People of the Philippines vs. Jose P. Ragudo, Jr.

The defense of insanity requires clear and convincing evidence that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime, and qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be proven with clear and convincing evidence, not mere conjecture.

Nancy A. Cacayorin was an employee at the Go Group of Companies, while Jose P. Ragudo, Jr. was a gate keeper in the compound where the company office was located. Ragudo was charged with murder, qualified theft, and alarms and scandals in separate Informations. The defense of insanity was invoked, prompting a reverse trial. Ragudo was referred to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation, which diagnosed him with "psychosis classified as Schizophrenia."

Nancy A. Cacayorin was an employee at the Go Group of Companies, while Jose P. Ragudo, Jr. was a gate keeper in the compound where the company office was located. On March 21, 2014, at around 4:00 p.m., Ragudo stabbed Cacayorin several times while she was seated in front of her office table, causing her instantaneous death. He also took a Baby Armalite Rifle with Serial Number 060420 owned by the Go Group of Companies, and thereafter discharged the firearm in the compound.

Ragudo was charged with murder, qualified theft, and alarms and scandals. During the proceedings, his counsel filed a Motion for Psychiatric Evaluation, which the RTC granted. Ragudo was referred to the NCMH, where he was admitted on May 13, 2015. An initial report dated October 6, 2015 found that Ragudo was suffering from "psychosis classified as Schizophrenia" but assessed him as competent to stand trial. He was arraigned on August 4, 2017, and pleaded not guilty to all charges. In view of the invocation of the defense of insanity, a reverse trial was conducted.

Ragudo testified that he could not remember the incident on March 21, 2014, claiming he had an unusual feeling—his head was very painful, his body was hot, and his mind was not sound. The NCMH issued a supplemental report dated February 28, 2018, reiterating its finding of schizophrenia and opining that Ragudo was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, based on his narrations of commanding auditory hallucinations and his failure to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts.

The prosecution presented witnesses who testified to Ragudo's actions on the day of the incident. Charmaine D. Salvador, a clerk in the same office, testified that she saw Ragudo repeatedly stabbing Cacayorin. Chita P. Sacbibit confirmed that she personally saw Ragudo fire a gun several times and stated that she had a normal conversation with him at around 3:00 p.m. on the day in question. Mark Anthony G. Rambaud, a manager, testified that Ragudo stole an M16 rifle from the office and was not authorized to possess it. Maria Gina C. Caballero, a household helper, stated in her Sworn Statement that Ragudo called out to her, said he stabbed Cacayorin, and discharged the firearm upward twice.

The RTC found Ragudo guilty of murder and theft, ruling that his defense of insanity failed because he was able to recall several details of the day in question and did not exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia immediately before or during the incident. The RTC found treachery present because the attack was swift and without warning, and noted abuse of superior strength as an armed man attacked an unarmed woman, though absorbed into treachery. For theft, the RTC found Ragudo guilty of simple theft, not qualified theft, because the prosecution failed to allege and prove grave abuse of confidence.

The CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto, concluding that the NCMH reports were based mainly on Ragudo's own narrations and that he was well aware of the circumstances leading to the act alleged. The CA also affirmed the findings of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

• Insanity Defense: Ragudo argued that his defense of insanity finds support in the supplemental report dated February 28, 2018 issued by the NCMH, and that although Dr. Galindez was not presented as a witness due to financial incapacity, the report is a public document that can support a finding that he was insane at the time of the act alleged.
• Incredibility of Prosecution Testimonies: Ragudo argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were contrary to ordinary human behavior, particularly that it was incredulous that he was alleged to have stolen the firearm when it was not recovered from him but in the compound by a police officer, and that witnesses would stay away and hide after hearing gunfire.
• Treachery: Ragudo argued that treachery should not be appreciated because there was no evidence to show that he consciously adopted such means of attack to secure an advantage, and that his position relative to Cacayorin was merely incidental and not deliberately sought.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Ragudo contended that abuse of superior strength was not present because the prosecution failed to present evidence on the relative disparity in age, size, strength, or force between him and Cacayorin, and that such circumstance cannot merely be inferred from the sex of the victim.

• Affirmation of Conviction: The prosecution maintained that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's judgment, arguing that the defense of insanity failed and that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength were properly appreciated.

