People of the Philippines vs. Joel Elamparo y Fontanilla

A warrantless seizure of evidence is valid under the plain view doctrine when the law enforcement officer is lawfully in a position to view the object, its discovery is inadvertent, and it is immediately apparent that the item is evidence of a crime. The Court also held that a person caught in flagrante delicto repacking prohibited drugs may be arrested without a warrant, and that the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code applies suppletorily to the Dangerous Drugs Act, reducing the penalty next lower in degree.

The case involves the prosecution of Joel Elamparo y Fontanilla under Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which imposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes and took effect on December 31, 1993. The offense charged was illegal possession of prohibited drugs, specifically marijuana, in violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. 6425. The case arose from a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers of the Kalookan Police Station in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, following an informant's report of drug selling in the area.

On February 12, 1995, at about 5:00 in the morning, Police Officer Romeo Baldonado, supervising policeman of the Kalookan Police Station, received a report from an informant that "some people are selling shabu and marijuana somewhere at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City." The informant stated that he himself had succeeded in buying said drugs. Baldonado formed a buy-bust operation team with himself as team leader and Police Officers Ernesto Andala, Ronielo Reantillo, and Bismark Gaviola as members. The team proceeded to the reported area at Progreso P. Gomez, Bagong Barrio, Kalookan City at around 5:45 in the morning.

Upon arrival, Gaviola, together with the informant, stood at the corner of P. Gomez Street, identified as the "market" where buyers of marijuana await a runner. A runner later identified as Erwin Spencer approached the poseur-buyer Gaviola and asked "Iiscore ba kayo." Having answered "Iiscore kami," Spencer left and returned after five minutes with the marijuana. Gaviola handed over the marked money and arrested Spencer, but Spencer freed himself and ran. The buy-bust team pursued Spencer, who ran inside a bungalow-type house with a steel gate. Having trapped Spencer inside the house, the police officers frisked him and recovered the marked money. The police officers likewise found appellant repacking five bricks of "marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of a round table inside the house's sala. Appellant was then arrested and confessed that the source of the "marijuana" was Benguet.

Spencer and appellant were taken to the precinct and delivered to the inquest fiscal for further investigation. The arresting officers executed an affidavit and requested the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct examination of the drugs seized. The NBI Report confirmed the drugs seized to be "Marijuana" weighing five kilos. The prosecution presented as witnesses PO2 Bismark Gaviola, the poseur-buyer; SPO2 Romeo Baldonado; and Juliet Gelacio Mahilum, a forensic chemist at the NBI, who testified that each of the five bricks of marijuana flowering tops gave positive results for marijuana.

For the defense, appellant and Angelo Bernales, a boarder at appellant's house, testified. Appellant gave a different version of the incident. At around 6:00 to 7:30 in the morning of February 12, 1995, he was at their house when somebody knocked at their door. His father opened it and was informed that somebody was looking for him. He went out and saw Erwin Spencer with handcuffs, being held by an arresting officer, and sighted PO3 Bismarck Gaviola holding a big box. When he persistently questioned Spencer as to why he was arrested, the arresting officers got mad at him and brought him to the police station where he was detained. The arresting officers demanded P15,000.00 for his release, but he remained in jail as he refused to accede to their demand. Spencer was released two days later after giving money to the police officers. Bernales testified that he was about to go out of the accused's house to bring breakfast to his father when he sighted Spencer in handcuffs in the company of three policemen, one of whom was holding a box, and saw the policemen knock at the door of the accused's house, after which the accused was taken away.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant contended that it was highly unusual for arresting officers to act on an "information" of an unknown source without confirming the veracity of the report, and that it was incredible that a peddler of marijuana would be so brazen as to approach total strangers and offer to sell them marijuana.
• Frame-Up and Extortion: Appellant insisted that he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana because he failed to pay the police officers the amount of P15,000.00 for his release, unlike Spencer, who paid said amount.
• Illegality of Arrest: Appellant assailed the legality of his arrest inside the house of his father for failure of the apprehending officers to secure a search warrant.
• Minority as Mitigating Circumstance: Appellant contended that if found guilty, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in his favor.

• Sufficiency of Surveillance: The Office of the Solicitor General contended that further surveillance was unnecessary because the police "asset" had personal knowledge of the open buying and selling of "marijuana" in the area, having purchased his "marijuana" a few hours before reporting the matter to the police.
• Lawful Hot Pursuit and Plain View: The OSG contended that appellant's arrest was an incident to a lawful hot pursuit made against Spencer, and that appellant was surprised in plain view repacking the five bricks of marijuana.
• Separate Investigation of Spencer: The OSG argued that appellant misrepresented himself in saying that Spencer was released without charges, considering that a separate investigation was conducted against the latter.
• Minority Concession: The OSG conceded that the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in favor of appellant.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and disregarding the theory of the defense.
• Validity of Warrantless Arrest and Seizure: Whether the warrantless arrest of appellant and the seizure of the marijuana bricks inside the house were lawful.
• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the discrepancy between the caption and the body of the Information affected the validity of the conviction.
• Minority as Privileged Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in favor of appellant, and what penalty should be imposed.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No error. The assessment of credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court, and the narration of the prosecution witnesses appeared worthy of belief, coming from law enforcers presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary.
• Validity of Warrantless Arrest and Seizure: Yes, lawful. The case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine, and appellant's arrest was lawful under Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the in flagrante delicto rule.
• Sufficiency of the Information: No error. It is not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein, which directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Minority as Privileged Mitigating Circumstance: Yes. Appellant, being a minor over fifteen and under eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime, is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code, applied suppletorily to the Dangerous Drugs Act.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court found that the trial court's assessment of credibility was entitled to utmost respect, as the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during their testimonies. The Court noted that drug pushers often sell their prohibited articles to prospective customers, be they strangers or not, in private as well as public places, even in the daytime. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting sale and delivery of prohibited drugs. The consummated sale between PO2 Gaviola and Spencer led to the eventual arrest of appellant.

