People of the Philippines vs. Jose C. Go

A trial court’s order granting a demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused is void when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion, and a void judgment does not trigger double jeopardy; consequently, the criminal case may be reinstated for further proceedings. Sufficient evidence to frustrate a demurrer exists where the prosecution proves the commission of the crime and the precise degree of participation of the accused therein.

The Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas ordered the closure of Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) in October 1998 and placed it under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). While PDIC sought to collect on OCBC’s past due loans, it discovered that two ₱10 million loans—purportedly granted to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.—were fictitious. The supposed borrowers denied having obtained the loans and disowned the signatures on the loan documents. PDIC’s investigation revealed that the loan proceeds had been released via manager’s checks made payable to third parties, then deposited into the OCBC savings account of respondent Jose C. Go, the bank’s president, and used to fund personal checks he had earlier issued. Respondents Aida C. Dela Rosa, OCBC Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, and Felecitas D. Necomedes, Senior Manager for Corporate Accounts, were implicated in the loan approvals and documentation. The three respondents were charged with two counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

• Nature of the case: Two Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against respondents Jose C. Go, Aida C. Dela Rosa, and Felecitas D. Necomedes in connection with fictitious loans at OCBC where they held high-ranking positions.
• The fictitious loans: During PDIC’s receivership of OCBC, demand letters sent to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. for two unsecured ₱10 million loans each were met with denials that any loan had been obtained or pursued. The signatures of the corporate officers on the loan documents were found to be forgeries. PDIC concluded the loans were bogus.
• Approval and release of loan proceeds: The OCBC Loan Committee—composed of Go (President), Dela Rosa (SVP/COO), Arnulfo Aurellano, and Richard Hsu—approved the loans. Dela Rosa certified the net loan proceeds. Two manager’s checks were issued on February 5, 1997: Manager’s Check No. 0000003347 for ₱9,985,075.00 (bearing the alpha-numeric code for Timmy’s, Inc. loan) and Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 for the same amount (code for Asia Textile Mills, Inc. loan). Both checks, however, were made payable not to the purported borrowers, but to “Zeta International” and “Phil. Recyclers Inc.” respectively, without any assignment documents from the borrowers.
• Encashment and deposit into Go’s accounts: On the same day, the two manager’s checks, together with other checks totaling ₱120,819,475.00, were encashed and the proceeds deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch, apparently on instruction of Dela Rosa. The deposit was covered by an OCBC Cash Deposit Slip dated February 5, 1997 with machine validation showing a deposit at 6:19 p.m., slightly after the presentment times of the manager’s checks. The amount was credited to Go’s savings account, which had an automatic transfer arrangement to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0.
• Use of the funds: The day before the deposit, seven OCBC checks issued by Go from his current account totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. After the deposit of ₱120,819,475.00 was credited, Go’s current account balance rose to ₱147,151,778.69, and the seven previously dishonored checks were cleared on February 5, 1997, being partly funded by the deposited manager’s check proceeds.
• Subsequent conduct: During a BSP examination in 1998, Go wrote to the BSP requesting that no communication be sent to Timmy’s, Inc. or Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and stated he was “willing to assume the viability and full payment” of the accounts under inquiry, including the two fictitious loans.
• Trial court’s grant of demurrer: The RTC held that the prosecution failed to prove respondents falsified the loan documents because the individuals whose signatures were allegedly forged were not presented in court, the prosecution witnesses lacked personal knowledge, and the checks were not shown to have been negotiated to Go’s account due to missing indorsements and the use of a cash deposit slip. The demurrer was granted and the accused acquitted.

• Joinder and timeliness: Petitioner argued that the public prosecutor effectively joined the private prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration, and the two-day delay in filing should not prejudice the State’s substantial interests; the trial court’s cognizance of the motion validated it, making the subsequent petition for certiorari timely.
• Nullity of the orders: Petitioner maintained that the July 2, 2007 Order granting the demurrer was void from its inception due to grave abuse of discretion, and a void order cannot attain finality.
• Grave abuse of discretion: Petitioner contended that the trial court capriciously disregarded abundant evidence establishing respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt, rendering the acquittal a product of partiality and an evasion of duty.
• Sufficiency of evidence: Petitioner asserted that the prosecution proved the existence of fictitious loans, the tracing of proceeds into Go’s personal accounts, and the use of those funds to cover his dishonored checks, satisfying all elements of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

• Double jeopardy and finality: Respondents argued that the grant of demurrer to evidence amounted to an acquittal, and since the public prosecutor failed to timely move for reconsideration, the order became final and double jeopardy barred further proceedings. The private prosecutor’s motion could not cure the absence of the public prosecutor’s timely action.
• No denial of due process: Respondents countered that the prosecution was afforded full opportunity to present its evidence; the demurrer was granted based on a fair and judicious evaluation of insufficient proof.
• Absence of misappropriation: Respondents contended that no loan proceeds were actually released to the named borrowers; therefore, there was nothing for Go to misappropriate. The manager’s checks were not payable to the borrowers and, lacking indorsements, were never negotiated or deposited in Go’s account.
• Insufficiency of evidence: Respondents challenged the authenticity and probative value of the documentary evidence, particularly the use of a cash deposit slip for check deposits and the unverified ledgers, and asserted the prosecution failed to establish the elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b), especially receipt of proceeds and demand.

