People of the Philippines vs. Jeronico M. Lobino

Treachery qualifies a killing to murder where the offender's sudden and unexpected attack upon an unarmed victim who is in no position to defend herself is deliberately adopted to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself; the victim's ability to run after the first blow does not negate treachery. Where the killing is qualified by treachery but no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attends its commission, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, Article 248 prescribing the range of reclusion perpetua to death.

Jeronico M. Lobino and Patricia Abajar lived together as common-law spouses for twenty years and had four children, one of whom, Julie Lobino, was among the prosecution's witnesses; Alberto Abajar, another prosecution witness, was the victim's son by a previous marriage. The killing was prosecuted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death, and the resulting death sentence was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Jeronico M. Lobino, also known as "Hapon," and Patricia Abajar lived together as husband and wife for twenty years without the benefit of marriage and had four children, among them Julie Lobino. Alberto Abajar, the victim's son by a previous marriage, was also part of the household circle. On the morning of April 28, 1994, Lobino, Abajar, and Julie were among eighteen persons at the seashore of Barangay Southern Looc, Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, catching fish with the "baling," the fishnet of Artemio Nisnisan.

According to Nisnisan, who had been fishing with the net for about an hour, he was one fathom away when he saw Lobino stab Abajar while the fishermen were dividing their catch. Abajar ran but was overtaken, and Lobino stabbed her twice more; Julie shouted for help, but only after the third thrust were Nisnisan and the others able to subdue Lobino and take him to the police station. On cross-examination, Nisnisan stated that he had observed no altercation between the two before the stabbing and had not been paying them particular attention; at the moment of the first thrust, Abajar was in a stooping position with Lobino in front of her, and the blow struck the right side of her stomach. She then ran in a staggered manner, enabling Lobino to catch up and deliver two more thrusts, after which she slumped to the ground unconscious.

Julie Lobino gave a substantially corroborating account. While her mother was getting her share of the fish, Lobino stabbed her with a stainless knife, first on the right side; Julie, who was one fathom away, admonished her father but ran for help for fear that he would attack her as well. The second thrust landed on her mother's lower right armpit and the third on her lower right arm. Lobino ran amuck and the knife he used was never recovered. Abajar was confined at the hospital for two days and died on April 30, 1994; she was buried at the Lao cemetery. Julie testified that she was the second of four children, did not know whether her parents were legally married, was unaware of any quarrel in the family, had observed no altercation between them that day, and was surprised by the suddenness of the attack.

Alberto Abajar was also out fishing that day and, upon reaching the shore, was informed by several people that his mother had been stabbed by Lobino. He spent a total of ₱5,000.00 for medical and funeral expenses. Dr. Israelson Taclob, connected with the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital in Oroquieta City since 1993, examined Abajar on April 28, 1994 and issued the medico-legal certificate and the certificate of death; the cause of death was a "stab wound at the right upper quadrant abdomen penetrating perforating with severe hemorrhage."

Testifying as the lone witness for the defense, Lobino admitted that he and the victim were not legally married but had lived together for twenty years and had four children. He claimed that prior to the incident they had several misunderstandings and often quarreled because the victim would come home late at night and, when confronted, would retort, "why do you ask, you can't refrain me"; she was also not at home to take care of him when he fell ill on April 5, 1994. On the day in question, he stabbed her because he could no longer "swallow" what was happening and lost control of himself. He remembered stabbing her only once and insisted that he had not planned to kill her. On cross-examination, he stated that they were at the seashore using Nisnisan's fishnet, that he stabbed the victim while she was picking up her share of the fish, and that when he lost control of himself he stabbed her two more times. He stayed at the beach until a neighbor brought him to the municipal building.

The trial court found the version of the prosecution witnesses more credible than that of the accused and rejected his account of provocation.

• Credibility of the Accused's Testimony: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in disregarding his testimony, which he offered as the sole account of his defense.
• Absence of Treachery: Appellant theorized that the mere suddenness of the attack did not mean that treachery attended the killing; that the fact the victim was in a stooping position was purely incidental and was not deliberately sought by him, since otherwise the victim would not have been able to run after she was first stabbed; and that neither prosecution witness, Artemio Nisnisan and Julie Lobino, could have seen the victim in the alleged stooping position because they were one fathom away.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Appellant submitted that he would not stab his common-law wife without any apparent reason; that he attacked her because he could no longer stand her going home late at night and her sarcastic remarks whenever her attention was called to what she was doing; and that the trial court should have credited him with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
• Absence of Aggravating Circumstance and Proper Penalty: Appellant maintained that the trial court should not have considered abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance and should have found him guilty only of homicide and not murder.

