant offered no defense; denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive and credible testimony.

• Illegal Possession — Ownership and Animus Possidendi: Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the offense is the fact of possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it was possessed with animus possidendi. The crime may be simple illegal possession, distinguished from the aggravated form where the firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder. To be liable for the aggravated form, illegal possession must be the specific and principal offense charged, with the fact of killing included in the particulars of the indictment. In either case, the offense is committed not on the basis of ownership but of possession without the requisite license or permit. Appellant’s ownership objection was therefore off-tangent. However, how the firearm came into appellant’s possession was a seriously contested issue: the prosecution witnesses stated they saw the gun only when appellant aimed and fired at the victims, while appellant contended he wrested it from Dennis Macagaling. Who truly possessed the firearm prior to the incident could not be determined with certitude due to the paucity of evidence. Since all that could be deduced was that appellant was in possession of the gun only on that occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment coeval therewith, it could not be concluded that he had the animus possidendi required for the offense charged.

• Illegal Possession — Proof of Lack of License and Identification: The prosecution had the burden of proving the negative allegation that appellant possessed the firearm “without legal authority therefor,” because the lack of a license is an essential ingredient of illegal possession. Under the Rules of Court, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution, and a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proved if it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged. The revised Rules on Evidence did not dispense with this requirement; the burden of proof is the duty to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish a claim or defense. In People vs. Quebral, the rule was explained that if the subject of the negative averment inheres in the offense as an essential ingredient, the prosecution has the burden of proving it; because of the difficulty of proving a negative, the prosecution need only make a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. People vs. Pajenado adopted this principle for illegal possession of firearms, holding that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient and the prosecution must prove it. This rule was reiterated in People vs. Tiozon, People vs. Caling, People vs. Ramos, et al., People vs. Arce, and People vs. Deunida. Applied to the case, the conviction could not be sustained. Pfc. Fesalbon, the lone prosecution witness on this issue, merely testified that he found the gun had no license and that appellant was not a firearm licensee, but he did not explain how he arrived at that conclusion. No certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office or the local command of the Philippine National Police was obtained despite the opportunity and intervening time. The identification of the firearm was also unsatisfactory: Fesalbon did not place any personal identification mark on the firearm or the ammunition, admitted that there were thousands of Smith and Wesson guns with the same general appearance, and the serial number had been erased. More than a year passed from retrieval to presentation in court. Such lack of positive identification was virtually equivalent to non-production of the real firearm and was analogous to People vs. Caling, where the rifle allegedly involved was not presented in evidence; that failure effectively closed the door to proof of the negative fact that no license or permit had been issued. Even assuming that mere prima facie evidence of lack of license would suffice, Fesalbon’s self-serving, unexplained, and undocumented conclusion could not approximate that evidential quantum. The illegal possession conviction was therefore reversed.

• Self-Defense — Burden of Proof — Once an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in legitimate defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Applied: Macagaling’s version and the number and location of the wounds failed to establish self-defense.

• Aberratio Ictus and Complex Crime — Aberratio ictus is a miscarriage of the blow, where the offender intends to hit one person but hits another. Under Article 48, in relation to Article 4, of the Revised Penal Code, a single act constituting two or more grave felonies results in a complex crime. However, an accused cannot be convicted of a complex crime if it is not charged; only the simple felony for the actual victim may be imposed. Applied: the killing of Fameronag was an aberratio ictus, but because no complex crime was charged, simple homicide was correct.

• Illegal Possession of Firearms under P.D. No. 1866 — The gravamen of the offense is possession of a firearm without a license, not ownership, and animus possidendi is assumed. Simple illegal possession is distinguished from the aggravated form where the firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder; the aggravated form requires illegal possession to be the specific and principal offense charged, with the fact of killing included in the particulars of the indictment. Applied: ownership was not essential, but the evidence showed only transitory possession, negating animus possidendi.

• Negative Averment as Essential Ingredient — In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the offense charged. A negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proved if it is an essential ingredient of the offense. For illegal possession of firearms, the lack of a license is an essential negative ingredient; the prosecution must prove it, although it may make a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. Applied: the prosecution failed to prove lack of license.

• Proof of Lack of License in Illegal Possession — The prosecution must present adequate evidence, such as a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office or the Philippine National Police, to prove that the accused had no license or permit. A police witness’s bare, unexplained conclusion is insufficient. Applied: no certification was obtained, and the conviction was reversed.

• Positive Identification of the Firearm — The firearm must be positively identified. Lack of positive identification is virtually equivalent to non-production of the real firearm in court and precludes proof of the negative fact that no license or permit had been issued. Applied: no identification mark was placed, many similar guns existed, and more than a year passed before presentation.

• Right to Counsel of Choice — The right to counsel of choice is not absolute. Appointment of counsel de oficio to avoid delay under the continuous trial system does not violate the right where the accused’s own counsel later handles the defense and no material prejudice is shown. Applied: no violation was found.

• Credibility of Witnesses; Relationship and Minor Inconsistencies — A witness’s relationship to the victim does not disqualify the witness or necessarily imply bias. Minor inconsistencies on non-material details do not impair credibility where the witnesses concur on material points. Applied: the alleged inconsistencies were minor or not inconsistencies.

