People of the Philippines vs. Jayson Berdin, Castro Calejanan and Luciano Saluyo

Where the prosecution proves only the qualifying circumstance of treachery and no other aggravating circumstance, the death penalty cannot be imposed; the lesser indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua must be applied pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Jayson Berdin, Castro Calejanan, and Luciano Saluyo were charged with the murder of Juliano Mampo in Kidapawan, Cotabato. Berdin was the godson of Saluyo and the son-in-law of Calejanan; the three were together on the night of the killing, and it was Saluyo and Calejanan whom Berdin sought out when he decided to surrender to the barangay captain. A prior grievance over the cutting of trees, which the victim attributed to Berdin's having reported him, supplied the backdrop to the fatal encounter.

On June 10, 1997, at around two o'clock in the afternoon, Juliano Mampo asked his son Jemuel to buy fish at Poblacion Kidapawan, Cotabato. Upon Jemuel's return, his father told him that appellant Luciano Saluyo, alias "Isot," had come to their house to pledge his pistol for ₱500.00 to be spent on his son's wedding, but Juliano declined because he had no money. Later that evening, at around ten o'clock, Jemuel accompanied his father to Saluyo's house, where appellants Jayson Berdin and Castro Calejanan were also present. After about an hour of conversation, father and son headed home, with Jemuel walking ahead of his father. Unknown to them, the three appellants trailed behind. When Jemuel turned around, he saw Calejanan holding his father's left hand and Saluyo holding his right. Frightened, Jemuel hid behind a tree three to five meters away and watched as Berdin hacked his father's head twice with a bolo. When his father was about to fall, Saluyo and Calejanan held him up; Berdin then grabbed the victim's head and slashed his neck. The appellants looked for Jemuel but could not find him.

At about the same time, Rudy Yamilo, then on his way to a neighbor's house at Sitio Puas Inda, Barangay Amas, Kidapawan, witnessed the crime from a distance of about ten meters, seeing Berdin hack the victim with a bolo while Saluyo and Calejanan held his arms. The police arrived not long thereafter. Dr. Roberto A. Omandac, Municipal Health Officer of Kidapawan, conducted a post mortem examination and testified that the victim suffered two hack wounds on the head — one eleven-inch long, three-inch deep hack wound on the right forehead extending to the right ear, and another five-inch long hack wound on the upper right portion of the head — and that the cause of death was an eight-and-a-half-inch long hack wound on the neck severing the windpipe and major blood vessels.

Saluyo and Calejanan denied the charge, maintaining that they were both at home in Barangay Amas, Kidapawan when the incident transpired and that it was Berdin who killed the victim. Calejanan testified that on the night of June 10, 1997, Saluyo informed him that his son-in-law Berdin was being assaulted by the victim; soon thereafter, Berdin, accompanied by his wife, arrived and said, "Pa nakapatay ko ug tawo kay gisulong ko" (Pa, I killed a person because I was attacked), and asked Calejanan to accompany him to the barangay captain so he could surrender. Saluyo testified that he distinctly heard the victim shouting outside the house of his godson Berdin, "Jayson, kanaog ka kay patyon ta ka" (Jayson, come down because I will kill you) and "Kay ikaw ang tig-report nga ako ang tig-pamutol og kahoy dinhi" (Because you are the one reporting that I am the one cutting trees here); he peeped through a hole but saw nothing because it was dark. Subsequently, Berdin went to his house saying, "Nong, ihatod ko sa kapitan kay mo-surrender ko" (Nong, bring me to the barangay captain because I will surrender). Before proceeding to the barangay captain's place, they passed by Calejanan's house. Berdin voluntarily admitted to the barangay captain that he killed the victim, and the barangay captain summoned the police to investigate. The police went to the crime scene and, upon their return, asked Saluyo to ride in their jeep; when they reached the barangay captain's house, the police confronted him saying, "Kining si Julian Mampo gitabangan ninyo kini" (This Julian Mampo, you helped one another in killing him), which he vehemently denied.

Berdin, invoking self-defense, gave a different version. On June 10, 1997, at around seven o'clock in the evening, he and his wife were awakened by the victim shouting, "Kanaug diha kay ikaw diay ang nagsumbong nga ako ang nagpamutol sa kahoy" (Come down because you reported that I was the one cutting trees). When Berdin refused to come out of the house, the victim attempted to gain entry by destroying the door, hacking it several times with a bolo. Berdin then approached the victim calmly and persuaded him to discuss their differences, but the victim remained headstrong and threatened to kill him. The victim hacked Berdin twice with a bolo but missed and hit the door instead. Berdin retaliated by hacking the victim twice. The victim retreated momentarily but attacked Berdin once more; at that moment, Berdin hit the victim at the neck, causing the latter to fall. After ascertaining that the victim was already dead, Berdin proceeded to the house of his godfather Saluyo and requested the latter to accompany him to the barangay captain; Saluyo suggested that they first inform Calejanan, Berdin's father-in-law. In the presence of the barangay captain, Berdin voluntarily admitted he committed the crime. The barangay captain then summoned the police to conduct an investigation at the crime scene; upon their return, the police brought the three appellants to the Kidapawan Police Station.

