People of the Philippines vs. Lawrence Ponciano y Sabolan

Robbery with homicide as a special complex crime requires that the original criminal design of the culprit be robbery and that the homicide be committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery; where the intent to rob is not proven and the taking of personal property comes to the offender's mind only after the killing as an afterthought, the acts constitute separate crimes of homicide and theft, not a single complex crime.

Appellant Lawrence Ponciano y Sabolan was a friend of Ricardo Rivera and a frequent guest at the latter's residence in Balangcas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the two had shared at least ten prior drinking sessions. The case arose from a jurisdiction in which the Revised Penal Code punishes homicide under Article 249 and theft under Article 309, and in which the Rules of Court supply presumptions from possession of recently stolen property and the requisites for circumstantial evidence. The prosecution charged a single special complex crime, robbery with multiple homicide, a designation whose correctness the Court addressed on its own initiative.

On the night of July 29, 1986, Lawrence Ponciano y Sabolan joined a drinking session at the house of Ricardo Rivera in Balangcas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, together with Eulogio Sanchez and Orlando (also referred to as Rolando) Silvestre. Ponciano was a friend of Rivera and had drunk at the latter's house on at least ten previous occasions. The group consumed a long-necked bottle of White Castle whisky and a flat bottle of Tanduay, and at some point viewed a Betamax film.

According to the prosecution, Rowena Fernandez-Rivera, Ricardo's wife, was inside the house with her husband's niece Alicia Rivera and her mother-in-law Brigida Rivera. Alicia went upstairs and remarked that Ricardo was already lying down; Rowena replied that he was probably very drunk. Rowena and Alicia then went downstairs to ask Ponciano and his companions to go home. Ponciano refused to leave, and when they insisted, he drew a bladed instrument, approached the two women, and brandished the weapon at them. He then lunged at Alicia. Rowena fled upstairs and locked herself inside her mother-in-law's room, from where she heard Alicia asking for help, a voice from her husband's room saying "Pare," and moaning sounds. She emerged only when policemen arrived and knocked. She later saw her husband sprawled on the bed with a piece of wood beside his body, and the Sony Betamax set, transformer, rewinder, and remote control moved from their usual place in the sala to the side of a round table seven to eight steps away. Her husband's wristwatch was missing.

Eulogio Sanchez testified that he fell asleep during the session and was awakened by Alicia, who was on the floor near his feet, wounded and asking to be brought to the hospital. Too drunk to carry her, he sought the help of Zosimo Mendiola and called the police at the Polo sub-station, then went home to sleep. When he woke, he saw Ponciano standing in the kitchen holding a knife. He did not witness the actual killing. Orlando Silvestre testified that after urinating outside the house, Ponciano called him and showed him Ricardo Rivera's room, saying "Look, he (Carding) is already dead." Silvestre saw Rivera lifeless, saw Ponciano holding a knife stained with blood, and noticed bloodstains on the upper portion of Ponciano's pants. On his way out he saw Alicia with stab wounds; when he tried to lift her, Ponciano warned him not to touch her or he would be attacked, so Silvestre fled and fetched the police mobile patrol.

Pat. Ildefonso Orig, Jr. testified that in the early morning of July 29, 1986, he received a report of a stabbing at Balangcas from the barangay chairman and responded with a team. They found Ponciano on the terrace of the victim's house, appearing high on drugs or highly intoxicated and holding a stainless kitchen knife; he surrendered when asked. Inside, they found Ricardo Rivera bloodied on the bed with stab wounds, and two other victims at the back of the house, one already dead and the other still alive and taken to the hospital. Pfc. Chua frisked Ponciano and recovered two wristwatches — a lady's and a man's — and the push button of the Betamax machine. Dr. Rodolfo Lezondra, NBI medico-legal officer, conducted autopsies on the three cadavers on July 30, 1986 and reported that all three died of hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds inflicted with a single-bladed knife such as a kitchen knife; the injuries on Ricardo Rivera indicated that the victim was lying down while the assailant was standing.

Ponciano, for his part, testified that he was drinking with Ricardo Rivera, Dante, and Odie at Rivera's residence beginning around 11:30 in the evening; that after about two hours he became drunk and was under the influence of drugs, having taken blue max or tribo thrill tablets before drinking; that he did not know what happened afterwards; and that he was awakened by the police officer who arrested him, at which point he noticed that his pants were covered with blood. He denied any misunderstanding with Ricardo Rivera or Regina Villanueva. On cross-examination he admitted that he had been taking drugs for about two months before the incident, that he had drunk liquor and taken drugs simultaneously on prior occasions, and that he had been drinking liquor for a long time.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with multiple homicide on the basis of the prosecution evidence, and rendered the judgment quoted at the outset of the decision.

