People of the Philippines vs. Jose Torrefiel

Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused, and for alibi to prosper the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement; it may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during, and right after the commission of the crime, and once established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

Jose Torrefiel and the Mangilog family were neighbors in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan. Torrefiel had established residence in that barangay after marrying a resident there, although his parents lived in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. His house stood about one hundred fifty meters from that of the Mangilogs, and the two households had known each other for years — Torrefiel would visit the Mangilogs, usually for coffee, and Leopoldo Mangilog would likewise visit Torrefiel's house. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but the death penalty was proscribed at the time the crimes were committed on May 26, 1989.

Jose Torrefiel was charged, together with Hilario Masgong alias "Mark," Casiano Masgong alias "Manny," Saturnino Suyod alias "Ka Eddie," Jerry Delicano alias "Ka Cocoy," Luciano Solanoy, Jr. alias "Ka Balot," Noel Semira alias "Ka Nido," Ricky David alias "Ka Macky," and Alex Francisco alias "Ka Jing," with Murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and with Robbery in Criminal Case No. 2911. Torrefiel and the Mangilog family were neighbors in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan. Torrefiel had established residence in that barangay after marrying a resident there, although his parents lived in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. His house stood about one hundred fifty meters from that of the Mangilogs, and the two households had known each other for years — Torrefiel would visit the Mangilogs, usually for coffee, and Leopoldo Mangilog would likewise visit Torrefiel's house.

At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989, Realidad Mangilog woke up to prepare breakfast while her husband Leopoldo and her son Reynaldo were about to join her downstairs. When the kitchen backdoor was opened, Torrefiel, armed with a bolo and a handgun, entered first, followed in order by Masiano Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex Francisco, Saturnino Suyod, and Noel alias "Nido," all armed with long firearms. The group greeted Leopoldo with "How are you Tay?", to which he replied "as usual." Leopoldo served the newcomers coffee, and because the coffee was insufficient, Realidad asked Hermogenes Calizo, then the errand boy of the Mangilogs, to buy more from the store. The group did not touch or taste the coffee; instead, Torrefiel, Casiano Masgong, and Satur Suyod aimed their guns at Leopoldo and shot him to death.

Simultaneously, Reynaldo, who was then taking a bath in the bathroom located outside the house, was shot and stabbed by the other members of the group who had not entered the house. After the killings, the accused ransacked the house and took P500.00 in cash, a wrist watch, kitchen wares, grocery items, chickens, and a guitar. Before leaving, they fired their guns at random, blaming the victims for the fact that the military was running after them, and told the people along the road that "the fish is okey and could be ready to be butchered."

Torrefiel invoked alibi. He claimed that at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989, he was at the house of Barangay Captain Benedicto Puod in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, which could be reached in an hour and a half from Barangay Naligusan. He had gone on vacation to Barangay Agbalogo on May 22, 1989 and had attended the fiesta there on May 25, 1989, remaining in the barangay thereafter upon his wife's advice not to return to Barangay Naligusan because the situation there was "somewhat hot." Benedicto Puod confirmed that he and Torrefiel were together drinking alcoholic drinks from 7:00 to 11:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989 on the occasion of his child's birthday. Pedro Tosio testified that Torrefiel was at his house in Barangay Agbalogo in the morning until about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1989, the day of the fiesta, and that he also saw Torrefiel pass by his house on May 26, 1989.

Against the alibi, Realidad Mangilog positively identified Torrefiel as one of the armed men responsible for the death of her husband and son; she testified that she recognized Torrefiel leading the group, followed by Masiano Masgong alias "Manny," Alex Francisco, Satur or Saturnino Suyod, and Noel Semira alias "Nido." On further questioning, however, she named Satur Suyod, Casiano Masgong, and Hilario Masgong as the persons who gunned down her husband and did not mention Torrefiel among the assailants. Two other prosecution witnesses corroborated Torrefiel's presence at the scene: Coreto Maguirang testified that while watching over his carabao grazing at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989, he saw Torrefiel and his group pass by him at a distance of about ten meters, heading toward the house of Leopoldo Mangilog, and that he could not be mistaken as to Torrefiel's identity because he had on several occasions seen him with the same group of armed men; Hermogenes Calizo claimed that he had seen Torrefiel face to face in the men's house of the Mangilogs that same morning shortly before the incident, he having been sent out by Realidad to buy coffee and thus not having witnessed the actual killing.

