People of the Philippines vs. Honorato C. Beltran, Jr.

Unlawful aggression is a sine qua non of self-defense; absent actual or imminent peril to the accused, the justifying circumstance cannot be appreciated even if the other requisites are alleged. Treachery qualifies a killing to murder where the attack is sudden and unexpected and renders the unarmed victim defenseless, even if the first blow was frontal, when the victim is attacked again after being rendered helpless.

The Revised Penal Code governs the charge of murder, the justifying circumstance of self-defense under Article 11, the aggravating circumstance of treachery under Article 14, and the mitigating circumstances under Article 13. The case therefore required the prosecution to prove the elements of murder and the defense to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.

On October 25, 1999, around 10:00 p.m., along Velasquez Road, Barangay Sta. Rita, Batangas City, Honorato C. Beltran, Jr., also known as Jun-Jun and Junior, and Norman H. Concepcion were in the vicinity. Ever D. Sales, a gasoline boy at Caltex Gasoline Station in San Pascual, Batangas City, was bicycling home through Velasquez Road. He saw Beltran holding a bolo and standing in front of his house at the side of the road; on the opposite side, Norman stood in front of an automobile repair shop. Exhausted, Ever stopped to rest at a nipa hut near the road. Minutes later, from about six meters away, he saw Beltran stalking Norman, who was walking near the automobile shop. Beltran approached Norman and, without warning, hacked him with a bolo. Norman tried to avoid the blow by moving backward and shielding his face with his left arm, but his left hand was hit. When Norman turned and ran, Beltran hacked him at the back, causing him to fall on a grassy area; Beltran repeatedly hacked him. Fearing for his safety, Ever left the nipa hut and sought help at a nearby sari-sari store. Later, he returned to the crime scene and found no trace of Beltran; he discovered Norman's bloodied, lifeless body on the ground. He went home and narrated what he witnessed to a relative, Renato Sales, who later informed Carmina Baliwag, who relayed the information to Normita Concepcion, Norman's sister. Ever declared he knew of no reason why Beltran hacked Norman.

Rolando G. Dalisay, a resident of Velasquez Subdivision engaged in carpentry, corroborated Ever. Around 10:00 p.m. on October 25, 1999, while walking along Velasquez Road to buy medicines, he saw Beltran, about 15 meters away, hacking Norman with a bolo. When Norman fell, Beltran continued relentlessly hacking him. Afraid of being seen, Rolando went home and informed his wife. When barangay tanod and policemen arrived, he proceeded to the scene and told them what he witnessed. He personally knew Beltran, a former employee in his carpentry business, and Norman, a relative of his wife. He testified that Beltran and Norman had a previous quarrel, which was later settled in their barangay office.

SPO1 Julian D. Mendoza, investigating officer, received information about the hacking at about midnight on October 26, 1999. He and SPO3 Mario Panaligan rushed to the scene. Upon arrival, he asked the people present about the identity of the dead person and the killer. Rolando approached him and said the dead person was Norman and the killer was Beltran. Normita also arrived and gave relevant information. They proceeded to Beltran's house, but he was not there. On October 27, 1999, Tomas Dimacuha surrendered Beltran. Later, Beltran's brother, Sherman Beltran, brought to Mendoza the bolo, about three palms in length, used in hacking Norman.

Dr. Dinah R. Lucero, Medical Officer IV of the Batangas City Health Office, conducted the post mortem examination on Norman's cadaver on October 26, 1999 at Eternal Memorial Chapel. She declared that aside from the body being almost decapitated, Norman suffered seven stab wounds, and the cause of death was "massive blood loss secondary to multiple hacking wound." The death certificate showed Norman was 22 years old. Normita testified that on the evening of October 25, 1999, Carmina Baliwag called her and instructed her to proceed to Velasquez Road. Upon arriving, she was shocked to find Norman's dead body. She claimed Beltran had a motive to kill Norman because of an altercation on October 22, 1999, which was settled on October 25, 1999. She stated she spent P61,000.00 in connection with Norman's death; Norman worked as an assistant to the electrician at First Gas Company with a monthly income of P6,000.00; she was shocked and felt pity at his sudden and gruesome death.

