People of the Philippines vs. Joven Bausing and Manuel Loroso

Defense of a relative cannot be appreciated absent unlawful aggression, and an accused who admits the killing must prove the justifying circumstance by strong, clear, and convincing evidence; conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts, and treachery qualifies the killing where one accused restrains the victim while the other stabs him.

Joven Bausing was the father of Valentin Bausing, also called Rodolfo. Manuel Loroso owned the billiard hall in Barangay Consuelo, General Luna, Surigao del Norte, where the incident occurred. Alexander Mantilla was an incumbent Barangay Councilman and a Ronda Member of the same barangay. The Revised Penal Code provisions on defense of a relative and treachery supplied the legal backdrop to the appeal.

On August 3, 1978, at about 9:15 in the evening, Alexander Mantilla, incumbent Barangay Councilman and Ronda Member of Barangay Consuelo, General Luna, Surigao del Norte, was performing his official duties at the billiard hall of Manuel Loroso. Present were Ruirino Crisologo, Domingo Teraytay, Estanislao Sunico, Aureliano Pacanor, Segundiano Pacanor, Edisimo Minglana, Barangay Captain Rufo Bunga, Pepito Tokong, Juanito Tokong, Manuel Loroso, Joven Bausing, and Valentin Bausing. Two billiard tables were in use, with Domingo Teraytay, Barangay Captain Rufo Bunga, Juanito Tokong, and Estanislao Sunico playing.

The game was interrupted when Domingo Teraytay and Manuel Loroso grappled for a knife protruding from Teraytay’s back pocket. The knife was taken with the assistance of Estanislao Sunico and Aureliano Pacanor, and Loroso, as owner of the billiard hall, confiscated it to prevent trouble. Thereafter, Valentin Bausing, sometimes called Rodolfo, clattered the billiard balls, prompting Mantilla to admonish him to stop because he was not concerned with the game.

According to the prosecution eyewitnesses, without any word, Manuel Loroso came from behind Mantilla and held the latter’s hands while they were raised. Joven Bausing suddenly appeared with an unsheathed sharp-pointed bolo hidden inside an umbrella and thrust it many times upon Mantilla. Mantilla was released only by Loroso after the victim was staggering unconsciously, and he later fell dead outside the billiard hall. Crisologo testified that he saw Loroso and Teraytay grappling; that Valentin Bausing made trouble and was advised by Mantilla; that Loroso approached the deceased from behind and held his hands; that Joven Bausing ran toward them and repeatedly thrust a bolo at the victim, who kicked in a futile attempt to defend himself; that the victim was hit below the left breast and right breast; and that, when weakened and down, Joven Bausing again stabbed the helpless victim on the mouth before Bausing and Loroso walked away. Pepito Tokong, Domingo Teraytay, and Edisimo Minglana corroborated Crisologo in all material points. All witnesses gave the same version: the deceased was trying to stop Valentin Bausing from making trouble when Loroso approached from behind and held both hands, while Joven Bausing, Valentin’s father, suddenly attacked and stabbed Mantilla several times. As the victim staggered toward the door, he fell flat on his face; not satisfied, Bausing held the fallen victim’s head and stabbed him on the armpit, hacked his left arm biceps, forearm, and mouth.

The autopsy report and testimony of Dr. Prospero Tayco showed that the deceased suffered seventeen incised wounds, including a “through and through” incised wound of the heart, 21 inches long with entrance at the apex of the heart, which was the primary cause of death, with massive blood loss secondary thereto, aside from numerous abrasions and avulsions. Both Valentin and Joven Bausing suffered no injury.

