People of the Philippines vs. Jessie Olivo, Jr.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction where (1) there is more than one circumstance, (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt; the circumstances must point to overt acts of the accused leading to only one conclusion — guilt — and must be inconsistent with the theory that the accused is innocent. An attack by an armed man upon a woman who dies as a result is murder, because his sex and weapon give him superiority of strength.

In the morning of June 14, 1996, the body of a young Igorot woman was found in a canal near the Athletic Bowl at Burnham Park in Baguio City. The woman was naked from the waist down, her bloody face crushed beyond recognition, her mouth open in a silent scream; her abdomen, partially covered by a pink shirt, bore several tiny stab wounds, and there were wounds on her neck as well. Scattered around her were a hairband, black shoes, white panties, and a pair of dark blue pants, while the police recovered from the canal what appeared to be her personal effects together with two rough rocks stained with blood and a screwdriver about ten inches long with a black handle made of plastic or rubber. The dead woman was identified by her granduncle, Teodoro Incan, as his grandniece, Jane Lorielinda "Lorie" Tacyo.

According to the police, Lorie was seen in the morning of June 13, 1996 at the Igorot Garden, Burnham Park, where she and two companions — accused-appellant Jessie Olivo, Jr. and Maybelle Sacliwen — had their picture taken by a street photographer. The colored picture shows the victim smiling behind accused-appellant and Maybelle Sacliwen, wearing earrings, a headband, dark blue pants, and the pink shirt later found on her dead body. Dr. John Tinoyan conducted an autopsy on the cadaver at the Baguio Funeral Homes on June 14, 1996 at 4:45 p.m. He found a contusion hematoma at the right maxillary area, multiple abrasions on the lower portion of the face, multiple crushing injuries involving the jaws with complete fractures, a completely comminuted fracture of the base of the skull with the cervical vertebrae detached from the skull, subarachnoid hemorrhages at the posterior base of the skull involving the cerebellum and brain stem, eight stab wounds on the anterior lower portion of the neck, and ten stab wounds on the hypogastrium below the umbilicus, with multiple penetration of the small intestine and urinary bladder. The external genitalia was intact with no signs of abrasions or lacerations, and no fluids were recovered on the posterior vaginal pouch. The cause of death was neurogenic shock due to massive crushing injuries of the head, with multiple stab wounds of the body. Analyzing the abrasions, bone fractures, and hemorrhages, Dr. Tinoyan concluded that Lorie was probably lying down, with the back of her head on a rough surface, when a piece of rock struck the lower portion of her face; those injuries were fatal and could have caused instantaneous death. As regards the stab wounds, he said they could have been caused by a thin instrument with a blunt end, like a screwdriver, and that the victim's body was probably stabbed after she had already died, since there was no massive internal bleeding or tissue reaction. The hair had maggots, indicating that the victim had been dead for about 16 to 24 hours prior to the autopsy.

Shalimar Gaddang, a former girlfriend of accused-appellant, was interviewed by the police. She said she hung out with Jane at the Mountain Rock Disco, near Burnham Park, on June 14, 1996, from midnight to 1 a.m. Accused-appellant arrived at the establishment at around 2:00 a.m., and half an hour later Lorie invited Shalimar to take a walk with her and accused-appellant. Shalimar declined the invitation, and Lorie left the disco accompanied by accused-appellant. It was the last time Shalimar saw Lorie alive. Several friends of accused-appellant said that the screwdriver found near Lorie's body looked very much like the one he usually carried in his back pocket; it was like an icepick and had a handle made of black rubber, like the handlebars of a bike. During the first week of June 1996, Junalyn Bantasan, Wyndell Bautista, and Shalimar Gaddang — all friends of accused-appellant — saw the screwdriver in his possession at Burnham Park, Malcolm Square, and Mountain Rock Disco; during the picture-taking session at the Igorot Garden on the morning of June 13, 1996, Maybelle Sacliwen saw him with the screwdriver; and in the afternoon, Richard Opiawen also saw him in possession of the weapon while he took a walk with the victim.