The defense presented Beltran and Dr. Luisito Briones. Beltran admitted hacking Norman with a bolo but insisted he acted in self-defense. He narrated that on October 25, 1999, around 10:00 p.m., he and his mother were resting inside their house when he suddenly heard Norman shouting and insulting him outside and challenging him to a fight. When he came out, he noticed Norman was accompanied by several unidentified persons. He tried to pacify Norman, but Norman slapped the back of his head and pulled out an ice pick from his pocket. He retreated and looked for something to defend himself. He found a bolo near a tamarind tree in front of their house and took it. When Norman was about to enter Beltran's house, Beltran hacked him with the bolo. Norman tried to avoid the blow, but it hit his left arm. Beltran lost grip of the bolo, and it fell. While Beltran was reaching for it, Norman grabbed his head and tried to stab him with the ice pick. Beltran eluded the counter-attack but sustained a minor wound on the forehead. Upon gaining control of the scuffle, Beltran took the bolo and hacked Norman four consecutive times, most landing on the head. When he noticed Norman was no longer moving, he fled and went to his brother, Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, where he stayed that night and hid the bolo. The next day, he went to his sister's house in Lipa City. Later that day, he went to Granja Hospital in Lipa City for treatment of his forehead wound. Beltran also claimed that on October 22, 1999, he was mauled by Norman near a sari-sari store; that Norman was taller than him since he was only 5'4; that he was forced to kill Norman because the latter insulted him and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan City to surrender to police when he was apprehended by barangay officers in Lipa City. Beltran was 29 years old at the time of his arrest.

Dr. Luisito D. Briones testified that he treated Beltran on the morning of October 26, 1999 at Granja Hospital in Lipa City for a lacerated wound on the forehead. He claimed the wound was possibly caused by a knife and was already healing. He issued a medical certificate attesting to the same. The RTC found Ever's testimony candid, straightforward, and credible; it found him unbiased because he was neither a friend nor an enemy of Beltran and Norman but a mere neighbor, and found no ulterior motive for him to testify against Beltran. The RTC rejected Beltran's self-defense in view of the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings.

• Credibility of Ever Sales: Appellant argued that Ever's testimony was biased, unbelievable, and confusing; that the trial court should not have given it credence; and that the inconsistencies between Ever's open-court testimony and his sworn statements—such as the distance from the hacking (six meters versus twenty meters), the source of light (moon versus electric post and moon), and the presence of appellant's mother—rendered the testimony unreliable.
• Self-Defense: Appellant maintained that he acted in self-defense and that its elements were present; he admitted hacking Norman but claimed Norman shouted insults, challenged him to a fight, slapped the back of his head, and pulled out an ice pick, forcing him to defend himself.
• Treachery: Appellant contended that treachery was not established beyond reasonable doubt because there was no direct evidence that the attack was sudden, that Norman was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself, or that appellant employed treachery to insure the crime's execution.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Assuming self-defense was unavailable, appellant argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act and voluntary surrender under Article 13, paragraphs (4) and (7), of the Revised Penal Code.
• Damages: Appellant insisted that the trial court awarded excessive actual damages without proof or justification.

• Credibility of Ever Sales: The Office of the Solicitor General, for the People, argued that Ever's testimony that "there was light coming from the moon" did not deny his sworn statement that "there was a light from the lamp (electric) post and the moon."
• Self-Defense and Reasonable Means: The Office of the Solicitor General observed that if appellant merely wanted to protect himself from what he perceived as Norman's unlawful aggression, he could have just disabled Norman.