The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses straightforward, credible, and convincing, and found no evidence that they were motivated by ulterior motive to implicate the appellants. It held that the multiple hack wounds sustained by the victim negated Berdin's claim of self-defense, and that conspiracy was established through the testimonies of Jemuel Mampo and Rudy Yamilo, who described how Calejanan and Saluyo held the victim's hands while Berdin hacked him.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellants argued that the court a quo gravely erred in finding that their guilt for the crime charged had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Self-Defense: Appellants maintained that the court a quo gravely erred in not giving weight and credence to Jayson Berdin's plea of self-defense.
• Treachery: Appellants contended that the court a quo gravely erred in finding that the commission of the crime charged was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense: The Solicitor General contended that in invoking self-defense, appellant Berdin in effect admitted killing the victim, shifting to him the onus probandi to show that his act was justified; even if the prosecution's evidence were weak, it could not be readily dismissed, and Berdin must rely on the strength of his own evidence rather than on the weakness of the prosecution's.
• Nature of Wounds: The Solicitor General argued that the nature, severity, and number of wounds suffered by the victim were totally inconsistent with Berdin's plea of self-defense.
• Conspiracy and Treachery: The Solicitor General agreed with the trial court that all the appellants conspired with one another in killing the victim, and that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime considering that the assault was sudden and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the trial court erred in finding the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime charged proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to Jayson Berdin's plea of self-defense.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the three appellants in killing the victim was established.
• Treachery: Whether the commission of the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty was the correct imposable penalty.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No error. The conviction stands, the prosecution eyewitnesses having positively identified all three appellants, and their categorical and consistent testimony, untainted by ill motive, prevails over the defenses of alibi and denial.
• Self-Defense: No. Berdin failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the requisites of self-defense, and the nature, number, and location of the victim's wounds negated his claim.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established, the appellants' concerted acts having demonstrated a common purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest.
• Treachery: Yes. The sudden and unexpected attack from behind, without provocation on the victim's part, insured the killing without risk to the assailants and qualified the crime to murder.
• Penalty: No. The death penalty was improperly imposed; with only treachery proven and no other aggravating circumstance, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The trial court's reliance on the testimonies of eyewitnesses Jemuel Mampo and Rudy Yamilo was sustained, it being settled that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe their firsthand account and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted — an exception not shown in the case. The positive identification of the appellants, being categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevailed over alibi and denial, which are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof.
• Self-Defense: Where self-defense is invoked, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel the aggression. On automatic review, the burden is even more difficult, as the appellant must show that the court below committed a palpable error in appreciating the evidence. Berdin failed to discharge this burden. His corroborating witness, Saluyo, merely testified that he heard the victim threatening to kill Berdin but admitted that when he tried to look, he saw nothing because it was dark; instead of fortifying the defense, Saluyo affirmed its weakness. Berdin's own testimony was dubious: he claimed that while the victim was hacking their door, he still attempted to talk to the victim to thresh out their differences, which was inconsistent with a person whose life was in peril. The nature, character, location, and extent of the victim's wounds — an eleven-inch long, three-inch deep hack wound on the right forehead extending to the right ear, another five-inch hack wound on the upper right portion of the head, and an eight-and-a-half-inch hack wound on the neck severing the windpipe and major blood vessels — showed a single-minded effort to kill rather than a defensive act, and thus disproved self-defense.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and its existence may be logically inferred and proved through acts of the accused that point to a common purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. Jemuel testified that while Calejanan and Saluyo held his father's hands, Berdin hacked his head twice with a bolo, and that when his father was about to fall, Calejanan and Saluyo held him up and immediately Berdin grabbed his head and slashed his neck. These circumstances showed that Saluyo and Calejanan acted in unison with Berdin, of one mind not only in attacking the victim but also in the manner of the attack. Although there was no proof of a previous agreement, conspiracy was evident from the manner of its perpetration. With conspiracy established, it was no longer necessary to determine who among the malefactors rendered the fatal blow.
• Treachery: There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. Two essential elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Treachery was shown when the victim was attacked from behind; the sudden and unexpected assault without provocation on the part of the victim, who did not know he was being followed clandestinely and had no inkling of the fate that would befall him, placed him in a position where he could not effectively defend himself. The manner of killing was deliberately adopted, as Calejanan and Saluyo held the victim's hands while Berdin hacked his head twice, and when the victim was about to fall they again held him while Berdin grabbed his head and slashed his neck. Treachery, being attendant in the slaying, qualified the crime into murder.
• Penalty: The prosecution failed to prove any other aggravating circumstance that would warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Under Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Accordingly, the appropriate imposable penalty is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua. As to damages, when death occurs as a result of a crime, each appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity without need of evidence or proof of damages. Temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty; following People vs. Abrazaldo, temperate damages were computed at ₱25,000.00. Moral damages of ₱50,000.00 were awarded, moral damages being intended not to enrich the victim's heirs but to allow them to obtain means for diversion that could alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings, as the victim's son unequivocally described how his family suffered wounded feelings over his father's death. On exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that in criminal offenses exemplary damages may be imposed only when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, and People vs. Catubig held that exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 are recoverable if an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, is present.