• Insanity Defense: Whether the defense of insanity was sufficiently proven with clear and convincing evidence to exempt Ragudo from criminal liability.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven to qualify the killing as murder.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was proven.
• Diminished Exercise of Willpower: Whether the mitigating circumstance of diminished exercise of willpower under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated.
• Theft: Whether Ragudo was properly convicted of theft.

• Insanity Defense: No. The defense of insanity was not proven with clear and convincing evidence, as the NCMH examination was conducted more than one year after the incident and was based on Ragudo's self-serving narration rather than observations of his behavior at the relevant time.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven because the prosecution failed to show that Ragudo consciously and deliberately adopted the means of attack to ensure its execution without risk to himself; a sudden attack alone does not constitute treachery.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: No. Abuse of superior strength was not proven because there was no evidence of the relative strength of the aggressor and victim, nor that the superior strength was purposely and consciously sought by the assailant.
• Diminished Exercise of Willpower: No. The mitigating circumstance was not appreciated because Ragudo was diagnosed with schizophrenia only one year and two months after the act alleged, and it was not established that his willpower was diminished at the time of the incident.
• Theft: Yes. Ragudo was properly convicted of theft, as all elements were proven, but the penalty was modified to two months and one day of arresto mayor.

• Insanity Defense: The Court applied the three-way test in People vs. Paña: (1) the accused was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her acts; (2) the inability occurred at the time of the commission of the crime; and (3) it must be as a result of a mental illness or disorder. The Court found that Ragudo's first examination was conducted on May 13, 2015, or around one year and two months after the commission of the offense, and the last examination was on February 18, 2016, or around two years after. The NCMH opinion was based on Ragudo's self-serving narration of facts, and witnesses who testified based on personal knowledge—Salvador and Sacbibit—observed no unusual behavior from Ragudo prior to or on the day of the incident. Ragudo was able to recall several details of the day in question, with a peculiar mental block only as to the two extraordinary events of that day. Thus, the proof failed to show clear and convincing evidence that insanity was present at the time of the commission of the crime.

• Treachery: The Court cited the definition of treachery: when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Both elements must be present: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The Court ruled that it cannot speculate that the means employed by Ragudo were consciously and deliberately adopted merely from the fact that the attack was sudden or that the male employees left the compound. In the absence of proof as to how the attack started, treachery cannot be appreciated.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: The Court cited the requirement that for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, there should be proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim, and it should be shown that this superior strength was "purposely and consciously sought by the assailant." The only basis of the CA for ruling that abuse of superior strength was present was its conclusion that Ragudo supposedly took advantage of the sex of the female victim and waited for the male employees to leave the office before killing her. These are mere conjectures not supported by clear and convincing evidence, and do not show how such superior strength existed, the disparity between the attacker and the victim, and how it was purposely sought or deliberately intended.

• Diminished Exercise of Willpower: The Court cited People vs. Tampus, where schizophrenia was considered a mitigating circumstance "if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused," but the accused in that case had suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the act alleged. In People vs. Opuran, the Court confirmed that this mitigating circumstance is appreciated only when it is clear that the accused had been suffering from a disease affecting his intelligence and willpower for a number of years before the act alleged. Here, Ragudo was diagnosed with schizophrenia only one year and two months after the act alleged, so it was not sufficiently established that his exercise of willpower was diminished at the time of the incident.

• Theft: The Court affirmed the ruling that Ragudo was guilty of theft instead of qualified theft, as the prosecution failed to allege and prove grave abuse of confidence. The elements of theft were proven: (i) the taking of personal property; (ii) the property belongs to another; (iii) the taking was done with intent to gain; (iv) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; and (v) the taking is accomplished without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. Since there was no evidence as to the value of the firearm, the minimum penalty under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, was applied. The Court modified the penalty from four months to two months and one day of arresto mayor, as the range of the minimum penalty is one month and one day to four months, and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the minimum period should be imposed.

• Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance — Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability when insane, unless they have acted during a lucid interval. Insanity is defined as being "deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime." The three-way test in People vs. Paña requires: (1) the accused was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her acts; (2) the inability occurred at the time of the commission of the crime; and (3) it must be as a result of a mental illness or disorder. The quantum of evidence required is clear and convincing evidence. An accused pleading insanity as a defense cannot competently testify on their state of insanity, as "[a]n insane person would naturally have no understanding or recollection of their actions and behavioral patterns."

• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods, or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. A mere sudden attack does not necessarily equate to treachery; there must be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means of execution. Qualifying circumstances cannot rest on mere conjecture, no matter how reasonable or probable.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. The appreciation of the aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. Even when a man equipped with a deadly weapon attacked an unarmed woman, for abuse of superior strength to be appreciated, it must be established that the assailant purposely sought or deliberately intended to use such advantage.

• Diminished Exercise of Willpower — Under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, schizophrenia may be considered a mitigating circumstance "if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused." This mitigating circumstance is appreciated only when it is clear that the accused had been suffering from a disease affecting his intelligence and willpower for a number of years before the act alleged. A diagnosis made more than a year after the commission of the offense is insufficient to establish that the accused's willpower was diminished at the time of the incident.

• "Insanity, as an exempting circumstance, must be shown medically, unless there are extraordinary circumstances and there is no other evidence available. Our procedural rules allow ordinary witnesses to testify on the 'mental sanity of a person with whom [they are] sufficiently acquainted,' but reports and evaluation from medical experts have greater evidentiary value in determining an accused's mental state." — This passage establishes the evidentiary framework for proving insanity as an exempting circumstance, emphasizing the primacy of medical evidence while acknowledging the role of ordinary witnesses.

• "It is not enough that the attack was 'sudden,' 'unexpected,' and 'without any warning or provocation.' There must also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself." — This passage articulates the two-element test for treachery and clarifies that suddenness alone is insufficient to qualify a killing as murder.

• "Circumstances which qualify criminal responsibility cannot rest on mere conjecture, no matter how reasonable or probable." — This passage states the fundamental principle that qualifying circumstances must be proven with clear and convincing evidence, not inferred from speculation.

• "To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case." — This passage defines the requirement of purposeful and conscious use of superior strength and demonstrates its application where the prosecution fails to establish how the attack was perpetrated.

• People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 (1950) — Controlling precedent defining insanity as being "deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime." This definition was adopted and clarified by the three-way test in Paña.
• People vs. Paña, 890 Phil. 533 (2020) — Controlling precedent establishing the three-way test for the insanity defense and the quantum of clear and convincing evidence required.
• People vs. Tampus, 607 Phil. 296 (2009) — Followed for the principle that schizophrenia may be considered a mitigating circumstance if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused, but only where the accused had been treated for the condition prior to the act.
• People vs. Opuran, 469 Phil. 698 (2004) — Followed for the principle that the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower is appreciated only when it is clear that the accused had been suffering from a disease affecting his intelligence and willpower for a number of years before the act alleged.
• People vs. Enriquez, Jr., 854 Phil. 609 (2019) — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery.
• People vs. Bacares, 875 Phil. 490 (2020) — Cited for the definition of abuse of superior strength and the requirement that the advantage must be purposely sought or deliberately intended.
• People vs. Cortez, 844 Phil. 1086 (2018) — Followed for the principle that even when a man equipped with a deadly weapon attacked an unarmed woman, abuse of superior strength requires proof that the assailant purposely sought or deliberately intended to use such advantage.
• People vs. Watamama, 734 Phil. 673 (2014) — Cited for the principle that qualifying circumstances cannot rest on mere conjecture.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited for the monetary awards of PHP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity and PHP 50,000.00 as moral damages for homicide.

• Article 12, Revised Penal Code — Provides the exempting circumstance of insanity, exempting from criminal liability a person who is insane at the time of the commission of the crime, unless they acted during a lucid interval.
• Article 13(9), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of diminished exercise of willpower, which the Court declined to appreciate because the diagnosis of schizophrenia was made more than a year after the act alleged.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and its qualifying circumstances, including treachery and abuse of superior strength, which the Court found were not proven with clear and convincing evidence.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines homicide, the crime for which Ragudo was ultimately convicted after the qualifying circumstances were not proven.
• Article 309, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Provides the penalty for theft, under which the minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods was applied due to the prosecution's failure to prove the value of the firearm.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to impose the indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for homicide.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred.