People of the Philippines vs. Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban

A buy-bust operation is a valid form of entrapment and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures; evidence seized from the accused is admissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest, and the offense is consummated by the mere delivery of the prohibited drug even without proof that marked money was paid.

Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged with violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675. That law penalizes the sale, delivery, or distribution of prohibited drugs. The prosecution’s case was built on an anti-narcotics buy-bust operation conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit of NARCOM.

Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal Case No. 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila with violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, for conspiring to sell, deliver, or give away marijuana. The information alleged one cigarette foil wrapper containing marijuana and two cigarette foil wrappers containing marijuana. The charge stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit of NARCOM at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila, at around 2:30 p.m. on May 4, 1987, after a confidential report from an informant named Arnel. The team was composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as team leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer, and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia. Arcoy, with Arnel as companion, was assigned to buy P10.00 worth of marijuana from the two accused.

According to the prosecution, Arcoy first negotiated with Juan de la Cruz. When Arcoy said he was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana; Beltran took it from his pants’ pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After Arcoy ascertained that the foil contained marijuana, he gave the prearranged signal by scratching his head. His teammates converged, identified themselves as NARCOM agents, and arrested De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill, Exhibit C-1, used by Arcoy was found in De la Cruz’s possession together with two aluminum foils containing marijuana, Exhibits B-2 and B-3.

The defense gave a different account. Juan de la Cruz claimed that he was suffering from loose bowel movement and remained in bed at their place at 3034 Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila, throughout May 4, 1987; he never left, had no visitor that day, and was never engaged in selling marijuana. He alleged that NARCOM agents raided his place without a search warrant or his permission, that one agent searched thoroughly, another guarded the door, and a third merely observed, and that his place was ransacked and he was bodily searched. Reynaldo Beltran claimed that he was arrested earlier by the same group while playing pool at Aling Ely’s place along Maliclic St. that afternoon and was taken after Arnel pointed to him as being engaged in selling marijuana. Both accused were brought to a parked vehicle and then to NARCOM headquarters for investigation, where they first learned that they were being charged with selling marijuana.

After a comparative evaluation of the conflicting versions, the trial court found the prosecution’s version more worthy of credit. It rejected the defense of denial and the claim of unlawful raid, and found no motive for the military to fabricate evidence. The trial court’s factual findings rested on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the NARCOM personnel, and on its assessment of the credibility of the defense witnesses Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat.

• Constitutionality of Buy-Bust Operation: Accused-appellant Beltran argued that a buy-bust operation to enforce Republic Act No. 6425 is unconstitutional and that any evidence acquired under such method should be inadmissible, being no different from seizure of evidence from one’s person or abode without a search warrant.
• Corruption and Abuse: Accused-appellant argued that the buy-bust operation should be declared illegal because it breeds corruption among police and military officers through planting of evidence for purposes of extortion.
• Absence of Civilian Witness: Accused-appellant argued that the confiscated marijuana sticks should not be given probative value because no civilian or neutral person signed as witness to its taking; if the operation were true, at least one civic-minded citizen could have been convinced by the police to witness it.
• Identity of Confiscated Marijuana and Exhibit E: Accused-appellant argued that Exhibits B-2, B-3, and B-4 should not be considered the very ones confiscated; if they were, the original receipt prepared at the scene by the poseur-buyer would not have been thrown away, and Exhibit E should be given no probative value because it was executed by someone who did not actually confiscate the marijuana.
• Marked Money: Accused-appellant argued that the buy-bust operation should not be given probative value because the alleged marked money could not be identified by team leader T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas; marked money must be recorded, if not photographed, to be admissible as evidence.
• Defense Witnesses: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in not giving value to the testimony of two disinterested defense witnesses, Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat, whose testimony substantially corroborated that of the accused.
• Motive to Fabricate Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in concluding there was no motive for the military to manufacture evidence, asserting that apprehensions of this kind are made to fill up a quota of arrests to comply with standard operating procedure and efficiency reports.
• Non-presentation of Informer: Accused-appellant reproached the prosecution for not presenting the civilian informer as a witness.

• Validity of Buy-Bust Operation: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, explained that a buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto; it is essentially entrapment because the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime.
• Warrantless Search: Respondent maintained that although a buy-bust operation involves seizure of evidence from one’s person without a search warrant, a search warrant is not necessary because the search is incident to a lawful arrest; a peace officer may arrest without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
• Exhibit E: Respondent argued that Exhibit E is actually based on, and is merely a clearer copy of, the receipt prepared at the scene of the crime by P/Pfc. Arcoy.

