People of the Philippines vs. Larry Cachapero y Basilio

The precise date and hour of the commission of rape need not be alleged in the information, time not being an essential element of the offense; an allegation of the approximate date satisfies Sections 6 and 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Any objection to such formal defect must be raised before arraignment, either through a motion for a bill of particulars or a motion to quash; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Larry Cachapero y Basilio and Anna Laurence Toledo were neighbors in Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac, the child being a playmate of the accused's younger siblings, Lorena and Dino Cachapero. The charge was brought under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, the statute providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. Section 3(b)(1) of that law defines child abuse as the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, including psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse, and emotional maltreatment.

Anna Laurence Toledo was seven years old and a resident of Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac, where she was a playmate of Lorena and Dino Cachapero, the younger siblings of appellant Larry Cachapero y Basilio. Sometime in March 1998, Anna went to a nearby house to play with Lorena and Dino. On that occasion, Larry made her lie down, removed her shorts and panty, and inserted his penis into her sexual organ, causing her pain. He warned her not to tell her parents because he might be scolded.

According to the prosecution, the abuse came to light on September 2, 1998, while Conchita Donato was conducting a remedial class in Reading for her Grade I and II students. One of her pupils, Jocelyn Meneses, told her that Anna had been sexually abused by "Manong Larry." Donato ordered the other students to leave the room and asked Jocelyn and Anna to stay behind. When confronted, Anna covered her face with both hands, cried, and answered yes. The teachers held a conference and decided to report the matter to Anna's parents.

The following day, September 3, 1998, Anna's mother brought her to the Camiling District Hospital, where Dr. Mercedes B. Gapultos, a medico-legal officer, examined her. The examination disclosed an undeveloped mons pubis with no pubic hairs, old hymenal lacerations at the 3:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions, and no abrasions or contusions in the perineum. Dr. Gapultos testified that the old hymenal lacerations could be caused by many factors, including penetration of the hymen by a hard object or by an object forcibly entered.

An Information dated December 1, 1998, signed by OIC Provincial Prosecutor Alipio C. Yumul, charged Larry with having wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Anna Laurence Toledo, a seven-year-old minor, "sometime in March 1998" in Camiling, Tarlac. Arraigned on October 2, 2000, and assisted by counsel de oficio, Larry pleaded not guilty.

For the defense, Larry testified that at the time of the alleged incident he was in their house together with his father and mother, and that he did not see the private complainant on that day. He claimed that the case had been filed against him because of a long-standing feud between his mother and the mother of the private complainant. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that the quarrel between the two mothers occurred only after the incident, not before it.

The trial court found the testimony of the child victim credible and sufficient to convict, particularly as it was supported by the medical findings. It rejected the claim of false accusation, reasoning that no woman in her right mind would unnecessarily expose her minor daughter to the humiliation and stigma of a public trial, and added that the sexual abuse of the victim prejudiced her development under Section 3(b)(1) of Republic Act No. 7610.

• Insufficient Information: Appellant contended that the Information was fatally defective for failing to state the precise hour when the crime was committed, which he claimed was a material ingredient of rape, thereby jeopardizing his right to be properly informed of the charge against him.
• Inconsistent Testimony: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the private complainant's testimony, which he described as full of inconsistencies — specifically on whether or not she bled after the alleged rape and on what time she informed her mother about the incident — and he characterized the victim as a coached witness.
• Failure of Proof: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the Information was insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for failure to state the precise date of the commission of the alleged rape, time being allegedly an essential element of the crime charged.
• Credibility of the Complainant: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of the private complainant, which was allegedly full of inconsistencies.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of the Information: No. The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape, so the precise date and hour need not be alleged; an allegation of the approximate date complies with Sections 6 and 11 of Rule 110, and any objection to the form of the Information was waived for not having been raised before arraignment.
• Credibility of the Complainant: No. The testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so when she is a minor, and the alleged inconsistencies touched on details that did not affect the essential fact of carnal knowledge.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age, both of which were duly established, while the defenses of denial and alibi were bare and uncorroborated.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape, and its precise date and hour therefore need not be alleged in the complaint or information. Section 11 of Rule 110 provides that it is not necessary to state the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Section 6 of the same Rule requires only the approximate date of the commission of the offense. The allegation that the crime was committed "sometime in March 1998," which the private complainant placed more or less at the closing of the school year, was reasonably definite and certain and thus sufficiently met the requirement of the law. Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Had appellant found the Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars under Section 9 of Rule 116, to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information under Section 3(e) of Rule 117, on the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. Having pursued neither remedy, he was deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the Information. By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence for the defense, his counsel actively took part in the trial, and the defense never objected to the presentation of prosecution evidence proving that the offense had been committed in March 1998. Appellant failed to show that he was deprived of a proper defense, for he was in fact able to foist an alibi; his constitutionally protected right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was therefore not violated.

