People of the Philippines vs. Joel Pinca y Huarde

Where the law prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for murder, the death penalty may be imposed only if a qualifying or aggravating circumstance is both alleged in the information and proved during trial; absent any aggravating circumstance, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Republic Act No. 7659 defines the so-called heinous crimes and, in amending Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribes the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" for murder. The appellant, Joel Pinca y Huarde, worked at Madona's Bake Shop in the public market of Balilihan, Bohol, the same municipality where the victim, Conrado Angcahan, and the prosecution's principal eyewitness, Gerry Abenir, resided; Pinca and Abenir shared a passenger motorcycle ride home on the night in question. Because the trial court imposed the capital penalty, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, a procedural posture that placed the entire record, including the sufficiency of the modifying circumstances alleged in the Information, squarely before the Court.

On the afternoon of January 16, 1995, Gerry Abenir arrived in Balilihan, Bohol from Tagbilaran City and, with a companion, entered Madona's Bake Shop at the public market, where they drank beer. Joel Pinca y Huarde, who worked at the bakery, was present. According to Abenir, Pinca remarked that someone had splashed liquor on him and that, were it not for the presence of the shop owner, he would have inflicted injuries on the person responsible. Pinca's own account placed Conrado Angcahan, nicknamed Dodong, at the bakery at about 6:30 in the evening, asking Abenir for cigarettes; Abenir refused him, and Angcahan murmured and went out.

At about 7:00 in the evening, Abenir and Pinca rode a passenger motorcycle (habal-habal) driven by Wilfredo Lumantas toward their respective homes in Del Carmen Weste and Dorol, Balilihan. On the way, they passed Angcahan walking unsteadily by the roadside, seemingly drunk. Abenir disembarked at his home in Del Carmen Weste, and Pinca also got down even though his destination, Dorol, lay more than a kilometer farther.

The two accounts of what followed diverge sharply. According to Abenir, Pinca told him he would wait for Angcahan because the latter was the person who had splashed liquor on him; Pinca then picked up a piece of wood from a pile about two meters away and, once near, suddenly and without warning struck Angcahan at the back of the head, felling him. Gripped with fear, Abenir ran home and did not report the matter. Pinca testified that Abenir whistled at Angcahan, that the two boxed each other, and that Abenir ran, fetched a piece of wood, and struck Angcahan, who parried the blows with his forearm before falling to the ground, whereupon Abenir struck him on the head and warned him not to talk.

At 5:00 o'clock the following morning, Police Officer Victor Llano arrived and inquired into the incident; Abenir obliged and gave his account. The two proceeded to Pinca's house, where Pinca denied any participation. Moments later, two police officers arrived and returned to Pinca's house, but he was no longer there; at the police station, Abenir's written statements were taken down. Pinca, for his part, testified that after the police investigation he went to Tagbilaran City to fetch his wife, learned there that the Balilihan police were looking for him, and presented himself at the police station, where he was placed in jail.

The autopsy report of Municipal Health Officer Jude Doblas disclosed a lacerated wound about three inches in length over the right occipito-parietal region of the head and a contusion with hematoma over the anterior face, with death caused by cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to intra-cerebral hemorrhage from the lacerated head wound. Significantly, no contusions were found on the victim's arms. The habal-habal driver testified that he did not know what transpired after his two passengers disembarked, and the police recovered a bloodied piece of wood near the victim's body that same evening.

Evaluating the conflicting versions, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution. It found that Pinca had a motive to injure the victim, the latter having splashed liquor on him a few hours earlier, leaving a score to settle; that Abenir's testimony that the victim was hit on the nape was supported by the autopsy report, which showed no injuries to the forearms despite the defense claim that the victim had defended himself with them; and that it was contrary to human experience for Abenir to assault a victim who had done him no wrong and had not provoked him.