• Absence of Proof of Taking: Appellant contended that the prosecution presented no evidence of the taking of the wristwatches, the Betamax machine, and its accessories, noting that the Betamax machine and its accessories were still in the house and had merely been moved from their usual setting.
• Hearsay Testimony: Appellant argued that the testimony of Pat. Orig — who related that Pfc. Chua had frisked him and found two wristwatches and the push button of the Betamax machine — was hearsay, since Orig had no personal knowledge of the frisk, not being the one who conducted it.
• Absence of Eyewitness to the Killing: Appellant alleged that no evidence linked him to the killing, as no one actually saw him kill the victims.

• Designation of the Offense: Whether the crime charged may be designated as robbery with multiple homicide.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on the Taking: Whether the taking of the wristwatches and the remote control of the Betamax machine was established by the prosecution.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on the Killings: Whether the killings were established despite the absence of an eyewitness to the actual stabbing.
• Criminal Design in Robbery with Homicide: Whether the appellant may be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua on three counts was properly imposed.

• Designation of the Offense: No. The designation "robbery with multiple homicide" is incorrect; assuming a complex crime was committed, it should be categorized as robbery with homicide regardless of the number of persons killed by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on the Taking: Yes. The taking of the wristwatches and the remote control was established by Orig's testimony, which was not hearsay because he was personally present when Pfc. Chua frisked the appellant and found the articles in his possession.
• Sufficiency of Evidence on the Killings: Yes. Direct evidence of the appellant's participation in the stabbing was unnecessary, circumstantial evidence having sufficiently established the fact under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
• Criminal Design in Robbery with Homicide: No. The facts were inadequate to convict the appellant of robbery with homicide, the requisite criminal design of robbery not having been duly proven; the taking of the wristwatches was merely an afterthought following the killings.
• Penalty: No. Reclusion perpetua on three counts was improper; the appellant was convicted of three separate homicides and one theft, with the corresponding penalties under Articles 249 and 309(3) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Designation of the Offense: The Court motu proprio commented on the crime charged and held that the designation "robbery with multiple homicide" was incorrect. Assuming a complex crime was committed, it should be categorized as robbery with homicide regardless of the number of persons killed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, citing People vs. Maranion (G.R. No. 90672-73, July 18, 1991) and People vs. Nunag (G.R. No. 92570, April 22, 1991).

• Sufficiency of Evidence on the Taking: The appellant's allegations failed. The taking of the wristwatches and the remote control gadget of the Betamax machine was established by Orig's testimony. The appellant was caught red-handed in possession of the wristwatches belonging to Ricardo and Alicia Rivera and the remote control of the Betamax machine. Orig's testimony was not hearsay because he was personally present when Pfc. Chua frisked the appellant and found the articles in his possession; he had personal knowledge of the frisking and of the items found, and therefore his testimony could not be categorized as hearsay. Because the appellant was caught in possession of the stolen property, he was presumed to be the taker in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of his possession, in accordance with Rule 131, Section 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence (Rule 131, Section 5(j) of the Rules of Court), which provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. The appellant offered no explanation as to the property found on him.

• Sufficiency of Evidence on the Killings: Although there was no eyewitness to the actual killing, several circumstances pieced together led to the definite conclusion that the appellant perpetrated the killings: (1) the prosecution witnesses placed the appellant at the scene of the crime, and he himself testified that he was there; (2) Sanchez and Orig saw the appellant with a knife; (3) Fernandez-Rivera stated that the appellant took out a bladed instrument, approached her and Alicia, brandished the weapon at them, and lunged at Alicia; and (4) Silvestre saw Ricardo Rivera already dead, saw the appellant holding a knife stained with blood, and saw that the appellant had bloodstains on the upper portion of his pants — a fact the appellant admitted on cross-examination — and Silvestre further stated that the appellant admonished him not to touch Alicia. Direct evidence of the appellant's participation in the actual stabbing was not necessary when circumstantial evidence sufficiently established that fact, citing People vs. Santito, Jr. (G.R. No. 91628, August 22, 1991, citing People vs. Roa, 167 SCRA 116, 122 [1988]). Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Rule 133, Section 4, Revised Rules on Evidence). All requisites were present. The records showed beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant killed the three victims and took the wristwatches and the remote control of the Betamax machine.