• Credibility of the Complainant: The testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint; in so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive. The victim was a young girl of seven when she came forward and nine when she narrated the violation of her person, describing how appellant made her lie down, removed her shorts and panty, inserted his penis into her sexual organ, and caused her pain, demonstrating with her fingers a penetration of about two inches. Her testimony was not flawless or perfect in all aspects, but it was the narration of a minor who barely understood sex and sexuality, and it would not be fair to apply the standards used for adults. She fully understood the defilement of her person even if she was at a loss for the right words to describe the horrid details, which was why the prosecutor had to ask leading questions — allowed under Section 10 of Rule 132 when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a child of tender years. The account stating the essential fact that appellant had carnal knowledge of her referred to details not in any way affected or obscured by the supposed contradictions, namely, whether or not she bled after the rape or how soon she informed her mother of the incident. The victim's story was further buttressed by Dr. Gapultos' medical findings of old lacerations in her hymen which, although not indispensable to a rape conviction, were credible physical evidence of forcible defloration. Similarly corroborative was Conchita Donato's unrebutted testimony, which disclosed that appellant's sister, Lorena, had admitted having seen the incident in much the same detail as the victim had declared — that both were inside the room and naked, with Larry on top of Anna Lorraine. Finally, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence that have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted; this deference is consistent with the principle that when the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, when a guileless girl of seven credibly declares that she has been raped, she has said all that is necessary to prove the ravishment of her honor.

• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age. The prosecution duly established that appellant had sexual intercourse with the private complainant and that the latter, as shown by her birth certificate, was under twelve years old at the time. Against this, the alibi of appellant that he was in the house of his parents at the time of the rape was of little probative value. While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim; in particular, the defense of alibi is weak if wanting in material corroboration, as in this case. Also unpersuasive was appellant's contention that the charge was precipitated by a long-standing feud between his family and that of the private complainant, since he himself belied the allegation on cross-examination by admitting that the quarrel between his mother and the complainant's mother occurred only after the incident.

• Time is not an essential element of rape — The precise date and hour of the commission of rape need not be alleged in the complaint or information because time is not a material ingredient of the offense. Under Section 11 of Rule 110, the precise date need not be stated except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and the offense may be alleged on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission; Section 6 of the same Rule requires only the approximate date. The Court applied this rule to hold that the allegation that the crime was committed "sometime in March 1998" was reasonably definite and certain and sufficiently complied with the law.

• Waiver of objections to formal defects in the information — Objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. If the accused finds the information insufficient, he must move before arraignment either for a bill of particulars under Section 9 of Rule 116 or for the quashal of the information under Section 3(e) of Rule 117 on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Failure to pursue either remedy, coupled with active participation in the trial and failure to object to the presentation of evidence, amounts to a waiver of the objection. The Court applied this rule to bar appellant's belated challenge to the Information.

• Credibility of a child rape victim's testimony — The testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor; the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, her willingness to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial being an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. Her testimony is not to be measured by the standards used for adults, and leading questions may be asked of a child of tender years under Section 10 of Rule 132 when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers. The Court applied this doctrine in sustaining the trial court's reliance on the seven-year-old victim's testimony despite minor inconsistencies on collateral details.

• Gravamen of statutory rape — The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the prosecution established both elements: sexual intercourse with the private complainant and her age of less than twelve years at the time, as shown by her birth certificate.