• Credibility of Prosecution Eyewitness and Self-Defense: Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to Ever Sales's testimony despite its alleged incredibility and bias, instead of accepting appellant's claim of self-defense.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court gravely erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery despite the prosecution's alleged failure to establish it beyond reasonable doubt.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether, assuming appellant was not entitled to self-defense, the trial court erred in not considering in his favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act and voluntary surrender.
• Damages: Whether the trial court gravely erred in awarding excessive actual damages.

• Credibility of Prosecution Eyewitness and Self-Defense: No. The trial court correctly gave full faith and credence to Ever's positive and categorical testimony, corroborated by Rolando; the alleged inconsistencies were minor and did not discredit him, and self-defense failed for lack of unlawful aggression.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was alleged in the Information and proved at trial; the sudden and unexpected attack rendered the unarmed victim defenseless, and the frontal nature of the first blow did not negate treachery because Norman was attacked again after being rendered helpless.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. Sufficient provocation was absent because Norman did not provoke appellant on the night of the killing, and voluntary surrender was absent because appellant fled and hid until apprehended; neither mitigating circumstance could offset treachery.
• Damages: Partly meritorious. The award of actual damages was reduced; civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00, temperate damages of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages, and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 were proper.

• Credibility of Prosecution Eyewitness and Self-Defense: The RTC's findings on credibility, affirmed by the CA, are accorded high respect and generally conclusive. Ever testified he saw appellant, from six meters, stalking Norman and hacking him without warning; moonlight and an electric post provided visibility. Rolando corroborated. The alleged inconsistencies between Ever's open-court testimony and his sworn statements—distance, light source, presence of appellant's mother—were minor, trivial, and not material to murder; ex-parte affidavits are incomplete and inferior to open-court testimony. The RTC found Ever candid, straightforward, credible, unbiased, and without ulterior motive. Self-defense requires (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of means, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation. Unlawful aggression is a sine qua non; it means actual or imminent peril, not merely threatening or intimidating attitude. Under the prosecution's version, Norman was walking and not provoking; appellant approached and hacked him, making appellant the unlawful aggressor. Even under appellant's version, mere invectives, a challenge to fight, a slap on the head, and brandishing an ice pick did not create actual or imminent danger; appellant had less harmful means, no ice pick was found, and no proof showed Norman stabbed him or tried to enter his house. Appellant's superficial forehead injury, already healing, did not show actual peril. Norman's seven fatal wounds, almost decapitation, showed a determined effort to kill, not self-defense. The means employed were not reasonably necessary; repeated hacking, including when Norman was on the ground, was not rational equivalence. Self-defense is inherently weak and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; appellant failed.
• Treachery: Treachery has two elements: (1) employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from retaliatory acts and deprive the victim of opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such means. It must be alleged in the Information and proved at trial. Here, treachery was alleged and proved. Appellant waited for dark, stalked Norman, approached the unsuspecting and unarmed victim, and suddenly hacked him; when Norman tried to shield himself and run, appellant hacked his back and repeatedly hacked him on the head and neck as he lay helpless. The use of nighttime and a deadly bolo, and repeated attacks on vital parts, were deliberately adopted to cripple Norman and prevent retaliation or escape. The fact that Norman faced appellant at the first blow did not negate treachery because he was attacked again after being rendered helpless. The prior quarrel did not negate treachery: it occurred on October 22, 1999, was settled before barangay officials on the morning of October 25, 1999, and the parties shook hands, so Norman had no reason to anticipate retaliation. No conversation or struggle occurred shortly before the hacking.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Sufficient provocation under Article 13(4) requires (1) provocation or threat sufficient and proportionate to the crime and adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2) it must originate from the offended party; and (3) it must be immediate to the commission of the crime. Norman did not provoke appellant on the night of the killing; no argument or physical struggle preceded the hacking. The prior altercation on October 22, 1999 was too remote. Even if present, this ordinary mitigating circumstance cannot offset the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. Voluntary surrender under Article 13(7) requires (1) the offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) the offender surrendered to a person in authority or his agent. Appellant was apprehended by barangay officials of Lipa City before being turned over to police by Tomas Dimacuha. Assuming surrender, it was not spontaneous: after the hacking, he went to his brother in Bauan, Batangas, then to his sister in Lipa City, hid the bolo, and took three days to surrender. Flight and hiding are inconsistent with spontaneity.
• Damages: When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be awarded: civil indemnity ex delicto, actual or compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages. Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is proper without proof other than the commission of murder resulting in death. Moral damages are proper because Normita testified to moral shock and wounded feelings from Norman's brutal and sudden death, but the amount is reduced from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00. Normita claimed P61,080.00 for burial and funeral expenses, but receipts showed only P18,420.82. Expenses for food, drinks, flowers, chairs, tables, and the 40-day prayer were unsupported by receipts and merely listed on yellow paper. Actual damages require receipts. Under People vs. Dela Cruz, when actual damages proven by receipts are less than P25,000.00, temperate damages of P25,000.00 are justified in lieu of actual damages, to avoid the anomaly that heirs proving lesser actual damages would be worse off than those proving none. Thus, P25,000.00 temperate damages instead of P18,420.82. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded absent documentary evidence. Exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are proper because treachery was firmly established.