• Self-defense — requisites and burden of proof — Where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression. The plea cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful. The nature, number, and location of the wounds inflicted are important indicia that may disprove the plea. In this case, Berdin's claim failed: his corroborating witness saw nothing because it was dark, his own account of calmly attempting to talk to the victim while his door was being hacked was inconsistent with a person whose life was in peril, and the severity and location of the victim's wounds showed a single-minded effort to kill.
• Conspiracy — definition and proof — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Its existence may be logically inferred and proved through acts of the accused that point to a common purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest. Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and regardless of the fact, the perpetrators are liable as principals. Once conspiracy is established, it is no longer necessary to determine who among the malefactors rendered the fatal blow. Here, conspiracy was inferred from the manner of perpetration: Saluyo and Calejanan held the victim's hands while Berdin hacked him, and held him up again when he was about to fall while Berdin slashed his neck.
• Treachery — definition and elements — There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make. Two essential elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Treachery is present when the attack is sudden and unexpected, rendering the victim unable to defend himself. In this case, the victim was attacked from behind, without provocation, by assailants who had clandestinely followed him, and the manner of killing was deliberately adopted. Treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Application of indivisible penalties under Article 63(2) — When the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Because only the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven and no other aggravating circumstance warranted the death penalty, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed instead of death.
• Civil liability arising from crime — damages — When death occurs as a result of a crime, the accused should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity without need of evidence or proof of damages. Temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty, computed in this case at ₱25,000.00. Moral damages of ₱50,000.00 are awarded to allow the heirs to obtain means for diversion that could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological sufferings. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages in criminal offenses may be imposed only when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, and People vs. Catubig held that exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 are recoverable if an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, is present.

• "where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression." — States the canonical three requisites of self-defense and allocates the burden of proof to the accused, the framework the Court applied in rejecting Berdin's plea.
• "The existence of conspiracy may be logically inferred and proved through acts of the accused that point to a common purpose, a concert of action, and a community of interest." — Articulates the standard formulation for proving conspiracy by circumstantial acts, which the Court used to sustain the finding of conspiracy among the three appellants.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make." — Defines treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the basis for qualifying the killing to murder.
• "In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove any other aggravating circumstance that warrants the imposition of the death penalty. Hence, the appropriate imposable penalty is the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the same Code." — States the ratio for reducing the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, the decision's principal dispositive modification.

• People vs. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003 — Cited for the rule that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful; also cited as the basis for computing temperate damages at ₱25,000.00.
• People vs. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380 — Cited by the trial court for the rule that the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted on a victim negate a claim of self-defense, and that where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate a common design toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and the perpetrators are liable as principals.
• People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 — Cited for the rule that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by an assailant are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense.
• People vs. Dulot, G.R. No. 137770, January 30, 2001, 350 SCRA 591 — Cited for the definition of conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
• People vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 124892, January 30, 2001, 350 SCRA 537 — Cited for the rule that the existence of conspiracy may be inferred from acts pointing to a common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest, and that with conspiracy established it is no longer necessary to determine who rendered the fatal blow.
• People vs. Bolivar, G.R. No. 130597, February 21, 2001, 352 SCRA 438 — Cited for the definition of treachery.
• People vs. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA 679 — Cited for the two essential elements of treachery.
• People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621 — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 are recoverable if there is present an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, in the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Solamillo, G.R. No. 126131, June 17, 2003 — Cited for the rules on temperate damages in lieu of actual damages and on the award of moral damages.
• People vs. Pinuela, G.R. Nos. 140727-28, January 31, 2003 — Cited for the rule that the positive identification of the appellants, when categorical and consistent and without ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over alibi and denial.
• Carlos Arcona y Moban vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134784, December 9, 2002 — Cited for the rule that the accused invoking self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.

• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, only treachery having been proven.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that in criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed only when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Discussed in connection with the recoverability of exemplary damages where an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or ordinary, is present.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.