• Alibi (Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2911): Accused-appellant maintained that he was not at the scene of the incident at the time it occurred, having been at Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan, and that he could not have murdered Leopoldo Mangilog or robbed the Mangilogs of their personal belongings.
• Non-Participation in the Killing of Reynaldo Mangilog (Criminal Case No. 2910): Accused-appellant contended that he had nothing to do with the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog, relying on the testimony of Realidad Mangilog to the effect that Reynaldo was shot and stabbed to death by the members of the group who stationed themselves outside the house.

• Treachery: The Solicitor General observed that the killing of the victims was qualified by treachery, as alleged in the informations.

• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi may prevail over the positive identification of the accused-appellant.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established, rendering accused-appellant liable as a co-principal for the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog notwithstanding his non-participation therein.
• Treachery and Aggravating Circumstances: Whether treachery qualified the killings, and whether abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men were absorbed by treachery.
• Penalty: Whether reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty for each case of murder.

• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused, and for alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene at the time of its commission.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during, and right after the shooting, and once established, all the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation.
• Treachery and Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Treachery qualified the killings, the victims having been attacked without opportunity to defend themselves; treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men.
• Penalty: Yes. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder qualified by treachery and attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation carries reclusion perpetua in each case, applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the proscription against the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed.

• Alibi: The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Torrefiel had been positively identified as one of the culprits by prosecution witness Realidad Mangilog, whose testimony could not be doubted: the Mangilogs and Torrefiel had known each other for years as neighbors, his house being only about one hundred fifty meters from theirs, and there were occasions when Torrefiel would visit the Mangilogs, usually for coffee, and Leopoldo would visit Torrefiel's house. Realidad knew Torrefiel so well that she could not have been mistaken in identifying him as one of the armed men responsible for the deaths of her husband and son. Two other prosecution witnesses, Coreto Maguirang and Hermogenes Calizo, confirmed Torrefiel's presence in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident. No improper motive could be imputed to Realidad Mangilog that would make her testify falsely against Torrefiel; hence her testimony was worthy of full faith and credit. Complementing the positive identification was Torrefiel's failure to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at Barangay Naligusan at the time of the incident, assuming his claim that he went to the house of Barangay Captain Puod at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1989 was true. As he himself testified, it would take just one and a half hours to reach Barangay Naligusan from Barangay Agbalogo; it would not at all be impossible for him to be at Barangay Agbalogo at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, or some two hours after the crimes were committed at Barangay Naligusan.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was clearly manifest. For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime, as only rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in writing. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during, and right after the shooting of the victim which indicate their common intention to commit the crime. The record showed that (1) all the accused, including Torrefiel, arrived together at the scene of the killings; (2) they were all fully armed; (3) three of them simultaneously shot Leopoldo Mangilog to death while an undetermined number shot and stabbed Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the attack on the two victims was executed simultaneously; and (5) the accused stated that the victims were responsible for the fact that the military men were running after them, tending to establish a motive to kill. All these indubitably indicated a concerted effort on the part of the accused on a common design to kill the victims. Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation; it is not necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the final liquidation of the victims or the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator, as the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them. It hardly mattered, therefore, that Torrefiel did not actually participate in the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog or of Leopoldo Mangilog.
• Treachery and Aggravating Circumstances: As alleged in the informations, the killing of the victims was qualified by treachery. Leopoldo Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter; Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to death while he was taking a bath. The victims were naturally unarmed at that time, and their execution was done so early in the morning, when they had practically just awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims were clearly not in any position to defend themselves from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused. These circumstances manifestly indicated the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be appreciated, namely, the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men, and evident premeditation as aggravating circumstances; these findings are factual, and findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on record, and no such showing was made. Treachery, however, absorbs the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, as it appeared that the accused saw to it that they were armed and far outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective.
• Penalty: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since Torrefiel was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910, and the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was also attendant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in each case, applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed.