• Self-defense — unlawful aggression as sine qua non — Under Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, self-defense requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an actual or imminent attack or threat placing the accused's life in actual peril; it is indispensable, and without it self-defense cannot be appreciated even if the other elements are present. The Court applied this doctrine because Norman was not attacking appellant; appellant was the unlawful aggressor.
• Reasonable necessity of the means employed — The means used to repel aggression must be reasonably necessary, considering the weapons, physical condition of the parties, and other circumstances showing rational equivalence between attack and defense. Repeated hacking, including after the victim fell, was not reasonably necessary; appellant could have disabled Norman or avoided the alleged danger by less harmful means.
• Burden of proof in self-defense — Where the accused admits killing but invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to him to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence; self-defense is inherently weak and easy to fabricate, and the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not the weakness of the prosecution. Appellant failed to discharge this burden.
• Treachery as a qualifying circumstance — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure the crime's execution without risk to himself from the victim's defense. It has two elements: (1) employment of means that insure the offender's safety from retaliation and deprive the victim of opportunity for self-defense; and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such means. It must be alleged in the Information and proved at trial. The Court found treachery because appellant stalked and suddenly attacked the unarmed Norman, used nighttime and a bolo, and repeatedly hacked him on vital parts.
• Treachery despite frontal attack — Treachery may be appreciated when the victim was initially attacked frontally but was attacked again after being rendered helpless and without means to defend himself or retaliate. The Court applied this because Norman was hacked again at the back and repeatedly while on the ground.
• Sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance — Article 13, paragraph (4), of the Revised Penal Code requires that the provocation or threat be sufficient and proportionate to the crime, originate from the offended party, and be immediate to the commission of the crime. The Court found no provocation on the night of the killing and held that the prior altercation was too remote; moreover, this ordinary mitigating circumstance cannot offset the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance — Article 13, paragraph (7), of the Revised Penal Code requires that the offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended, that the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous, and that it was made to a person in authority or his agent. Flight and hiding negate spontaneity. Appellant fled to his brother, then his sister, hid the bolo, and was apprehended after three days.
• Damages in murder — When death occurs due to a crime, civil indemnity ex delicto, actual or compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and temperate damages may be awarded. Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 requires no proof other than the death caused by the crime. Actual damages require receipts; when proven actual damages are less than P25,000.00, temperate damages of P25,000.00 may be awarded in lieu thereof. Exemplary damages may be awarded when treachery is established.
• Credibility of witnesses and appellate deference — Findings of the trial court on witness credibility, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are accorded high respect and generally conclusive. Inconsistencies between an ex-parte affidavit and open-court testimony are not fatal; affidavits are usually incomplete and inferior to testimony in open court. The Court applied this to uphold Ever's testimony.

