People of the Philippines vs. Jonathan Besonia

After a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt; the plea of guilty is only supporting evidence, and where it has adversely influenced or impaired the prosecution's presentation of its case, remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.

Besonia was prosecuted before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, for two counts of murder, a capital offense under Republic Act No. 7659, which authorizes the death penalty where the killing is attended by specified qualifying and aggravating circumstances, including the use of an unlicensed firearm. Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribes the procedure to be observed when an accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, requiring a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the plea and the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to prove guilt and the precise degree of culpability.

Jonathan Besonia was charged with two counts of murder in separate informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 00-52307 and 00-52308 for the killing of Ernesto Mospa Nieles and Jerry Sampiano. The prosecution alleged that the killings occurred on 27 June 2000 at about 3:30 p.m. on Guzman Street, Mandurriao, Iloilo City, and that the weapon used was an unlicensed firearm. At the time of the incident, Sampiano was a construction worker of Besonia's aunt.

Upon his arraignment on 22 August 2000, Besonia entered a plea of not guilty in each case. Pre-trial was then held, during which both the prosecution and the defense admitted the identities of the victims and the accused, the date, time, and place of the incident, the fact that the weapon used was an unlicensed firearm, and that Sampiano was a construction worker of Besonia's aunt.

On 6 March 2001, before the start of the trial, Besonia, through his counsel Atty. Calixto Perez, manifested that he would enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide after a medical operation on his gall bladder. The trial court ordered the prosecution to begin presenting its evidence. Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Nieles, testified that his findings revealed a bullet wound on the left side of the victim's head and another on the thoraco-abdominal region at the left side of his body; that the two bullet slugs recovered from the body came from a .38 caliber firearm; and that the cause of death was the laceration of the brain and internal hemorrhage secondary to bullet wounds. SPO1 Ricardo Clarete, the duly authorized representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division, declared that based on the certification issued by his office after verification from available records, Besonia was not a licensed or registered holder of a firearm of any kind and caliber. Dr. Agustin P. Vencer testified that he examined Sampiano at the West Visayas Medical Center on 27 June 2000 and found gunshot wounds on the right arm extending to the right lung and liver, and on the right eye extending to the respiratory center of the brain; because Sampiano's abdomen was distended, he was operated on twice, but he expired on 30 June 2000, a day after his second operation.

On 29 May 2001, Besonia manifested his desire to enter a plea of guilty to murder, and re-arraignment was scheduled on 5 June 2001. On that date, Besonia pleaded guilty to the two charges of murder, and the trial court forthwith conducted a searching inquiry to determine the voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea. During the inquiry, Besonia confirmed that no one had threatened him or offered him any promise or reward to plead guilty, that he was twenty-eight years old and a third-year high school student, that he had planned the killings for about two months, and that he understood the elements of murder and the possibility of the death penalty. The trial court explained to him the elements of murder, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, and the penalty and civil liabilities, and Besonia narrated how he shot both victims with a .38 caliber revolver that he owned but which was not licensed in his name.

After the searching inquiry, the prosecution presented PO3 Efren Feliprada and PO3 Hilarion Roga, Jr. as additional witnesses on the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm. PO3 Feliprada testified that at about 3:30 p.m. of 27 June 2000, he, together with PO3 Gerardo Jison and PO2 Hagmay Dignadice, responded to a report of a shooting incident in Guzman Street, Mandurriao, Iloilo City; that while his companions were carrying Sampiano's body to the hospital, he gathered information from bystanders who identified Besonia as the assailant and informed him that Besonia had boarded a passenger jeep en route to Leon, Iloilo; that he and PO2 Dignadice immediately chased the jeep and, in Barangay Buhay, Alimodian, saw Besonia alight; that upon noticing them, Besonia attempted to escape but failed; and that PO2 Dignadice recovered from Besonia's waist a .38 caliber revolver with marking .38JB, loaded with three live ammunition and two empty shells. PO3 Roga, the forensic examiner, testified that the test fire ballistic examination showed that the three live ammunition and two empty shells recovered by the police came from the same .38 caliber firearm, and PO3 Feliprada, when recalled, confirmed that the firearm examined by PO3 Roga was the same firearm recovered from Besonia.

