People of the Philippines vs. Junie (or Dioney) Salvador, Sr. y Masayang

Insanity as an exempting circumstance requires clear and convincing proof of a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment at the time of or immediately preceding the commission of the felony; a psychiatric diagnosis made long after the incident does not satisfy this burden. Voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance when the accused was not actually arrested, surrendered to a person in authority or the latter's agent, and acted voluntarily; where the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and no aggravating circumstance attends, the lesser penalty is imposed under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused-appellant Junie (or Dioney) Salvador, Sr. y Masayang was the live-in partner of Miraflor B. Realo and the father of Dioney Salvador, Jr.; the other victims were Miraflor's daughter Rosana B. Realo and his nieces Mariz R. Masayang and Jannes R. Masayang. The charges arose under the Revised Penal Code, with the killing of his son Dioney, Jr. prosecuted as parricide under Article 246 and the other killings as murder under Article 248, qualified by treachery. The defense invoked insanity under Article 12, paragraph 1, which exempts an insane person unless acting during a lucid interval. The case also implicated Article 63 on the application of indivisible penalties and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Accused-appellant Junie (or Dioney) Salvador, Sr. y Masayang was charged with five counts of murder for the deaths of Junie M. Salvador, Jr. (Dioney, Jr.), his two-year-old son; Rossana B. Realo, the twelve-year-old daughter of his live-in partner; Miraflor B. Realo, his live-in partner; Mariz R. Masayang, his three-year-old niece; and Jonessa R. Masayang, his one-year-and-two-month-old niece. The Informations alleged that on or about February 11, 2011, in Kapalong, Davao del Norte, he attacked and hacked the victims with bolos, causing their deaths and damages to their heirs. For the killings other than that of Dioney, Jr., the Informations alleged treachery and evident premeditation.

On February 11, 2011, at around 6:00 a.m., accused-appellant and Miraflor, together with Miraflor's daughter Melissa and Melissa's husband Santos, walked to the barangay hall to attend the Pamilya Pantawid program. Accused-appellant appeared very sweet to Miraflor and was happily cracking jokes. When they reached the hall, he told Miraflor and Melissa that he would go home because his name did not appear in the program's list. At about 11:30 a.m., while still at the barangay hall, Melissa told Santos to go home so he could feed their children, Mariz and Jannes. Santos did not find his children at home, and while looking for them at neighbors' houses, he saw accused-appellant on the street with blood on his arms and shirt and a bolo in his hand. Santos asked what happened, but accused-appellant did not reply. Santos returned to the barangay hall and told Melissa that the children were not at home and that he saw accused-appellant gone wild; Melissa then told Miraflor what Santos had said.

That same morning, Joy was on her way to Miraflor's house to look for Mariz and Jannes when she saw accused-appellant chasing Miraflor in the street. Joy was about two-arm-lengths away from Miraflor when accused-appellant, using a bolo, hacked Miraflor four times in the back and in the nape. Joy was about to ask help from the barangay when she saw accused-appellant drag Miraflor toward their house by pulling her hair. When informed, Kagawad Salaysay and two soldiers immediately proceeded to accused-appellant's house and saw him holding two bolos while Miraflor lay on the floor. When Salaysay told accused-appellant to surrender, he voluntarily did so, saying, "I will surrender Cons," and "If I want to kill a lot of people, I could but I only killed my family"; he then handed his bolos to Salaysay's companion. It was only when the policemen entered accused-appellant's house that the bodies of the four dead children—Mariz, Jannes, Rosana, and Dioney, Jr.—were discovered. At the Kapalong police station, PO1 Aguspina asked accused-appellant about his personal circumstances, to which he was responsive.

For the defense, Dr. Reagan Joseph Villanueva, who had special training in psychiatry, testified that he reviewed Dr. Giola Fe Dinglasan's records on accused-appellant. Dr. Dinglasan saw accused-appellant on June 6, 2012, or sixteen months after the February 11, 2011 incident; initially he was given medicine for depression and later for psychosis. According to Dr. Villanueva, a relapse was possible if accused-appellant was not given his medicines, and he suggested regular check-up and proper medication. Accused-appellant testified that he remembered who his victims were but did not recall that he killed them, the incident that took place before their death, or where he was on February 11, 2011. He said it was only his sister who informed him of the deaths of his family members and relatives. He claimed a happy relationship with Miraflor and closeness to Dioney, Jr.; he stopped taking prohibited drugs when he started living with Miraflor and gave up smoking while in prison; and he had never been confined in a mental hospital before the incident or after incarceration.

The RTC found no question that accused-appellant was the author of the killings and that the only issue was whether he was fully aware of the wrongness of his acts. It ruled that he failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was suffering from insanity or loss or absence of reason before and after he killed the victims. It found that the killing of Dioney, Jr. fell under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code because Dioney was his son, and that the hacking of Miraflor, Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes was attended by treachery. The RTC held that minors Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes could not have suspected the attack, much less defended themselves, as confirmed by wounds on their back, torso, and skull. The CA likewise found no evidence that accused-appellant was struck with schizoaffective disorder immediately prior to or during the hacking; the diagnosis came more than a year after the incident, and the defense arguments were speculative and inconclusive.

• Insanity Defense: Accused-appellant insisted that, as testified to by Dr. Villanueva, he was suffering from schizoaffective disorder, which impaired his mental condition and deprived him of reason at the time of the incident.
• Failure of Proof: Accused-appellant assigned error to the trial court's conviction notwithstanding the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Insanity Defense: Whether the trial court erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony of and psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reagan Joseph Villanueva finding accused-appellant to be suffering from schizoaffective disorder.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the offenses charged notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in imposing the penalties.
• Crimes, Penalties, and Damages: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of parricide and murder, and what penalties and damages should be imposed.

• Insanity Defense: No. The insanity defense failed because accused-appellant did not prove a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment at the time of or immediately preceding the killings; the psychiatric diagnosis was made long after the incident.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution established accused-appellant's identity as the killer and the qualifying circumstances; the presumption of sanity and the evidence overcame the defense.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The RTC and CA overlooked voluntary surrender; accused-appellant spontaneously surrendered to Salaysay before arrest, which is a mitigating circumstance.
• Crimes, Penalties, and Damages: Affirmed. The killing of Dioney, Jr. is parricide under Article 246; the killings of Rosana, Miraflor, Mariz, and Jannes are murder under Article 248 qualified by treachery; with voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole is imposed for each, plus damages under People vs. Jugueta.

• Insanity Defense: The prosecution and defense did not dispute that accused-appellant killed Dioney, Jr., Rosana, Miraflor, Mariz, and Jannes; the only controversy was whether he was insane at the time of the commission of the offenses. Every person is presumed to have acted with a complete grasp of his mental faculties, and Article 800 of the Civil Code presumes everyone sane. Insanity as an exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code exists only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act—when the accused is deprived of reason, acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or suffers total deprivation of freedom of the will. The plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance; the accused bears the burden of proving its existence. Two elements must concur: first, the insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and second, such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime. The psychiatric evidence did not prove these elements. Dr. Dinglasan first evaluated accused-appellant only on March 22, 2011, more than a month after the incident, but the records do not show her diagnosis on that date; the certification merely showed that on June 6, 2012, Dr. Dinglasan diagnosed accused-appellant with the disorder. Dr. Villanueva personally examined accused-appellant on September 27, 2012, one year and seven months after the incident, and no documentary proof showed how he arrived at his diagnosis; his testimony was general and did not detail his specific observations of accused-appellant. He admitted that Dr. Dinglasan's diagnosis was based on observations from the first to the last consultation and that he could not exactly say when the condition started; he also admitted it was possible that accused-appellant's present condition was triggered by the massacre rather than existing at the time of the killings. A diagnosis made long after the incident cannot prove the accused's mental state at the time of the offense. Accused-appellant's testimony did not fortify the defense: although he denied memory of the incident, he admitted he knew who his victims were and that he intentionally erased the incident from his mind because of the pain he felt whenever he remembered it. His surrender statement—"If I want to kill a lot of people, I could but I only killed my family"—persuasively disproved his claim of not knowingly or voluntarily killing his victims. Mere behavioral oddities cannot support a finding of insanity unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a total absence of reason, discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The identity of accused-appellant as the killer was not disputed; the only crux of the controversy was insanity. Because the insanity defense failed, the prosecution's evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal conferred full jurisdiction on the Court to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, and cite the proper provision of the penal law; the Court reviewed the records and found no basis to reverse the convictions.