• Criminal Design in Robbery with Homicide: The facts were not adequate to convict the appellant of robbery with homicide. To sustain a conviction for this special complex crime, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide must be perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on the occasion thereof (People vs. Manalang, 170 SCRA 149, 162 [1989]); the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life (People vs. Luna, 58 SCRA 198, 208 [1974]). The records must show conclusively that the homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, because a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for robo con homicidio; when a person is charged with robbery, the intent to rob must be proven (People vs. Lanseta, 95 SCRA 166, 176 [1980]). Here, the requisite criminal design was not duly proven. There was no showing of the appellant's intention, determined by his acts prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to the commission of the crime, to commit robbery (People vs. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539, 553 [1984]). The appellant was a friend of one of the victims, Ricardo Rivera; what started as a drinking spree among friends ended in a killing spree by the appellant, who admitted being drunk and under the influence of drugs. That robbery was his purpose did not appear to be a logical deduction; it was more logical to infer that the taking of the wristwatches was just an afterthought after he had killed his three victims. To constitute robbery with homicide, there must be a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing — whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes were committed at the same time (People vs. Verdad, 122 SCRA 239, 244 [1983], citing People vs. Hernandez, 46 Phil. 48 [1924]) — and here that direct relation or intimate connection was not established. Following People vs. Manalang, if the original design was not to commit robbery but the idea of taking the personal property of another with intent to gain came to the offender's mind only after the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident in the homicide, the criminal acts constitute two distinct offenses and not a single complex crime; the crimes would be either homicide or murder, as the case may be, and theft. Accordingly, the appellant was convicted of three separate crimes of homicide and one offense of theft. Notwithstanding that the information charged robbery with multiple homicide, it is a well-settled rule that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object before trial, the Court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them, setting out the findings of fact and law in each case. As the allegations in the information determine what offense is charged, the appellant could be convicted of each homicide as alleged and proved and of theft as alleged and proved; each separate homicide and the crime of theft were proved.

• Penalty: The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness were appreciated in the killing of Ricardo Rivera, who was killed in his own home by the appellant, a guest of the deceased (People vs. Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991; People vs. Lobetania, 116 SCRA 297, 302 [1982]). As to intoxication, there was no doubt that the appellant was drunk, but this alternative circumstance could not be considered mitigating because the appellant, aside from his self-serving testimony that he could not remember anything, failed to prove that the liquor he drank impaired his mental faculties and that his drinking was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony (People vs. Serenio, 179 SCRA 379, 383 [1989]). It was instead considered aggravating, since the appellant himself admitted that he had been drinking liquor for a long time, that he had taken part in at least ten drinking sessions at Ricardo Rivera's house, that he tried to stop drinking but returned to his old habit, and that he was even drinking after the July 29, 1986 incident. Not only was he drunk, but he testified that it was his habit to take prohibited drugs while drinking liquor; on the night in question he admitted taking an estimated fifteen pieces of bluemax tablets and an undetermined amount of "exponie" tablets. The penalties were accordingly fixed under Article 249 in relation to Article 64(6) of the Revised Penal Code for the homicide of Ricardo Rivera, and under Article 249 in relation to Article 64(3) for the homicides of Alicia Rivera and Regina Villanueva, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law applied in each case, and under Article 309(3) for the theft.

• Robbery with homicide as a special complex crime — To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide must be perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on the occasion thereof. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life, and the intent to rob must be proven; a mere presumption of such intent is insufficient. The Court applied the doctrine by holding that the prosecution failed to establish the requisite criminal design, the appellant's acts prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to the crime showing no intent to rob.

• Afterthought rule — If the original design was not to commit robbery but the idea of taking the personal property of another with intent to gain came to the offender's mind only after the homicide, as an afterthought or as a minor incident in the homicide, the criminal acts constitute two distinct offenses rather than a single complex crime; the crimes would be either homicide or murder, as the case may be, and theft. The Court applied this rule in convicting the appellant of three separate homicides and one theft instead of robbery with homicide.

• Direct relation or intimate connection test — To constitute robbery with homicide, there must be a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes were committed at the same time. The Court found this connection absent because the taking of the wristwatches appeared to be a mere afterthought to the killing spree.

• Circumstantial evidence — requisites for conviction — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Direct evidence of participation in the actual stabbing is not necessary when circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishes the fact. The Court found all requisites present based on the appellant's presence at the scene, his being seen holding a knife, his brandishing of a bladed weapon and lunging at Alicia, and his being seen with a bloodstained knife and bloodstained pants.

• Presumption from possession of recently stolen property — Under Rule 131, Section 3(j) of the Revised Rules on Evidence (formerly Rule 131, Section 5(j) of the Rules of Court), a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. The presumption applies in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of possession. The Court applied the presumption because the appellant was caught in possession of the stolen wristwatches and the Betamax remote control and offered no explanation.

• Conviction of multiple offenses charged in a single information — When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object before trial, the Court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each and every one of them, setting out the findings of fact and law in each case. The allegations in the information determine what offense is charged. The Court applied this rule in convicting the appellant of three homicides and one theft despite the single information for robbery with multiple homicide.

• Intoxication as an alternative circumstance — Intoxication cannot be considered mitigating where the accused fails to prove that the liquor he drank impaired his mental faculties and that his drinking was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. It may be considered aggravating where the accused admits long-standing and habitual drinking. The Court treated the appellant's intoxication as aggravating, not mitigating, given his admitted habitual drinking and drug use.

