People of the Philippines vs. Judge Rafael R. Lagos, et al.

The grant of a demurrer to evidence, although ordinarily tantamount to an acquittal and protected by double jeopardy, may be annulled by certiorari under Rule 65 where the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; the confidential informant's testimony is not indispensable to the prosecution of illegal drug sale where the poseur-buyer who actively participated in the buy-bust operation testified to the consummated transaction.

Private respondents Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino, Jonathan Dy y Rubic, and Carlo Castro y Cando were charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, a special law penalizing the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, and transportation of dangerous drugs. The case was raffled to Branch 79 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by public respondent Judge Rafael R. Lagos. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is the petitioner in the present action.

On 30 March 2007, at 11:00 a.m., a confidential informant appeared before the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (AIDSOTF) of the Philippine National Police in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and relayed to Police Senior Inspector Fidel Fortaleza, Jr. that an individual using the alias "Brian" was engaged in the illegal sale of the prohibited drug "ecstasy" in BF Homes, Parañaque City. The informant further reported that "Brian," later identified as private respondent Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino, had promised a commission from any transaction the informant would help arrange. Acting as team leader, P S/Insp. Fortaleza assembled and briefed the team that would conduct the buy-bust operation, assigning Police Officer 2 Marlo V. Frando as poseur-buyer and PO2 Ruel P. Cubian as back-up, with the rest of the team serving as perimeter security. P S/Insp. Fortaleza and PO2 Leonard So prepared and dusted two ₱500 bills as buy-bust money, and the informant then called Estacio to say that a prospective buyer wished to purchase thirty tablets of ecstasy with a total value of ₱50,000. That afternoon, Estacio instructed them to proceed to Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, where the transaction was to take place.

At 11:00 p.m. of the same day, Estacio alighted from a Toyota Vios at the Jollibee branch located at the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Tandang Sora. PO2 Frando, accompanied by the informant, approached Estacio; after the latter was introduced to PO2 Frando as the prospective buyer, Estacio demanded to see the payment, but PO2 Frando asked him to first show the ecstasy pills. Estacio then opened the doors of the vehicle and introduced his two companions, Carlo and Jonathan — later identified as respondents Carlo Castro and Jonathan Dy — to PO2 Frando and the informant. Castro handed PO2 Frando one sealed plastic sachet containing several pink pills; the latter gave the "boodle" money to Dy and immediately removed his baseball cap, the prearranged signal to the rest of the buy-bust team that the transaction was complete.

PO2 Frando then introduced himself as a police officer and informed respondents of their constitutional rights. PO2 Cubian frisked Dy and recovered the buy-bust money. Respondents were escorted to the AIDSOTF office in Camp Crame, where they identified themselves as Castel Vinci Estacio y Tolentino, Carlo Castro y Cando, and Jonathan Dy y Rubic. As officer in charge of the inventory of the evidence seized, PO2 Cubian turned over the plastic sachet to PO3 Jose Rey Serrona, who was in charge of the investigation. On 31 March 2007, forensic chemist and Police Senior Inspector Yelah C. Manaog conducted a laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet, which was completed at 10:50 a.m. that same day; the thirty pink pills were found positive for methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) hydrochloride, commonly known as ecstasy, a dangerous drug.

An Information dated 3 April 2007 was filed against respondents for the sale of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Fernando Sagum, Jr. of the Quezon City RTC. Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty, and trial ensued, with the prosecution presenting the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P S/Insp. Manaog, and PO3 Serrona. After the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence on 17 November 2007, respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer as well as a Motion to Resolve their Petition for Bail. On 2 January 2008, Judge Sagum denied both motions; respondent Estacio then sought his inhibition, a move subsequently adopted by respondents Dy and Castro. On 15 January 2008, Judge Sagum inhibited himself, and on 31 January 2008 the case was re-raffled to public respondent Judge Lagos.