• Voluntary Surrender: The RTC and the CA failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Its elements are: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure the accused's safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and cannot be characterized as voluntary surrender. Salaysay testified that on February 11, 2011, two persons reported to the barangay hall that a person had gone wild; Salaysay and two soldiers proceeded to the scene and saw accused-appellant holding two bolos. When asked to surrender, accused-appellant calmly approached Salaysay, said, "I will surrender Cons," handed his bolos to Salaysay's companion, and voluntarily went with Salaysay to the barangay hall and thereafter to the police station. The surrender was spontaneous and with the intent to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities, either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he wished to save the authorities the trouble and expense of searching for and capturing him. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

• Crimes, Penalties, and Damages: In Crim. Case No. 17628, Dioney, Jr. was the two-year-old son of accused-appellant; the killing is parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, Article 63 required the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. In Crim. Case Nos. 17629, 17631, and 17632, the victims Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes were twelve years and three months, three years and two months, and one year and two months old, respectively. Minor children, by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense; when an adult person attacks a child, treachery exists. The elements of murder are: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. Because the killings of Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes were attended by treachery, the conviction for murder was sustained. In Crim. Case No. 17630, Miraflor was accused-appellant's live-in partner; the Information alleged treachery and evident premeditation. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Alevosia is characterized by a deliberate, sudden, and unexpected assault from behind, without warning and without giving the victim a chance to defend himself or repel the assault and without risk to the assailant. Two elements must be alleged and proved: (1) the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Joy testified that she saw accused-appellant chase Miraflor out of the house and then stab her and hack her in the nape with a bolo. Intent to kill was established by the certificate of death reflecting the cause of death as "hacked wound, neck area, (R) dorsal area." The sudden attack from behind with a bolo ensured the killing; treachery was thus established, and accused-appellant was guilty of murder. With voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, Article 63 required reclusion perpetua. Following People vs. Jugueta, accused-appellant was liable to the heirs of each victim for civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱75,000.00, exemplary damages of ₱75,000.00, and temperate damages of ₱50,000.00, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the decision until full payment.

• Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance — Under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, insanity exempts an accused from criminal liability only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment at the time of or immediately preceding the commission of the crime. Mere abnormality of mental faculties or behavioral oddities does not exclude imputability. The accused bears the burden of proving insanity, and the plea is in the nature of confession and avoidance. A psychiatric diagnosis made long after the incident cannot establish the accused's mental state at the time of the offense. In this case, the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder was made more than a year after the killings, and the defense failed to prove that accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason at the time of or immediately preceding the crimes.

• Presumption of Sanity — Every person is presumed to have acted with a complete grasp of his mental faculties, and Article 800 of the Civil Code presumes everyone sane. The defense must overcome this presumption. Accused-appellant failed to do so.

• Voluntary Surrender — The elements are: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. A surrender is not spontaneous, and cannot be characterized as voluntary, where the clear reasons are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure the accused's safety. The Court applied the doctrine because accused-appellant spontaneously surrendered to Salaysay before arrest and voluntarily submitted himself to the authorities.

• Application of Indivisible Penalties under Article 63 — When the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this rule after appreciating voluntary surrender, imposing reclusion perpetua instead of death for parricide and murder.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two elements must be alleged and proved: (1) the means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Minor children, by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense; when an adult person attacks a child, treachery exists. The Court applied the doctrine to the killings of Rosana, Mariz, and Jannes, and to Miraflor, who was suddenly attacked from behind with a bolo.

• Murder — The elements are: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The killings of Rosana, Miraflor, Mariz, and Jannes were qualified by treachery and thus constituted murder.

• Parricide — Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, descendants, or spouse shall be guilty of parricide. The killing of Dioney, Jr., accused-appellant's two-year-old son, constituted parricide.