• Passion and Obfuscation: The People, through the Solicitor General, argued that appellant's insinuations regarding his common-law wife's late-night trysts and her lack of concern for a sick husband were not cogent enough to drive anyone to passion or obfuscation and to commit the crime at the spur of the moment; that, besides being vague and generic, the alleged provocative acts did not even proximately precede the commission of the crime; and that, if at all, such allegations proved instead that appellant harbored certain ill-feelings against his common-law wife.
• Aggravating Circumstance and Penalty: The People submitted that the trial court erred in considering insult or disregard of respect due to the offended party as an aggravating circumstance to justify the imposition of the death penalty, and recommended that appellant be sentenced only to reclusion perpetua.

• Credibility of the Accused's Testimony: Whether the trial court erred in disregarding the testimony of the accused, Jeronico Lobino.
• Treachery: Whether the killing of Patricia Abajar was qualified by treachery.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation should be appreciated in favor of the accused.
• Aggravating Circumstance and Penalty: Whether the aggravating circumstance invoked against the accused was properly appreciated so as to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.

• Credibility of the Accused's Testimony: No. The evaluation by the trial judge of the credibility of witnesses and the ascribing of evidentiary weight to their testimony is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate court, barring patent arbitrariness, and the trial court was in a better position to assess the evidence and view the witnesses as they testified.
• Treachery: Yes. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and the victim — unarmed, kneeling, and unaware — had no opportunity to defend herself or retaliate; the deliberate adoption of that mode of assault insured the execution of the crime without risk to the offender.
• Passion and Obfuscation: No. Neither requisite was established: no unlawful act sufficient to produce obfuscation was proved, and the alleged provocative acts, if any, were remote from the killing, leaving appellant ample time to recover his normal equanimity.
• Aggravating Circumstance and Penalty: No. The aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of respect due to the offended party was not proved, and with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the murder, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code required the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• Credibility of the Accused's Testimony: The Court reiterated the settled rule that the evaluation by the trial judge of the credibility of witnesses and the ascribing of evidentiary weight to their testimony is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate court, barring patent arbitrariness in arriving at his conclusions. Reason and experience sustain the factual findings of the trial court, which was in a better position to assess the evidence before it and to view the witnesses as they gave their testimony. No patent arbitrariness appearing, the trial court's preference for the version of the prosecution witnesses over the lone testimony of the accused was upheld.

• Treachery: Quoting People of the Philippines vs. Ramy Valles, the Court restated that under the Revised Penal Code there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself, and the mere fact that the victim had no weapon with which to defend himself is not sufficient to prove the first element. There must be evidence that the mode of assault was deliberately or consciously adopted to insure the execution of the crime without risk to the offender; if the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of provocation on the part of the victim, no treachery attends the commission of the crime, the essence of treachery being the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. Applying these principles, the Court found that appellant stabbed the victim as she was kneeling to get her share of the fish; in that position she was not in a position to defend herself and had no inkling of what appellant was about to do. A sudden attack against an unarmed victim constitutes treachery, and the fact that the victim was still able to run after the first strike did not negate the fact that appellant adopted such approach to prevent any defense on her part. With the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, murder was perpetrated.

• Passion and Obfuscation: The Court set out the requisites of passion and obfuscation: (1) that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason, but the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings; the turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense. Here, no evidence supported appellant's theory that he and the victim quarreled: Julie Lobino, who lived with her parents, testified that she knew of no quarrel or altercation between them, and none of the prosecution witnesses testified that a quarrel preceded the attack. Appellant's allegation that the victim did not take care of him when he was ill on April 5, 1994 concerned a date far removed from the commission of the crime on April 28, 1994, and such length of time would have been sufficient to enable him to recover his equanimity. The Court adopted the Solicitor General's observation that the alleged provocative acts were vague and generic, did not proximately precede the commission of the crime, and at most proved that appellant harbored ill-feelings against his common-law wife.

• Aggravating Circumstance and Penalty: The Court found merit in the Solicitor General's submission that the trial court erred in considering insult or disregard of respect due to the offended party as an aggravating circumstance to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Quoting People vs. Valencia and People vs. Mangsant, the Court held that it is necessary to prove the specific fact or circumstance, other than that the victim is a woman, or an old man, or one of high rank, showing insult or disregard of sex, age, or rank, in order that it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance; there must be evidence that in the commission of the crime the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party. Absent any proof that appellant attacked the victim with the intention to add insult to her, there was no basis for reckoning the said aggravating circumstance. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death, and in accordance with Article 63, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty should be imposed. Conformably, as recommended by counsel for the People, appellant was sentenced only to reclusion perpetua and not death. In line with the current policy of the Court, appellant was also held liable to pay the heirs of the deceased ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

• Conclusiveness of the Trial Court's Credibility Findings — The evaluation by the trial judge of the credibility of witnesses and the ascribing of evidentiary weight to their testimony is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate court, barring patent arbitrariness in arriving at his conclusions. The rule rests on the trial court's superior position to assess the evidence and to view the witnesses as they testify. The Court applied the doctrine in refusing to disturb the trial court's preference for the prosecution's version over the accused's lone testimony.

• Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Corollaries applied by the Court: treachery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself; the mere fact that the victim had no weapon with which to defend himself is not sufficient to prove the first element; if the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was merely triggered by sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of provocation by the victim, no treachery attends the commission of the crime; the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked; and a sudden attack against an unarmed victim constitutes treachery. The victim's ability to run after the first strike does not negate treachery, since the offender's mode of assault was adopted precisely to prevent any defense on her part.

• Passion and Obfuscation — The mitigating circumstance requires: (1) that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) that said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings; the turmoil and unreason naturally resulting from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense. The Court found both requisites absent, the alleged provocative acts being unproved and, in any event, remote in time from the killing.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Insult or Disregard of Respect Due to the Offended Party — It is necessary to prove the specific fact or circumstance, other than that the victim is a woman, or an old man, or one of high rank, showing insult or disregard of sex, age, or rank, in order that it may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. There must be evidence that in the commission of the crime the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party. Absent such proof, the circumstance cannot be appreciated to justify the death penalty.

• Application of Indivisible Penalties Under Article 63 — Where the penalty prescribed for the offense is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is neither a mitigating nor an aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty must be imposed. Because murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and because no modifying circumstance attended the killing, the Court reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• Civil Indemnity for Homicide and Murder — In line with the then-current policy of the Court, an accused convicted of a killing is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, independent of proof of actual damages.

• "Under the Revised Penal Code, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This is the Court's canonical restatement of treachery, drawn from People of the Philippines vs. Ramy Valles, and supplies the definition from which the two concurring conditions are derived.

• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked." — This formulation marks the boundary between a treacherous killing and one merely triggered by sudden infuriation, and explains why the Court rejected appellant's claim that the killing was not preconceived.

• "A sudden attack against an unarmed victim constitutes treachery." — This is the Court's operative application of the doctrine to the facts: the victim was kneeling, unarmed, and unaware when stabbed, and her ability to run after the first thrust did not negate the qualifying circumstance.

• "There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason." — This defines the mitigating circumstance invoked by appellant and anchors the Court's holding that the alleged late-night trysts and sarcastic remarks were neither proved nor proximate to the killing.

• People of the Philippines vs. Ramy Valles, G.R. No. 110564, 267 SCRA 103 — The controlling precedent on treachery; the Court quoted its formulation of the crime's definition and two concurring conditions, and its rule that treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Estrellanes — Cited within the Valles excerpt for the rule that the mere fact the victim had no weapon with which to defend himself is not sufficient to prove the first element of treachery; followed.
• People of the Philippines vs. Modesto de Roxas y Razon @ "Mody", et al., G.R. No. 106783, February 15, 1995, 241 SCRA 369, 375 — Cited for the rule that the trial judge's evaluation of witness credibility and ascribing of evidentiary weight is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate court, barring patent arbitrariness; followed in rejecting the first assigned error.
• People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Bautista y Niales, G.R. No. 109800, March 12, 1996, 254 SCRA 621, 629 — Cited for the rule that the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings; followed in denying the mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Alanguilang, 52 Phil. 663, 665; People vs. Ulita, 108 Phil. 730, 743; People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA 123, 134 — Cited through Reyes, Revised Penal Code, for the requisites of passion and obfuscation; followed.
• People vs. Valencia, C.A., 43 O.G. 3740; People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548, 550-551 — Cited for the requirement that the specific fact of insult or disregard of sex, age, or rank be proved, and that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party; followed in striking down the aggravating circumstance.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder, for which the prescribed penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied it in affirming that the killing of Patricia Abajar was murder, qualified as it was by treachery.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties. Because the penalty for murder is composed of two indivisible penalties and neither a mitigating nor an aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the Court applied Article 63 to impose the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Insult or Disregard of Respect Due to the Offended Party (Revised Penal Code) — The Court held that this circumstance requires proof of a specific fact, other than that the victim is a woman, or an old man, or one of high rank, showing insult or disregard of sex, age, or rank, and evidence that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of the offended party. Absent such proof, the circumstance cannot be appreciated to justify the death penalty.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., are on official leave.