• Motive and Credibility of the Evidence: Appellant argued that the trial court's decision was inconsistent with the evidence, contending that it erred in finding that he had a motive to inflict injuries on the victim, in finding that only the testimony of prosecution witness Gerry Abenir was supported by the autopsy report, and in finding that Abenir had no motive to assault the victim.
• Treachery: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• Evident Premeditation: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in not appreciating voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• Presumption of Innocence: Appellant asserted that the trial court violated the constitutional presumption of innocence by resolving all doubts against him.
• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty: Appellant averred that the sentence of death imposed by the trial court was an unconstitutional penalty and thus void, arguing that murder as defined by Republic Act No. 7659 is not a heinous crime and that there is no compelling reason to reimpose the death penalty for murder.
• Intoxication: In his Reply Brief, appellant further submitted that in the event his conviction is upheld, intoxication should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses and in finding that the prosecution evidence established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• Intoxication: Whether intoxication should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in the event the conviction is upheld.
• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for Murder: Whether Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it classifies murder as a heinous crime and prescribes the death penalty therefor, is unconstitutional.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty of death was correctly imposed, or whether the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be applied.
• Damages: Whether the heirs of the victim are entitled to damages despite the trial court's failure to award them.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Yes. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great respect absent any of the recognized exceptions, and Abenir's clear and unequivocal account, corroborated by the autopsy report and the physical evidence, established appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: Yes. The sudden and deliberate blow struck from behind against an unsuspecting victim who was given no chance to resist or escape constitutes treachery under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to prove the time when appellant determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating that he clung to that determination, and a sufficient lapse of time for reflection.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. Appellant denied any knowledge of the crime and distanced himself by going to Tagbilaran City; his later appearance at the police station "to clear his name" was neither spontaneous nor unconditional.
• Intoxication: No. A single glass of beer was not shown to have been of such quantity as to obfuscate his reason, nor was it shown that he was not a habitual drinker or that he drank to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime.
• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for Murder: Not resolved. The constitutional question was not the lis mota of the case, since the death penalty could not be imposed in any event for want of an aggravating circumstance.
• Proper Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. Under Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, where the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attended the deed, the lesser penalty must be applied.
• Damages: P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P4,600 as actual damages. In criminal appeals the Court may review and correct errors in the appealed judgment even if not raised, including the trial court's failure to award damages proven by the victim's wife.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The determination of which witnesses and whose testimonies to believe is best addressed by the trial judge, who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand; such assessment is generally entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless (1) it is clearly arbitrary or unfounded, (2) some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted, (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion, or (4) the judge who penned the appealed decision was not the same one who presided over the trial and heard the witnesses testify. Because the assailed Decision contained only a scanty discussion, the Court perused the transcripts and the other evidence and found no reason to reverse or modify the trial court's findings. Only two eyewitnesses testified — Abenir and the appellant — each pointing to the other as the culprit, so their testimonies had to be evaluated in detail. Abenir's account was consistent and coherent: he and Pinca drank beer at the bakery, Pinca complained that someone had splashed liquor on him, they rode the habal-habal together, they passed the victim walking unsteadily, Pinca disembarked although his destination lay farther on, Pinca said he would wait for the victim as the latter had splashed liquor on him, and Pinca then picked up a piece of wood and struck the victim at the back of the neck in the moonlight. Appellant's version, by contrast, was riddled with material inconsistencies and equivocations. He could not explain why he disembarked a kilometer short of his contracted destination merely because Abenir told him to, without protest or remark; he was castigated by the trial court for being evasive and admonished to give truthful answers, and the public prosecutor, unable to obtain a responsive answer, moved to another topic. His claim that Abenir whistled at the victim contradicted his direct testimony that Abenir said "shit-shit" or "sit-sit"; his claim that the fistfight occurred immediately after Abenir disembarked was belied by his own statement that Abenir got off about ten meters from where they had passed the victim, and by the habal-habal driver's testimony that he did not know what transpired after his passengers disembarked. Most tellingly, his assertion that the victim parried successive hard blows with his forearms was contradicted by the autopsy report, which showed no contusions on the victim's arms. Abenir's account, on the other hand, explained the laceration on the back of the victim's head, the contusion on his face, and the bloodied piece of wood recovered by the police near the body that same evening; the interval between appellant's alighting, his picking up the wood two meters away, and his approach allowed the driver to leave without witnessing the killing. The prosecution evidence thus established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the perpetrator of the murder.

• Treachery: For treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (1) the offender employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, and (2) the said means, method or manner of execution was deliberately adopted. The essence of treachery is the deliberateness and the unexpectedness of the attack, which give the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. Here, the victim was merely walking unsteadily by the roadside, seemingly drunk; appellant, who recognized him as he passed by, first picked up a piece of wood and then whacked him from behind, hitting him at the back of his head, so that with the severe force of the blow the totally oblivious victim simply slumped to the ground face down. The attack from behind, being sudden and deliberate, was treacherous; the victim was utterly unsuspecting and thus unable to put up any resistance or defense.

