People of the Philippines vs. Jesus L. Crisostomo

Where the Revised Penal Code provides a compound penalty consisting of imprisonment and a fine, the higher penalty—not necessarily the imprisonment—is the basis for computing the prescriptive period of the offense. Because the fine of P15,000.00 to P45,000.00 was afflictive under Article 26 and higher than the correctional penalty of arresto mayor, the offense prescribed in fifteen years under Article 90.

Jesus L. Crisostomo was the accused in an estafa prosecution instituted by the People of the Philippines before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The charge arose from a transaction involving a parcel of land in Calumpit, Bulacan and the spouses Teodoro Faustino and Regina Pangan, with Antonio Villarama as the prior mortgagee. The governing statutes were Article 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes a person who, knowing real property is encumbered, disposes of it although the encumbrance be not recorded; Article 26, which classifies fines as afflictive, correctional, or light; and Article 90, which fixes prescriptive periods and provides that the highest penalty is the basis when the penalty fixed by law is compound.

On or about September 16, 1945, in Malolos, Bulacan, Jesus L. Crisostomo allegedly sold, transferred, and conveyed by absolute sale to the spouses Teodoro Faustino and Regina Pangan a parcel of land containing an area of three hectares, more or less, situated in Bugyong, Calumpit, Bulacan, for P15,000.00. The sale was executed through a public instrument duly recorded with the Register of Deeds. In the deed of sale, Crisostomo stated that the property was free from all liens and encumbrances of whatever nature.

According to the prosecution, that statement was false because the property had previously been encumbered by way of mortgage to Antonio Villarama, and the mortgage was still valid and subsisting at the time of the sale. The fact of the encumbrance allegedly came to the knowledge of the spouses only in 1953. The property was later sold at public auction as a consequence of foreclosure proceedings against Crisostomo, and the spouses were allegedly defrauded and damaged in the sum of P15,000.00.

On September 3, 1959, Crisostomo was charged before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan with the crime of estafa, described and punished under Article 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. The information recited the foregoing allegations of sale, false statement of freedom from encumbrances, prior mortgage, delayed discovery, foreclosure, and damage.

On October 18, 1959, Crisostomo moved to quash the information on the ground that the offense had already prescribed. The prosecution and the defense exchanged pleadings. The defense contended that the offense prescribed in five years because it was punishable with arresto mayor; the prosecution contended that it prescribed in fifteen years because the law also imposed a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, which in this case would be a minimum of P15,000.00.

• Prescriptive Period Based on Fine: The People, as plaintiff-appellant, argued that the offense prescribes in fifteen years because, aside from the penalty of arresto mayor, the law imposes a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, which in this case would be a minimum of P15,000.00.
• Afflictive Fine under Article 26: The prosecution maintained that the fine is afflictive under Article 26 because it exceeds P6,000.00, and that under Article 90 an afflictive penalty prescribes in fifteen years.
• Reliance on Basalo: The prosecution relied on People vs. Basalo, where the Supreme Court held that for purposes of prescription of an offense penalized with a fine, the fine imposable, if correctional or afflictive under Article 26, should be made the basis rather than arresto mayor.
• Fine as Medium of Computation: The State maintained that the fine, classified as afflictive, should be made the medium of computation of the prescriptive period.

• Five-Year Prescription: Crisostomo contended that the offense charged prescribes in five years, it being punishable with arresto mayor under Article 90, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Basalo Not Applicable: The accused-appellee argued that Basalo involved a penalty of “arresto mayor or fine” under Article 319, par. 2, while the present case involves “arresto mayor and fine” under Article 316, par. 2, which carry different juridical concepts; therefore, arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years, should be the basis, disregarding the fine.
• Fine Subordinate When Conjoined: The accused and the trial court argued that when a fine is imposed in conjunction with another penalty, the fine is merely an additional penalty subordinated to the main penalty, and the court has no choice but to impose it with the other penalty; hence, the afflictive fine should not be the basis for prescription.
• Cited Cases: The accused cited People vs. Dinsay, People vs. Maneja, People vs. Yuhai @ Haya, and People vs. Aquino, et al. in support of dismissal.

• Prescriptive Period for Estafa under Article 316, par. 2: Whether a crime punishable under Article 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized by arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, prescribes in five years based on the arresto mayor or in fifteen years based on the fine when the fine is afflictive under Article 26.
• Starting Point of Prescription / Non-prescription: Whether, assuming a fifteen-year prescriptive period, the offense had already prescribed when the information was filed on September 3, 1959, considering either September 16, 1945, the date of the fraudulent transaction, or 1953, the year the offended parties gained actual knowledge of the fraud.

• Prescriptive Period for Estafa under Article 316, par. 2: Fifteen years. The penalty is compound, and under the last paragraph of Article 90 the highest penalty is the basis; the fine of P15,000.00 to P45,000.00 is afflictive under Article 26 and higher than the correctional arresto mayor.
• Starting Point of Prescription / Non-prescription: No prescription. From either September 16, 1945 or 1953, the fifteen-year period had not elapsed when the information was filed on September 3, 1959.