Joven Bausing admitted the killing but invoked defense of a relative, claiming he acted in defense of his son Rodulfo Bausing. Manuel Loroso denied participation, claiming he was busy pumping air into his petromax lamp lighting the billiard hall at the time and ran away as soon as he saw blood after the second thrust by Bausing; he faulted the trial court for classifying his denial as alibi. Ederesa Tokong testified that after the killing, Loroso slept in the house of the spouses Tokong with bloodstains on his shirt and trousers, and that the blanket and beddings he used were also stained with blood. Bausing claimed he voluntarily surrendered to Pat. Arturo Esparrago of the Surigao del Norte Police Station on the night of the incident, but records showed that appellants were arrested on August 28, 1978, as per the return made by Station Commander Saturnino Plaza of the General Luna, Surigao del Norte Police Force.

The trial court credited the eyewitness accounts that Loroso held Mantilla’s hands from behind while Bausing stabbed him, found that both appellants acted in concert, and rejected Bausing’s claim of defense of relative and Loroso’s denial. It also found that the killing was attended by treachery and that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was present.

• Loroso’s Participation and Conspiracy: Appellant Loroso argued that the lower court erred in holding that he held Alexander Mantilla from behind while Mantilla was being stabbed by Joven Bausing, that he and Bausing conspired to kill Mantilla, and that his defense was alibi, thus erring in convicting him of murder.
• Ederesa Tokong’s Testimony: Appellant Loroso argued that the trial court erred in holding that Ederesa Tokong’s testimony had been unrebutted and therefore fatal to the defense; he claimed that he testified as a sur-rebuttal witness and rebutted Tokong’s testimony point by point.
• Defense of Relative: Appellant Joven Bausing argued that the lower court erred in not believing his defense that he was acting in defense of his son, Rodulfo Bausing, and in holding that his defense lacked the quantum of proof required by law.
• Treachery: Appellants argued that the lower court erred in holding that the crime committed was qualified with treachery.
• Penalty and Voluntary Surrender: Appellant Joven Bausing argued that, assuming he had to be convicted, the lower court erred in convicting him of murder and not only of homicide and in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.

• Defense of Relative: Whether the trial court erred in not believing Joven Bausing’s defense that he acted in defense of his son Rodulfo Bausing and in holding that the defense lacked the quantum of proof required by law.
• Loroso’s Participation and Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Manuel Loroso held Alexander Mantilla from behind while the latter was stabbed by Joven Bausing, that Loroso and Bausing conspired in killing Mantilla, and that Loroso’s defense was alibi, thus erring in convicting Loroso of murder.
• Ederesa Tokong’s Testimony: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Ederesa Tokong’s testimony had been unrebutted and therefore fatal to the defense.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the crime committed was qualified with treachery.
• Penalty and Voluntary Surrender: Whether, assuming Joven Bausing had to be convicted, the trial court erred in convicting him of murder and not only of homicide and in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor.

• Defense of Relative: No. The requisites under Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, Revised Penal Code, were not met because unlawful aggression by the deceased was not established; Bausing admitted the killing and failed to prove the justifying circumstance by strong, clear, and convincing evidence.
• Loroso’s Participation and Conspiracy: No. Positive eyewitness testimony established that Loroso held Mantilla’s hands from behind while Bausing stabbed him; conspiracy was inferred from their concerted acts, and Loroso’s denial could not prevail over positive identification.
• Ederesa Tokong’s Testimony: No. The trial court meant only that Loroso failed to rebut Tokong’s testimony that he slept in the Tokong house with bloodstained clothing and beddings, not that no sur-rebuttal witness was presented.
• Treachery: No. The killing was qualified by treachery because the victim was unarmed and deprived of any means to defend himself while Loroso held his hands and Bausing stabbed him.
• Penalty and Voluntary Surrender: No. Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated because the return of the warrant of arrest showed appellants were in fact arrested on August 28, 1978; the conviction for murder was proper.