• Validity of Demurrer Grant: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the respondents.
• Finality and Double Jeopardy: Whether the trial court’s order of acquittal had become final and executory due to the public prosecutor’s failure to timely move for reconsideration, thereby attaching double jeopardy.
• Nature of Errors: Whether the appellate court correctly characterized the trial court’s alleged errors as mere errors of judgment not reviewable by certiorari.

• Validity of Demurrer Grant: The trial court’s grant of demurrer to evidence was issued with grave abuse of discretion and was therefore null and void. The prosecution presented competent evidence that sufficiently established the elements of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The bank funds were received by Go in his fiduciary capacity as bank president, and he misappropriated the proceeds by covering his own dishonored checks. Demand was not essential where conversion was proven. The falsification was evidenced by simulated loan documents bearing forged signatures; Go’s possession and use of the falsified documents raised a presumption that he authored them, and Dela Rosa’s and Nicomedes’ active participation in the loan approvals and documentation was shown. The trial court ignored critical evidence, including Go’s letter to the BSP offering to assume the loans, which constituted an implied admission of guilt. The abuse of discretion was patent and gross, evading the duty to properly weigh the evidence.
• Finality and Double Jeopardy: Because the orders granting demurrer were void for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, they never attained finality and double jeopardy did not attach. A void judgment has no legal effect and may be ignored or challenged at any time. The procedural lapse of the public prosecutor could not invest the void orders with validity.
• Nature of Errors: The trial court’s errors were not mere misappreciations of evidence but constituted a capricious, whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, falling within the exception to the finality of acquittals. The appellate court’s characterization was erroneous.

• Demurrer to evidence — sufficiency of prosecution evidence — Evidence is sufficient to defeat a demurrer if it proves (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation by the accused therein. The trial court must evaluate whether the prosecution’s evidence suffices for conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Although the grant or denial of a demurrer lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, the ruling is reviewable by certiorari when issued with grave abuse of discretion.
• Effect of grave abuse of discretion on demurrer acquittal — An order granting a demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion is void. It does not result in double jeopardy, and the appellate court may annul it and order the reinstatement of the criminal case.
• Void judgment — A void judgment has no legal or binding effect, force, or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent and may be resisted in any proceeding; it need not be vacated or avoided.
• Presumption of authorship of falsified documents — One who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger, particularly when the use is closely connected in time with the forgery and no satisfactory explanation is offered.
• Offer of compromise as implied admission of guilt — In criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
• Estafa through abuse of confidence — demand not always required — Demand is not an element of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code when the prosecution has proved misappropriation or conversion; a mere verbal query may suffice.

• “The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution, because not only the rights of the accused — but those of the offended party and the public interest as well — are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse.” — Introductory admonition underscoring the circumspection required in resolving demurrers to evidence.
• “By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. … Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.”
• “A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.”
• “In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.”

• Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 293 (1999) — Followed for the definition of demurrer to evidence and the standard of sufficiency of evidence required to overcome it.
• Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 189365, October 12, 2011 — Relied upon for the rule that an appellate court may review a dismissal via certiorari when the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion, rendering the order void and preventing the attachment of double jeopardy.
• Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, G.R. Nos. 172777 & 172792, October 19, 2011 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010 — Applied in holding that a bank president holds bank funds in a fiduciary capacity, making misappropriation of such funds estafa under Article 315(1)(b).
• Chua v. People, G.R. No. 183132, February 8, 2012 — Used for the presumption that one who possesses and uses falsified documents is presumed the author of the falsification.
• Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa, 452 SCRA 736 (2005) — Relied upon by the Court of Appeals for the principle that only the public prosecutor may seek reconsideration of a dismissal on the criminal aspect; the Supreme Court did not disturb this rule but rendered it inapplicable because the order was void.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 315(1)(b) — Estafa through misappropriation or conversion of money or property received in trust or for administration. Applied to hold that respondents, as bank officers, received depositors’ funds in a fiduciary capacity and misappropriated them.
• Revised Penal Code, Articles 171 and 172 — Falsification of commercial documents by a private individual. The elements were discussed in relation to simulating loan documents and forging signatures.
• Rule 119, Section 23, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Demurrer to evidence. The provision is cited as the procedural basis for the accused’s challenge and the trial court’s authority to dismiss.
• Rule 130, Section 27, Revised Rules on Evidence — Offer of compromise in criminal cases admissible as an implied admission of guilt. Go’s letter to BSP was treated as such an offer.
• Civil Code, Article 1980 — Savings deposits governed by the provisions on simple loan; establishes a debtor‑creditor relationship between bank and depositor, foundational to the fiduciary duty of bank officers.

Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, and Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.