• Constitutionality of Buy-Bust Operation: Whether a buy-bust operation conducted to enforce Republic Act No. 6425 is unconstitutional and whether evidence acquired through it is inadmissible for being obtained without a search warrant.
• Warrantless Search and Arrest: Whether the warrantless seizure of evidence from the accused during a buy-bust operation is valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest.
• Absence of Civilian Witness: Whether the confiscated marijuana foils should be given probative value despite the absence of a civilian or neutral witness to their taking.
• Identity of Confiscated Marijuana and Exhibit E: Whether Exhibits B-2, B-3, and B-4 were the very items confiscated and whether Exhibit E should be given probative value despite being prepared by Sgt. Jimenez rather than the poseur-buyer.
• Marked Money: Whether the failure of the team leader to identify the marked money, or the non-presentation of the marked money, invalidates the prosecution’s case.
• Defense Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the testimony of Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat.
• Motive to Fabricate Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in concluding there was no motive for the military to manufacture evidence.
• Non-presentation of Informer: Whether the prosecution’s failure to present the civilian informer as a witness weakens its case.

• Constitutionality of Buy-Bust Operation: No. A buy-bust operation is a valid form of entrapment, not an unconstitutional method of enforcing Republic Act No. 6425; it does not violate the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
• Warrantless Search and Arrest: Yes. The warrantless seizure of evidence from the accused during the buy-bust operation was valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest, and a peace officer may arrest without a warrant when the offense is committed in his presence.
• Absence of Civilian Witness: Yes. The confiscated marijuana foils may be given probative value despite the absence of a civilian or neutral witness; such absence does not undermine the prosecution’s case.
• Identity of Confiscated Marijuana and Exhibit E: Yes. Exhibit E was properly given probative value because it was a clearer copy of the receipt prepared at the scene by the poseur-buyer, and Sgt. Jimenez had personal knowledge of the facts.
• Marked Money: No. The failure to identify or present the marked money does not invalidate the conviction; the offense is consummated by the mere delivery of the prohibited drug.
• Defense Witnesses: No. The trial court did not err in rejecting the testimony of Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat; its credibility findings are entitled to great weight.
• Motive to Fabricate Evidence: No. The claim of motive to fabricate evidence was a bare, unsupported allegation, and no cogent motive was established.
• Non-presentation of Informer: No. The non-presentation of the civilian informer did not weaken the prosecution’s case; the accused could have compelled the witness’s testimony, and the number of prosecution witnesses is discretionary.

• Constitutionality of Buy-Bust Operation: The ruling acknowledged that the poseur-buyer method is not always reliable and is susceptible to mistakes, harassment, extortion, and abuse, and that by its nature the possibility of abuse is great. It nevertheless declined to shackle narcotics agents, whose task is formidable and risky, lest their efforts be hampered. The Solicitor General’s explanation was adopted: a buy-bust operation traps a malefactor in flagrante delicto and is essentially entrapment because the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit the crime; the criminal intent originated from the accused. Entrapment is the employment of ways and means to trap or capture a lawbreaker and is often the only effective way to apprehend a criminal in the act. Thus, the operation did not violate the Constitution.
• Warrantless Search and Arrest: Although a buy-bust operation involves seizure of evidence from the person without a search warrant, no warrant was necessary because the search was incident to a lawful arrest. Under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a peace officer may arrest without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In buy-bust operations, violators are invariably caught red-handed. There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles were admissible.
• Absence of Civilian Witness: The absence of a civilian or neutral witness did not undermine the prosecution. The natural reaction of a civilian is to avoid involvement in a criminal case because of inconvenience, time, fear of reprisal, and reticence. Other witnesses would only be cumulative or corroborative. Credence was accorded to the prosecution’s evidence, mainly police testimonies, and law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty absent proof to the contrary.
• Identity of Confiscated Marijuana and Exhibit E: Exhibit E was based on, and was merely a clearer copy of, the receipt prepared at the scene by P/Pfc. Arcoy. The draft receipt had to be prepared hurriedly and was not clearly written, so Sgt. Vicente Jimenez mechanically transferred its entries into a more legible copy. Sgt. Jimenez, a member of the team, had personal knowledge of the facts in both receipts and was an eyewitness to the events.
• Marked Money: The marked money was in the possession of P/Pfc. Arcoy, the poseur-buyer. In the transaction, the foil of marijuana was handed to Arcoy by appellant Beltran, and Arcoy gave the money to Juan de la Cruz. Even if the money was not presented in court, this did not militate against the prosecution. There was no need to prove that the marked money was handed to the appellants in payment, because the crime could be consummated by the mere delivery of the prohibited drugs. The law proscribes not only selling but also delivering; knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense.
• Defense Witnesses: No reason existed to disturb the trial court’s rejection of the testimony of Lolita Mendoza and Maribeth Manapat. The time-honored principle is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court, because the trial court saw and heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The exceptions to this rule did not obtain.
• Motive to Fabricate Evidence: The imputation of insidious motives to the military was based on bare, unsupported allegations. From the evidence, no reason appeared why the prosecution witnesses would fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime. The defense established no cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge the accused with peddling marijuana. The trial court found not even a breath, much less an accusation, that the military and police personnel involved were engaged in such nefarious activities.
• Non-presentation of Informer: The non-presentation of a certain witness by the prosecution is not a sufficiently plausible defense. If the accused believed the informer’s testimony was important, he should have availed of it, even by compulsory judicial process. The non-presentation of some prosecution witnesses does not detract from the prosecution’s case, since the number of witnesses to be called is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officers.

• Buy-Bust Operation as Entrapment — A buy-bust operation is a method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto. It is essentially entrapment because the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit a crime; the criminal intent originates from the accused. It is a valid and effective means of apprehending drug peddlers and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, the NARCOM buy-bust operation was upheld despite the Court’s recognition that the method is susceptible to abuse.
• Search Incident to a Lawful Arrest — A warrantless search is valid when it is incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may arrest without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In a buy-bust operation, the violator is caught red-handed, so the seizure of evidence from his person is lawful and the evidence is admissible. Applied here, the marijuana foils and marked money were admissible.
• Consummation of the Drug Offense by Delivery — Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the offense is consummated not only by selling but also by delivering a prohibited drug. Knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense. Thus, proof that marked money was paid is not essential to conviction. Applied here, the non-presentation or non-identification of the marked money did not invalidate the conviction.
• Credibility of Witnesses on Appeal — Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate court, because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The rule admits exceptions, but none obtained in this case. Applied here, the rejection of the defense witnesses was sustained.
• Presumption of Regularity in Performance of Duty — Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. Applied here, credence was accorded to the prosecution’s evidence, which consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen.
• Non-presentation of Witnesses and Informers — The non-presentation of a witness by the prosecution is not a sufficiently plausible defense. If the accused believes the testimony is important, he should avail of it, even by compulsory judicial process. The number of prosecution witnesses to be called is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecuting officers. Applied here, the non-presentation of the civilian informer did not weaken the prosecution’s case.
• Absence of Civilian Witness in Buy-Bust Operations — The absence of a civilian or neutral witness to the confiscation does not undermine the prosecution’s case. Civilians naturally avoid involvement because of inconvenience, time, fear of reprisal, and reticence. Applied here, the absence of a civilian witness did not affect the probative value of the confiscated marijuana.

• "We are not, however, inclined to shackle the hands of narcotics agents whose task, as it is, is already formidable and attended with great risk, lest their dedicated efforts for the apprehension and successful prosecution of prohibited drug violators be unduly hampered." — This passage states the Court’s balancing rationale for upholding buy-bust operations despite their recognized susceptibility to abuse.
• "While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest." — This is the core ruling on the constitutionality of the warrantless seizure during a buy-bust operation.
• "In fact, there was even no need to prove that the marked money was handed to the appellants in payment of the goods. The crime could have been consummated by the mere delivery of the prohibited drugs. What the law proscribes is not only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited to, the act of delivering." — This passage defines the consummation of the drug offense and explains why the marked money need not be presented.
• "The absence of any civilian witness should not undermine the case for the prosecution. The natural reaction of a civilian to inhibit himself from being a witness to a crime is understandable." — This passage rejects the argument that the absence of a civilian witness invalidates the confiscation and prosecution.

• People vs. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151 (1986) — Cited in the discussion of the buy-bust operation’s susceptibility to mistakes, harassment, extortion, and abuse; it supports the Court’s acknowledgment of the risks while still upholding the operation.
• People vs. Ale, 145 SCRA 50 (1986) — Cited for the proposition that by the very nature of the anti-narcotics operation, the possibility of abuse is great.
• People vs. Gatong-o, et al., 168 SCRA 716 (1988) — Cited for the definition of entrapment and the principle that it is often the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of committing the offense.
• People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988) — Cited for the judicial experience that in buy-bust operations, violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act are invariably caught red-handed.
• People vs. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646 (1988) — Cited for the presumption that law enforcers have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.
• People vs. Polo, 147 SCRA 651 (1987) — Cited for the rule that even if the marked money is not presented in court, it does not militate against the prosecution’s case.
• People vs. Bantac, et al., 167 SCRA 109 (1988) and People vs. Espera, et al., G.R. No. 67173, July 31, 1989 — Cited for the principle that the trial court’s findings on witness credibility are given great weight and respect on appeal.
• People vs. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538 (1987) and People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-32864, March 8, 1989 — Cited for the rule that the non-presentation of certain prosecution witnesses is not a plausible defense and does not detract from the prosecution’s case.

• Section 4, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675 — This provision prohibits the sale, delivery, giving away, or distribution of prohibited drugs and was the basis of the charge against the accused. The conviction was affirmed under this provision.
• Section 21, Article IV, Republic Act No. 6425 — Cited in the information in relation to Section 4, Article II; the accused were charged with violation of Section 4 in relation to Section 21. The Court affirmed the conviction under the charge.
• Section 2(f), Article I, in relation to Section 4, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — Cited to support the ruling that knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, by any means, with or without consideration, consummates the offense. Applied here, delivery of the marijuana foil consummated the offense even without proof of payment.
• Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Cited to support the validity of the warrantless search as incident to a lawful arrest. Applied here, the seizure of evidence from the accused during the buy-bust operation was lawful.
• Section 5(a), Rule 113, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — Cited to support the warrantless arrest of a person who, in the officer’s presence, has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Applied here, the accused were caught in flagrante delicto during the buy-bust operation.

Justices Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento concurred.