• Defense of Relative: Under Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, Revised Penal Code, defense of a relative requires (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) where the provocation was given by the person attacked, the defender had no part therein. The first requisite is indispensable; without unlawful aggression there is nothing to prevent or repel. Unlawful aggression must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude, and the accused must prove a positively strong act of real aggression putting life or personal safety in real peril. Here, Bausing admitted killing Mantilla, so he bore the burden of proving the justifying circumstance by strong, clear, and convincing evidence, not merely by relying on the prosecution’s weakness. All four prosecution eyewitnesses testified that the deceased committed no unlawful aggression; he merely admonished Valentin Bausing to stop meddling with the game. The nature, character, location, and number of wounds—seventeen incised wounds, including the through-and-through heart wound—belied the claim that Mantilla was the unlawful aggressor, especially since Valentin and Joven Bausing suffered no injury. The defense of relative therefore failed.
• Loroso’s Participation and Conspiracy: Loroso’s unsubstantiated disclaimer of participation could not be given credence. His self-serving denial could not prevail over the forthright and positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who uniformly pointed to him as having held both hands of Mantilla from behind and raised them upward while Joven Bausing suddenly appeared, unsheathed the bolo hidden inside the umbrella, and stabbed the victim continuously. Loroso released his hold only when Mantilla was already on the verge of death. The rule is that greater weight is given to positive identification by prosecution witnesses than to the accused’s plain denial. Conspiracy was inferred from the concerted acts of both accused: they approached the victim almost simultaneously; one held the victim’s hands tightly from behind and raised them upward, while the other delivered the fatal stabs. The manner by which Loroso held the victim’s hands prevented the latter from defending himself and without that act the crime would not have been accomplished, making Loroso a conspirator and a principal by indispensable cooperation. Where the accused’s acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part to complete it, with concerted and cooperative acts indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments, conspiracy is established and the act of one is the act of all.
• Ederesa Tokong’s Testimony: The argument that the trial court erred in treating Ederesa Tokong’s testimony as unrebutted was devoid of merit. What the trial court meant was that Loroso failed to rebut Tokong’s testimony that after the killing he slept in the house of the spouses Tokong with bloodstains on his shirt and trousers, and that the blanket and beddings he used were also stained with blood. The pronouncement did not mean that no sur-rebuttal witness was ever presented by the defense.
• Treachery: The killing was murder qualified by treachery. The victim was not only unarmed but was also deprived of every means to defend himself from the treacherous attack. Loroso held both hands of the deceased while Joven Bausing suddenly appeared and started stabbing him. In People vs. Mahusay, the Court ruled that there is treachery where the victim was held tightly by one of the accused before his co-accused stabbed him, as in this case. The appellants executed the crime in a manner that tended directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to themselves arising from the defense the deceased might have made, pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty and Voluntary Surrender: The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender invoked by Joven Bausing deserved scant consideration. While Bausing claimed to have voluntarily surrendered to Pat. Arturo Esparrago of the Surigao del Norte Police Station on the night of the incident, the records showed that appellants were in fact arrested on August 28, 1978, as per the return made by Station Commander Saturnino Plaza of the General Luna, Surigao del Norte Police Force. Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the return of the warrant of arrest showed that the appellant was in fact arrested. The conviction for murder, rather than homicide, was therefore proper because treachery qualified the killing.

• Defense of a relative — A justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, Revised Penal Code, requiring (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) if the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the defender had no part therein. The first requisite is indispensable; unlawful aggression must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger, not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude, and must be proved by a positively strong act of real aggression putting life or personal safety in real peril. In this case, no unlawful aggression by Mantilla was established; he merely admonished Valentin Bausing, and Bausing admitted the killing but failed to prove the defense.
• Burden of proving a justifying circumstance after admitting the killing — Where the accused admits killing the victim but invokes a justifying circumstance, the burden shifts to the accused to prove the justifying circumstance by strong, clear, and convincing evidence; the accused cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution. Bausing’s admission of the killing and his failure to prove unlawful aggression defeated his defense of a relative.
• Positive identification versus denial — Greater weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses than to the accused’s plain denial of participation. Loroso’s denial could not overcome the eyewitnesses’ uniform testimony that he held Mantilla’s hands from behind while Bausing stabbed him.
• Conspiracy inferred from concerted acts — Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused when they point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Where one accused performs one part and another performs another part to complete the same object, with concerted and cooperative acts, the act of one is the act of all. The Court applied this to Loroso’s restraint of the victim and Bausing’s stabbing, making Loroso a conspirator and principal by indispensable cooperation.
• Treachery — Under Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code, there is treachery when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the victim might make. Treachery exists where the victim is held tightly by one accused before his co-accused stabs him. The victim’s restraint and unarmed condition qualified the killing as murder.
• Voluntary surrender — Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the return of the warrant of arrest shows that the accused was in fact arrested. Bausing’s claim of surrender was negated by the record showing arrest on August 28, 1978.