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense manifested that it would not present any evidence. On 26 June 2001, the trial court promulgated its judgment finding Besonia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of murder and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death in each case, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victims P50,000.00 as death compensation and P30,000.00 as moral damages in each case. The trial court's decision consisted of only three pages, more than half of which was devoted to the narration of Besonia's plea of guilty and the searching inquiry; apart from his admissions during the inquiry, the only evidence mentioned in the decision concerned the use of an unlicensed firearm, and there was no discussion of his guilt, the appreciation of evident premeditation, the penalty, or the civil liabilities. Mildred Besonia, Besonia's aunt, who was allegedly an eyewitness to the crime and who had executed an affidavit narrating the shooting incident and identifying Besonia as the perpetrator, was not made to testify, evidently because of his plea of guilt.

• Right Against Self-Incrimination: Besonia argued that the finding of guilt by the trial court was based mainly on his confession, which was inadmissible for having been obtained in gross violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
• Insufficient Prosecution Evidence: Besonia maintained that the prosecution endeavored to prove the charges for murder by evidence other than the testimonies of the proclaimed eyewitnesses, and that in the absence of evidence proving his guilt, he should be acquitted.
• Flawed Re-Arraignment: In his Reply Brief, Besonia claimed that his re-arraignment was "notoriously flawed" in that, despite his endeavor to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, the trial court paid no attention to it, thus depriving him of the opportunity to make such plea.
• No Basis for Homicide Conviction: Besonia argued that there was no basis for the recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General to hold him guilty of the lesser crime of homicide because of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability, the only support for such recommendation being his own testimony, which was obtained in gross violation of his right not to be compelled to testify against himself.
• Prayer for Remand: Besonia prayed that the judgment in these cases be set aside and that the cases be remanded to the trial court for re-arraignment and further proceedings.

• Validity of the Judicial Confession: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that Besonia's voluntary confession in open court is valid in all respects, there being no indication that he was forced, intimidated, coerced, or lured by anybody into admitting the crimes.
• Corroborating Evidence: The OSG argued that the judicial confession is buttressed by the prosecution evidence that the .38 caliber revolver taken from Besonia was the same gun that fired the two slugs recovered from the cadaver of Nieles.
• Insufficient Evident Premeditation: The OSG conceded that Besonia's admission that he planned the killing a couple of months before its perpetration is insufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.
• Recommended Downgrade: The OSG recommended the downgrading in each case of the crime from murder to homicide, aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm, and of the penalty from death to an indeterminate sentence of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.
• Damages: The OSG recommended that temperate damages of P10,000 be awarded in each case in favor of the victims' heirs, and that the award of moral damages be increased from P30,000 to P50,000.

• Plea to a Lesser Offense: Whether the trial court erred in not acting on Besonia's manifestation to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.
• Right Against Self-Incrimination: Whether Besonia's constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when the trial court elicited his plea of guilty and his admissions during the searching inquiry.
• Compliance with Section 3, Rule 116: Whether the trial court complied with Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and the precise degree of his culpability after a plea of guilty to a capital offense.
• Effective Assistance of Counsel: Whether Besonia was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel.
• Remedy: Whether the cases should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

• Plea to a Lesser Offense: No. The intended plea to homicide was subject to a suspensive condition, and under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a plea to a lesser offense necessarily included in the charge requires the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, its allowance being discretionary upon the trial court.
• Right Against Self-Incrimination: No. The right against self-incrimination does not apply where the testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the accused himself without any compulsion from the agents of the State.
• Compliance with Section 3, Rule 116: No. The trial court required the prosecution to prove only the use of an unlicensed firearm, not Besonia's guilt and precise degree of culpability, and the evidence presented was insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Effective Assistance of Counsel: No. Defense counsel rendered lackadaisical and perfunctory representation, waiving objections, failing to advise Besonia of the consequences of his plea, remaining silent during the searching inquiry, and presenting no evidence.
• Remedy: Remand. Where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's case, remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.

• Plea to a Lesser Offense: The trial court could not be faulted for not acting on Besonia's manifestation, made before the start of trial, that he would plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide. The intended change of plea was still subject to a suspensive condition — the operation on Besonia's gall bladder — the date of which was unknown, and the trial court could not hold the trial in abeyance for an indefinite period. Moreover, under Section 2 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a plea to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the crime charged must be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and, as can be gleaned from the use of the word "may" in the second sentence of that Section, it is discretionary upon the trial court whether to allow such a plea. In any event, when Besonia again manifested his desire to enter a plea of guilty two months later, but this time to the crime of murder, the trial court set the re-arraignment to 5 June 2001. The re-arraignment itself was not irregular: it complied with Section 1 of Rule 116, because before Besonia pleaded guilty to both charges, the two informations for murder were first read and translated to the Ilonggo dialect, which was the language known to him.

• Right Against Self-Incrimination: The right against self-incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all its coercive powers, from extracting from the suspect testimony that may convict him and to avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own protection. It does not apply where, as in these cases, the testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the accused himself without any compulsion from the agents of the State. Nothing in the records indicated that Besonia was forced, intimidated, or compelled by the trial court or by anybody into admitting the crimes. The trial court had substantially followed the parameters for the conduct of a searching inquiry, having ascertained the voluntariness of the plea, explained the elements of murder and the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, informed Besonia of the penalty and civil liabilities, and elicited from him a narration of the incident. At any rate, his plea of guilty and his admissions during the searching inquiry could not be the sole basis for his conviction.

• Compliance with Section 3, Rule 116: A plea of guilty is only supporting evidence or a secondary basis for a finding of culpability; the main proof is the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial must be conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered, and the court cannot and should not relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The reason for the rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed penalties. In these cases, the trial court did not comply with the second requisite under Section 3, Rule 116 — to order the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability — and merely required the prosecution to present evidence "to prove the guilt or degree of culpability of the accused for the use of [an] unlicensed firearm." The evidence presented was thus confined to the testimonies of the police officers on the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, apart from those of the doctors on the injuries sustained by the victims, and these were insufficient to establish Besonia's guilt. Mildred Besonia, the aunt of Besonia who was allegedly an eyewitness and who had executed an affidavit narrating the shooting incident and identifying him as the perpetrator, was not made to testify, evidently because of his plea of guilt. The trial court and the prosecution unduly relied on the plea of guilty and the admissions made during the searching inquiry, and the prosecution's presentation was lacking in the assiduity expected in a prosecution for a capital offense — too meager to be accepted as the standard constitutional due process at work enough to forfeit a human life.

• Effective Assistance of Counsel: Defense counsel Atty. Perez merely performed a lackadaisical and perfunctory representation of Besonia before and during the trial. He failed to question before the arraignment the legality of Besonia's arrest, a failure deemed a waiver of the right to raise that question once an accused enters a plea; he failed to object to the admissibility of the firearm seized after Besonia's arrest; there was no showing that he advised Besonia of the consequences of his plea of guilty to the crimes of murder; he remained silent throughout the searching inquiry; he did not cross-examine the police officers, and his cross-examination of the two doctors was limited to only two questions each; and he did not present any evidence on behalf of Besonia. These failures were indicative of his failure to effectively provide Besonia with qualified and competent representation, falling short of the demanding mandate required of a lawyer to defend an accused no matter how guilty the latter may seem to be, and evincing an apparent disregard of his fidelity to his oath as a lawyer and responsibility as an officer of the court to aid in the administration and dispensation of justice. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process and must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simple perfunctory representation.

• Remedy: Where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's case, the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative. Given the attendant circumstances, the cases were remanded to the court a quo for further reception of evidence. No matter how outrageous the crimes charged might be or how depraved the offender would appear to be, the uncompromising demand of due process and of the rule of law must still prevail.

• Plea of Guilty to a Capital Offense — When an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea; (2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask the accused whether he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he so desires. The Court found that the trial court complied with the first and third requisites but failed to comply with the second, having limited the prosecution's evidence to the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm.

• Searching Inquiry — A searching inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of the plea so that the plea of guilty can truly be said to be based on a free and informed judgment. While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct it, the Court in People vs. Aranzado enumerated suggested parameters: ascertaining from the accused himself how he was brought into the custody of the law, whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and under what conditions he was detained and interrogated; asking defense counsel whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty; eliciting information about the personality profile of the accused; informing the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence; and requiring the accused to fully narrate the incident or reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime. The Court found the trial court's inquiry substantially compliant.

• Plea of Guilty as Supporting Evidence Only — A plea of guilty is only supporting evidence or a secondary basis for a finding of culpability; the main proof is the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial must be conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered, and the court cannot and should not relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove guilt and the precise degree of culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence.

• Right Against Self-Incrimination — The right against self-incrimination is intended to prevent the State, with all its coercive powers, from extracting from a suspect testimony that may convict him and to avoid a person subjected to such compulsion to perjure himself for his own protection. It does not apply where the testimony was freely and voluntarily given by the accused himself without any compulsion from the agents of the State.

• Effective Assistance of Counsel — The right to counsel means more than the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections; it requires an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simple perfunctory representation. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws, and existing jurisprudence.

• Remand Where Plea of Guilt Impairs the Prosecution — Where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's case, the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.

• "It must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the evidentiary weight of a plea of guilty, grounding the Court's conclusion that the prosecution's meager evidence could not sustain the conviction despite the plea.
• "The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the standard of effective assistance of counsel, applied to fault defense counsel's perfunctory representation.
• "It has been held that where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's case, the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative." — This passage announces the controlling rule on the remedy, explaining why the conviction was set aside and the cases remanded rather than the accused acquitted outright.
• "No matter how outrageous the crimes charged might be or how depraved the offender would appear to be, the uncompromising demand of due process and of the rule of law must still prevail." — This closing pronouncement underscores the primacy of due process in capital prosecutions and is frequently cited for that principle.

• People vs. Camay, L-51306, 29 July 1987, 152 SCRA 401 — Outlined the three requisites for compliance with Section 3, Rule 116 when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense; relied upon by the Court in assessing the trial court's compliance.
• People vs. Aranzado, 418 Phil. 125 (2001) — Enumerated the parameters for conducting a searching inquiry and supplied the Court's discourse on the demanding mandate of defense counsel; cited in finding the trial court's inquiry substantially compliant and in faulting defense counsel's perfunctory representation.
• People vs. Abapo, 385 Phil. 1175 (2000) — Cited for the rule that where the plea of guilt to a capital offense has adversely influenced or impaired the presentation of the prosecution's case, remand to the trial court for further proceedings is imperative.
• People vs. Molina, G.R. Nos. 141129-33, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 378 — Cited alongside People vs. Abapo for the remand rule and for the standard of constitutional due process in capital prosecutions.
• People vs. Tizon, 375 Phil. 1069 (1999) — Cited for the principle that the uncompromising demand of due process and the rule of law must prevail regardless of the heinousness of the crime charged.
• People vs. Bascuguin, 418 Phil. 209 (2001) — Cited alongside People vs. Tizon for the same due process principle.
• People vs. Bella, G.R. Nos. 130411-14, 13 October 1999, 316 SCRA 804 — Cited among the cases outlining the requirements of a searching inquiry.

• Section 3, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires that when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea, require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and the precise degree of culpability, and allow the accused to present evidence in his behalf. The trial court failed to comply with the second requirement, limiting the prosecution's evidence to the use of an unlicensed firearm.
• Section 2, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that a plea to a lesser offense necessarily included in the crime charged must be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that it is discretionary upon the trial court to allow such a plea. Cited in rejecting Besonia's claim that the trial court erred in not acting on his manifestation to plead guilty to homicide.
• Section 1, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs arraignment; the Court found the re-arraignment on 5 June 2001 compliant because the informations were read and translated to the Ilonggo dialect known to Besonia before he pleaded guilty.
• Section 17, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The Court held the right was not violated because Besonia's plea and admissions were freely and voluntarily given without compulsion from State agents.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — The death penalty law; the searching inquiry referred to Section 20-a of R.A. 7659 in informing Besonia that his plea of guilty would not reduce the death penalty. The Court noted that the penalty for murder using an unlicensed firearm is death.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Azcuna, J., on official leave.