• Validity of Warrantless Arrest and Seizure: The Court acknowledged that Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibits a search and seizure without a judicial warrant, and Section 3 provides that evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible. However, the right is subject to exceptions, including the plain view doctrine. Citing People vs. Doria, the Court stated the requisites of the plain view doctrine: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. When Spencer wrenched himself free and ran towards the house of appellant, the buy-bust team was justified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside, they caught appellant in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view on top of a table. The Court also applied Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which allows warrantless arrest when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. The two elements of in flagrante delicto arrest concurred: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The Court held that although the caption of the Information charged appellant with violation of Section 4 of Article II of R.A. 6425, which refers to the sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs, the body of the Information charged appellant with illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8. Citing People vs. Resayaga, the Court held that it is not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein which directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant having been fully apprised of the elements of the crime of illegal possession, he may properly be convicted of that crime.

• Minority as Privileged Mitigating Circumstance: The Court noted that in drug cases, the quantity of the prohibited drugs involved is determinative of the imposable penalty. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that when the quantity of indian hemp or marijuana is 750 grams or more, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. Appellant was born on January 9, 1978, and was only 17 years, 1 month, and 3 days old at the time of the commission of the crime. Citing People vs. Simon, the Court recognized the suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous Drugs Act after its amendment by R.A. No. 7659. Being a minor over fifteen and under eighteen, appellant is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Article 68(2) provides that the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. Applying Article 61(2) for graduating penalties, the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion perpetua is reclusion temporal. There being no generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor. No fine is imposable, as it is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.

• Plain View Doctrine — Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In this case, the police officers lawfully entered the house in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect and saw appellant repacking marijuana bricks in full view on top of a table.

• In Flagrante Delicto Arrest — Under Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. When appellant was seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers were not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

• Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous Drugs Act — The rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code apply suppletorily to the Dangerous Drugs Act after its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659. A minor over fifteen and under eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13(2) of the Revised Penal Code, and Article 68(2) provides that the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.

• Control of the Information — It is not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein which directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Where the caption of the Information charges one offense but the body alleges another, the accused may be convicted of the offense alleged in the body if he was fully apprised of its elements.

• "Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Doria, states the canonical formulation of the plain view doctrine and its three requisites, which the Court applied to uphold the warrantless seizure of the marijuana bricks.

• "When Spencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of PO2 Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards the house of appellant. The members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal." — This passage explains the factual basis for the lawful intrusion into the house, which is the first requisite of the plain view doctrine.

• "It is not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein which directly apprise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." — This passage states the rule on the control of the Information, holding that the body of the Information, not its caption, determines the offense for which the accused may be convicted.

• "Appellant being a minor over fifteen and under eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime, he is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 13 (2) of the Revised Penal Code." — This passage establishes the application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority to the Dangerous Drugs Act through the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999) — Controlling precedent for the plain view doctrine and the in flagrante delicto arrest rule; quoted extensively for the requisites of the plain view doctrine.
• People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994) — Controlling precedent for the suppletory application of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous Drugs Act after its amendment by R.A. No. 7659.
• People vs. Resayaga, 159 SCRA 426 (1988) — Followed for the rule that it is not the designation of the offense in the Information that is controlling but the allegations therein.
• People vs. Requiz, G.R. No. 130922, November 19, 1999 — Cited for the rule on the assessment of credibility of witnesses and the proposition that drug pushers may sell to strangers.
• People vs. Blas, 209 SCRA 339 (1992) — Cited for the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcers.
• People vs. Nario, 224 SCRA 647 (1993) — Cited for the proposition that what matters in drug cases is the fact of agreement and the act constituting sale and delivery.
• People vs. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997) — Cited for the five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures.
• People vs. Medina, 292 SCRA 436 (1998) — Cited with People vs. Simon for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous Drugs Act.
• Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997) — Cited for the in flagrante delicto arrest rule.
• People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) — Cited for the elements of in flagrante delicto arrest.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits a search and seizure without a judicial warrant; the Court acknowledged this prohibition but found the warrantless seizure valid under the plain view exception.
• Section 3, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that any evidence obtained without a warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding; the Court found the evidence admissible because the seizure fell under the plain view exception.
• Section 12, Rule 126, Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
• Section 5(a), Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Allows a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; applied to uphold appellant's arrest as an in flagrante delicto arrest.
• Section 8, Article II, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659 — The offense of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, for which appellant was convicted.
• Section 20, R.A. 6425, as amended by Section 17, R.A. 7659 — Provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 when the quantity of marijuana is 750 grams or more.
• Article 13(2), Revised Penal Code — The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, applied suppletorily to reduce appellant's penalty.
• Article 68(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed for a minor over fifteen and under eighteen, but always in the proper period.
• Article 61(2), Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the rules for graduating penalties, applied to determine the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to set the minimum of the indeterminate penalty within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.