• "In order that the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative may be properly invoked, the following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein (Art. 11, par. 1 & 2, Revised Penal Code)." — States the requisites for defense of a relative, the justifying circumstance Bausing invoked and failed to establish.
• "The first requisite is indispensable. There can be no self-defense unless it is proven that there had been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by the assailant." — Emphasizes that unlawful aggression is the threshold requirement; its absence defeated Bausing’s defense.
• "The presence of conspiracy was inferred from the concerted acts of both the accused. They both approached the victim almost simultaneously. As one held the victim's hands tightly from behind and raised them upward, the other delivered the fatal stabs which caused Mantilla's death." — States the ratio for finding conspiracy and Loroso’s liability as a co-conspirator.
• "In People v. Mahusay (138 SCRA 452 [1985]), this Court ruled that there is treachery where the victim was held tightly by one of the accused before his co-accused stabbed him, as in the case at bar." — Supplies the controlling formulation of treachery applied to the killing.

• People vs. Malazzab, 160 SCRA 123 [1988] — Cited for the rule that if there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel.
• Ortega vs. Sandiganbayan [1990] — Cited alongside Malazzab for the same rule on unlawful aggression as an indispensable requisite.
• People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149 [1989] — Cited for the requirement that unlawful aggression be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.
• Pacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983] — Cited for the requirement that the accused present proof of a positively strong act of real aggression.
• People vs. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285 [1989] — Cited for the rule that an accused who admits the killing must prove the justifying circumstance by strong, clear, and convincing evidence and cannot rely on the prosecution’s weakness.
• People vs. Marciales, 166 SCRA 436 [1988] — Cited for the principle that the nature, character, location, and number of wounds may belie a claim that the deceased was the unlawful aggressor.
• People vs. Bocatcat, Sr., 188 SCRA 175 [1990] — Cited for the rule that weak denials cannot prevail over clear and positive testimonies of eyewitnesses.
• People vs. de Mesa, 188 SCRA 48 [1990] — Cited for the settled rule that greater weight is given to positive identification by prosecution witnesses than to the accused’s plain denial.
• People vs. Mahusay, 138 SCRA 452 [1985] — Cited as the controlling precedent for treachery where the victim was held tightly by one accused before his co-accused stabbed him.
• People vs. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 [1985] — Cited for the definition of treachery as execution of the crime in a manner that tends directly and specially to ensure it without risk to the offender.
• People vs. Martinez, 127 SCRA 260 [1985] — Cited for the principle that one who holds the victim’s hands, without which act the crime would not have been accomplished, is a conspirator and principal by indispensable cooperation.
• People vs. Manlolo, 169 SCRA 394 [1989] — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from concerted and cooperative acts indicating a joint purpose and design.
• People vs. Monadi, 97 Phil. 575 [1955] — Cited for the rule that conspiracy can be inferred from the acts of the accused when they point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests.

• Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative and its requisites. The Court applied it and found the defense unavailable because unlawful aggression by the deceased was not established.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the victim might make. The Court applied it because the victim was unarmed and restrained while Bausing stabbed him.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.