On June 16, 1996, accused-appellant left for Metro Manila. At the Farmers Market in Cubao, Quezon City, he bumped into Jackson Sequiel, a friend who worked at the Sphinx Massage Parlor on Aurora Boulevard; accused-appellant accompanied Jackson to the establishment and found work as a masseur. Another acquaintance, Teddy Amyong, the cashier of Sphinx, testified that one day accused-appellant told him about an "incident" which happened in Baguio in the first or second week of June, that he left Baguio because someone named Lorie had been killed, and that he might be implicated in her death. Accused-appellant told Jackson that if he was arrested in connection with the killing, he would tell on his companions. When Teddy and Jackson returned to Baguio, they reported the matter to the police, as a result of which the police arrested accused-appellant in Cubao and brought him back to Baguio City. Even before his arrest in August 1996, the Baguio City police were already looking for him because his friends and "kabarkada" had given sworn statements pointing to him as the owner of the screwdriver recovered from the crime scene.

Testifying in his behalf, accused-appellant, who was then 18 years old, denied any involvement in the killing. He said that Maybelle Sacliwan introduced him to Lorie at the Mountain Rock Disco a week before she died, and that Lorie remained a mere acquaintance as he already had a relationship with Shalimar Gaddang. According to him, the last time he saw Lorie alive was in the morning of June 13, 1996, when she and Maybelle invited him to a picture-taking session at the Igorot Garden. On the night of June 13, he went dancing and drinking at the Mountain Rock Disco with Maybelle Sacliwan, the latter's boyfriend Ruben Pasiwen, and three friends of Ruben; Lorie was not with them. The group stayed at the disco until the following morning, and at around 6 a.m. of June 14, 1996, the friends went to the Igorot Garden and parted ways. Without sleep, accused-appellant got an "or" bucket of water from the house of a friend and went straight to Burnham Park to wash cars with a certain "Jim Boy." At around 4:30 in the afternoon, he went again to the Mountain Rock Disco and slept from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. in a room below the disco, then joined his friends Tammy, Jack, and Christ in the disco, where he heard that an unidentified person had been found dead at the Athletic Bowl. At 9:30 p.m., Hadjie Sakiban came and invited him and other people to go to the morgue to identify the body; accused-appellant invited Ruben to accompany him, and the group did not recognize the dead person as her face already looked different. Hadjie told accused-appellant that the police found the screwdriver used to stab the victim; when the group went to the police station, accused-appellant recognized the screwdriver as the one owned by Wyndell Bautista, a member of the Bukas Kotse gang, who used it to open cars. He first saw Wyndell carrying the screwdriver on June 8 at Malcolm Square, where the latter used it to strike cement; Wyndell kept it in a bag, and once, while accused-appellant was washing a car, he saw Wyndell steal the car stereo inside by opening it. On June 15, 1996, Maybelle met accused-appellant at Burnham Park while he was washing cars and told him that it was Lorie who had been found dead near the Athletic Bowl. On June 21, 1996, accused-appellant met Jackson Sequiel in Baguio City; Jackson invited him to work as a masseur at the Sphinx Massage Parlor in Cubao, Metro Manila, and they left Baguio the same day, together with a security guard named "Saldo" or "Zaldy," whom accused-appellant believed was Teddy Amyong. One day, Zaldy told accused-appellant about "a killing" at the Athletic Bowl and asked him if he was involved; accused-appellant said he had nothing to do with the crime. Zaldy also asked him if he knew who owned the screwdriver found near the body, and he replied, "No, that is the screwdriver of Wyndell Bautista." After three weeks of working at the Sphinx, a policeman named Robert Fangki arrested accused-appellant and took him back to Baguio City.

To prove damages, the prosecution presented Teodoro Incan, the granduncle of the victim, who testified that the family felt great pain and had already spent P63,800.00 in connection with Lorie's death: P3,500.00 for embalming services; P8,000.00 for transportation of the body to Natonin, Mt. Province; P1,200.00 for a coffin; P400.00 for funeral services; and P50,000.00 for the wake and several pigs butchered in accordance with indigenous custom. On this record, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, holding that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was present since he was taller and stronger than the victim, while the evidence failed to show outraging or scoffing at the corpse; it sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and awarded indemnity, actual damages, moral damages, and costs.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellant alleged that the evidence on record did not satisfy the test of moral certainty to warrant his conviction for the crime of murder.
• Misappreciation of Testimonial Evidence: He questioned the trial court's appreciation of the testimonies of the friends of the accused and of the victim.
• Misappreciation of Flight: He questioned the trial court's appreciation of the fact that he fled from Baguio City soon after the police found the victim's body.
• Misappreciation of His Declaration: He questioned the trial court's appreciation of his declaration that he was involved in Lorie's death.
• Conduct Inconsistent with Guilt: He claimed that, had he committed the crime, he would not have returned to the Mountain Rock Disco that night or on subsequent evenings, nor gone to the morgue to help identify the dead body, nor to the police station to help identify the owner of the recovered screwdriver; instead, he would have fled to a place far from the police and the scene of the crime.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence on record satisfies the test of moral certainty to warrant conviction for murder.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength attended the killing.
• Outraging or Scoffing at the Corpse: Whether the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of the victim was established.
• Flight and Post-Crime Conduct: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating accused-appellant's flight from Baguio City and his declarations after the crime as evidence of his guilt.
• Damages: Whether the awards of moral damages and actual damages were proper.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The three requisites for circumstantial evidence under Rule 133, §4 were present, the combination of proven circumstances producing a conviction beyond reasonable doubt and pointing to no conclusion other than guilt.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. Accused-appellant was taller and stronger than the victim, and an attack by an armed man upon a woman who dies as a result is murder because his sex and weapon gave him superiority of strength.
• Outraging or Scoffing at the Corpse: No. The evidence failed to show that, in stabbing the dead body and stripping off her garments, the purpose was to insult the victim or show contempt for the dead.
• Flight and Post-Crime Conduct: No error. The trial court's assessment of credibility is accorded great respect, and the acts, declarations, or omissions of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under Rule 130, §26.
• Damages: Partly. The award of P200,000.00 as moral damages was reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current rulings, while the award of P63,800.00 as actual damages was disallowed for lack of receipts.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Although no eyewitness testified to the killing, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the elements of the crime if the following requisites are present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances or a combination thereof should point to overt acts of the accused which would then lead to only one conclusion — that the accused is guilty of the crime charged — and should be inconsistent with the theory that the accused is innocent. The Court found seven circumstances taken together sufficient: (1) two rocks and a screwdriver, all stained with human blood, were recovered from the place where Lorie's body was found, with the hairstrands on the rocks belonging to the victim; (2) the victim's face had been smashed and her neck and stomach bore multiple stab wounds, with Dr. Tinoyan concluding that a hard object, probably a rock, caused instantaneous death and that the victim was already dead when stabbed with a blunt instrument that could be a screwdriver, placing the time of death between 12 midnight and 2:30 a.m. on June 14, 1996; (3) the screwdriver was positively identified as owned by accused-appellant, several friends having seen it in his possession during the first week of June 1996 and on June 13, 1996; (4) on the night of June 13, 1996, accused-appellant, Lorie, and others were at the Mountain Rock Disco until around midnight or 1 a.m. of June 14, 1996, and Shalimar Gaddang saw the accused and the victim leave the disco after midnight; (5) a few days after the killing, accused-appellant left Baguio City for Metro Manila; (6) while working at the Sphinx Massage Parlor, he told Jackson Sequiel and Teddie Ayom what he knew about the killing and said that, if arrested, he would tell on his companions, prompting them to report the matter to the police; and (7) even before his arrest in August 1996, the Baguio City police were already looking for him because his friends had given sworn statements pointing to him as the owner of the screwdriver recovered from the crime scene. All three requisites were thus present.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes murder by reclusion perpetua to death when committed with attendant circumstances including taking advantage of superior strength and outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of the victim. The trial court correctly held that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was present since accused-appellant was taller and stronger than the victim. An attack made by an armed man upon a woman, who died as a result thereof, is murder, because his sex and weapon gave him superiority of strength.

• Outraging or Scoffing at the Corpse: Although the information alleged this qualifying circumstance as well, the evidence failed to show it. The word "outrage" means to subject to gross insult, while "scoff" means to show contempt by derisive acts or language. There was no proof showing that, in stabbing the dead body of the victim and stripping off her garments, the purpose of accused-appellant was to insult the victim or to show contempt for the dead.

• Flight and Post-Crime Conduct: The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded great respect because it had the opportunity to hear them and observe their demeanor and manner of testifying; the exception is when it overlooked or misapplied some facts which could have affected the result of the case, and the proximate contact of the trial court with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony. With respect to declarations, acts, and omissions of accused-appellant after the crime, these may be received in evidence against him under Rule 130, §26 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. While not all human beings react to similar events in the same way, and the fact that accused-appellant did not immediately flee from Baguio City did not necessarily mean he had nothing to do with the killing — he may have gone to the morgue and the police station precisely to dispel suspicion — the fact remains that after the body of the victim had been found and his screwdriver recovered near the body, accused-appellant actually fled from Baguio City. As observed in People vs. Gordon, the fact that the accused does not flee from the scene of the crime does not necessarily indicate a clear conscience.

• Damages: The prosecution having proven the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength, the trial court correctly ruled that accused-appellant committed murder, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death; in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the award of P200,000.00 as moral damages was reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current rulings, and the award of P63,800.00 as actual damages was disallowed for lack of receipts to support the same.

• Circumstantial Evidence — Requisites — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the elements of a crime if the following requisites are present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances or a combination thereof should point to overt acts of the accused which would lead to only one conclusion — that the accused is guilty of the crime charged — and should be inconsistent with the theory that the accused is innocent. The Court applied this test to the seven circumstances established by the prosecution and concluded that all three requisites were satisfied, sustaining the conviction despite the absence of an eyewitness.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — A qualifying circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the intentional employment of excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the offended party. The Court held that the circumstance attended the killing because accused-appellant was taller and stronger than the victim, and because an attack made by an armed man upon a woman, who dies as a result thereof, is murder, his sex and weapon giving him superiority of strength.

• Outraging or Scoffing at the Person or Corpse — A qualifying circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. "Outrage" means to subject to gross insult, while "scoff" means to show contempt by derisive acts or language. The Court held that the circumstance was not established because there was no proof that, in stabbing the dead body and stripping off the victim's garments, the purpose was to insult the victim or show contempt for the dead.

• Acts, Declarations, and Omissions of a Party — Under Rule 130, §26 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The Court relied on this rule to uphold the trial court's appreciation of accused-appellant's post-crime declarations and conduct, including his statements at the Sphinx Massage Parlor and his flight from Baguio City.

• Flight and Non-Flight as Evidence — Not all human beings react to similar events in the same way; the fact that an accused does not immediately flee from the scene of the crime does not necessarily indicate a clear conscience, since he may have remained precisely to dispel suspicion. Flight after the discovery of the body and the recovery of the weapon, however, may be taken against the accused, consistent with the maxim that the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, whereas the righteous is as brave as a lion.

• Credibility of Witnesses — The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded great respect because it had the opportunity to hear them and observe their demeanor and manner of testifying; the exception is when it overlooked or misapplied some facts which could have affected the result of the case. The proximate contact of the trial court with those who take the witness stand places it in a more competent position to discriminate between true and false testimony.