• Prescriptive Period for Estafa under Article 316, par. 2: The offense is penalized by arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value. Article 90 provides that when the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the prescriptive rules. The Court ruled that where the Revised Penal Code provides a penalty consisting of imprisonment and fine, whichever penalty is higher should be the basis. Here, the fine ranged from P15,000.00 to P45,000.00; because it exceeded P6,000.00, Article 26 classified it as afflictive, while arresto mayor is correctional. The fine being higher, the offense prescribed in fifteen years for afflictive penalties. People vs. Basalo was held applicable: it declared that for prescription, a fine imposable under Article 319, if correctional or afflictive under Article 26, should be the basis rather than arresto mayor. The trial court’s view that the fine could not be classified because it was imposed in conjunction with imprisonment was untenable; Article 26 declares without qualification that a fine is afflictive, correctional, or light, and no provision makes a fine subordinate to imprisonment when imposed together. In conjunction with imprisonment, a fine is as much a principal penalty as the imprisonment. The cases cited by the accused and the trial court were not applicable because their facts and issues differed.
• Starting Point of Prescription / Non-prescription: The prescriptive period being fifteen years, the offense had not prescribed. From whatever date the computation may start—whether from September 16, 1945, the date of the fraudulent transaction, or from 1953, when the offended parties gained actual knowledge of the fraud—the fifteen years had not elapsed when the information was filed on September 3, 1959. The dismissal on prescription was therefore reversed.

• Compound Penalty Rule in Prescription — Under the last paragraph of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty fixed by law is compound, the highest penalty is made the basis for applying the prescriptive periods. The Court applied this rule to a penalty consisting of imprisonment and a fine: whichever penalty is higher controls. Because the fine was afflictive and higher than arresto mayor, the offense prescribed in fifteen years.
• Fine as Principal Penalty When Imposed with Imprisonment — A fine imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is not subordinate to the imprisonment; it is as much a principal penalty as the imprisonment. The Revised Penal Code contains no provision subordinating such a fine. Thus, the fine’s classification under Article 26 may determine the prescriptive period.
• Basalo Doctrine on Fines and Prescription — For prescription of an offense penalized with a fine, whether imposed as a single or alternative penalty, the fine should not be reduced or converted into a prison term; it should be considered as such fine under Article 26, and if correctional or afflictive, it should be made the basis rather than arresto mayor. The Court applied this doctrine to a compound penalty by selecting the higher penalty.
• Classification of Fines under Article 26 — A fine is afflictive if it exceeds P6,000.00; correctional if it does not exceed P6,000.00 but is not less than P200.00; and light if it is less than P200.00. This classification determines the prescriptive period under Article 90. The fine in this case, ranging from P15,000.00 to P45,000.00, was afflictive.

• "We conclude, therefore, that where the Revised Penal Code provides a penalty consisting of imprisonment and fine, whichever penalty is the higher, should be the basis in computing the period of prescription." — This is the ratio decidendi: it states the rule for compound penalties of imprisonment and fine.
• "When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second, and third paragraphs of this article." — This is the statutory basis in Article 90, quoted by the Court, for using the highest penalty in a compound penalty.
• "In conjunction with imprisonment, a fine is as much a principal penalty as the imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other." — This rejects the trial court’s theory that a fine imposed with imprisonment is merely an additional, subordinate penalty.
• "The period of prescription of offense charged in the case at bar, is, therefore, fifteen (15) years. And from whatever date the computation may start, whether from September 16, 1945, the date of the fraudulent transaction, or from 1953, the year the offended parties gained actual knowledge of the fraud, the fifteen years had not prescribed when the information was filed on September 3, 1959." — This applies the rule and resolves the non-prescription issue.

• People vs. Basalo, G.R. No. L-9892, April 15, 1957; 53 O.G. [15] 4814 — Relied upon and applied. It held that for prescription of an offense penalized with a fine, the fine imposable, if correctional or afflictive under Article 26, should be the basis rather than arresto mayor.
• People vs. Rufo Cruz, G.R. No. L-15132, May 25, 1960 — Cited in support of the last paragraph of Article 90, that when the penalty fixed by law is compound, the highest penalty is the basis for prescription.
• People vs. Dinsay, 40 O.G. 12 Supp., 50 — Cited by the accused and trial court but held not applicable because the facts and issues differed.
• People vs. Maneja, 72 Phil. 256 — Cited by the accused and trial court but held not applicable because the facts and issues differed.
• People vs. Yuhai @ Haya, G.R. No. L-9598, Aug. 15, 1956 — Cited by the accused and trial court but held not applicable because the facts and issues differed.
• People vs. Aquino, et al., G.R. Nos. L-9357-70, Aug. 21, 1956 — Cited by the accused and trial court but held not applicable because the facts and issues differed.

• Article 316, par. 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines other forms of swindling, penalizing any person who, knowing real property is encumbered, disposes of the same although the encumbrance be not recorded. The penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value. The Court treated this as a compound penalty for prescription.
• Article 26, Revised Penal Code — Classifies fines: afflictive if it exceeds P6,000.00; correctional if it does not exceed P6,000.00 but is not less than P200.00; light if less than P200.00. The fine in this case, P15,000.00 to P45,000.00, was afflictive.
• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties prescribe in fifteen years; those punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten years, except those punishable by arresto mayor, which prescribe in five years. When the penalty fixed by law is compound, the highest penalty is the basis. The Court applied the fifteen-year period.
• Article 319, par. 2, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the discussion of People vs. Basalo as the provision penalizing violation of the Chattel Mortgage Law with arresto mayor or a fine. The Court distinguished the alternative penalty there from the compound penalty in Article 316, par. 2.

Bengzon, C.J.; Padilla, J.; Bautista Angelo, J.; Concepcion, J.; Reyes, J.B.L.; Barrera, J.; Dizon, J.; Regala, J.; and Makalintal, J. Labrador, J., took no part.