• Denial as Defense — Denial, like alibi, is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive and credible testimony of prosecution witnesses. Applied: appellant’s denial regarding Fameronag’s death could not overcome the prosecution’s evidence.

• "In a long line of cases, it has been held that where the accused admits the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in legitimate defense of himself." — States the burden-shifting rule for self-defense, which the Court applied to reject appellant’s claim.

• "Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the offense is basically the fact of possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it was so possessed with animus possidendi." — Defines the core of illegal possession of firearms and explains why ownership is not the decisive issue.

• "The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative averment, like, for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law, inheres in the offense as an essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same (Sec. 297, Act No. 190; U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303, 306, 307)." — States the negative-averment rule relied upon to require proof that appellant lacked a firearms license.

• "Indeed, such lack of positive identification is virtually equivalent to the non-production of the real firearm in court and is analogous to the situation in People vs. Caling, supra, where the rifle allegedly involved in the case was not presented in evidence." — Explains why the unsatisfactory identification of the firearm contributed to the reversal of the illegal possession conviction.

• People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564 (1939) — Explained that if a negative averment is an essential ingredient of the offense, the prosecution has the burden of proving it; because of the difficulty of proving a negative, the prosecution need only make a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. Followed in reversing the illegal possession conviction.
• People vs. Pajenado, L-27680-81, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 812 — Held that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of illegal possession of a firearm and that the prosecution must prove it. Adopted the Quebral rule.
• People vs. Caling, G.R. No. 94784, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 821 — Cited for the distinction between simple and aggravated illegal possession and for the rule that failure to present the firearm closes the door to proof of the negative fact that no license was issued.
• People vs. Tiozon, G.R. No. 89823, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 368 — Reiterated the rule requiring the prosecution to prove the lack of a license in illegal possession cases.
• People vs. Ramos, et al., G.R. Nos. 101804-07, May 25, 1993, 222 SCRA 557 — Reiterated the same rule on proof of lack of license.
• People vs. Arce, G.R. Nos. 101833-34, October 26, 1993, 227 SCRA 406 — Reiterated the same rule on proof of lack of license.
• People vs. Deunida, G.R. Nos. 105199-200, March 28, 1994 — Reiterated the same rule on proof of lack of license.
• People vs. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-39, February 26, 1990, 182 SCRA 601 — Held that the aggravated form of illegal possession requires illegal possession to be the specific and principal offense charged, with the fact of killing included in the particulars of the indictment.
• People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950) — Cited on the concept of a complex crime or delito compuesto.
• People vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil. 171 (1912) — Cited for the rule that an accused cannot be convicted of a complex crime not charged.
• People vs. Sagadsad, et al., G.R. No. 88042, November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 641 — Cited for the principle that the number of wounds may indicate a determined effort to kill.
• People vs. Sarense, et al., G.R. No. 97433, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 780 — Cited for the principle that wounds indicative of aggression may confirm the prosecution’s theory.
• People vs. Avila, G.R. No. 82374, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 242 — Cited for the rule that minor differences in details do not affect witness credibility.
• People vs. Payumo, G.R. No. 81761, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 64 — Cited for the rule that denial is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive testimony.
• People vs. De la Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 68319, May 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 632 — Cited on the burden of proving self-defense.
• Araneta, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 43527, July 3, 1990, 187 SCRA 123 — Cited on the burden of proving self-defense.
• People vs. Fider, G.R. No. 105285, June 5, 1993, 223 SCRA 117 — Cited for the rule that the prosecution must prove all elements of the offense alleged.
• People vs. Aranda, G.R. No. 100985, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 562 — Cited for the same rule that the prosecution must prove all elements alleged.

• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866 — Defines illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The Court applied it by holding that the gravamen is possession without a license, not ownership, and by distinguishing simple illegal possession from the aggravated form.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes. The Court applied it to the aberratio ictus but held that appellant could not be convicted of a complex crime because it was not charged.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Cited in relation to Article 48 for criminal liability arising from a culpable aberratio ictus.
• Articles 29 and 70, Revised Penal Code — Concern credit for preventive imprisonment and successive service of penalties. These were included in the trial court’s disposition and affirmed.
• Section 2, Rule 131 (1964 Rules of Court); Section 71, Rule 123 (1940 Rules of Court) — Provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution, and a negative fact alleged by the prosecution need not be proved unless it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged. Applied to require proof that appellant lacked a firearms license.
• Section 1, Rule 131 (as amended, 1989) — Defines burden of proof as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish a claim or defense. Cited to show that the requirement to prove an essential negative ingredient was not dispensed with.
• Constitutional right to counsel — Appellant invoked the constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his choice. The Court held that the appointment of counsel de oficio did not violate that right under the circumstances.
• Presidential Decree No. 1866 and Republic Act No. 7659 — The footnote noted that the constitutional prohibition against the death penalty still applied to capital offenses under P.D. No. 1866 because they were not included in the crimes for which the reimposition of the death penalty was provided in R.A. No. 7659.

Narvasa, C.J.; Puno, J.; and Mendoza, J. concurred. Padilla, J., was on leave.