• "Time and again, we held that unlawful aggression is a sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense." — States the indispensable requisite for self-defense; without unlawful aggression, the justifying circumstance cannot be appreciated even if the other elements are present.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — Defines treachery under Article 14, paragraph (16), of the Revised Penal Code and supplies the statutory basis for the qualifying circumstance.
• "It is settled that treachery is to be appreciated when the victim was initially attacked frontally, but was attacked again after being rendered helpless and had no means to defend himself or to retaliate." — Rejects the argument that a frontal attack necessarily negates treachery and is central to the Court's affirmance of the murder qualification.
• "However, in the case of People v. Dela Cruz, this Court declared that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, such as in the present case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00, is justified in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount." — Justifies the award of temperate damages instead of the lesser actual damages proven by receipts.

• People vs. Mateo, G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640 — Procedural precedent cited as basis for transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
• People vs. Dela Cruz, 459 Phil. 130, 138-139 (2003) — Relied on for the rule that when actual damages proven by receipts are less than P25,000.00, temperate damages of P25,000.00 may be awarded in lieu of actual damages.
• People vs. Riglos, 394 Phil. 54, 72 (2000) — Cited for the rule that treachery is appreciated when the victim was initially attacked frontally but attacked again after being rendered helpless.
• People vs. Agsalog, G.R. No. 141087, 31 March 2004, 426 SCRA 624, 639 — Cited for the rule that as long as the attack was sudden and unexpected and the unarmed victim was not in a position to repel it, treachery exists.
• People vs. Cario, 351 Phil. 644, 659 (1998) — Cited for unlawful aggression as a sine qua non of self-defense.
• People vs. Delmindo, G.R. No. 146810, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 546, 557 — Cited for the significance of the gravity, location, and number of wounds in showing intent to kill rather than self-defense.
• People vs. Carujao, G.R. No. 122767, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 207, 213 — Cited for the principle that self-defense is inherently weak and easy to fabricate.
• Rendon vs. People, G.R. No. 127089, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 142, 146 — Cited for the burden on the accused to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Mallari, 452 Phil. 210, 223 (2003) — Cited for the elements of voluntary surrender and the requirement of spontaneity.
• People vs. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 655, 675 — Cited for the rule that flight and hiding are inconsistent with voluntary surrender.
• Nueva España vs. People, G.R. No. 163351, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 555 — Cited for the damages awardable when death occurs due to a crime.
• People vs. Manambay, G.R. No. 130684, 5 February 2004, 422 SCRA 73, 90 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages when treachery is established.
• People vs. Lazaro, 319 Phil. 352, 361 (1995); People vs. Layno, 332 Phil. 612, 625 (1996); People vs. Foncardas, G.R. No. 144598, 6 February 2004, 422 SCRA 356, 370 — Cited for the rule that inconsistencies between an affidavit and open-court testimony do not necessarily discredit a witness.
• People vs. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, 18 February 2004, 423 SCRA 260, 265 — Cited for according high respect to trial court findings on witness credibility.
• People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 118912, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 40, 50 — Cited for the conclusiveness of factual findings affirmed by the appellate court.

• Article 11, paragraph (1), Revised Penal Code — Defines self-defense and its requisites: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Applied: all requisites failed, especially unlawful aggression.
• Article 14, paragraph (16), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as an aggravating circumstance and provides the two elements: employment of means, methods, or forms that tend directly and specially to insure execution without risk to the offender from the victim's defense, and deliberate or conscious choice of such means. Applied: treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Article 13, paragraph (4), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the crime. Applied: not appreciated because no immediate provocation from Norman.
• Article 13, paragraph (7), Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to a person in authority or his agents. Applied: not appreciated because appellant fled and was apprehended.
• Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Require that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information and proved during trial. Applied: treachery was alleged in the Information and established by evidence.

• Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson
• Ynares-Santiago, J.
• Austria-Martinez, J.
• Callejo, Sr., J.