• Evident Premeditation: For evident premeditation to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, there must be clear and convincing proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and the execution that allowed the criminal to reflect upon the consequences of his act. These elements were not established. It was not shown that appellant had resolved to kill Angcahan well before the habal-habal that transported him passed by the victim; rather, there appeared to be no sufficient period of time within which appellant was able to reflect upon the grave consequences of his evil intent. Evident premeditation could not, therefore, aggravate the commission of the offense.

• Voluntary Surrender: For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested, (2) the offender surrendered to a person in authority, and (3) the surrender was voluntary. If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to ensure the safety of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence not voluntary. According to appellant himself, when the police came to his house the morning after the incident, he completely denied any knowledge of the murder; he learned that he was a suspect only while in Tagbilaran City to fetch his wife, who told him the police had come looking for him at her place of work, and it was only upon returning to Balilihan that he proceeded to the police station "to clear his name," where he was instead incarcerated as the prime suspect. Denying any personal knowledge of the crime and attempting to distance himself from the place of the incident were not marks of voluntary surrender, and his eventual appearance at the station showed no intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.

• Intoxication: Intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime; it decreases the penalty if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime, but is aggravating when habitual or intentional. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason, and must at the same time show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime. Appellant belatedly pleaded intoxication in his Reply Brief, relying merely on the prosecution's narration of facts which supposedly indicated that he was intoxicated and that there was no evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent to a plan. He could not simply rely on those statements; he himself had to present convincing proof of the nature and effect of his intoxication. What appeared undisputed in the records was only that he had a glass of beer prior to the murder, and under normal circumstances a glass of beer is not so intoxicating as to diminish a man's rational capacity. It was not proven at all that such amount of alcohol blurred his reason, an element essential for intoxication to be considered mitigating.

• Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for Murder: The Court did not find the resolution of this issue to be the very lis mota of the case. Absent any aggravating circumstance in appellant's commission of murder, the death penalty prescribed under Republic Act No. 7659 could not be imposed upon him; the determination of the constitutional question was therefore not essential to the disposition of his appeal. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law or part of it to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon it will be unavoidable.

• Proper Penalty: The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, prescribes the penalty range of "reclusion perpetua to death" for murder. Where the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, Article 63 provides that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. As discussed, no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense; hence, pursuant to Article 63(2), the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon appellant.

• Damages: Although the appellee did not question the non-award by the trial court of damages in favor of the heirs of the victim, the Court took issue thereon in the exercise of its power in criminal appeals to review and correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been raised. The victim's wife submitted and affirmed in the trial court the truth of the actual expenses incurred by the family during the wake and the burial of the victim, as well as the prayer ceremonies for him. Consistent with jurisprudence, the Court gave credence to those expenses that appeared to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, the wake and the burial of the victim; based on the evidence, these expenses added up to P4,600.

• Trial court's findings on witness credibility — The assessment of which witnesses and whose testimonies to believe is best addressed by the trial judge, who had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the witness stand; such findings are generally entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The Court recognized four exceptions: (1) the assessment is clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some substantial fact or circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted; (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion; or (4) the judge who penned the appealed decision was not the same one who presided over the trial and heard the witnesses testify. Finding none of the exceptions present, the Court sustained the trial court's crediting of the prosecution eyewitness over the appellant's inconsistent and equivocating testimony.

• Treachery — For treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (1) the offender employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method or manner of execution was deliberately adopted. Its essence is the deliberateness and the unexpectedness of the attack, which give the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. The Court applied the doctrine to the sudden blow struck from behind with a piece of wood against a victim who was walking unsteadily and was utterly unaware of the attack, holding the killing qualified by treachery.

• Evident premeditation — For evident premeditation to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, there must be clear and convincing proof of: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and the execution that allowed the criminal to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The Court found none of the elements established, there being no showing that the appellant had resolved to kill the victim well before the habal-habal passed by him, nor any sufficient period for reflection.

• Voluntary surrender — The requisites are: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to ensure the safety of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence not voluntary. The Court held that the appellant's denial of knowledge of the crime, his trip to Tagbilaran City, and his belated appearance at the police station "to clear his name" negated voluntariness.

• Intoxication as an alternative circumstance — Intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. It decreases the penalty if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; it is aggravating when habitual or intentional. A person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission of the crime sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason, and must at the same time show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime. A single glass of beer, without proof that it blurred the appellant's reason, was held insufficient.

• Avoidance of constitutional questions (lis mota) — A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law or part of it to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the parties, and when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon it will be unavoidable. Because the death penalty could not be imposed for want of an aggravating circumstance, the constitutional challenge to Republic Act No. 7659 was not the lis mota and was not resolved.