• Alibi — Alibi is a defense that places the accused elsewhere when the crime was committed. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses. For alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: (a) the accused must establish that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; and (b) he must establish that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. In this case, Torrefiel was positively identified by Realidad Mangilog, a neighbor who had known him for years, and corroborated by two other witnesses; moreover, since Barangay Agbalogo was only one and a half hours away from the scene, it was not physically impossible for him to have been at the scene at the time of the crimes and at Agbalogo two hours later.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime, as such an agreement is rarely demonstrable; it may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during, and right after the commission of the crime, which indicate their common intention. Once conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation; it is unnecessary to ascertain the individual participation in the final liquidation of the victim or the precise modality or extent of each conspirator's participation, because the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The Court applied this doctrine to hold Torrefiel liable for the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog even though he did not actually participate in that killing.
• Treachery — Treachery (alevosia) qualifies a killing when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The two conditions for its appreciation are: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The Court found both conditions present where Leopoldo was shot while serving coffee or shortly thereafter and Reynaldo was shot and stabbed while bathing, both being unarmed and attacked suddenly and unexpectedly early in the morning.
• Absorption of Aggravating Circumstances by Treachery — Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men where the accused saw to it that they were armed and far outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective. The Court applied this rule to set aside the Court of Appeals' appreciation of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men as separate aggravating circumstances.
• Conclusiveness of Findings of Fact of the Court of Appeals — Findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on record. The Court applied this rule in sustaining the appellate court's finding of evident premeditation, no contrary showing having been made.

• "It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused." — This states the threshold rule on the alibi defense and is the proposition for which the case is most commonly cited in subsequent jurisprudence on eyewitness identification.
• "Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." — This articulates the two-requisite test for the defense of alibi, the second requisite being the ground on which Torrefiel's defense failed given the short travel time between the two barangays.
• "For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime as only rarely would such an agreement be demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in writing." — This defines the evidentiary standard for proving conspiracy and justifies the inference of conspiracy from circumstantial acts.
• "Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation." — This states the consequence of a finding of conspiracy and supplies the basis for holding Torrefiel liable for the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog despite his non-participation in that particular act.

• People vs. Barte, 230 SCRA 401, 408 [1994] — Cited as authority for the rule that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
• People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170, 184 [1993] — Cited for the requisites of alibi, particularly that the accused must show it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
• People vs. Tami, 244 SCRA 1, 22 [1995] — Cited for the rule that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime.
• People vs. Yabut, 226 SCRA 715, 719 [1993] — Cited for the same proposition that criminal undertakings are rarely documented by agreement in writing.
• People vs. Umbrero, 196 SCRA 821, 829 [1991] and People vs. Dalanon, 237 SCRA 607, 619 [1994] — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during, and right after the shooting of the victim.
• People vs. Solon, 244 SCRA 554, 562 [1995] — Cited for the rule that all conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation.
• People vs. Asuncion, 179 SCRA 396, 401 [1989] — Cited for the rule that it is not necessary to ascertain the individual participation of each conspirator in the final liquidation of the victim.
• People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369, 377 [1995] — Cited for the rule that the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
• People vs. Lualhati, 234 SCRA 325, 332 [1994] — Cited in connection with the appreciation of treachery in the killing of the victims.
• People vs. Suitos, 220 SCRA 419 [1993], People vs. Bernardo, 222 SCRA 502, 508-509 [1993], and People vs. Verchez, 233 SCRA 174, 183 [1994] — Cited for the conditions under which treachery may be appreciated.
• People vs. Amondina, 220 SCRA 6, 11 [1993] (citing People vs. Mori, 55 SCRA 382) — Cited for the rule that treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men.
• Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 98, 102 [1994] — Cited for the rule that findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed absent a showing that they are contrary to the evidence on record.
• People vs. Tabao, 240 SCRA 758, 770 [1995] and People vs. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283, 293 [1995] (citing People vs. Rostata, 218 SCRA 657 [1993]) — Cited for the rule that where no improper motive can be imputed to a witness, her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for murder, which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The Court applied this provision in determining the proper penalty for the two murder convictions.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the rules for the application of indivisible penalties. The Court applied this provision, together with the proscription against the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed, in imposing reclusion perpetua for each case of murder qualified by treachery and attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
• Section 13, Rule 124, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the certification of cases to the Supreme Court where the Court of Appeals has ascertained that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or death. The Court of Appeals invoked this provision in certifying Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 to the Supreme Court for final determination instead of entering judgment.
• Constitutional proscription against the death penalty — The Court considered the proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed (May 26, 1989) in fixing the penalty at reclusion perpetua rather than death.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ.