People of the Philippines vs. Joel Acquiatan

Conspiracy, whenever alleged, must be proved with the same quantum of evidence required to establish an element of the offense—proof beyond reasonable doubt—and failure to establish it renders each accused liable only for his own specific acts; circumstantial evidence cannot sustain a conviction unless the combination of proven circumstances produces moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, committed the crime.

Joel Acquiatan @ "Kain" was charged with murder for the killing of Franco Anacio, together with Anthony Palada @ "Ton-Ton" and Jonalyn Logrosa @ "Misa." Acquiatan and Franco were childhood friends and neighbors. Palada died during the proceedings and the case against him was dismissed.

On February 1, 2009, at past midnight, in Barangay 04, Can-avid, Eastern Samar, Franco Anacio was shot and killed. The information charged Joel Acquiatan @ "Kain," Anthony Palada @ "Ton-Ton," and Jonalyn Logrosa @ "Misa" with murder, alleging that they conspired, helped one another, and employed treachery, evident premeditation, and deliberate intent to take Franco's life by shooting him with an unlicensed shotgun. All the accused pleaded not guilty; Palada later died and the case against him was dismissed.

According to the prosecution, Marly Anacio, Franco's wife, testified that at about 1:00 a.m. on February 1, 2009, she, Franco, and their baby were sleeping in their house when their dogs barked. Franco asked her to switch on the lights at the front and back of the house. He peeped through a hole in the wall, saw four persons outside their fence, and told her; she also peeked and saw them. They then went back to sleep. A few minutes later, Marly heard a gunshot and immediately opened a window. She saw Acquiatan, Palada, Logrosa—who was carrying a long firearm—and an unidentified person walking out of their fence toward the street, which was illuminated by sodium light. She went outside, saw her mother-in-law Eva already there, and both followed the four men. Acquiatan proceeded to his parents' house while his companions entered the house of a certain Pacita Trasga. Marly and Eva returned to Franco's house, where Marly saw Franco lying down with blood oozing from his side; she shouted for help. Franco died, and Dr. Felix G. Nicart, who conducted the postmortem examination, concluded that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. Marly also testified that Franco had previously told her that on December 22, 2008, Palada warned him to watch out because they would "destroy" him, and that on January 8, 2009, Acquiatan, with Palada and two companions, pointed a gun at Franco and his friend Ruel Cebreros and fired it upwards near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church.

Eva Anacio, Franco's mother, essentially affirmed Marly's testimony. She testified that she rose from bed to find out why their dogs were barking, peeped through the jalousie window, and saw Acquiatan, Palada, Logrosa, and an unidentified person conversing under a guava tree just outside their fence. Her house was a few meters from her son's house, both enclosed by a common fence, and the place where the men stood was illuminated by a fluorescent light from the barangay captain's house about 15 meters away. She returned to sleep but stood up again when she heard a gunshot. Opening the jalousie window, she saw Acquiatan, Palada, an unidentified person, and Logrosa, who then appeared to be carrying a long firearm, going out of their fence. Eva went out the back door to go to her son's house, but outside she saw Marly coming after the men; Marly told her that the men were quarrelling. Eva observed the four men heading in different directions—some to the INC Church, others to Pacita Irasga's house. When Eva and Marly returned to the house, they found Franco lying on the floor and wounded. Eva lost consciousness; upon regaining it, she joined Marly in asking neighbors for help. She also declared that she incurred expenses for her son's wake and burial.

SPO4 Feleo Grata testified that on February 1, 2009, he was called to investigate Franco's killing. He went to the victim's house, saw Franco's dead body, and observed a hole in the wall probably caused by a gunshot. He invited Eva and Marly to the police station, where they told him the names of the suspects and gave him one empty shell of a homemade shotgun. He declared that the incident was entered in the police blotter, with the nicknames of Acquiatan and Palada indicated as the persons responsible for the killing.

Acquiatan raised alibi. He testified that he was sleeping in his house at about 1:00 a.m. on February 1, 2009; his parents, sister, and family friend Wenefrida Cantos were there. He had gone to sleep early at around 7:00 p.m. on January 31, 2009, so that he could attend a morning mass at the INC Church. He woke at 6:00 a.m. the next day and prepared for church service, and it was from Eustaquio Legion that he learned Franco Anacio had been shot and killed. Acquiatan admitted knowing the victim because they were childhood friends and neighbors, and mentioned that Franco was known to be a troublemaker when drunk, as evidenced by a police blotter entry dated January 6, 2009. Wenefrida Cantos corroborated that she was in Acquiatan's house at the time of the incident; she recalled that on the evening of January 31, 2009, Acquiatan arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ate supper, and went to sleep, and that when she woke at 4:00 a.m. the following day, she saw him still asleep and asked if he would attend the church service, to which he replied that he would just follow later. SPO1 Allan Cebrero, property custodian of the PNP, Can-avid, Eastern Samar, brought the original police blotter Entry No. 1058 and certified it as a true copy, but on cross-examination admitted that the original did not contain the signature of Rodrigo Baliquia and that the photocopy was not a faithful reproduction of the original. Logrosa and Palada denied participation and interposed alibi; Palada claimed he was asleep in his cousin's house, while Logrosa claimed he was in Balanga City, Bataan, and they presented witnesses.

The RTC deemed credible the testimonies of Marly and Eva regarding the presence of Acquiatan and two unidentified persons at the crime scene prior to the shooting. It relied on Marly's testimony that after hearing the shots she saw Acquiatan and his companions leave the area, and she thereafter found her husband dead. The RTC ruled that treachery attended the killing because it was committed while the victim was asleep. The CA observed that Acquiatan had conspired with his co-accused; that all the accused had arrived at the crime scene together, conversed, and immediately walked away together after the shots were fired; and that although no eyewitness saw the shooting, sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to pin the crime on all of the accused, including Acquiatan, considering that they had conspired in committing the murder.

• Conspiracy: The accused-appellant insisted that the CA erred in its finding of conspiracy among the accused.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The accused-appellant maintained that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to establish his participation in the murder of Franco.

• Conspiracy: Whether the CA erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish accused-appellant's participation in the murder.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the conviction of accused-appellant was supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established; mere presence at the scene, companionship, or knowledge or acquiescence does not suffice absent proof of an overt act in furtherance of the common design, and conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Circumstantial Evidence: No. The combination of circumstances did not result in moral certainty that accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, committed the crime; the identity of the shooter was not reliably established.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The conviction was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and acquittal was required under Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court and the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit a felony. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship; mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy; knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is not enough absent active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to furthering the common design. Conspiracy must be established not by conjecture but by positive and conclusive evidence, requiring the same degree of proof required to establish the elements of the crime itself—proof beyond reasonable doubt. The CA inferred conspiracy from the accused's arrival together, positioning outside the fence, the gunshot, and their flight. The Supreme Court held that this lacked factual and legal bases. Although witnesses saw Acquiatan and his companions near the house prior to the shooting, with one armed, and leaving after the shot, such circumstances did not suffice without showing that each accused committed at least an overt act in furtherance of the attack on Franco. Without the clear showing of their respective overt acts, conspiracy could not be shown, and each could only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. The Court adopted the explanation in People vs. Lizada that an overt act is some physical activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles or spontaneous desistance, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The overt act must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. No such overt act was shown for Acquiatan.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The lack of direct evidence on the commission of the murder as far as Acquiatan was concerned would not have hampered the effort to incriminate him had sufficient circumstantial evidence been presented. Under Section 4, Rule 133, circumstantial evidence suffices to produce a conviction only when the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. The CA listed eight circumstances. The Supreme Court held that the requisites did not concur. The mere presence of Acquiatan at the scene of the crime could not justly incriminate him considering that the identity of the shooter himself remained not reliably established. Eva Anacio recalled that it was Logrosa whom she had seen carrying the long firearm right after the shooting, yet Logrosa was acquitted for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This revealed that the combination of all the circumstances did not result in moral certainty that Acquiatan, to the exclusion of all others, had committed the crime.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Section 2, Rule 133 provides that in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt; proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty, and moral certainty only is required. The requirement has a vital role because the accused may lose his liberty upon conviction and would be stigmatized by a conviction. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt. The reasonable doubt standard is indispensable. The Court thus acquitted Acquiatan to breathe life to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be established where all the accused acted in concert and their acts show the same purpose or common design and unity in execution, but it must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship; mere presence at the scene does not amount to conspiracy, and knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is not enough absent active participation. Conspiracy must be proved by positive and conclusive evidence, not conjecture, and with the same quantum required to establish an element of the offense—proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish conspiracy renders each accused liable only for his own specific acts. Applied here, the CA's inference from arrival, positioning, and flight was insufficient absent proof of Acquiatan's overt act.
• Overt act — As explained in People vs. Lizada, an overt act is some physical activity or deed indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles or spontaneous desistance, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The overt act must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. Applied here, no overt act by Acquiatan in furtherance of the attack on Franco was shown.
• Circumstantial evidence — Under Section 4, Rule 133, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Applied here, the eight circumstances relied upon by the CA did not concur; the identity of the shooter was not reliably established, and Logrosa was acquitted despite being seen carrying the long firearm, so no moral certainty existed as to Acquiatan.
• Proof beyond reasonable doubt — Under Section 2, Rule 133, in a criminal case the accused is entitled to acquittal unless guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt; proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty, and moral certainty only is required. Applied here, the conviction was reversed because the prosecution's evidence did not meet this standard.
• Constitutional presumption of innocence — The decision states that due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt, and that the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable. The Court acquitted Acquiatan to breathe life to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• "Although it is not an element of the crime charged, conspiracy, whenever alleged, must be proved with the same quantum of evidence required to establish an element of the offense, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to establish the existence of the conspiracy renders each accused only liable for his own specific acts." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the quantum of proof for conspiracy and the consequence of failure to prove it.
• "Conspiracy transcends mere companionship. Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge or acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any showing of his active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose." — This defines the minimum showing required for conspiracy and rejects mere presence or companionship as sufficient.
• "In other words, conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the elements of the crime itself—the proof beyond reasonable doubt." — This reinforces the controlling standard that conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• "This should reveal that the combination of all the circumstances did not result in a moral certainty that the accused appellant, to the exclusion of all others, had committed the crime." — This applies the circumstantial evidence requisites and explains why the conviction could not stand.

• People vs. Buatista, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 524, 540 — cited for the rule that conspiracy is sufficiently established where all the accused acted in concert and their acts show the same purpose or common design and unity in execution.
• Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 673, 685 — cited for the rule that conspiracy transcends mere companionship; mere presence at the scene is not enough, and knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate does not make one a conspirator absent active participation.
• Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, 797 SCRA 241, 312 — cited for the rule that conspiracy must be established not by conjecture but by positive and conclusive evidence.
• San Juan vs. People, G.R. No. 177191, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 300, 314 — cited for the rule that conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the elements of the crime itself—proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62, 94-95 — cited for the definition and explanation of an overt act.
• People vs. Morales, G.R. No. 172873, March 19, 2010, 616 SCRA 233, 225 — cited in connection with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt and due process.

• Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt; proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty, and moral certainty only is required. Applied here, the conviction was reversed because the prosecution's evidence did not meet this standard.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime. Applied here, the requisites did not concur.
• Constitutional presumption of innocence — The decision refers to the constitutional presumption of innocence and due process, stating that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt. The text does not cite a specific article or section. Applied here, the Court acquitted Acquiatan.

Jardeleza, Gesmundo, Carandang, and Inting, JJ., concur.