• Article 63(2) — lesser penalty where no modifying circumstances attend — Where the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this rule to reduce the penalty for murder from death to reclusion perpetua, treachery being a qualifying circumstance that is absorbed in the definition of the crime and does not itself aggravate the penalty.

• Damages in criminal appeals — The Court, in the exercise of its power in criminal appeals, may review and correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not been raised by the parties. Consistent with jurisprudence, credence is given to expenses shown to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim, and indemnity ex delicto is awarded to the heirs.

• "Republic Act 7659 defines the so-called heinous crimes. Not all convictions involving such crimes automatically warrant the imposition of the death penalty. There are specific qualifying and/or aggravating circumstances that must both be alleged in the information and proven during the trial, before the criminal offenders may be sentenced to death. Absent any of these specific qualifying and/or aggravating circumstances, the capital penalty cannot be imposed." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the penalty ruling: the capital penalty for murder under Republic Act No. 7659 requires both allegation and proof of a qualifying or aggravating circumstance, a requirement the prosecution failed to satisfy.
• "The essence of treachery is the deliberateness and the unexpectedness of the attack, which give the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape." — This is the canonical formulation of treachery applied by the Court in holding that the sudden blow from behind qualified the killing to murder.
• "If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to ensure the safety of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence not voluntary." — This passage defines the voluntariness requirement of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which the Court found absent given the appellant's denial of the crime and his attempt to distance himself from the scene.
• "It is a well established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law [or part of it] to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." — This passage articulates the doctrine of avoidance of constitutional questions, the ground on which the Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the death penalty for murder.

• People vs. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 405 (August 7, 1990) — Cited as among the controlling authorities for the rule that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, based on its firsthand observation of the witnesses' demeanor, is entitled to great respect on appeal.
• People vs. Pili, 289 SCRA 118 (April 15, 1998) — Cited for the proposition that the trial judge, having directly observed the entire proceedings, is in the best position to determine reasonably whose testimonies to accept and which witnesses to believe or disbelieve.
• People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (July 28, 1998) — Cited, together with other cases, as authority for the exception to the rule on deference to credibility findings: where the judge who penned the appealed decision was not the same one who had presided over the trial and heard the witnesses testify.
• People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 (February 12, 1997) — Cited, with People vs. Eubra, as authority on the nature and essence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213 (April 20, 1998) — Cited as authority on the requisites of evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
• People vs. Sumalpong — Cited repeatedly (as "supra") as authority on the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance and on the rule that a surrender motivated solely by the inevitability of arrest is not spontaneous.
• People vs. Belaro, G.R. No. 99869 (May 26, 1999) — Cited, with People vs. Fortich, as authority on the proof required to establish intoxication as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Fortich, 281 SCRA 600 (November 13, 1997) — Cited, with People vs. Belaro, on the requisites for pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty.
• Sotto vs. Comelec, 76 Phil 516, 522 (April 16, 1946) — The principal authority, per Feria, J., for the doctrine of avoidance of constitutional questions: a court will not decide a constitutional question if the record presents some other ground upon which it may rest its judgment.
• People vs. Rebamontan, G.R. No. 125318 (April 13, 1999) — Cited, with People vs. Yam-id and People vs. Mante, as authority for the application of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the lesser indivisible penalty where no modifying circumstances attend the commission of the offense.
• People vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124, 147 (January 28, 1998) — Cited, with People vs. Atop, as authority for the Court's power in criminal appeals to review and correct errors in the appealed judgment even if not raised by the parties.
• People vs. Cordero, 263 SCRA 122 (October 11, 1996) — Cited, with People vs. Salcedo, People vs. Ortega Jr., and People vs. Jamiro, as authority for giving credence to expenses genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder and prescribes the penalty range of "reclusion perpetua to death." The Court held that although the killing was qualified by treachery and thus constituted murder, the death penalty could not be imposed absent an aggravating circumstance alleged and proved.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the rules for the application of indivisible penalties. Paragraph 2 thereof provides that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Because no modifying circumstance attended the killing, the Court applied the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death.
• Article 15, Revised Penal Code — Treats intoxication as an alternative circumstance, aggravating or mitigating depending on whether it is habitual or intentional or whether it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. The Court cited this provision in rejecting the appellant's belated plea of intoxication, a single glass of beer not having been shown to have obfuscated his reason.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 7659 — Cited in the trial court's judgment as the provision under which the penalty for murder was imposed in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; the Court ultimately held that the capital penalty prescribed by the law could not be applied to the appellant.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.