• Actual Damages Require Proof — An award of actual damages must be supported by receipts; absent such proof, the award must be disallowed. The Court deleted the trial court's award of P63,800.00 as actual damages for lack of receipts.

• Moral Damages in Criminal Cases — Moral damages awarded in a criminal conviction are subject to reduction in accordance with current rulings. The Court reduced the trial court's award of P200,000.00 to P50,000.00.

• "circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the elements of the crime if the following requisites are present: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." — This passage states the canonical three-part test for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, drawn from Rule 133, §4 of the Rules of Court, and serves as the ratio decidendi sustaining the conviction in the absence of an eyewitness.

• "It has been held that the circumstances or a combination thereof should point to overt acts of the accused, which would then lead to only one conclusion, that is, that the accused is guilty of the crime charges. These should be inconsistent with the theory that the accused is innocent." — This passage supplies the qualitative standard complementing the three requisites: the circumstances must exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence, and it is the formulation commonly cited in subsequent circumstantial-evidence jurisprudence.

• "An attack made by an armed man upon a woman, who died as result thereof, is murder, because his sex and weapon gave him superiority of strength." — This passage articulates the rule on abuse of superior strength as applied to the killing of a woman by an armed male assailant, and is the basis for affirming the qualifying circumstance.

• "There is no proof showing that, in stabbing the dead body of the victim and stripping off her garments, the purpose of accused-appellant was to insult the victim or to show contempt for the dead." — This passage explains why the qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse, though alleged in the information, was not established, and defines the evidentiary threshold for that circumstance.

• People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 128647, March 31, 2000 — Cited twice: for the rule that the circumstances or combination thereof must point to overt acts leading to only one conclusion of guilt and be inconsistent with innocence, and for the rule that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded great respect absent overlooked or misapplied facts.
• People vs. Labuguen, G.R. No. 127849, August 9, 2000 — Cited alongside Salonga for the circumstantial-evidence standard requiring that the circumstances exclude the theory of innocence.
• People vs. Ragundiaz, G.R. No. 124977, June 22, 2000 — Cited alongside Salonga and Labuguen for the same circumstantial-evidence standard.
• People vs. Gordon, 129 SCRA 465 (1984) — Cited for the rule that the fact that the accused does not flee from the scene of the crime does not necessarily indicate a clear conscience.
• People vs. Gallo, 318 SCRA 157 (1999) — Cited as the source of the maxim that the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, whereas the righteous is as brave as a lion, in support of treating flight as evidence of guilt.
• People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446 (1935) — Cited for the rule that an attack by an armed man upon a woman who dies as a result is murder because his sex and weapon gave him superiority of strength.
• People vs. Jamoralin, 88 Phil. 789 (1951) — Cited alongside Quesada for the same rule on abuse of superior strength in the killing of a woman.
• People vs. Berzuela, G.R. No. 132078, September 25, 2000 — Cited as a current ruling supporting the reduction of the moral damages award to P50,000.00.
• People vs. Lopez, 312 SCRA 684 (1999) — Cited alongside Berzuela for the reduction of moral damages.
• People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 136818, December 19, 2000 — Cited for the disallowance of actual damages unsupported by receipts.

• Rule 133, §4, Rules of Court — Provides the requisites for circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict. The Court applied the three requisites to the seven circumstances established by the prosecution and found them all satisfied.
• Rule 130, §26, Revised Rules on Evidence — Provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. The Court invoked this provision to uphold the admission of accused-appellant's post-crime declarations and conduct as evidence against him.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder by reclusion perpetua to death when committed with attendant circumstances, including taking advantage of superior strength and outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse of the victim. The Court found the first attendant circumstance present and the second absent.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the penalty when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, requiring the lesser penalty. The Court applied it in imposing reclusion perpetua rather than death.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code — Governs credit for preventive imprisonment. The Court directed that accused-appellant be credited with 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, JJ., concur.