• Alibi and denial as defenses — While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions thereof cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim, and the defense of alibi is weak if wanting in material corroboration. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting appellant's uncorroborated claim that he was in his parents' house at the time of the incident.

• Exemplary damages require an aggravating circumstance alleged and proved — Exemplary damages may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The Court applied this doctrine in deleting the ₱25,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, there being no such circumstances in the present case.

• "Time is not an essential element of rape. An information that states the approximate rather than the precise time it was committed is sufficient in form. Any perceived formal defect in the information must be raised before arraignment, either through a bill of particulars or a motion to quash; otherwise, objection to such defect shall be considered waived." — This passage, drawn from the Court's own syllabus statement at the head of the Decision, states the ratio decidendi on the first issue and is the formulation most likely to be cited for the twin rules on the non-essentiality of time in rape and the waiver of formal objections to the information.

• "The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint." — This is the canonical formulation of the rule on the credibility of a child rape victim, invoked to justify the trial court's reliance on the seven-year-old complainant's testimony.

• "The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age." — This passage defines the essential elements of statutory rape and anchors the Court's conclusion that the prosecution had established both carnal knowledge and the victim's minority.

• "Such damages may be given only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during the trial." — This passage states the controlling requisites for the award of exemplary damages and supplies the ground for deleting the ₱25,000.00 award made by the trial court.

• People vs. Elpedes, 350 SCRA 716, January 31, 2001 — Cited as authority for the rule that the time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape, supporting the Court's rejection of appellant's challenge to the Information.
• People vs. Marquez, 347 SCRA 510, December 8, 2000 — Cited for the rule that objections to the form of the information cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and for the availability of a motion for a bill of particulars before arraignment.
• People vs. Gianan, 340 SCRA 477, September 15, 2000 — Cited in connection with the bill of particulars under Section 9 of Rule 116 and the motion to quash under Section 3(e) of Rule 117 as the proper pre-arraignment remedies.
• People vs. Razonable, 386 Phil. 771, April 12, 2000 — Cited for the rule that failure to raise a formal defect in the information before arraignment results in waiver of the objection.
• People vs. De Guzman, 372 SCRA 95, December 11, 2001 — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit.
• People vs. Bato, 382 Phil. 558, February 16, 2000 — Cited for the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit.
• Dulla vs. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 791, February 18, 2000 — Cited for the allowance of leading questions to a child of tender years under Section 10 of Rule 132.
• People vs. Dimapilis, 300 SCRA 279, December 17, 1998 — Cited for the rule that the gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age.
• People vs. Nicolas, 387 SCRA 638, August 22, 2002 — Cited for the rule that bare denial and alibi cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.
• People vs. Mayor Sanchez, 361 Phil. 692, January 25, 1999 — Cited for the rule that the defense of alibi is weak if wanting in material corroboration.
• Talay vs. Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 185, February 27, 2003 — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages may be awarded only when aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during trial.
• People vs. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, August 28, 2001 — Cited alongside Talay vs. Court of Appeals for the requisites governing the award of exemplary damages.

• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code — The provision under which appellant was charged and convicted of rape, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
• Section 3(b)(1), Republic Act No. 7610 — Defines "child abuse" as the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, including psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse, and emotional maltreatment. The trial court cited this provision in holding that the sexual abuse of the victim prejudiced her development.
• Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. This provision supplied the principal basis for rejecting appellant's challenge to the Information.
• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Enumerates the requisites of a sufficient complaint or information, among them the approximate date of the commission of the offense. The Court relied on this provision in holding that the allegation of an approximate date satisfied the law.
• Section 9, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Allows the accused, before arraignment, to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The Court cited this remedy as one appellant should have availed of but did not.
• Section 3(e), Rule 117, Rules of Court — Allows the accused to move to quash the complaint or information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The Court cited this as the other pre-arraignment remedy appellant failed to pursue, resulting in waiver.
• Section 10, Rule 132, Rules of Court — Permits leading questions when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute. The Court invoked this provision to justify the prosecutor's leading questions to the child victim.

Davide, Jr. (on official leave), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.