Judge Lagos issued the first assailed Order on 23 April 2008 granting respondents' Petition for Bail and allowing them to file their demurrer. On 24 June 2008, he issued the second assailed Order acquitting all the accused. On motion for reconsideration filed by the People, he issued the third assailed Order denying the motion and granting the accused's Motion to Withdraw Cash Bonds. In granting the demurrer, the trial court declared that the testimonies of PO2 Frando, PO2 Cubian, P S/Insp. Manaog, and AIDSOTF Chief Leonardo R. Suan were insufficient to prove the culmination of the illegal sale or to show their personal knowledge of the offer to sell and the acceptance thereof, and surmised that it was the confidential informant who had initiated the negotiation of the sale and should thus have been presented at trial.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The prosecution argued that Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the demurrer despite clear proof of the elements of the illegal sale, the existence of the corpus delicti, and the arrest in flagrante delicto.

• Double Jeopardy: Private respondents countered that the Petition is dismissible on the ground of double jeopardy.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Private respondents argued that the Petition is violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts.

• Double Jeopardy and Certiorari: Whether the acquittal of the accused by reason of the grant of a demurrer to evidence bars the People from assailing the same via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the Petition violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge Lagos committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the demurrer to evidence.
• Indispensability of the CI's Testimony: Whether the testimony of the confidential informant is indispensable to the prosecution's case for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

• Double Jeopardy and Certiorari: No. Although the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and entitles the accused to the right of repose, the rule on double jeopardy yields to judicial review via certiorari under Rule 65 where the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in such a case the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.
• Hierarchy of Courts: No. The Court granted the petition and resolved the merits, taking cognizance of the special civil action notwithstanding private respondents' invocation of the hierarchy of courts.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The trial court's assessment that the prosecution witnesses lacked personal knowledge of the illegal sale starkly contrasted with the records, which showed that the poseur-buyer and the other arresting officers witnessed the consummated transaction; the grant of the demurrer was unsupported by prevailing jurisprudence.
• Indispensability of the CI's Testimony: No. The testimony of the confidential informant is not indispensable, being merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug.

• Double Jeopardy and Certiorari: It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal, and an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court being endowed with the power to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The party asking for review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy. Because the trial court's grant of the demurrer was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence, it constituted grave abuse of discretion and the resulting acquittal was properly brought within the Court's certiorari jurisdiction.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The Court granted the petition and proceeded to resolve the merits of the special civil action, thereby taking cognizance of the action notwithstanding the private respondents' invocation of the hierarchy of courts.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The trial court's assessment that the witnesses had no personal knowledge of the illegal sale starkly contrasted with the facts borne out by the records. PO2 Frando was present during the negotiation and the actual buy-bust operation, himself acted as the poseur-buyer, and testified in open court. PO2 Cubian frisked the accused and recovered the buy-bust money, and he also testified in court. P S/Insp. Manaog testified as to the corpus delicti of the crime, and the thirty pills of ecstasy were duly marked, identified, and presented in court. The validity of buy-bust transactions as an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense is well-settled. The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs are proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In buy-bust operations, the delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the seller's receipt of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit, and courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of their official duties when they have no motive to testify falsely against the accused. No contention was made that the AIDSOTF members were motivated by ill will or malice, and no evidence was adduced to show that they neglected to perform their duties properly; hence their testimonies as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation deserved full faith and credence. The arrest of the respondents was made not on the basis of the informant's tip but of the actual buy-bust operation, in which they were caught in flagrante delicto engaged in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and the elements of the sale — the identity of the sellers, the delivery of the drugs, and the payment therefor — were confirmed in the presence of the officers. That the confidential informant initially provided the information did not negate the subsequent consummation of the illegal sale. The trial court's reliance on the 2004 case of People vs. Ong was misplaced, because Ong involved a conviction based on the lone testimony of one apprehending officer who was merely the deliveryman while the confidential informant acted as the poseur-buyer, whereas in this case PO2 Frando was a buy-bust team member who also acted as the poseur-buyer and whose testimony was a firsthand account of what transpired during the buy-bust. The grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion; the prosecution's evidence was, prima facie, sufficient to prove the criminal charges filed against respondents, subject to the defenses they may present in the course of a full-blown trial.

• Indispensability of the CI's Testimony: It is well-settled that the testimony of the confidential informant in the sale of illegal drugs is not indispensable. Requiring the informant to testify is an added imposition that runs contrary to jurisprudential doctrine, since the testimony of the informant would merely be corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. Except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the officers had motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that it was the informant who acted as the poseur-buyer, the informant's testimony may be dispensed with, as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts. None of these exceptions obtained in the present case, since the fact of the illegal sale had already been established by the testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team, and the trial court need not have characterized the informant's testimony as indispensable to the prosecution's case.

• Grave abuse of discretion as an exception to double jeopardy — The grant of a demurrer to evidence is tantamount to an acquittal, and an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This rule is not absolute: the rule on double jeopardy is subject to judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court being empowered to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The party seeking review must show: (a) a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; (b) a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; (c) an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or (d) a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. Where any of these is present, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.

• Elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs — The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs are (a) proof that the illicit transaction took place, and (b) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In buy-bust operations, the delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the seller's receipt of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.

• Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty — Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve faith and credit. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of regularity accorded to them in the performance of their official duties.

• Non-indispensability of the confidential informant's testimony — The testimony of the confidential informant in the sale of illegal drugs is not indispensable, being merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court. Informants are usually not presented because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. The informant's testimony may be dispensed with except when: (a) the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers; (b) there are reasons to believe that the officers had motives to falsely testify against the accused; or (c) it was the informant who acted as the poseur-buyer.

• "It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal." — This states the general rule on the finality of an acquittal following the grant of a demurrer, the baseline principle from which the Court then carves out the certiorari exception.
• "This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court." — This is the ratio of the procedural holding, establishing that double jeopardy does not bar certiorari review where grave abuse of discretion taints the acquittal.
• "The only elements necessary to consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence." — This is the canonical formulation of the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the substantive rule the trial court misapplied when it granted the demurrer.
• "It is well-settled that the testimony of the CI in the sale of illegal drugs is not indispensable." — This is the doctrinal core of the Court's rejection of the trial court's demand for the informant's testimony, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent dangerous drugs jurisprudence.

• People vs. Court of Appeals and Galicia, 545 Phil. 278, 292-293 (2007), citing People vs. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517, 556 (2000) — Cited for the general rule that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and that the acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose.
• De Vera vs. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, 7 April 2009, 584 SCRA 506 — Cited for the Supreme Court's constitutional power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
• People vs. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550, 567-568 — Cited for the requisites of grave abuse of discretion and for the rule that where such abuse is present the accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy.
• People vs. Chua, 416 Phil. 33, 56 (2001); People vs. Dumangay, G.R. No. 173483, 23 September 2008, 566 SCRA 290, 302 — Cited for the settled validity of buy-bust transactions as an effective means of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense.
• People vs. Unisa, G.R. No. 185721, 28 September 2011, 658 SCRA 305 — Cited for the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
• People vs. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 184807, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 216, 225-226 — Cited for the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and the credit accorded to police officers' testimonies absent proof of improper motive.
• People vs. Utoh, G.R. No. 196227, 14 November 2011 (Unsigned Resolution) — Cited and quoted for the rule that an arrest in a buy-bust operation is not based on the informant's tip but on the accused being caught in flagrante delicto, and that police officers conducting a buy-bust operation are authorized and duty-bound to apprehend violators and search them for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Andres, G.R. No. 193184, 7 February 2011, 641 SCRA 602, 610-611 — Cited for the rule that the confidential informant's testimony is not indispensable and is merely corroborative and cumulative of the poseur-buyer's eyewitness account.
• People vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 172369, 7 March 2007, 517 SCRA 749, 759-760 — Cited for the rule that where the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, it need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Ong (2004) — Distinguished. The trial court had relied on Ong on the supposition that its facts "mirror" those of the present case; the Court held there was no basis for the conclusion because Ong involved a conviction based on the lone testimony of one apprehending officer who was merely the deliveryman while the confidential informant acted as the poseur-buyer, whereas in the present case the poseur-buyer was himself a buy-bust team member who participated in the actual sale transaction.

• Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 — The provision penalizing the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, under which the Information dated 3 April 2007 was filed against the respondents and which supplied the elements the Court analyzed in assessing the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle for the special civil action for certiorari, invoked by the People to annul the trial court's orders notwithstanding the general rule on the finality of an acquittal.
• Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Cited in the Chief Justice's certification that the conclusions in the Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

• Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro
• Lucas P. Bersamin
• Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
• Bienvenido L. Reyes