• Aggravating circumstances of dwelling and abuse of confidence — Dwelling is aggravating when the victim is killed in his own home, and abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness is aggravating where the offender was a guest of the deceased. The Court appreciated both circumstances in the killing of Ricardo Rivera.

• "The fact, however, are not adequate to convict the appellant of the crime of robbery with homicide. To sustain a conviction for this special complex crime, the original criminal design of the culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetuated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the elements of robbery with homicide as a special complex crime and the reason the conviction therefor could not stand.

• "It is more logical to infer that the taking of the wristwatches was just an afterthought by the appellant after he had killed his three victims. To constitute robbery with homicide, there should be a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the killing—whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes were committed at the same time." — This passage applies the direct-relation or intimate-connection test and articulates the afterthought reasoning that converted the charge into separate offenses.

• "if the original design was not to commit robbery but that the idea of taking the personal property of another with intent to gain came to the mind of the offender after the homicide only as an afterthought or as a minor incident in the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constituting two distinct offenses and not as a single complex crime; the crimes would be either homicide or murder, as the case may be, and theft." — Quoted from People vs. Manalang and adopted by the Court, this is the canonical formulation of the afterthought rule frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage states the requisites for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which the Court found satisfied as to the killings.

• People vs. Manalang, 170 SCRA 149 (1989) — Controlling precedent. Supplied the rule that where the taking of property is a mere afterthought to the homicide, the acts constitute two distinct offenses rather than a single complex crime, and the rule permitting conviction of as many offenses as are charged and proved when the accused fails to object to a single information charging multiple offenses.
• People vs. Verdad, 122 SCRA 239 (1983), citing People vs. Hernandez, 46 Phil. 48 (1924) — Followed. Established the direct relation or intimate connection requirement between the robbery and the killing, which the Court found absent.
• People vs. Santito, Jr., G.R. No. 91628, August 22, 1991, citing People vs. Roa, 167 SCRA 116 (1988) — Followed. Held that direct evidence of participation in the actual stabbing is unnecessary when circumstantial evidence sufficiently establishes the fact.
• People vs. Maranion, G.R. No. 90672-73, July 18, 1991, and People vs. Nunag, G.R. No. 92570, April 22, 1991 — Followed. Held that the complex crime is robbery with homicide regardless of the number of persons killed by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
• People vs. Luna, 58 SCRA 198 (1974) — Followed. Held that the intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.
• People vs. Lanseta, 95 SCRA 166 (1980) — Followed. Held that when a person is charged with robbery, the intent to rob must be proven and a mere presumption is insufficient.
• People vs. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539 (1984) — Followed. Required a showing of the accused's intention, determined by his acts prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to the crime, to commit robbery.
• People vs. Serenio, 179 SCRA 379 (1989) — Followed. Held that intoxication cannot be mitigating where the accused fails to prove impairment of mental faculties and that the drinking was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony.
• People vs. Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991, and People vs. Lobetania, 116 SCRA 297 (1982) — Followed. Supported the appreciation of dwelling and abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness as aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. dela Fuente, G.R. No. 63251-52, December 29, 1983 — Cited by the trial court as basis for the award of indemnity to the victims' heirs.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code (Homicide) — Prescribes the penalty for homicide. Applied to each of the three separate killings of Ricardo Rivera, Alicia Rivera, and Regina Villanueva after the Court rejected the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
• Article 309(3), Revised Penal Code (Theft) — Prescribes the penalty for theft where the value of the property taken does not exceed a specified amount. Applied to the separate offense of theft for the taking of the wristwatches and the Betamax remote control.
• Article 64(6), Revised Penal Code — Rule on the application of penalties where aggravating circumstances are present. Applied in fixing the penalty for the homicide of Ricardo Rivera, aggravated by dwelling, abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness, and intoxication.
• Article 64(3), Revised Penal Code — Rule on the application of penalties where an aggravating circumstance is present. Applied in fixing the penalties for the homicides of Alicia Rivera and Regina Villanueva, aggravated by intoxication.
• Rule 131, Section 3(j), Revised Rules on Evidence (formerly Rule 131, Section 5(j), Rules of Court) — Provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. Applied to presume the appellant as the taker of the wristwatches and the Betamax remote control, he having offered no explanation for his possession.
• Rule 133, Section 4, Revised Rules on Evidence (formerly Rule 133, Section 5, Rules of Court) — Sets out the requisites for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence for conviction. Applied to establish the appellant's participation in the killings despite the absence of an eyewitness.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing the indeterminate penalties for each of the three homicides and for the theft.

Bidin, J., Davide, Jr., J., and Romero, J., concurred. Fernan, C.J., was on leave.