• Damages in Heinous Crimes — Following People vs. Jugueta, the Court awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages to the heirs of the victims, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of the decision until full payment.

• Appellate Review in Criminal Cases — An appeal throws the entire case wide open for review; the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those raised as errors. The appeal confers full jurisdiction over the case and renders the court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. The Court applied this doctrine to appreciate voluntary surrender, which the RTC and CA had overlooked.

• "Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will." — This passage states the controlling definition of insanity as an exempting circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and anchors the Court's rejection of accused-appellant's defense.
• "He who invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence; thus, for accused-appellant's defense of insanity to prosper, two (2) elements must concur: (1) that defendant's insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and (2) that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime." — This excerpt sets out the two-element test for the insanity defense and explains why a diagnosis made long after the incident is insufficient.
• "The Court notes that the RTC and the CA failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of accused-appellant's voluntary surrender, the elements of which are as follows: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary." — This passage identifies the overlooked mitigating circumstance and states the requisites of voluntary surrender applied in reducing the penalty under Article 63.
• "Settled is the rule that minor children, by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person attacks a child, treachery exists." — This excerpt states the rule that qualified the killings of the minor victims as murder and supports the finding of treachery.

• People vs. Belonio, 473 Phil. 637 (2004) — Cited for the presumption of sanity and the rule that the accused invoking insanity bears the burden of proving it.
• People vs. Opuran, 469 Phil. 698 (2004) — Cited for the Civil Code presumption that everyone is sane.
• People vs. Domingo, 599 Phil. 589 (2009) — Cited for the definition of insanity as a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act.
• People vs. Roa, G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017 — Cited for the rule that the plea of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance and for the explanation of the insanity defense.
• People vs. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017 — Cited for the two elements of insanity as an exempting circumstance and the rule that mere behavioral oddities cannot support a finding of insanity.
• People vs. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 — Cited for the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of the accused must relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.
• People vs. Placer, 719 Phil. 268 (2013) — Cited for the elements of voluntary surrender.
• Belbis, Jr. vs. People, 698 Phil. 706 (2012) — Cited for the rule that a surrender is not spontaneous, and cannot be voluntary, where the reasons are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure the accused's safety.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited as the controlling jurisprudence on the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages for heinous crimes.
• People vs. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018 — Cited for the elements of murder.
• People vs. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017 — Cited for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Raytos, G.R. No. 225623, June 7, 2017 — Cited for the characterization of alevosia as a deliberate, sudden, and unexpected assault from behind.
• People vs. Dasmarinas, G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017 — Cited for the two elements of treachery.
• People vs. Macaspac, G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017 — Cited for the rule that treachery, when alleged and proved, qualifies the killing and raises it to murder.
• Cirera vs. People, 739 Phil. 25 (2014) — Cited for the rule that intent to kill may be proved by the means used, the nature, location, and number of wounds, and the conduct of the malefactors; also cited for the rule that unexpectedness of the attack does not always equate to treachery.
• Escamilla vs. People, 705 Phil. 188 (2013) — Cited for the evidence that may prove intent to kill.
• People vs. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017 — Cited for the essence of treachery as an attack without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner.
• People vs. Oloverio, 756 Phil. 435 (2015) — Cited for the requirement of evidence that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of execution.
• Ramos vs. People, G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017, 815 SCRA 266 — Cited for the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case wide open for review and allows the appellate court to correct errors though unassigned.

• Article 12, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Exempts an imbecile or an insane person from criminal liability unless the latter acted during a lucid interval; defines insanity as a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act. The Court applied this provision in rejecting accused-appellant's insanity defense.
• Article 800, Civil Code — Presumes that everyone is sane. The Court relied on this presumption in requiring accused-appellant to prove insanity.
• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes parricide, including the killing of one's child. The Court applied this provision to the killing of Dioney, Jr., accused-appellant's son.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder when the killing is attended by qualifying circumstances such as treachery. The Court applied this provision to the killings of Rosana, Miraflor, Mariz, and Jannes.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides the rules for the application of indivisible penalties; when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this provision after appreciating voluntary surrender, imposing reclusion perpetua instead of death.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.